Chapter I, 1
Original German
Preisschrift über die Freiheit des Willens, gekrönt von der Königlich Norwegischen Societät der Wissenschaften, zu Drontheim, am 26. Januar 1839. Motto: La liberté est un mystère.
Die von der Königl. Societät aufgestellte Frage lautet:
Num liberum hominum arbitrium e sui ipsius conscientia demonstrari potest?
Verdeutscht: „Läßt die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens sich aus dem Selbstbewußtsein beweisen?“
I. Begriffsbestimmungen.
Bei einer so wichtigen, ernsten und schwierigen Frage, die im wesentlichen mit einem Hauptproblem der gesamten Philosophie mittlerer und neuerer Zeit zusammenfällt, ist große Genauigkeit und daher eine Analyse der in der Frage vorkommenden Hauptbegriffe gewiß an ihrer Stelle.
1 Was heißt Freiheit?
Dieser Begriff ist, genau betrachtet, ein negativer. Wir denken durch ihn nur die Abwesenheit alles Hindernden und Hemmenden: dieses hingegen muß, als Kraft äußernd, ein Positives sein. Der möglichen Beschaffenheit dieses Hemmenden entsprechend hat der Begriff drei sehr verschiedene Unterarten: physische, intellektuelle und moralische Freiheit.
a) Physische Freiheit ist die Abwesenheit der materiellen Hindernisse jeder Art. Daher sagen wir: freier Himmel, freie Aussicht, freie Luft, freies Feld, ein freier Platz, freie Wärme (die nicht chemisch gebunden ist), freie Elektrizität, freier Lauf des Stroms, wo er nicht mehr durch Berge oder Schleusen gehemmt ist u. s. w. Selbst freie Wohnung, freie Kost, freie Presse, postfreier Brief, bezeichnet die Abwesenheit der lästigen Bedingungen, welche, als Hindernisse des Genusses, solchen Dingen anzuhängen pflegen. Am häufigsten aber ist in unserm Denken der Begriff der Freiheit das Prädikat animalischer Wesen, deren Eigentümliches ist, daß ihre Bewegungen von ihrem Willen ausgehen, willkürlich sind und demnach alsdann frei genannt werden, wann kein materielles Hindernis dies unmöglich macht. Da nun diese Hindernisse sehr verschiedener Art sein können, das durch sie Gehinderte aber stets der Wille ist; so faßt man, der Einfachheit halber, den Begriff lieber von der positiven Seite, und denkt dadurch alles, was sich allein durch seinen Willen bewegt, oder allein aus seinem Willen handelt: welche Umwendung des Begriffs im wesentlichen nichts ändert. Demnach werden, in dieser physischen Bedeutung des Begriffs der Freiheit, Tiere und Menschen dann frei genannt, wann weder Bande, noch Kerker, noch Lähmung, also überhaupt kein physisches, materielles Hindernis ihre Handlungen hemmt, sondern diese ihrem Willen gemäß vor sich gehen.
Diese physische Bedeutung des Begriffs der Freiheit, und besonders als Prädikat animalischer Wesen, ist die ursprüngliche, unmittelbare und daher allerhäufigste, in welcher er ebendeshalb auch keinem Zweifel oder Kontrovers unterworfen ist, sondern seine Realität stets durch die Erfahrung beglaubigen kann. Denn sobald ein animalisches Wesen nur aus seinem Willen handelt, ist es, in dieser Bedeutung, frei: wobei keine Rücksicht darauf genommen wird, was etwan auf seinen Willen selbst Einfluß haben mag. Denn nur auf das Können, d. h. eben auf die Abwesenheit physischer Hindernisse seiner Aktionen, bezieht sich der Begriff der Freiheit, in dieser seiner ursprünglichen, unmittelbaren und daher populären Bedeutung. Daher sagt man: frei ist der Vogel in der Luft, das Wild im Walde; frei ist der Mensch von Natur; nur der Freie ist glücklich. Auch ein Volk nennt man frei, und versteht darunter, daß es allein nach Gesetzen regiert wird, diese Gesetze aber selbst gegeben hat: denn alsdann befolgt es überall nur seinen eigenen Willen. Die politische Freiheit ist demnach der physischen beizuzählen.
