Chapter III, 1
Original German
III. Der Wille vor dem Bewußtsein anderer Dinge.
Wenn wir uns nun an das Erkenntnisvermögen mit unserm Probleme wenden; so wissen wir zum voraus, daß, da dieses Vermögen wesentlich nach außen gerichtet ist, der Wille für dasselbe nicht ein Gegenstand unmittelbarer Wahrnehmung sein kann, wie er dies für das, dennoch in unserer Sache inkompetent befundene, Selbstbewußtsein war; sondern, daß hier nur die mit einem Willen begabten Wesen betrachtet werden können, welche vor dem Erkenntnisvermögen als objektive und äußere Erscheinungen, d. i. als Gegenstände der Erfahrung, dastehen und nunmehr als solche zu untersuchen und zu beurteilen sind, teils nach allgemeinen für die Erfahrung überhaupt, ihrer Möglichkeit nach, feststehenden, a priori gewissen Regeln, teils nach den Thatfachen, welche die fertige und wirklich vorhandene Erfahrung liefert. Also nicht mehr, wie vorhin, mit dem Willen selbst, wie er nur dem innern Sinne offen liegt; sondern mit den wollenden, vom Willen bewegten Wesen, welche Gegenstände der äußern Sinne, sind, haben wir es hier zu thun. Wenn wir nun auch dadurch in den Nachteil versetzt sind, den eigentlichen Gegenstand unsers Forschens nur mittelbar und aus größerer Entfernung betrachten zu müssen; so wird derselbe überwogen durch den Vorteil, daß wir uns jetzt eines viel vollkommeneren Organons bei unserer Untersuchung bedienen können, als das dunkle, dumpfe, einseitige, direkte Selbstbewußtsein, der sogenannte innere Sinn, war: nämlich des mit allen äußern Sinnen und allen Kräften zum objektiven Auffassen ausgerüsteten Verstandes.
Als die allgemeinste und grundwesentliche Form dieses Verstandes finden wir das Gesetz der Kausalität, da sogar allein durch dessen Vermittelung die Anschauung der realen Außenwelt zu stande kommt, als bei welcher wir die in unsern Sinnesorganen empfundenen Affektionen und Veränderungen sogleich und ganz unmittelbar als „Wirkungen“ auffassen und (ohne Anleitung, Belehrung und Erfahrung) augenblicklich von ihnen den Uebergang machen zu ihren „Ursachen“, welche nunmehr, eben durch diesen Verstandesprozeß, als Objekte im Raum sich darstellen ∗). Hieraus erhellt unwidersprechlich, daß das Gesetz der Kausalität uns a priori, folglich als ein, hinsichtlich der Möglichkeit aller Erfahrung überhaupt, notwendiges bewußt ist; ohne daß wir des indirekten, schwierigen, ja, ungenügenden Beweises, den Kant für diese wichtige Wahrheit gegeben hat, bedürften. Das Gesetz der Kausalität steht a priori fest, als die allgemeine Regel, welcher alle reale Objekte der Außenwelt ohne Ausnahme unterworfen sind. Diese Ausnahmslosigkeit verdankt es eben seiner Apriorität. Dasselbe bezieht sich wesentlich und ausschließlich auf Veränderungen, und besagt, daß wo und wann, in der objektiven, realen, materiellen Welt, irgend etwas, groß oder klein, viel oder wenig, sich verändert, notwendig gleich vorher auch etwas anderes sich verändert haben muß, und damit dieses sich veränderte, vor ihm wieder ein anderes, und so ins Unendliche, ohne daß irgend ein Anfangspunkt dieser regressiven Reihe von Veränderungen, welche die Zeit erfüllt, wie die Materie den Raum, jemals abzusehen, oder auch nur als möglich zu denken, geschweige vorauszuseßen wäre. Denn die unermüdlich sich erneuernde Frage „was führte diese Veränderung herbei?“ gestattet dem Verstande nimmermehr einen letzten Ruhepunkt; wie sehr er dabei auch ermüden mag: weshalb eine erste Ursache gerade so undenkbar ist, wie ein Anfang der Zeit oder eine Grenze des Raumes. — Nicht minder besagt das Gesetz der Kausalität, daß wenn die frühere Veränderung, — die Ursache, — eingetreten ist, die dadurch herbeigeführte spätere, — die Wirkung, — ganz unausbleiblich eintreten muß, mithin notwendig erfolgt. Durch diesen Charakter von Notwendigkeit bewährt sich das Gesetz der Kausalität als eine Gestaltung des Satzes vom Grunde, welcher die allgemeinste Form unsers gesamten Erkenntnisvermögens ist und wie in der realen Welt als Ursächlichkeit, so in der Gedankenwelt als logisches Gesetz vom Erkenntnisgrunde, und selbst im leeren, aber a priori angeschaueten Raume als Gesetz der streng notwendigen Abhängigkeit der Lage aller Teile desselben gegenseitig voneinander auftritt; — welche notwendige Abhängigkeit speziell und ausführlich nachzuweisen, das alleinige Thema der Geometrie ist. Daher eben, wie ich schon im Anfange erörtert habe, notwendig sein und Folge eines gegebenen Grundes sein Wechselbegriffe sind.
