Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Religion, Chapter XVIII, 1
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CONCERNING THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR OUR ENTRANCE INTO THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN
1 The difficulty propounded concerning the repugnancy of obeying God and men, is to be removed by the distinctions between the points necessary and not necessary to salvation. 2. All things necessary to salvation, are contained in faith and obedience. 3. What kind of obedience that is, which is required of us. 4. What faith is, and how distinguished from profession, from science, from opinion. 5. What it is to believe in Christ. 6. That that article alone, that Jesus is the Christ, is necessary to salvation; is proved from the scope of the evangelists. 7. From the preachings of the apostles. 8. From the easiness of Christian religion. 9. From this also, that it is the foundation of faith. 10. From the most evident words of Christ and his apostles. 11. In that article is contained the faith of the Old Testament. 12. How faith and obedience concur to salvation. 13. In a Christian city, there is no contradiction between the commands of God and of the city. 14. The doctrines which this day are controverted about religion, do for the most part relate to the right of dominion.
The difficulty propounded concerning the repugnance of obeying God and men, is to be removed by the distinction between the points necessary, and not necessary to salvation.
1 It was ever granted, that all authority in secular matters derived from him who had the sovereign power, whether he were one man or an assembly of men. That the same in spiritual matters depended on the authority of the Church, is manifest by the lastly foregoing proofs; and besides by this, that all Christian cities are Churches endued with this kind of authority. From whence a man, though but dull of apprehension, may collect, that in a Christian city, that is to say, in a city whose sovereignty belongs to a Christian prince or council, all power, as well spiritual as secular, is united under Christ, and therefore it is to be obeyed in all things. But on the other side, because we must rather obey God than men, there is a difficulty risen, how obedience may safely be yielded to them, if at any time somewhat should be commanded by them to be done which Christ hath prohibited. The reason of this difficulty is, that seeing God no longer speaks to us by Christ and his prophets in open voice, but by the holy Scriptures, which by divers men are diversely understood; they know indeed what princes and a congregated Church do command; but whether that which they do command, be contrary to the word of God or not, this they know not; but with a wavering obedience between the punishments of temporal and spiritual death, as it were sailing between Scylla and Charybdis, they often run themselves upon both. But they who rightly distinguish between the things necessary to salvation, and those which are not necessary, can have none of this kind of doubt. For if the command of the prince or city be such, that he can obey it without hazard of his eternal salvation, it is unjust not to obey them; and the apostle’s precepts take place (Col. iii. 20-22): Children obey your parents in all things: servants in all things obey your masters according to the flesh. And the command of Christ (Matth. xxiii. 2-3): The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ chair; all things therefore whatsoever they command you, that observe and do. On the contrary, if they command us to do those things which are punished with eternal death, it were madness not rather to choose to die a natural death, than by obeying to die eternally: and then comes in that which Christ says (Matth. x. 28): Fear not them who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul. We must see, therefore, what all those things are, which are necessary to salvation.
All things necessary to salvation, are contained in faith and obedience.
2 Now all things necessary to salvation are comprehended in two virtues, faith and obedience. The latter of these, if it could be perfect, would alone suffice to preserve us from damnation; but because we have all of us been long since guilty of disobedience against God in Adam, and besides we ourselves have since actually sinned, obedience is not sufficient without remission of sins. But this, together with our entrance into the kingdom of heaven, is the reward of faith; nothing else is requisite to salvation. For the kingdom of heaven is shut to none but sinners, that is to say, those who have not performed due obedience to the laws; and not to those neither, if they believe the necessary articles of the Christian faith. Now, if we shall know in what points obedience doth consist, and which are the necessary articles of the Christian faith; it will at once be manifest what we must do, and what abstain from, at the command of cities and of princes.
What kind of obedience that is, which is required of us.
