Plato · Complete work
Stephanus 62
Stephanus 62 of 76. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
Open the complete readerOriginal Ancient Greek
62a τέμνει, λογιστέον ἀναμιμνῃσκομένοις τὴν τοῦ σχήματος αὐτοῦ γένεσιν, ὅτι μάλιστα ἐκείνη καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη φύσις διακρίνουσα ἡμῶν κατὰ σμικρά τε τὰ σώματα κερματίζουσα τοῦτο ὃ νῦν θερμὸν λέγομεν εἰκότως τὸ πάθημα καὶ τοὔνομα παρέσχεν. τὸ δʼ ἐναντίον τούτων κατάδηλον μέν, ὅμως δὲ μηδὲν ἐπιδεὲς ἔστω λόγου. τὰ γὰρ δὴ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγρῶν μεγαλομερέστερα εἰσιόντα, τὰ σμικρότερα ἐξωθοῦντα, εἰς τὰς ἐκείνων οὐ δυνάμενα ἕδρας ἐνδῦναι, συνωθοῦντα ἡμῶν 62b τὸ νοτερόν, ἐξ ἀνωμάλου κεκινημένου τε ἀκίνητον διʼ ὁμαλότητα καὶ τὴν σύνωσιν ἀπεργαζόμενα πήγνυσιν· τὸ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν συναγόμενον μάχεται κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ εἰς τοὐναντίον ἀπωθοῦν. τῇ δὴ μάχῃ καὶ τῷ σεισμῷ τούτῳ τρόμος καὶ ῥῖγος ἐτέθη, ψυχρόν τε τὸ πάθος ἅπαν τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δρῶν αὐτὸ ἔσχεν ὄνομα. σκληρὸν δέ, ὅσοις ἂν ἡμῶν ἡ σὰρξ ὑπείκῃ, μαλακὸν δέ, ὅσα ἂν τῇ σαρκί· πρὸς ἄλληλά τε οὕτως. ὑπείκει δὲ ὅσον ἐπὶ σμικροῦ βαίνει· τὸ δὲ ἐκ 62c τετραγώνων ὂν βάσεων, ἅτε βεβηκὸς σφόδρα, ἀντιτυπώτατον εἶδος, ὅτι τε ἂν εἰς πυκνότητα συνιὸν πλείστην ἀντίτονον ᾖ μάλιστα. βαρὺ δὲ καὶ κοῦφον μετὰ τῆς τοῦ κάτω φύσεως ἄνω τε λεγομένης ἐξεταζόμενον ἂν δηλωθείη σαφέστατα. φύσει γὰρ δή τινας τόπους δύο εἶναι διειληφότας διχῇ τὸ πᾶν ἐναντίους, τὸν μὲν κάτω, πρὸς ὃν φέρεται πάνθʼ ὅσα τινὰ ὄγκον σώματος ἔχει, τὸν δὲ ἄνω, πρὸς ὃν ἀκουσίως ἔρχεται πᾶν, οὐκ ὀρθὸν οὐδαμῇ νομίζειν· τοῦ γὰρ παντὸς 62d οὐρανοῦ σφαιροειδοῦς ὄντος, ὅσα μὲν ἀφεστῶτα ἴσον τοῦ μέσου γέγονεν ἔσχατα, ὁμοίως αὐτὰ χρὴ ἔσχατα πεφυκέναι, τὸ δὲ μέσον τὰ αὐτὰ μέτρα τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀφεστηκὸς ἐν τῷ καταντικρὺ νομίζειν δεῖ πάντων εἶναι. τοῦ δὴ κόσμου ταύτῃ πεφυκότος, τί τῶν εἰρημένων ἄνω τις ἢ κάτω τιθέμενος οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ δόξει τὸ μηδὲν προσῆκον ὄνομα λέγειν; ὁ μὲν γὰρ μέσος ἐν αὐτῷ τόπος οὔτε κάτω πεφυκὼς οὔτε ἄνω λέγεσθαι δίκαιος, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ ἐν μέσῳ· ὁ δὲ πέριξ οὔτε δὴ μέσος οὔτʼ ἔχων διάφορον αὑτοῦ μέρος ἕτερον θατέρου μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἤ τι τῶν καταντικρύ. τοῦ δὲ ὁμοίως πάντῃ πεφυκότος ποῖά τις ἐπιφέρων ὀνόματα αὐτῷ ἐναντία καὶ πῇ καλῶς ἂν ἡγοῖτο λέγειν;
ΤΙ. εἰ γάρ τι καὶ στερεὸν εἴη κατὰ μέσον τοῦ
Musean translation
Mouseia's complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete Greek text (John Burnet's Oxford edition, Perseus Digital Library) across all 76 Stephanus pages and 364 sections, including the Atlantis prologue (20d–26e), for fidelity, philosophical precision, dialogue, and structure.