∗) Die gründliche Ausführung dieser Lehre findet man in der Abhandlung über den Satz vom Grunde, § 21.
Alle an den objektiven, in der realen Außenwelt liegenden Gegenständen vorgehende Veränderungen sind also dem Gesetz der Kausalität unterworfen, und treten daher, wann und wo sie eintreten, allemal als notwendig und unausbleiblich ein. — Eine Ausnahme hievon kann es nicht geben, da die Regel a priori für alle Möglichkeit der Erfahrung feststeht. Hinsichtlich ihrer Anwendung aber auf einen gegebenen Fall, ist bloß zu fragen, ob es sich um eine Veränderung eines in der äußern Erfahrung gegebenen realen Objekts handelt: sobald dies ist, unterliegen seine Veränderungen der Anwendung des Gesetzes der Kausalität, d. h. müssen durch eine Ursache, eben darum aber notwendig herbeigeführt sein.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the German, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
III. The Will Before the Consciousness of Other Things.
If we now turn to the faculty of knowledge with our problem, we know in advance that, since this faculty is essentially directed outward, the will cannot be an object of immediate perception for it, as it was for self-consciousness—which nevertheless proved incompetent in our inquiry. Here we can consider only beings endowed with a will, which stand before the faculty of knowledge as objective, external phenomena, that is, as objects of experience. As such, they must now be examined and judged partly by general rules that determine the very possibility of experience and are certain prior to experience, and partly by the facts supplied by experience as it actually exists, already constituted. Thus we are no longer concerned, as we were before, with the will itself, which lies open only to the inner sense, but with willing beings, moved by the will, that are objects of the outer senses. Although this places us at the disadvantage of having to consider the true object of our inquiry only indirectly and from a greater distance, this is outweighed by the advantage of now being able to use a far more perfect instrument in our investigation than obscure, dull, one-sided, direct self-consciousness, the so-called inner sense: namely, the understanding, equipped with all the outer senses and all the powers of objective apprehension.
We find the law of causality to be the most universal and fundamental form of this understanding, since only through its mediation does perception of the real external world come about at all. In such perception, we at once and quite directly apprehend the affections and changes felt in our sense organs as “effects” and instantly pass from them to their “causes” (without guidance, instruction, or experience). Through this very process of the understanding, these causes now present themselves as objects in space.∗) This shows incontestably that we are conscious of the law of causality prior to experience, and therefore as a law necessary to the possibility of any experience at all; we have no need of the indirect, difficult, and indeed inadequate proof Kant gave of this important truth. The law of causality is established prior to experience as the universal rule to which all real objects of the external world are subject without exception. It owes this absence of exceptions precisely to its independence from experience. It refers essentially and exclusively to changes, and states that wherever and whenever anything in the objective, real, material world changes—whether great or small, much or little—something else must necessarily have changed immediately before it; and for that to change, something else must have changed before it, and so on to infinity. No starting point in this regressive series of changes, which fills time as matter fills space, can ever be discerned or even conceived as possible, let alone presupposed. For the tirelessly recurring question “What brought about this change?” never allows the understanding a final resting place, however weary it may become. A first cause is therefore just as inconceivable as a beginning of time or a boundary of space.—The law of causality states no less that once the earlier change—the cause—has occurred, the later change it brings about—the effect—must occur without fail, and thus follows necessarily. Through this character of necessity, the law of causality proves to be a form of the principle of sufficient reason, which is the most universal form of our entire faculty of knowledge. Just as this principle appears in the real world as causality, so it appears in the world of thought as the logical law of the ground of knowledge, and even in empty space, perceived prior to experience, as the law by which the position of every part depends with strict necessity on that of all the others. To demonstrate this necessary dependence in detail is the sole subject of geometry. Thus, as I explained at the outset, to be necessary and to follow from a given ground are interchangeable concepts.