3 But by obedience in this place is signified not the fact, but the will and desire wherewith we purpose, and endeavour as much as we can, to obey for the future. In which sense the word obedience is equivalent to repentance; for the virtue of repentance consists not in the sorrow which accompanies the remembrance of sin; but in our conversion into the way, and full purpose to sin no more; without which that sorrow is said to be the sorrow not of a penitent, but a desperate person. But because they who love God cannot but desire to obey the divine law, and they who love their neighbours cannot but desire to obey the moral law; which consists (as hath been showed above in chap. III.) in the prohibition of pride, ingratitude, contumely, inhumanity, cruelty, injury, and the like offences, whereby our neighbours are prejudiced; therefore also love, or charity, is equivalent to the word obedience. Justice, also, which is a constant will of giving to every man his due, is equivalent with it. But that faith and repentance are sufficient for salvation, is manifest by the covenant itself of baptism. For they who were by Peter converted on the day of Pentecost, demanding him, what they should do: he answered (Acts ii. 38): Repent and be baptized every one of you, in the name of Jesus, for the remission of your sins. There was nothing therefore to be done for the obtaining of baptism, that is to say, for to enter into the kingdom of God, but to repent and believe in the name of Jesus; for the kingdom of heaven is promised by the covenant which is made in baptism. Furthermore, by the words of Christ, answering the lawyer who asked him what he should do to inherit eternal life (Luke xviii. 20): Thou knowest the commandments: Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, &c.: which refer to obedience; and (Mark x. 21): Sell all that thou hast, and come and follow me: which relates to faith. And by that which is said: The just shall live by faith; not every man, but the just; for justice is the same disposition of will which repentance and obedience are. And by the words of St. Mark (i. 15): The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent ye, and believe the gospel; by which words is not obscurely signified, that there is no need of other virtues for our entrance into the kingdom of God, excepting those of repentance and faith. The obedience therefore which is necessarily required to salvation, is nothing else but the will or endeavour to obey; that is to say, of doing according to the laws of God; that is, the moral laws, which are the same to all men, and the civil laws; that is to say, the commands of sovereigns in temporal matters, and the ecclesiastical laws in spiritual. Which two kinds of laws are divers in divers cities and Churches, and are known by their promulgation and public sentences.
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What faith is, and how distinguished from profession, from science, and from opinion.
4 That we may understand what the Christian faith is, we must define faith in general; and distinguish it from those other acts of the mind, wherewith commonly it is confounded. The object of faith universally taken, namely, for that which is believed, is evermore a proposition, that is to say, a speech affirmative or negative, which we grant to be true. But because propositions are granted for divers causes, it falls out that these kind of concessions are diversely called. But we grant propositions sometimes, which notwithstanding we receive not into our minds; and this either for a time, to wit, so long, till by consideration of the consequences we have well examined the truth of them, which we call supposing; or also simply, as through fear of the laws, which is to profess, or confess by outward tokens; or for a voluntary compliance sake, which men use out of civility to those whom they respect, and for love of peace to others, which is absolute yielding. Now the propositions which we receive for truth, we always grant for some reasons of our own; and these are derived either from the proposition itself, or from the person propounding. They are derived from the proposition itself, by calling to mind what things those words, which make up the proposition, do by common consent usually signify. If so, then the assent which we give, is called knowledge or science. But if we cannot remember what is certainly understood by those words, but sometimes one thing, sometimes another seem to be apprehended by us, then we are said to think. For example, if it be propounded that two and three make five; and by calling to mind, that the order of numeral words is so appointed by the common consent of them who are of the same language with us, (as it were, by a certain contract necessary for human society), that five shall be the name of so many unities as are contained in two and three taken together, a man assent that this is therefore true, because two and three together are the same with five: this assent shall be called knowledge. And to know