Chapter III, 3
Original German
Die dritte Art der bewegenden Ursachen ist die, welche den Charakter der Tiere bezeichnet: es ist die Motivation, d.h. die durch das Erkennen hindurchgehende Kausalität. Sie tritt in der Stufenfolge der Naturwesen auf dem Punkt ein, wo das kompliziertere und daher mannigfaltige Bedürfnisse habende Wesen, diese nicht mehr bloß auf Anlaß des Reizes befriedigen konnte, als welcher abgewartet werden muß; sondern es im stande sein mußte, die Mittel der Befriedigung zu wählen, zu ergreifen, ja, aufzusuchen. Deshalb tritt bei Wesen dieser Art an die Stelle der bloßen Empfänglichkeit für Reize und der Bewegung auf solche, die Empfänglichkeit für Motive, d.h. ein Vorstellungsvermögen, ein Intellekt, in unzähligen Abstufungen der Vollkommenheit, materiell sich darstellend als Nervensystem und Gehirn, und eben damit das Bewußtsein. Daß dem tierischen Leben ein Pflanzenleben zur Basis dient, welches als solches eben nur auf Reize vor sich geht, ist bekannt. Aber alle die Bewegungen, welche das Tier als Tier vollzieht, und welche eben deshalb von dem abhängen, was die Physiologie animalische Funktionen nennt, geschehen infolge eines erkannten Objekts, also auf Motive. Demnach ist ein Tier jeder Körper, dessen eigentümliche, seiner Natur angemessene, äußere Bewegungen und Veränderungen allemal auf Motive, d. h. auf gewisse, seinem hiebei schon vorausgesetzten Bewußtsein gegenwärtige Vorstellungen erfolgen. So unendliche Abstufungen in der Reihe der Tiere die Fähigkeit zu Vorstellungen, und eben damit das Bewußtsein, auch haben mag; so ist doch in jedem so viel davon vorhanden, daß das Motiv sich ihm darstellt und seine Bewegung veranlaßt: wobei dem nunmehr vorhandenen Selbstbewußtsein die innere bewegende Kraft, deren einzelne Aeußerung durch das Motiv hervorgerufen wird, als dasjenige sich kundgibt, was wir mit dem Worte Wille bezeichnen.
Ob nun aber ein gegebener Körper sich auf Reize, oder auf Motive bewege, kann, auch für die Beobachtung von außen, welche hier unser Standpunkt ist, nie zweifelhaft bleiben: so augenscheinlich verschieden ist die Wirkungsart eines Reizes von der eines Motivs. Denn der Reiz wirkt stets durch unmittelbare Berührung, oder sogar Intussusception, und wo auch diese nicht sichtbar ist, wie wo der Reiz die Luft, das Licht, die Wärme ist; so verrät sie sich doch dadurch, daß die Wirkung ein unverkennbares Verhältnis zur Dauer und Intensität des Reizes hat, wenn gleich dieses Verhältnis nicht bei allen Graden des Reizes dasselbe bleibt. Wo hingegen ein Motiv die Bewegung verursacht, fallen alle solche Unterschiede ganz weg. Denn hier ist das eigentliche und nächste Medium der Einwirkung nicht die Atmosphäre, sondern ganz allein die Erkenntnis. Das als Motiv wirkende Objekt braucht durchaus nichts weiter, als wahrgenommen, erkannt zu sein; wobei es ganz einerlei ist, wie lange, ob nahe, oder ferne, und wie deutlich es in die Apperception gekommen. Alle diese Unterschiede verändern hier den Grad der Wirkung ganz und gar nicht: sobald es nur wahrgenommen worden, wirkt es auf ganz gleiche Weise; vorausgesetzt, daß es überhaupt ein Bestimmungsgrund des hier zu erregenden Willens sei. Denn auch die physikalischen und chemischen Ursachen, desgleichen die