Chapter V, 1
Original German
V. Schluß und höhere Ansicht.
Alle jene sowohl poetischen, als philosophischen, glorreichen Vorgänger in der von mir verfochtenen Wahrheit habe ich hier gern in Erinnerung gebracht. Inzwischen sind nicht Autoritäten, sondern Gründe die Waffe des Philosophen; daher ich nur mit diesen meine Sache geführt habe, und doch hoffe, ihr eine solche Evidenz gegeben zu haben, daß ich jetzt wohl berechtigt bin, die Folgerung a non posse ad non esse zu ziehen; wodurch die oben, bei Untersuchung des Selbstbewußtseins, direkt und thatsächlich, folglich a posteriori begründete Verneinung der von der Königlichen Societät aufgestellten Frage jetzt auch mittelbar und a priori begründet ist: indem was überhaupt nicht vorhanden ist, auch nicht im Selbstbewußtsein Data haben kann, aus denen es sich beweisen ließe.
Wenn nun auch die hier verfochtene Wahrheit zu denen gehören mag, welche den vorgefaßten Meinungen der kurzsichtigen Menge entgegen, ja, dem Schwachen und Unwissenden anstößig sein können; so hat mich dies nicht abhalten dürfen, sie ohne Umschweife und ohne Rückhalt darzulegen: angesehen, daß ich hier nicht zum Volke, sondern zu einer erleuchteten Akademie rede, welche ihre sehr zeitgemäße Frage nicht aufgestellt hat zur Befestigung des Vorurteils, sondern zur Ehre der Wahrheit. — Ueberdies wird der redliche Wahrheitsforscher, solange es sich noch darum handelt, eine Wahrheit festzustellen und zu beglaubigen, stets ganz allein auf ihre Gründe und nicht auf ihre Folgen sehen, als wozu die Zeit dann sein wird, wann sie selbst feststeht. Unbekümmert um die Folgen, allein die Gründe prüfen und nicht erst fragen, ob eine erkannte Wahrheit auch mit dem System unserer übrigen Ueberzeugungen in Einklang stehe oder nicht, — dies ist es, was schon Kant empfiehlt, dessen Worte ich hier zu wiederholen mich nicht entbrechen kann: „Dies bestärkt die schon von andern erkannte und gepriesene Maxime, in jeder wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung mit aller möglichen Genauigkeit und Offenheit seinen Gang ungestört fortzusetzen, ohne sich an das zu kehren, wowider sie außer ihrem Felde etwan verstoßen möchte, sondern sie für sich allein, soviel man kann, wahr und vollständig zu vollführen. Oeftere Beobachtung hat mich überzeugt, daß, wenn man dieses Geschäft zu Ende gebracht hat, das, was in der Hälfte desselben, in Betracht anderer Lehren außerhalb, mir bisweilen sehr bedenklich schien, wenn ich diese Bedenklichkeit nur so lange aus den Augen ließ und bloß auf mein Geschäft achthatte, bis es vollendet sei, endlich auf unerwartete Weise mit demjenigen vollkommen zusammenstimmte, was sich ohne die mindeste Rücksicht auf jene Lehren, ohne Parteilichkeit und Vorliebe für dieselben, von selbst gefunden hatte. Schriftsteller würden sich manche Irrtümer, manche verlorene Mühe (weil sie auf Blendwerk gestellt war) ersparen, wenn sie sich nur entschließen könnten, mit etwas mehr Offenheit zu Werke zu gehen.“ (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, S. 190 der vierten Auflage, oder S. 239 der Rosenkranzischen.)