this truth is nothing else, but to acknowledge that it is made by ourselves. For by whose will and rules of speaking the number || is called two, ||| is called three, and ||||| is called five; by their will also it comes to pass that this proposition is true, two and three taken together make five. In like manner if we remember what it is that is called theft, and what injury; we shall understand by the words themselves, whether it be true that theft is an injury, or not. Truth is the same with a true proposition; but the proposition is true in which the word consequent, which by logicians is called the predicate, embraceth the word antecedent in its amplitude, which they call the subject. And to know truth, is the same thing as to remember that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words. Neither was it rashly nor unadvisedly said by Plato of old, that knowledge was memory. But it happens sometimes, that words although they have a certain and defined signification by constitution, yet by vulgar use either to adorn or deceive, they are so wrested from their own significations, that to remember the conceptions for which they were first imposed on things, is very hard, and not to be mastered but by a sharp judgment and very great diligence. It happens too that there are many words, which have no proper, determined, and everywhere the same signification; and are understood not by their own, but by virtue of other signs used together with them. Thirdly, there are some words of things unconceivable. Of those things, therefore, whereof they are the words, there is no conception; and therefore in vain do we seek for the truth of those propositions, which they make out of the words themselves. In these cases, while by considering the definitions of words we search out the truth of some proposition, according to the hope we have of finding it, we think it sometimes true, and sometimes false; either of which apart is called thinking, and also believing; both together, doubting. But when our reasons, for which we assent to some proposition, derive not from the proposition itself, but from the person propounding, whom we esteem so learned that he is not deceived, and we see no reason why he should deceive us; our assent, because it grows not from any confidence of our own, but from another man’s knowledge, is called faith. And by the confidence of whom we do believe, we are said to trust them, or to trust in them. By what hath been said, the difference appears, first, between faith and profession; for that is always joined with inward assent; this not always. That is an inward persuasion of the mind, this an outward obedience. Next, between faith and opinion; for this depends on our own reason, that on the good esteem we have of another. Lastly, between faith and knowledge; for this deliberately takes a proposition broken and chewed; that swallows it down whole and entire. The explication of words, whereby the matter enquired after is propounded, is conducible to knowledge; nay, the only way to know, is by definition. But this is prejudicial to faith; for those things which exceed human capacity, and are propounded to be believed, are never more evident by explication, but, on the contrary, more obscure and harder to be credited. And the same thing befalls a man, who endeavours to demonstrate the mysteries of faith by natural reason, which happens to a sick man, who will needs chew before he will swallow his wholesome but bitter pills; whence it comes to pass, that he presently brings them up again; which perhaps would otherwise, if he had taken them well down, have proved his remedy.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
CONCERNING WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR OUR ENTRANCE INTO THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN
1 The proposed difficulty concerning the conflict between obedience to God and obedience to men is resolved by distinguishing what is necessary for salvation from what is not. 2. Everything necessary for salvation is contained in faith and obedience. 3. What sort of obedience is required of us. 4. What faith is, and how it differs from profession, knowledge, and opinion. 5. What it is to believe in Christ. 6. That this article alone, that Jesus is the Christ, is necessary for salvation, proved from the purpose of the Evangelists. 7. From the preaching of the apostles. 8. From the ease of the Christian religion. 9. From its being the foundation of faith. 10. From the clearest words of Christ and his apostles. 11. The faith of the Old Testament is contained in this article. 12. How faith and obedience together bring about salvation. 13. In a Christian city there is no contradiction between the commands of God and those of the city. 14. The doctrines disputed today in religion concern, for the most part, the right of dominion.
The proposed difficulty concerning the conflict between obedience to God and obedience to men is resolved by distinguishing what is necessary for salvation from what is not.