∗) A thorough exposition of this doctrine can be found in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 21.
All changes occurring in objective things situated in the real external world are therefore subject to the law of causality, and so, whenever and wherever they occur, they always occur necessarily and without fail.—There can be no exception, since the rule is established prior to experience for every possible experience. As for its application to a given case, the only question is whether we are dealing with a change in a real object given in external experience. As soon as this is so, its changes fall under the application of the law of causality: that is, they must have been brought about by a cause, and for that very reason necessarily.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English translation, made independently and directly from the German, not from the Musean edition or a published English translation, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
III. The will as seen by consciousness of other things.
Let us now take our problem to our capacity for knowledge. We know in advance that this capacity is directed outward by its very nature. The will therefore cannot be an object of direct perception for it. The will was such an object for self-consciousness, though self-consciousness proved unable to judge our question. Here we can examine only beings that have a will. They appear before our capacity for knowledge as objective, external phenomena—that is, as objects of experience. We must now study and judge them as such. We must partly use general rules that are certain a priori and hold for experience as a whole, as conditions of its possibility. We must partly use the facts that actual, existing experience provides. So we are no longer dealing with the will itself, as it is open only to the inner sense. We are dealing with beings that will and are moved by the will, and that are objects of the outer senses. This puts us at a disadvantage: we must examine the true object of our inquiry only indirectly and from farther away. But that is more than offset by an advantage. We can now use a much better tool in our inquiry than direct self-consciousness, the so-called inner sense, with its dim, dull, one-sided awareness. Our tool is the understanding, equipped with all the outer senses and all the powers needed to grasp things objectively.
The most general and basic form of this understanding is the law of causality. Indeed, only through this law do we come to perceive the real external world. We immediately and quite directly take the sensations and changes felt in our sense organs as "effects." Without guidance, instruction, or experience, we instantly move from them to their "causes." Through this very process of understanding, these causes now present themselves as objects in space ∗). This makes one thing indisputably clear. We are aware of the law of causality a priori, and thus as a law necessary for any experience at all to be possible. We do not need the indirect, difficult, and even inadequate proof Kant gave for this important truth. The law of causality is established a priori as the general rule to which all real objects in the external world are subject, without exception. It admits no exceptions precisely because it is a priori. It applies essentially and exclusively to changes. It says that whenever and wherever anything changes in the objective, real, material world—whether large or small, much or little—something else must necessarily have changed just before it. For that earlier thing to change, something else must have changed before it, and so on to infinity. This backward chain of changes fills time as matter fills space. No starting point for it can ever be found, or even thought possible, much less assumed. The endlessly renewed question, "What brought about this change?" never lets the understanding reach a final resting place, however tired it may become. A first cause is therefore just as unthinkable as a beginning of time or a boundary of space.—The law of causality also says that once the earlier change—the cause—has occurred, the later change it brings about—the effect—must occur without fail. It therefore follows necessarily. This character of necessity shows that the law of causality is a form of the principle of sufficient reason. That principle is the most general form of our entire capacity for knowledge. In the real world it appears as causality. In the world of thought it appears as the logical law governing the grounds for knowledge. Even in empty space, which we perceive a priori, it appears as the law by which the positions of all parts depend on one another with strict necessity. Showing this necessary dependence in specific detail is the sole subject of geometry. That is precisely why, as I explained at the outset, being necessary and following from a given ground are interchangeable concepts.
∗) A thorough account of this theory is given in the treatise on the principle of sufficient reason, § 21.
All changes in objects situated in the real external world are therefore subject to the law of causality. Whenever and wherever they occur, they always occur necessarily and without fail.—There can be no exception. The rule is established a priori for all possible experience. To apply it to a particular case, we need ask only whether the case involves a change in a real object given in external experience. If it does, the object's changes fall under the law of causality. That is, they must have been brought about by a cause, and for that very reason necessarily.
About this section
Chapter III, 1 is part of On the Freedom of the Will by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 7 of 28 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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