Sobald wir aber von dieser physischen Freiheit abgehen und die zwei andern Arten derselben betrachten, haben wir es nicht mehr mit dem populären, sondern mit einem philosophischen Sinne des Begriffs zu thun, der bekanntlich vielen Schwierigkeiten den Weg öffnet. Er zerfällt in zwei gänzlich verschiedene Arten: die intellektuelle und die moralische Freiheit.
b) Die intellektuelle Freiheit, τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον κατὰ διάνοιαν bei Aristoteles, wird hier bloß zum Behuf der Vollständigkeit der Begriffseinteilung in Betracht gezogen: ich erlaube mir daher ihre Erörterung hinauszusetzen bis ganz ans Ende dieser Abhandlung, als wo die in ihr zu gebrauchenden Begriffe schon im Vorhergegangenen ihre Erklärung gefunden haben werden, so daß sie dann in der Kürze wird abgehandelt werden können. In der Einteilung aber mußte sie, als der physischen Freiheit zunächst verwandt, ihre Stelle neben dieser haben.
c) Ich wende mich also gleich zur dritten Art, zur moralischen Freiheit, als welche eigentlich das liberum arbitrium ist, von dem die Frage der königl. Societät redet.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the German, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will, awarded the prize by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences at Trondheim on January 26, 1839.Motto: Freedom is a mystery.
The question set by the Royal Society reads:
Can human freedom of will be demonstrated from self-consciousness?
In German: “Can the freedom of the human will be proved from self-consciousness?”
I. Definitions.
A question so important, grave and difficult, touching in essence on one of the central problems of medieval and modern philosophy, calls for great precision. An analysis of its principal concepts is therefore very much in order.
1 What does freedom mean?
Strictly considered, this is a negative concept. We think through it only the absence of everything that obstructs or restrains; whatever restrains, by contrast, must be something positive, since it exerts a force. According to the possible nature of this restraint, the concept has three very different subdivisions: physical, intellectual and moral freedom.
a) Physical freedom is the absence of material obstacles of every kind. Thus we speak of an open sky, an unobstructed view, open air, an open field, a vacant space, free heat—which is not chemically bound—free electricity, and a river’s free course where mountains or sluices no longer check it, and so on. Even free lodging, free board, a free press and a postage-free letter signify the absence of the burdensome conditions that generally attach to such things as obstacles to their enjoyment. Most often, however, our thinking makes freedom an attribute of animals, whose distinctive feature is that their movements proceed from their will and are voluntary. Accordingly, these movements are called free when no material obstacle makes them impossible. Since these obstacles can be of very different kinds, while what they obstruct is always the will, we find it simpler to take the concept from its positive side: everything that moves solely through its will, or acts solely from its will, is thereby thought of as free. This reversal of the concept changes nothing essential. In this physical sense of freedom, then, animals and human beings are called free when neither bonds, nor imprisonment, nor paralysis—in short, no physical, material obstacle—impede their actions, which instead proceed in accordance with their will.
This physical meaning of freedom, especially as an attribute of animals, is its original, immediate and therefore most common meaning. Precisely for that reason, it admits of neither doubt nor controversy: experience can always attest its reality. As soon as an animal acts from its will alone, it is free in this sense, regardless of whatever may influence that will itself. For the concept of freedom, in this original, immediate and thus popular meaning, concerns only ability: the absence of physical obstacles to action. Hence we say: the bird in the air is free, the wild animal in the forest is free; the human being is free by nature; only the free are happy. We also call a people free, meaning that it is governed by laws alone and has itself made those laws, so that it everywhere obeys only its own will. Political freedom must therefore be counted as physical freedom.