1 It has always been granted that all authority in secular matters derives from whoever holds sovereign power, whether one man or an assembly. That authority in spiritual matters likewise depends on the authority of the Church is evident from the proofs just given, and also from the fact that all Christian cities are Churches endowed with authority of this kind. From this even a person of limited understanding may infer that in a Christian city—that is, a city whose sovereignty belongs to a Christian prince or council—all power, spiritual as well as secular, is united under Christ, and therefore must be obeyed in all things. But on the other hand, because we must obey God rather than men, a difficulty arises: how can we safely obey them if they ever command something that Christ has forbidden? This difficulty arises because God no longer speaks to us openly through Christ and his prophets, but through the holy Scriptures, which different people understand differently. People know what princes and an assembled Church command, but do not know whether their commands are contrary to the word of God. Thus, wavering between the punishments of temporal and spiritual death, they sail as it were between Scylla and Charybdis, and often wreck themselves on both. But those who rightly distinguish what is necessary for salvation from what is not need have no such doubt. For if the prince or city gives a command that one can obey without endangering eternal salvation, it is unjust to disobey; and the apostle’s precepts apply (Col. iii. 20-22): “Children, obey your parents in all things; servants, obey your earthly masters in all things.” So does Christ’s command (Matth. xxiii. 2-3): “The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ chair; therefore observe and do whatever they command you.” Conversely, if they command us to do things punishable by eternal death, it would be madness not to choose natural death rather than eternal death through obedience. Then Christ’s words apply (Matth. x. 28): “Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul.” We must therefore consider everything that is necessary for salvation.
Everything necessary for salvation is contained in faith and obedience.
2 Everything necessary for salvation is comprised in two virtues, faith and obedience. The latter, if it could be perfect, would suffice by itself to preserve us from damnation. But because all of us were long ago guilty of disobedience to God in Adam, and have since committed sins ourselves, obedience is insufficient without forgiveness of sins. That forgiveness, together with entrance into the kingdom of heaven, is the reward of faith; nothing else is required for salvation. For the kingdom of heaven is closed only to sinners, that is, to those who have not duly obeyed the laws; and it is not closed even to them if they believe the necessary articles of Christian faith. If, then, we know what obedience consists in and which articles of Christian faith are necessary, we shall see at once what we must do, and what we must refrain from doing, at the command of cities and princes.
What sort of obedience is required of us.
3 Here obedience means not the deed but the will and desire with which we resolve and endeavor, as far as we can, to obey in the future. In this sense obedience is equivalent to repentance. The virtue of repentance consists not in the sorrow that accompanies the memory of sin but in turning to the right path and firmly resolving to sin no more. Without that resolve, sorrow is attributed not to a penitent person but to one in despair. Those who love God cannot fail to desire obedience to divine law; those who love their neighbors cannot fail to desire obedience to moral law, which consists (as shown above in chap. III.) in prohibiting pride, ingratitude, insult, inhumanity, cruelty, injury, and like offenses that harm our neighbors. Thus love, or charity, is also equivalent to obedience. Justice, a constant will to give every person what is due, is likewise equivalent to it. That faith and repentance suffice for salvation is evident from the baptismal covenant itself. When those converted by Peter on the day of Pentecost asked him what they should do, he answered (Acts ii. 38): “Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus, for the forgiveness of your sins.” Nothing, therefore, was required to obtain baptism—that is, to enter the kingdom of God—except repentance and belief in the name of Jesus, for the covenant made in baptism promises the kingdom of heaven. It is evident also from Christ’s words to the lawyer who asked what he should do to inherit eternal life (Luke xviii. 20): “You know the commandments: You shall not kill, you shall not commit adultery,” and so forth, referring to obedience; and (Mark x. 21): “Sell all you have, and come, follow me,” referring to faith. And from the saying, “The just shall live by faith”: not everyone, but the just, since justice is the same disposition of will as repentance and obedience. And from the words of St. Mark (i. 15): “The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent and believe the gospel.” These words plainly signify that no virtues besides repentance and faith are needed for our entrance into the kingdom of God. The obedience necessarily required for salvation, then, is simply the will or endeavor to obey: to act according to God’s laws, namely, the moral laws, which are the same for everyone, and the civil laws—that is, the commands of sovereigns in temporal matters and ecclesiastical laws in spiritual matters. These two kinds of laws differ among cities and Churches, and are known by their promulgation and public judgments.
What faith is, and how it differs from profession, knowledge, and opinion.