Unsere metaphysischen Kenntnisse überhaupt sind doch wohl noch himmelweit davon entfernt, eine solche Gewißheit zu haben, daß man irgend eine gründlich erwiesene Wahrheit darum verwerfen sollte, weil ihre Folgen nicht zu jenen passen. Vielmehr ist jede errungene und festgestellte Wahrheit ein eroberter Teil des Gebiets der Probleme des Wissens überhaupt und ein fester Punkt, die Hebel anzulegen, welche andere Lasten bewegen werden, ja, von welchem aus man sich, in günstigen Fällen, mit einemmale zu einer höhern Ansicht des Ganzen, als man bisher gehabt, emporschwingt. Denn die Verkettung der Wahrheiten ist in jedem Gebiete des Wissens so groß, daß wer sich in den ganz sichern Besitz einer einzigen gesetzt hat, allenfalls hoffen darf, von da aus das Ganze zu erobern. Wie bei einer schwierigen algebraischen Aufgabe eine einzige positiv gegebene Größe von unschätzbarem Wert ist, weil sie die Lösung möglich macht; so ist, in der schwierigsten aller menschlichen Aufgaben, welches die Metaphysik ist, die sichere, a priori und a posteriori bewiesene Erkenntnis der strengen Notwendigkeit, mit der aus gegebenem Charakter und gegebenen Motiven die Thaten erfolgen, ein solches unschätzbares Datum, von welchem ganz allein ausgehend man zur Lösung der gesamten Aufgabe gelangen kann. Daher muß alles, was nicht eine feste, wissenschaftliche Beglaubigung aufzuweisen hat, einer solchen wohlbegründeten Wahrheit, wo es ihr im Wege steht, weichen, nicht aber diese jenem: und keineswegs darf sie sich zu Akkommodation und Beschränkungen verstehen, um sich mit unbewiesenen und vielleicht irrigen Behauptungen in Einklang zu setzen.
Noch eine allgemeine Bemerkung sei mir hier erlaubt. Ein Rückblick auf unser Resultat gibt zu der Betrachtung Anlaß, daß in Hinsicht der zwei Probleme, welche schon im vorigen Abschnitt als die tiefsten der Philosophie der Neueren, hingegen den Alten nicht deutlich bewußt, bezeichnet wurden, — nämlich das Problem von der Willensfreiheit und das vom Verhältnis zwischen Idealem und Realem, — der gesunde, aber rohe Verstand nicht nur inkompetent ist; sondern sogar einen entschiedenen natürlichen Hang zum Irrtum hat, von welchem ihn zurückzubringen, es einer schon weit gediehenen Philosophie bedarf. Es ist ihm nämlich wirklich natürlich, hinsichtlich auf das Erkennen viel zu viel dem Objekt beizumessen; daher es Lockes und Kants bedurfte, um zu zeigen, wie sehr viel davon aus dem Subjekt entspringt. Hinsichtlich auf das Wollen hingegen hat er umgekehrt den Hang, viel zu wenig dem Objekt und viel zu viel dem Subjekt beizulegen, indem er dasselbe ganz und gar von diesem ausgehen läßt, ohne den im Objekt gelegenen Faktor, die Motive, gehörig in Anschlag zu bringen, welche eigentlich die ganze individuelle Beschaffenheit der Handlungen bestimmen, während nur ihr Allgemeines und Wesentliches, nämlich ihr moralischer Grundcharakter, vom Subjekt ausgeht. Eine solche dem Verstande natürliche Verkehrtheit in spekulativen Forschungen darf uns jedoch nicht wundern; da er ursprünglich allein zu praktischen und keineswegs zu spekulativen Zwecken bestimmt ist. —
Wenn wir nun, infolge unserer bisherigen Darstellung, alle Freiheit des menschlichen Handelns völlig aufgehoben und dasselbe als durchweg der strengsten Notwendigkeit unterworfen erkannt haben; so sind wir eben dadurch auf den Punkt geführt, auf welchem wir die wahre moralische Freiheit, welche höherer Art ist, werden begreifen können.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the German, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
V. Conclusion and Higher View.
I have gladly recalled here all those glorious predecessors, poets and philosophers alike, in the truth I defend. Still, it is not authorities but reasons that are the philosopher’s weapon. I have therefore conducted my case with reasons alone, and yet I hope to have given it such evidence that I am now entitled to draw the inference from impossibility to nonexistence. Thereby the negative answer to the question posed by the Royal Society—grounded above, in the examination of self-consciousness, directly and factually, and therefore a posteriori—is now grounded indirectly and a priori as well: for what does not exist at all cannot have data in self-consciousness either, from which it could be proved.
