Stephanus 51

51a Timaeus: The same, then, holds also for that which is to receive well, again and again across its whole self, the likenesses of all the things that are forever: it is right that it stand by nature outside all the forms. That is why we should not call the mother and receptacle of the thing that has come to be, the visible and in every way sensible, earth or air or fire or water, nor any of the things that come from these, nor those from which these came to be; but let us say it is a kind invisible and formless, all-receiving, and partaking 51b in some most perplexing way of the intelligible, the hardest of all things to capture—and we shall not be speaking falsely. And insofar as it is possible, from what has been said, to reach its nature, this is the most correct way to speak of it: that the part of it ablaze at any moment appears as fire, the part moistened as water, and as earth and air insofar as it receives likenesses of these. But we must examine these matters by distinguishing the question more sharply, in an argument of the following kind: is there such a thing as fire itself, existing on its own, and all the things we are forever speaking of in this way, 51c each of them being in itself—or are the things we see, and all that we perceive through the body, the only things that possess truth of this kind, with nothing else anywhere in any way beside them, so that what we say each time—that there is an intelligible form of each—was said in vain, and that there was nothing there after all but an account? It is not right, then, to leave the question now before us unexamined and unjudged and to insist, as if by force, that we already hold the answer; nor should another stretch of argument 51d be tacked on midway, as a detour in a long argument; but if some great defining principle could be set out briefly and made plain, that would be the most timely thing of all. This, then, is how I myself cast my vote. If intelligence and true belief are two kinds, then these things exist in themselves absolutely—forms imperceptible to us, grasped by intelligence alone; but if, as it seems to some, true belief differs in nothing from intelligence, then everything we perceive through the body must be set down as most certain. 51e Of those two, then, we must say why they came to be apart and are unlike. For the one arises in us through teaching, the other through persuasion; the one is always attended by a true account, the other is without account; the one cannot be moved by persuasion, the other can be talked out of; and while we must say that every man partakes of the former, of intelligence the gods partake, and of the race of men but a little.

Timaeus: these things being so,

51a Timaeus: Then the same must hold for the thing that is going to receive, well and all over itself, repeated copies of everything that always is: it must by nature be free of all forms. So we should not call the mother and receptacle of everything that has come to be, everything visible and in every way perceivable, earth or air or fire or water, or anything made out of these, or anything out of which these are made. Rather, we will not be wrong if we say that it is an invisible and shapeless kind of thing that receives everything, 51b and that it partakes of what is intelligible in the hardest-to-pin-down way, and is itself the hardest thing to catch. As far as we can reach its nature from what has been said, one would be most right to put it like this: at any given time the part of it that has been set on fire appears as fire, the part made wet as water, and earth and air insofar as it receives copies of these. But we should look into these matters more by reasoning, and draw the line like this: is there a fire itself, all on its own, and are all the things we always talk about 51c real in that way, each one by itself? Or are these things we see, and all the rest that we perceive through the body, the only ones with that kind of truth, with no others besides them anywhere at all, so that every time we say there is some intelligible form of each thing we say it in vain, and it turns out to be nothing but words? So it is not right to leave the question untested and undecided and still insist strongly that this is how things are; nor should we pile onto a long account, as a side matter, 51d another long stretch of argument. But if some great limit could be marked out in a few words, that would be the most timely thing of all. So this is how I cast my own vote: if intelligence and true opinion are two kinds, then these things exist all on their own, forms we cannot perceive, grasped only by thought. But if, as it seems to some, true opinion does not differ from intelligence at all, then everything we perceive through the body must be taken as most firmly real. 51e Those two must be called two, because they have come to be apart and are not alike. One of them comes to us through teaching, the other through persuasion. The one always comes with a true account, the other has no account. The one cannot be moved by persuasion, the other can be persuaded to change. And we must say that every man shares in true opinion, while gods share in intelligence, and of mankind only a small part.

Timaeus: Since this is how things stand,

51a Timaeus: So likewise it is right that the substance which is to be fitted to receive frequently over its whole extent the copies of all things intelligible and eternal should itself, of its own nature, be void of all the forms. Wherefore, let us not speak of her that is the Mother and Receptacle of this generated world, which is perceptible by sight and all the senses, by the name of earth or air or fire or water, or any aggregates or constituents thereof: rather, if we describe her as a Kind invisible and unshaped, all-receptive, and in some most perplexing and most baffling way partaking of the intelligible, 51b we shall describe her truly.

In so far as it is possible to arrive at the nature of this kind from the foregoing account, one may state it most correctly in this way. That part of it which is made fiery appears each time as fire, that which has been liquefied as water; and it appears as earth and air in so far as it receives copies of these. But let us investigate the matter by more exact reasoning, and consider this question. Does there exist any self-subsisting fire 51c or any of those other objects which we likewise term self-subsisting realities? Or is it only these things which we see, or otherwise perceive by means of bodily senses, that exist, possessed of sensible reality; beside which no other things exist anywhere or anyhow, and it is merely an idle assertion of ours that there always exists an intelligible Form of every object, whereas it is really nothing more than a verbal phrase? Now, on the one hand, it would be improper to dismiss the question before us without a trial and a verdict, and simply to asseverate that the fact is so; while, on the other hand, we ought not to burden a lengthy discourse with another subsidiary argument. 51d If, however, it were possible to disclose briefly some main determining principle, that would best serve our purpose.

This, then, is the view for which I, for my part, cast my vote. If Reason and True Opinion are two distinct Kinds, most certainly these self-subsisting Forms do exist, imperceptible by our senses, and objects of Reason only; whereas if, as appears to some, True Opinion differs in naught from Reason, then, on the contrary, all the things which we perceive by our bodily senses must be judged to be most stable. 51e Now these two Kinds must be declared to be two, because they have come into existence separately and are unlike in condition. For the one of them arises in us by teaching, the other by persuasion; and the one is always in company with true reasoning, whereas the other is irrational; and the one is immovable by persuasion, whereas the other is alterable by persuasion; and of the one we must assert that every man partakes, but of Reason only the gods and but a small class of men.

This being so, we must agree that One Kind