4 To understand what Christian faith is, we must define faith in general and distinguish it from other acts of the mind with which it is commonly confused. The object of faith in the broad sense—that which is believed—is always a proposition, that is, an affirmative or negative statement that we grant to be true. But because propositions are granted for different reasons, these kinds of assent have different names. Sometimes we grant propositions without receiving them into our minds: either provisionally, until we have examined their truth by considering their consequences, which we call supposing; or unconditionally, as through fear of the laws, which is to profess or confess by outward signs; or in willing accommodation, as people do out of courtesy toward those they respect and for the sake of peace with others, which is yielding outright. Propositions we do accept as true, however, we always grant for reasons of our own; these reasons arise either from the proposition itself or from the person presenting it. They arise from the proposition itself when we recall what the words composing it ordinarily signify by common agreement. Assent on this basis is called knowledge or science. But if we cannot recall what those words certainly mean, and seem to understand them now one way and now another, we are said to think. For example, suppose someone proposes that two and three make five. We recall that speakers of our language have by common agreement established the order of number words, as though by a contract necessary to human society, so that five names the number of units contained in two and three together. If one assents because two and three together are the same as five, this assent is called knowledge. To know this truth is simply to acknowledge that we ourselves made it: those by whose will and rules of speech the number || is called two, ||| is called three, and ||||| is called five have by that same will made the proposition “two and three together make five” true. Likewise, if we remember what theft is called and what injury is called, we shall understand from the words themselves whether theft is an injury. Truth is the same as a true proposition; a proposition is true when the consequent word, which logicians call the predicate, embraces the antecedent word, which they call the subject, within its scope. To know truth is to remember that we ourselves made it by the very adoption of the words. Plato’s old claim that knowledge is memory was neither rash nor ill considered. But sometimes words, though given certain and definite meanings by convention, are so wrenched from those meanings by common usage, whether to embellish or deceive, that recalling the concepts for which they were first assigned to things is very difficult, demanding sharp judgment and great diligence. There are also many words that have no proper, settled meaning that remains the same everywhere; they are understood not in themselves but through other signs used with them. Third, there are words for inconceivable things. We have no conception of the things they name, and seek in vain to establish from the words alone the truth of propositions made with them. In these cases, as we search for a proposition’s truth by examining definitions, we regard it as true at times and false at others, according to our hope of finding that truth. Each judgment separately is called thinking, and also believing; the two together are called doubting. But when our reasons for assenting to a proposition come not from the proposition itself but from the person who presents it—whom we consider too learned to be mistaken and see no reason to suspect of deception—our assent is called faith, since it rests not on confidence of our own but on another’s knowledge. Those whose reliability makes us believe are said to be people we trust, or trust in. What has been said shows the difference, first, between faith and profession: faith always includes inward assent, profession does not; the former is inward conviction, the latter outward obedience. Next, faith differs from opinion: opinion depends on our own reasoning, faith on our favorable judgment of another. Lastly, faith differs from knowledge: knowledge takes a proposition apart and chews it carefully; faith swallows it whole. Explaining the words in which a question is posed helps knowledge; indeed, definition is the only way to know. But it harms faith, for matters beyond human comprehension that are put forward for belief become not clearer through explanation but more obscure and harder to credit. A person who attempts to demonstrate the mysteries of faith by natural reason is like a sick person who insists on chewing wholesome but bitter pills before swallowing them, and promptly spits them out; had he swallowed them whole, they might have cured him.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
On What We Need to Enter the Kingdom of Heaven
1 The apparent conflict between obeying God and obeying people can be resolved by distinguishing what is necessary for salvation from what is not. 2. Everything necessary for salvation is included in faith and obedience. 3. What kind of obedience is required of us. 4. What faith is, and how it differs from profession, knowledge, and opinion. 5. What it means to believe in Christ. 6. The evangelists’ purpose proves that only the article that Jesus is the Christ is necessary for salvation. 7. The apostles’ preaching proves the same. 8. So does the ease of the Christian religion. 9. So does the fact that this article is the foundation of faith. 10. So do the clearest words of Christ and his apostles. 11. This article includes the faith of the Old Testament. 12. How faith and obedience work together for salvation. 13. In a Christian city, God’s commands and the city’s commands do not conflict. 14. Today’s religious controversies mostly concern the right to rule.
