Mouseiaan open library of the ancient world

Plato · Complete work

Stephanus 49

Stephanus 49 of 76. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.

Open the complete reader

Original Ancient Greek

49a παραδείγματος δεύτερον, γένεσιν ἔχον καὶ ὁρατόν. τρίτον δὲ τότε μὲν οὐ διειλόμεθα, νομίσαντες τὰ δύο ἕξειν ἱκανῶς· νῦν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔοικεν εἰσαναγκάζειν χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀμυδρὸν εἶδος ἐπιχειρεῖν λόγοις ἐμφανίσαι. τίνʼ οὖν ἔχον δύναμιν καὶ φύσιν αὐτὸ ὑποληπτέον; τοιάνδε μάλιστα· πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν αὐτὴν οἷον τιθήνην. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν τἀληθές, δεῖ δὲ ἐναργέστερον εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, χαλεπὸν 49b δὲ ἄλλως τε καὶ διότι προαπορηθῆναι περὶ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν μετὰ πυρὸς ἀναγκαῖον τούτου χάριν· τούτων γὰρ εἰπεῖν ἕκαστον ὁποῖον ὄντως ὕδωρ χρὴ λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ πῦρ, καὶ ὁποῖον ὁτιοῦν μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ ἅπαντα καθʼ ἕκαστόν τε, οὕτως ὥστε τινὶ πιστῷ καὶ βεβαίῳ χρήσασθαι λόγῳ, χαλεπόν. πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ καὶ πῇ καὶ τί περὶ αὐτῶν εἰκότως διαπορηθέντες ἂν λέγοιμεν; πρῶτον μέν, ὃ δὴ νῦν ὕδωρ ὠνομάκαμεν, πηγνύμενον ὡς δοκοῦμεν λίθους καὶ γῆν γιγνόμενον 49c ὁρῶμεν, τηκόμενον δὲ καὶ διακρινόμενον αὖ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πνεῦμα καὶ ἀέρα, συγκαυθέντα δὲ ἀέρα πῦρ, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συγκριθὲν καὶ κατασβεσθὲν εἰς ἰδέαν τε ἀπιὸν αὖθις ἀέρος πῦρ, καὶ πάλιν ἀέρα συνιόντα καὶ πυκνούμενον νέφος καὶ ὁμίχλην, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἔτι μᾶλλον συμπιλουμένων ῥέον ὕδωρ, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ γῆν καὶ λίθους αὖθις, κύκλον τε οὕτω διαδιδόντα εἰς ἄλληλα, ὡς φαίνεται, τὴν γένεσιν. οὕτω δὴ τούτων οὐδέποτε 49d τῶν αὐτῶν ἑκάστων φανταζομένων, ποῖον αὐτῶν ὡς ὂν ὁτιοῦν τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο παγίως διισχυριζόμενος οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖταί τις ἑαυτόν; οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ ἀσφαλέστατα μακρῷ περὶ τούτων τιθεμένους ὧδε λέγειν· ἀεὶ ὃ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ γιγνόμενον, ὡς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἑκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ, μηδὲ ὕδωρ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀεί, μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτὲ μηδὲν ὥς τινα ἔχον βεβαιότητα, ὅσα 49e δεικνύντες τῷ ῥήματι τῷ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο προσχρώμενοι δηλοῦν ἡγούμεθά τι· φεύγει γὰρ οὐχ ὑπομένον τὴν τοῦ τόδε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν τῷδε καὶ πᾶσαν ὅση μόνιμα ὡς ὄντα αὐτὰ ἐνδείκνυται φάσις. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἕκαστα μὴ λέγειν, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀεὶ περιφερόμενον ὅμοιον ἑκάστου πέρι καὶ συμπάντων οὕτω καλεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ πῦρ τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοιοῦτον, καὶ ἅπαν ὅσονπερ ἂν ἔχῃ γένεσιν·

ΤΙ. ἐν ᾧ δὲ ἐγγιγνόμενα ἀεὶ ἕκαστα αὐτῶν φαντάζεται καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπόλλυται,

Musean translation

Mouseia's complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete Greek text (John Burnet's Oxford edition, Perseus Digital Library) across all 76 Stephanus pages and 364 sections, including the Atlantis prologue (20d–26e), for fidelity, philosophical precision, dialogue, and structure.