Even if the truth defended here may be among those that run against the preconceived opinions of the shortsighted crowd, and may even give offense to the weak and ignorant, this has not been allowed to keep me from setting it out plainly and without reserve. I speak here not to the people but to an enlightened Academy, which did not pose its very timely question to fortify prejudice but to honor truth.—Moreover, the honest inquirer after truth, so long as the task is still to establish and authenticate a truth, will always look solely to its grounds and not to its consequences; the time for those will come once the truth itself stands firm. To examine the grounds alone, heedless of consequences, and not to ask first whether a recognized truth agrees with the system of our other convictions or not—this is what Kant already recommends, and I cannot refrain from repeating his words here: “This confirms the maxim, already recognized and praised by others, of pursuing in every scientific inquiry one’s course undisturbed, with all possible exactness and candor, without turning aside for anything it might perhaps offend against outside its own field, but carrying it out by itself, as far as one can, truly and completely. Frequent observation has convinced me that when this business has been brought to its end, what had seemed to me very questionable midway, with regard to other doctrines outside it, finally agreed in an unexpected way perfectly with what had turned up of itself, without the least regard for those doctrines, without partiality or preference for them—provided I only left that misgiving out of sight for as long as I attended solely to my business until it was completed. Writers would spare themselves many errors, much wasted effort (because it was built on illusion), if they could only resolve to go to work with a little more candor.” (Critique of Practical Reason, S. 190 of the fourth edition, or S. 239 of Rosenkranz’s.)
Our metaphysical knowledge as a whole is surely still worlds away from having such certainty that we should reject any thoroughly proven truth merely because its consequences do not fit with it. On the contrary, every truth won and established is a conquered portion of the whole territory of the problems of knowledge, and a firm point at which to set the levers that will move other burdens—indeed, a point from which, in favorable cases, one may swing up all at once to a higher view of the whole than one has had before. For the interconnection of truths in every field of knowledge is so great that whoever has made himself entirely secure in the possession of a single one may at any rate hope to conquer the whole from there. As in a difficult algebraic problem a single positively given quantity is of inestimable value because it makes the solution possible, so in the most difficult of all human problems, which is metaphysics, the certain knowledge, proved a priori and a posteriori, of the strict necessity with which deeds follow from given character and given motives is such an inestimable datum, and starting from it alone one can arrive at the solution of the whole problem. Therefore everything that cannot show firm scientific authentication must give way to such a well-grounded truth where it stands in its path, and not the truth to it. Nor may that truth ever consent to accommodations and restrictions in order to bring itself into harmony with unproven and perhaps mistaken assertions.
One more general remark may be allowed me here. A look back at our result prompts the reflection that, with regard to the two problems already identified in the previous section as the deepest of modern philosophy, though not clearly present to the ancients—namely, the problem of freedom of the will and that of the relation between the ideal and the real—the sound but crude understanding is not merely incompetent. It even has a decided natural bent toward error, and to bring it back from this a philosophy already far advanced is needed. For it is indeed natural to it, in matters of knowing, to attribute far too much to the object, which is why Locke and Kant were needed to show how very much of it springs from the subject. In matters of willing, by contrast, it has the opposite bent: to attribute far too little to the object and far too much to the subject. It lets willing proceed entirely from the latter, without duly taking into account the factor lying in the object, the motives, which actually determine the whole individual character of actions, while only what is general and essential in them, their basic moral character, proceeds from the subject. Such a perversity, natural to the understanding in speculative inquiries, need not surprise us, however, since it was originally destined solely for practical purposes and by no means for speculative ones.—
If, as a result of our account so far, we have found all freedom of human action wholly removed and that action recognized as throughout subject to the strictest necessity, we have thereby been led to the point from which we shall be able to grasp true moral freedom, which is of a higher kind.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English translation, made independently and directly from the German, not from the Musean edition or a published English translation, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
V. Conclusion and Higher View.
I was glad to recall all those glorious predecessors, poets and philosophers alike, who held the truth I defend. Still, a philosopher's weapons are reasons, not authorities. So I have argued my case with reasons alone, and I hope I have made it so clear that I am now entitled to draw the conclusion from "cannot be" to "is not." Earlier, when I examined self-consciousness, I gave a direct and factual answer, and so an a posteriori one, denying the question the Royal Society posed. Now that denial is also established indirectly and a priori. For something that does not exist at all cannot have any data in self-consciousness from which it could be proved.