But once we leave this physical freedom and consider its two other kinds, we are dealing no longer with the popular meaning of the concept but with a philosophical one, which, as everyone knows, opens the way to many difficulties. It divides into two entirely different kinds: intellectual and moral freedom.
b) Intellectual freedom—what Aristotle calls the voluntary and involuntary in respect of thought—is considered here merely to complete the division of the concept. I therefore take the liberty of postponing its discussion to the very end of this essay. The concepts required for it will by then have been explained in the preceding argument, allowing it to be dealt with briefly. In the classification, however, it had to take its place beside physical freedom as its closest relative.
c) I turn at once, then, to the third kind, moral freedom, which is properly the freedom of choice referred to in the Royal Society’s question.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English translation, made independently and directly from the German, not from the Musean edition or a published English translation, including the author’s notes and appendix. Source edition: Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke, vol. VII, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, n.d. [1890s]), Internet Archive item arthurschopenha07schouoft
Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will, awarded the prize by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences in Trondheim on January 26, 1839. Motto: Freedom is a mystery.
The question set by the Royal Society is:
Can human freedom of the will be proved from self-consciousness?
In German: “Can the freedom of the human will be proved from self-consciousness?”
I. Definitions.
This question is important, serious, and difficult. In essence, it is also one of the central problems of all medieval and modern philosophy. Great precision is therefore certainly called for, along with an analysis of the main concepts in the question.
1 What does freedom mean?
On close examination, this is a negative concept. By it we mean only the absence of anything that obstructs or restrains. Whatever does the obstructing, however, must be something positive, since it exerts a force. Depending on what kind of obstruction is possible, the concept has three very different forms: physical, intellectual, and moral freedom.
a) Physical freedom is the absence of material obstacles of any kind. So we speak of an open sky, a clear view, open air, an open field, a free space, free heat (heat that is not chemically bound), free electricity, and the free flow of a river once mountains or locks no longer hold it back, and so on. Even free lodging, free meals, a free press, and a postage-free letter mean the absence of burdensome conditions that usually come with such things and obstruct our enjoyment of them. Most often, though, we think of freedom as a quality of animals. Their distinguishing feature is that their movements come from their will and are voluntary. We therefore call these movements free when no material obstacle makes them impossible. These obstacles can take very different forms, but what they obstruct is always the will. For simplicity, then, we prefer to approach the concept from its positive side. We use it to mean anything that moves solely through its own will, or acts solely from its own will. This reversal changes nothing essential in the concept. Accordingly, in this physical sense of freedom, animals and human beings are called free when neither bonds, imprisonment, nor paralysis—in short, no physical, material obstacle—hinder their actions, and these actions instead follow their will.
This physical meaning of freedom, especially as a quality of animals, is its original, direct, and therefore most common meaning. For that very reason, it is not open to doubt or dispute: experience can always confirm its reality. As soon as an animal acts only from its own will, it is free in this sense. No account is taken here of what might influence its will itself. In its original, direct, and therefore everyday meaning, freedom concerns only the ability to act—that is, the absence of physical obstacles to action. So we say: the bird in the air is free, and so is the wild animal in the forest; human beings are free by nature; only the free person is happy. We also call a people free. By this we mean that it is governed only by laws, and has made those laws itself. In that case it always follows only its own will. Political freedom therefore belongs under physical freedom.
But as soon as we leave this physical freedom behind and consider its two other forms, we are no longer dealing with the everyday meaning of the concept. We are dealing with a philosophical meaning, which, as everyone knows, opens the way to many difficulties. It divides into two entirely different forms: intellectual and moral freedom.
b) Intellectual freedom, what Aristotle calls the voluntary and involuntary in thought, is considered here only to make the classification complete. I will therefore take the liberty of postponing its discussion until the very end of this essay. By then, the concepts it requires will already have been explained in the preceding discussion, so it can be dealt with briefly. In the classification, however, it had to take its place beside physical freedom, to which it is most closely related.
c) I will therefore turn straight to the third kind, moral freedom. This is the freedom of choice that the Royal Society is asking about.
About this section
Chapter I, 1 is part of On the Freedom of the Will by Arthur Schopenhauer. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is chapter 1 of 28 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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