62a meets, must be reckoned out by calling to mind the coming-to-be of its shape: that it is this nature above all, and no other, which, dividing us and cutting our bodies into small pieces, has rightly given both the affection and the name to what we now call hot. The opposite of these things is plain enough, yet let it lack nothing of an account. For the parts of the fluids about the body that enter with larger parts, pushing out the smaller and unable to slip into their seats, crowd together the moisture in us 62b — which, from uneven and moving, becomes still through uniformity — and working a packing together, they congeal it; and what is being gathered against nature fights with what is natural in itself, thrusting itself toward the opposite. From this battle and this quaking were named trembling and shivering, and the whole affection, and the agent of it, took the name cold. And hard is whatever our flesh yields to, and soft whatever yields to our flesh; and so also with one another. A thing yields only as far as what steps upon it is small; while the one built 62c of square bases, since it is planted very deep, is the most resisting of forms, and whatever comes together into the greatest density is strongest in opposition. But heavy and light, examined together with the nature of what is called down and of what is called up, would be shown most clearly. For it is nowhere right to suppose that there are by nature two places, taking in the whole divided in two and opposite to one another — one, down, toward which everything that has any bulk of body is carried, the other, up, toward which everything comes against its will; for since the whole heaven 62d is spherical, the things that have come to be at equal distances from the center are all extremities, and they must all alike have the nature of extremities, while the center, standing the same measure from the extremities, must be thought to be opposite to all of them. Since the cosmos has this nature, would not anyone who sets up or down for the things we have mentioned seem, with justice, to be using a name that fits nothing? For the middle region of it, having by nature neither down nor up, has a right to be called neither — only the middle; and the region about it is neither the middle, nor does it hold one part of itself more directly opposite the center than another — than any of the parts across from it. And for what is by nature alike in every direction, what contrary names could anyone apply, and where, and think he spoke well?
Timaeus: For if some solid thing were at the center of the
Plain English translation
Mouseia's complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 76 Stephanus pages of the Greek.
62a we must reckon, as we remember how its shape came to be, that it is above all that nature and no other which, by dividing our bodies and cutting them into small pieces, reasonably gave both the feeling and the name to what we now call 'hot'. The opposite of this is obvious, but still let nothing go without an account. For when the larger parts of the fluids around our body enter, pushing out the smaller ones and not being able to get into their seats, they pack together 62b our moisture, which has been moved out of its uneven state, and make it motionless through uniformity and compression, and so they freeze it. And what is gathered together against its nature fights, pushing itself by its own nature in the opposite direction. This struggle and this shaking were given the names 'trembling' and 'shivering'; and the whole experience, and the thing that causes it, got the name 'cold'. And 'hard' is the name for whatever our flesh gives way to, and 'soft' for whatever gives way to our flesh; and the same between things themselves. What gives way is whatever rests on a small base. And what is made of 62c square bases, since it stands very firmly, is the most resistant kind; whatever comes together into the greatest density is the most resistant of all. Heavy and light, along with what is called the nature of 'down' and 'up', would be made clearest by an examination. For it is not right to suppose that there are two places by nature, dividing the whole in two and opposite to each other: a 'down' place, toward which everything that has any bulk of body travels, and an 'up' place, toward which everything goes unwillingly. For since the whole 62d heaven is spherical, the things that stand at an equal distance from the middle are the extremes, and they must all be extremes in the same way; and the middle, standing the same distance from the extremes, must be thought to be directly opposite all of them. Since the universe is by nature like this, would anyone who calls any of the things we have mentioned 'up' or 'down' not seem to be using a name that does not fit at all? For the middle place in it is by nature neither down nor up, and it is right to call it neither, but just 'in the middle'. And the region around it is neither middle, nor does it have one part of itself different from another, any more toward the middle than toward what is directly opposite. And for something that is by nature the same all over, what kind of opposite names could anyone put on it, and how could he think he was speaking correctly?
Timaeus: For even if there were some solid body at the middle of the
R. G. Bury (1929) translation
Public-domain Loeb translation from the Greek (Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. 9, Harvard University Press, 1929), in the Perseus Digital Library's digital text, with the same Stephanus pages and sections as the Greek.
62a the origin of its form, how that it above all others is the one substance which so divides our bodies and minces them up as to produce naturally both that affection which we call heat and its very name.
The opposite affection is evident, but none the less it must not lack description. When liquids with larger particles, which surround the body, enter into it they drive out the smaller particles; but as they cannot pass into their room they compress the moisture within us, so that in place of non-uniformity and motion they produce immobility and density, 62b as a result of the uniformity and compression. But that which is being contracted contrary to nature fights, and, in accordance with its nature, thrusts itself away in the contrary direction. And to this fighting and shaking we give the names of trembling and shivering; while this affection as a whole, as well as the cause thereof, is termed cold.
By the term hard we indicate all the things to which our flesh gives way; and by the term soft all those which give way to our flesh; and these terms are similarly used relatively to each other. Now a substance gives way when it has its base small; but when it is constructed 62c of quadrangular bases, being very firmly based, it is a most inelastic form; and so too is everything which is of very dense composition and most rigid.
The nature of heavy and light would be shown most clearly if, along with them, we examined also the nature of above and below, as they are called. That there really exist two distinct and totally opposite regions, each of which occupies one-half of the Universe—the one termed below, towards which move all things possessing any bodily mass, and the other above, towards which everything goes against its will,— 62d this is a wholly erroneous supposition For inasmuch as the whole Heaven is spherical, all its outermost parts, being equally distant from the center, must really be outermost in a similar degree; and one must conceive of the center, which is distant from all the outermost parts by the same measures, as being opposite to them all. Seeing, then, that the Cosmos is actually of this nature, which of the bodies mentioned can one set above or below without incurring justly the charge of applying a wholly unsuitable name? For its central region cannot rightly be termed either above or below, but just central; while its circumference neither is central nor has it any one part more divergent than another from the center or any of its opposite parts. But to that which is in all ways uniform, what opposite names can we suppose are rightly applicable, or in what sense?
Timaeus: For suppose there were a solid body evenly-balanced at the center of the universe,