Chapter V, 3

This path leads, as is easily foreseen, to the conclusion that we must no longer seek the work of our freedom, as the common view does, in our individual actions, but in the whole being and essence (existence and essence) of the human being himself. This must be thought of as his free deed, which presents itself to the faculty of knowledge bound to time, space and causality alone as a multiplicity and diversity of actions. Precisely because of the original unity of what presents itself in them, however, those actions must all bear exactly the same character, and they therefore appear strictly necessitated by the motives of the moment, by which they are called forth and determined in detail. Thus for the world of experience the principle that action follows being stands firm without exception. Every thing acts in accordance with its constitution, and its acting, which follows upon causes, makes that constitution known. Every human being acts according to what he is, and the action, accordingly necessary each time, is determined in the individual case solely by the motives. Freedom, which therefore cannot be found in action, must lie in being. It has been a fundamental error of all ages, a hysteron proteron—the later put before the earlier—to ascribe necessity to being and freedom to action. The reverse is true: freedom lies in being alone; but from it and the motives action follows with necessity, and from what we do we recognize what we are. On this, and not on the supposed freedom of indifferent choice, rest the consciousness of responsibility and the moral tendency of life. Everything depends on what someone is: what he does will result from it of itself, as a necessary corollary. The consciousness of acting on our own authority and as the original source, which undeniably accompanies all our deeds despite their dependence on motives, and by virtue of which they are our deeds, therefore does not deceive. But its true content reaches further than the deeds and begins higher up, since our being and essence itself, from which all deeds necessarily proceed (on the occasion of motives), is in truth comprised in it. In this sense one may compare that consciousness of acting on our own authority and as the original source, like the consciousness of responsibility that accompanies our acting, to a pointer that indicates a more distant object than the nearer one lying in the same direction at which it seems to point.

In a word: a human being always does only what he wills, and yet does it necessarily. But this is because he already is what he wills: for from what he is, everything he does at any time follows necessarily. If one considers his doing objectively, that is, from outside, one recognizes apodictically that, like the working of every natural being, it must be subject to the law of causality in all its strictness; subjectively, by contrast, everyone feels that he always does only what he wills. But this says merely that his working is the pure expression of his own very essence. Every natural being, even the lowest, would therefore feel the same, if it could feel.

Freedom is thus not abolished by my account but merely moved out of the domain of individual actions, where it demonstrably cannot be found, up into a higher region, less easily accessible to our knowledge: that is, it is transcendental. And this is also the sense in which I should like that saying of Malebranche, “freedom is a mystery,” to be understood, under whose aegis the present treatise has tried to solve the task set by the Royal Society.

As is easy to see, this path leads to the conclusion that we must no longer look for the work of our freedom in our individual actions, as the common view does. We must look for it in the whole being and essence of the human being (existence and essence). That being must be thought of as the person's free act. For the faculty of knowledge, which is tied to time, space, and causality, this act presents itself only as a multitude and variety of actions. But the original unity of what presents itself in them means that all of them must bear exactly the same character. So they appear strictly determined by necessity through the motives of the moment, which call them forth and fix them in detail. Therefore, for the world of experience, the rule that action follows being holds without exception. Every thing acts according to its nature, and its acting, which follows on causes, makes that nature known. Every person acts according to what they are. The action that is necessary on that basis is determined, in the individual case, by the motives alone. So freedom, which cannot be found in action, must lie in being. It has been a basic error in every age, a putting of the later before the earlier, to assign necessity to being and freedom to action. It is the other way around. Freedom lies in being alone. But from being and the motives, action follows with necessity. And from what we do, we recognize what we are. On this, and not on the supposed free choice of indifference, rest the awareness of responsibility and the moral tendency of life. Everything depends on what a person is. What they do will follow from that by itself, as a necessary consequence. Despite their dependence on motives, all our deeds are undeniably accompanied by an awareness of acting by our own power and as the original source of what we do. This awareness is what makes them our deeds, and it does not deceive us. But its true content reaches further than the deeds and begins higher up. For our being and essence itself, from which all deeds necessarily proceed (on the occasion of the motives), is truly included in it. In this sense, we can compare that awareness of acting by our own power and as the original source, and likewise the awareness of responsibility that accompanies our acting, to a pointer. It points to an object farther away than the nearer one lying in the same direction, which it seems to point to.

In a word: a human being always does only what they will, and yet does it necessarily. The reason is that they already are what they will. For everything they do at any time follows necessarily from what they are. If we look at their doing objectively, that is, from outside, we recognize with absolute certainty that it must be subject to the law of causality in its full strictness, like the working of every natural being. Subjectively, however, everyone feels that they always do only what they will. But this says merely that their acting is the pure expression of their own essence. So every natural being would feel the same, even the lowest, if it could feel.

So my account has not abolished freedom. It has only moved it out of the area of individual actions, where it demonstrably cannot be found, and up into a higher region that is not so easily reached by our knowledge. That is, freedom is transcendental. This is also the sense in which I would like Malebranche's saying, "Freedom is a mystery," to be understood. Under its shield the present treatise has tried to solve the task set by the Royal Society.