49a of the model, a second, subject to becoming and visible. A third kind we did not then distinguish, thinking the two would be enough; but now the account, it seems, compels us to attempt to set forth with words a kind that is hard and dim. What, then, having what power and what nature, must we take it to be? Chiefly this: that it is the receptacle of all becoming, as it were its nurse. That much is true as said; but it must be said more clearly—a hard thing 49b, and hard too for this reason, that questions about fire and the things that follow fire must first be raised for its sake. For it is hard to say of each of these what it really is—that this is water rather than fire, or this one rather than any other of them, or all together rather than each in turn—in such a way as to rest upon some trusty and firm account. How, then, and where, and what may we say about them, having raised the questions in the right way? First, then: what we now call water, when it condenses—as we suppose—we see becoming 49c stone and earth; and when it melts and disperses, this same becomes wind and air; and air, when it is heated along, becomes fire; and fire, on the other hand, when it is drawn together and quenched, passing back again into the form of air, becomes air; and air, coming together and thickening, becomes cloud and mist; and from these, as they are packed together yet more, flowing water; and from water, earth and stones again—and so, as it appears, becoming is handed on in a circle from one to the other. In this way, then, since 49d none of them ever presents itself as the same, who would not be ashamed of himself, insisting with fixed assurance that any one of them is this, and this something or other, and nothing else? There is none such; but by far the safest course, in laying these down, is to speak thus: whatever we always behold becoming other at other times—as fire—we should address, not this, but in each case the such, as fire; nor this as water, but the such, always; nor any other thing whatever as having some fixedness, of all 49e that we point to and make known by using the words "this" and "that," supposing we are saying something; for it runs away, not enduring the words "this" and "that," nor "here," nor any phrase that points them out as fixed in being. But of these one should not speak, one by one; rather one should call the such—the ever-turning, like to each thing and to all things—by such names: and so fire, the such that runs through all; and the all, whatever it be that has becoming.

Timaeus: And that in which each of them, ever coming to be, makes its appearance, and from which it again passes away,

Plain English translation

Mouseia's complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from all 76 Stephanus pages of the Greek.

49a of the model was the second, having birth and being visible. The third kind we did not divide off then, since we thought the two were enough. But now the account seems to force us to try to show, in words, a form that is hard and dim. What power and nature must we take it to have? This above all: that it is the receiver of all birth, like a nurse. What is true has been said; but it must be said more clearly, and that is hard, 49b partly because we must first raise difficulties about fire and the things that follow fire. For it is hard to say of each of these what it truly is—what must be called water rather than fire, and what any one of them is rather than all of them, each one—in such a way as to use some sure and fixed account. So how, and in what way, and what should we say about them, if we raise the questions as we should? First, what we now call water: when it hardens, we 49c see it become, as we think, stones and earth; and when it melts and breaks apart, this same thing becomes breath and air; and when air burns, it becomes fire; and fire, when it comes back together and is put out, goes again into the form of air; and air, coming together and growing thick, becomes cloud and mist; and from these, packed still more, comes flowing water; and from water come earth and stones again. And so, as it seems, they hand on the cycle of birth to one another in a ring. 49d So since none of these things ever shows itself as the same, would anyone not be ashamed of himself if he insisted firmly that any one of them is this certain thing and not something else? It cannot be done. By far the safest way to speak about them is this: what we always see becoming now this, now that—fire, for instance—we should not call "this fire" but always "the such," each time; not "this water" but always "the such"; and never call anything else by a name as if it had any fixedness, in all the cases where we think we are pointing at something 49e when we use the words "this" and "that" to show it. For it runs away and will not stand for "this" or "that" or "here," or any way of speaking that shows these things as fixed and standing things. So we should not call each thing "this," but should call it "the such," always turning about, the same way for each thing and for all alike; and so fire is "the such" through all time, and everything whatever that has birth.

Timaeus: But as for that into which each of these always comes when it shows itself, and from which it again passes away—

R. G. Bury (1929) translation

Public-domain Loeb translation from the Greek (Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. 9, Harvard University Press, 1929), in the Perseus Digital Library's digital text, with the same Stephanus pages and sections as the Greek.

49a and the second as the model’s Copy, subject to becoming and visible. A third kind we did not at that time distinguish, considering that those two were sufficient; but now the argument seems to compel us to try to reveal by words a Form that is baffling and obscure. What essential property, then, are we to conceive it to possess? This in particular,—that it should be the receptacle, and as it were the nurse, of all Becoming. Yet true though this statement is, we must needs describe it more plainly. 49b That, however, is a difficult task, especially because it is necessary, for its sake, to discuss first the problem of fire and its fellow elements. For in regard to these it is hard to say which particular element we ought really to term water rather than fire, and which we ought to term any one element rather than each and all of them, while still employing a terminology that is reliable and stable. How, then, shall we handle this problem, and what likely solution can we offer? First of all, we see that which we now call water becoming by condensation, 49c as we believe, stones and earth; and again, this same substance, by dissolving and dilating, becoming breath and air; and air through combustion becoming fire; and conversely, fire when contracted and quenched returning back to the form of air and air once more uniting and condensing into cloud and mist; and issuing from these, when still further compressed, flowing water; and from water earth and stones again: thus we see the elements passing on to one another, as it would seem, 49d in an unbroken circle the gift of birth. Accordingly, since no one of these ever remains identical in appearance, which of them shall a man definitely affirm to be any one particular element and no other without incurring ridicule? None such exists. On the contrary, by far the safest plan in treating of these elements is to proceed thus: Whatsoever object we perceive to be constantly changing from one state to another, like fire, that object, be it fire, we must never describe as this but as suchlike, nor should we ever call water this but suchlike nor should we describe any other element, as though it possessed stability, 49e of all those which we indicate by using the terms this and that and suppose ourselves to refer to a definite object. For such an object shuns and eludes the names this and that and every name which indicates that they are stable. Thus we must not call the several elements these, but in regard to each of them and all together we must apply the term suchlike to represent what is always circling round: thus we shall call that which is constantly suchlike by the name of fire, and so with everything else that is generated.

Timaeus: But that wherein they are always, in appearance,

Download the complete work as JSON · Retex Markdown