The truth I defend here may well be one that runs against the preconceived opinions of the short-sighted crowd. It may even offend the weak and ignorant. That could not stop me from setting it out openly and holding nothing back. After all, I am speaking here not to the people but to an enlightened academy. It did not pose its very timely question to shore up prejudice, but to honor the truth.—Besides, an honest seeker of truth looks only at the grounds of a truth, never at its consequences, as long as the task is still to establish it and make it credible. The time for consequences comes once the truth itself stands firm. To ignore the consequences, to examine only the grounds, and not even to ask first whether a recognized truth agrees with the system of our other convictions—this is what Kant already recommends. I cannot help repeating his words here: "This strengthens a maxim that others have already recognized and praised: in every scientific inquiry, we should go on our way undisturbed, with all possible precision and openness. We should pay no attention to anything outside the field that the inquiry might happen to clash with. Instead, we should carry it out by itself, as truly and completely as we can. Repeated observation has convinced me of this. Halfway through the work, a point sometimes seemed very troubling to me, in view of other doctrines outside it. But once the work was finished, I found that if I had only kept that worry out of sight until then and attended to my work alone, the point agreed perfectly in the end, in an unexpected way, with what had turned up by itself, with no regard at all for those doctrines and without bias or fondness for them. Writers would save themselves many errors and much wasted effort (because it rested on illusion) if they could only decide to go to work with a little more openness." (Critique of Practical Reason, S. 190 of the fourth edition, or S. 239 of Rosenkranz's.)
Our metaphysical knowledge as a whole is surely still very far from having such certainty that we should reject a thoroughly proved truth just because its consequences do not fit with other things. On the contrary, every truth that has been won and established is a conquered piece of the whole territory of the problems of knowledge. It is also a firm point on which to set the levers that will move other loads. In favorable cases, it is even a point from which one swings up all at once to a higher view of the whole than one had before. For truths are so closely linked in every field of knowledge that anyone who has taken secure possession of a single one may hope, at the very least, to conquer the whole from there. Take a difficult algebra problem. One quantity that is positively given is priceless, because it makes the solution possible. In the same way, metaphysics is the most difficult of all human tasks. In it, the certain knowledge—proved a priori and a posteriori—of the strict necessity with which actions follow from a given character and given motives is just such a priceless given fact. Starting from it alone, one can reach the solution of the whole problem. So anything that cannot show firm scientific backing must give way to such a well-founded truth wherever it stands in its path. The truth must not give way to it. It must never agree to compromises and limits just to bring itself into line with claims that are unproved and perhaps mistaken.
Let me make one more general remark. Looking back at our result, we can see something about the two problems that the previous section already named as the deepest in modern philosophy, though the ancients were not clearly aware of them. They are the problem of freedom of the will and the problem of the relation between the ideal and the real. On both, the healthy but unrefined understanding is not only unqualified to judge. It even has a definite natural tendency toward error, and it takes a philosophy that is already far advanced to bring it back. When it comes to knowing, it is really natural for the understanding to credit the object with far too much. That is why Locke and Kant were needed, to show how much of it comes from the subject. When it comes to willing, it has the opposite tendency: it credits the object with far too little and the subject with far too much. It lets willing come wholly from the subject. It fails to count properly the factor that lies in the object, the motives. Yet the motives really determine the whole individual character of actions, while only what is general and essential in them, their basic moral character, comes from the subject. We should not be surprised by such a natural perversity of the understanding in speculative inquiry. It was originally meant only for practical purposes, and not at all for speculative ones.—
Our account so far has shown that all freedom of human action is completely removed, and that action is subject throughout to the strictest necessity. That very result has led us to the point where we will be able to grasp true moral freedom, which is of a higher kind.
About this section
Chapter V, 1 is part of On the Freedom of the Will by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 25 of 28 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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