Reize, wirken ebenfalls nur, sofern der zu affizierende Körper für sie empfänglich ist. Ich sagte eben „des hier zu erregenden Willens“: denn, wie schon erwähnt, als das, was das Wort Wille bezeichnet, gibt sich hier dem Wesen selbst, innerlich und unmittelbar, dasjenige kund, was eigentlich dem Motiv die Kraft zu wirken erteilt, die geheime Springfeder der durch dasselbe hervorgerufenen Bewegung. Bei ausschließlich auf Reize sich bewegenden Körpern (Pflanzen) nennen wir jene beharrende, innere Bedingung Lebenskraft; — bei den bloß auf Ursachen im engsten Sinne sich bewegenden Körpern nennen wir sie Naturkraft, oder Qualität: immer wird sie von den Erklärungen als das Unerklärliche vorausgesetzt; weil hier im Innern der Wesen kein Selbstbewußtsein ist, dem sie unmittelbar zugänglich wäre. Ob nun aber diese in solchen erkenntnislosen, sogar leblosen Wesen liegende innere Bedingung ihrer Reaktion auf äußere Ursachen, wenn man, von der Erscheinung überhaupt abgehend, nach demjenigen forschen wollte, was Kant das Ding an sich nennt, etwan ihrem Wesen nach identisch wäre mit dem, was wir in uns den Willen nennen, wie ein Philosoph neuerer Zeit uns wirklich hat andemonstrieren wollen, — dies lasse ich dahingestellt, ohne jedoch dem gerade widersprechen zu wollen ∗).
∗) Es versteht sich, daß ich hier mich selbst meine und nur des erforderten Inkognitos wegen nicht in der ersten Person reden durfte.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the German, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
The third kind of moving cause is the one that defines the character of animals: motivation, that is, causality mediated by knowledge. It appears in the ascending scale of natural beings at the point where a more complex being, with correspondingly varied needs, could no longer satisfy them merely in response to a stimulus, which has to be awaited, but had to be capable of choosing, seizing, and indeed seeking out the means of satisfaction. In beings of this kind, therefore, mere receptivity to stimuli and movement in response to them are replaced by receptivity to motives: that is, a faculty of representation, an intellect, in countless degrees of perfection, materially manifested as a nervous system and brain, and with it consciousness. It is well known that animal life rests on a foundation of plant life, which, as such, proceeds only in response to stimuli. But all the movements an animal performs as an animal, which for that very reason depend on what physiology calls animal functions, occur as a result of an object known, and thus in response to motives. An animal, accordingly, is any body whose distinctive outward movements and changes, in keeping with its nature, always occur in response to motives: that is, to certain representations present to its consciousness, which is already presupposed here. However infinitely the capacity for representations, and with it consciousness, may vary in degree throughout the animal series, every animal possesses enough of it for a motive to present itself and occasion its movement. To the self-consciousness now present, the inner moving force, whose particular expression is called forth by the motive, reveals itself as what we designate by the word will.
Whether a given body moves in response to stimuli or to motives can never remain doubtful even to external observation, which is our standpoint here: so manifestly different is a stimulus’s mode of action from a motive’s. For the stimulus always acts through direct contact, or even through being taken into the body. And even where this contact is not visible, as when the stimulus is air, light, or warmth, it still reveals itself in the unmistakable relation of the effect to the duration and intensity of the stimulus, although this relation does not remain the same at every degree of the stimulus. Where a motive causes the movement, by contrast, all such differences disappear entirely. For here the actual and immediate medium of influence is not the atmosphere but knowledge alone. The object acting as a motive needs only to be perceived, to be known; it makes no difference how long, whether from near or far, or how distinctly it has entered conscious apprehension. None of these differences alters the degree of the effect in the least: as soon as the object has merely been perceived, it acts in exactly the same way, provided that it is at all a determining ground of the will to be aroused here. For physical and chemical causes, and likewise stimuli, also act only insofar as the body to be affected is receptive to them. I have just said “the will to be aroused here”: for, as already mentioned, what actually gives the motive its power to act—the hidden spring of the movement it calls forth—reveals itself inwardly and immediately to the being itself as what the word will designates. In bodies that move exclusively in response to stimuli (plants), we call this abiding inner condition the vital force; in bodies that move only in response to causes in the narrowest sense, we call it a force of nature, or a quality. Explanations always presuppose it as something inexplicable, because here, within these beings, there is no self-consciousness to which it would be directly accessible. But if we were to leave phenomena altogether and inquire into what Kant calls the thing in itself, might this inner condition of their reaction to external causes, present in beings without knowledge and even in lifeless beings, be essentially identical with what we call the will within ourselves—as a philosopher of recent times has in fact undertaken to demonstrate to us? I leave this undecided, without, however, wishing to contradict it outright.∗)
∗) It goes without saying that I mean myself here, and that only the required anonymity prevented me from speaking in the first person.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English translation, made independently and directly from the German, not from the Musean edition or a published English translation, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
The third kind of moving cause marks out animals. It is motivation: causality that works through knowledge. It appears at the point in the scale of natural beings where a more complex being, with many different needs, could no longer meet them simply in response to a stimulus. A stimulus has to be waited for. Instead, the being had to be able to choose, take hold of, and even seek out the means of meeting its needs. In beings of this kind, mere sensitivity to stimuli and movement in response to them are therefore replaced by sensitivity to motives. This means a capacity for representations, an intellect, in countless degrees of perfection. In material terms it appears as a nervous system and brain, and with it comes consciousness. It is well known that animal life rests on a basis of plant life, which as such proceeds only in response to stimuli. But all movements an animal makes as an animal depend on what physiology calls animal functions. They occur as a result of an object that is known, and thus in response to motives. An animal is therefore any body whose characteristic external movements and changes, suited to its nature, always occur in response to motives. These are particular representations present to its consciousness, whose existence we already assume here. Across the range of animals, the capacity for representations, and with it consciousness, may have infinitely many degrees. Still, every animal has enough of it for the motive to present itself and bring about movement. Self-consciousness is now present too. To it, the inner moving force, whose particular expression is called forth by the motive, reveals itself as what we call will.
Even observation from outside, which is our standpoint here, can never leave it doubtful whether a given body moves in response to stimuli or to motives. A stimulus and a motive work in such visibly different ways. A stimulus always acts through direct contact or even through being taken into the body. Even when this contact is not visible, as when the stimulus is air, light, or heat, it still reveals itself. The effect has an unmistakable relation to the stimulus's duration and intensity, though this relation does not stay the same at every degree of stimulus. But when a motive causes movement, all these differences disappear. Here the actual, immediate medium of influence is not the atmosphere. It is knowledge alone. The object acting as a motive needs only to be perceived, to be known. It makes no difference how long it has been perceived, whether from nearby or far away, or how clearly it has entered awareness. None of these differences changes the degree of the effect at all. As soon as the object has been perceived, it acts in exactly the same way—provided that it is a determining ground for the will to be stirred into action here. For physical and chemical causes, and likewise stimuli, also act only insofar as the body they are to affect is receptive to them. I just said, "the will to be stirred into action here." As already mentioned, what we call will is what here makes itself known to the being itself, inwardly and directly. It is what actually gives the motive its power to act, the hidden spring driving the movement the motive brings about. In bodies that move exclusively in response to stimuli—plants—we call this enduring inner condition vital force. In bodies that move only in response to causes in the narrowest sense, we call it a force of nature or a quality. Explanations always assume it as something that cannot be explained. For inside these beings there is no self-consciousness to which it would be directly accessible. These beings lack knowledge and may even lack life. Yet they have this inner condition for their reaction to external causes. Suppose we were to leave phenomena altogether and inquire into what Kant calls the thing in itself. Might that inner condition then be essentially identical with what we call will in ourselves, as a recent philosopher has actually tried to prove to us? I leave that question open, though without wishing simply to deny it ∗).
∗) Of course I mean myself here. Only the required anonymity prevented me from speaking in the first person.
About this section
Chapter III, 3 is part of On the Freedom of the Will by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 9 of 28 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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