The apparent conflict between obeying God and obeying people can be resolved by distinguishing what is necessary for salvation from what is not.
1 Everyone has always agreed that authority in secular matters comes from whoever holds sovereign power, whether one person or an assembly. The preceding proofs show that authority in spiritual matters likewise depends on the authority of the Church. Moreover, every Christian city is a Church with this kind of authority. Even someone slow to understand can conclude that in a Christian city—that is, a city ruled by a Christian prince or council—all spiritual and secular power is united under Christ. Its authority must therefore be obeyed in everything. On the other hand, because we must obey God rather than people, a difficulty arises: how can we safely obey them if they ever command something Christ has forbidden? The difficulty comes from the fact that God no longer speaks openly to us through Christ and his prophets. He speaks through the holy Scriptures, which different people understand differently. People know what princes and an assembled Church command, but they do not know whether those commands conflict with God’s word. Their obedience wavers between the penalties of bodily and spiritual death. Sailing, as it were, between Scylla and Charybdis, they often run into both. But people who correctly distinguish what is necessary for salvation from what is not will have no such doubt. If someone can obey the prince or city without endangering eternal salvation, disobedience is unjust. Then the apostle’s instructions apply (Col. iii. 20-22): “Children, obey your parents in everything; servants, obey your earthly masters in everything.” Christ’s command also applies (Matth. xxiii. 2-3): “The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ chair; therefore observe and do everything they command you.” Conversely, if they order us to do things punishable by eternal death, it would be madness to choose eternal death through obedience rather than natural death. Then Christ’s words apply (Matth. x. 28): “Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul.” We must therefore determine everything necessary for salvation.
Everything necessary for salvation is included in faith and obedience.
2 Everything necessary for salvation comes under two virtues: faith and obedience. If obedience could be perfect, it would alone protect us from damnation. But all of us became guilty of disobedience to God long ago in Adam, and we ourselves have since committed sins. So obedience is not enough without forgiveness of sins. Forgiveness, along with entry into the kingdom of heaven, is the reward of faith. Nothing else is needed for salvation. The kingdom of heaven is closed only to sinners, meaning those who have not duly obeyed the laws. It is not closed even to them if they believe the necessary articles of Christian faith. Once we know what obedience consists of and which articles of Christian faith are necessary, we will know what we must do, and what we must refuse to do, when cities and princes command us.
What kind of obedience is required of us.
3 Here obedience means not the act itself but the will and desire with which we intend and try as hard as we can to obey in the future. In this sense obedience means the same as repentance. The virtue of repentance does not consist in feeling sorry when we remember a sin. It consists in changing course and firmly intending not to sin again. Without that intention, the sorrow is not a repentant person’s sorrow but a desperate person’s. Those who love God necessarily want to obey divine law. Those who love their neighbors necessarily want to obey moral law, which, as shown above in chap. III, forbids pride, ingratitude, insults, inhumanity, cruelty, injustice, and similar offenses that harm our neighbors. So love, or charity, also means the same as obedience. Justice, a steady will to give everyone what is due, means the same as well. That faith and repentance suffice for salvation is clear from the baptismal covenant itself. When the people Peter converted on the day of Pentecost asked him what to do, he answered (Acts ii. 38): “Repent and let each of you be baptized in the name of Jesus for the forgiveness of your sins.” Therefore, to receive baptism—that is, to enter God’s kingdom—they needed only to repent and believe in the name of Jesus. The baptismal covenant promises the kingdom of heaven. There are also Christ’s words to the lawyer who asked what he should do to inherit eternal life (Luke xviii. 20): “You know the commandments: You shall not kill; you shall not commit adultery,” and so on. These concern obedience. His words (Mark x. 21), “Sell everything you have, and come follow me,” concern faith. Again, it is said, “The just shall live by faith”: not everyone, but the just. Justice is the same disposition of the will as repentance and obedience. St. Mark’s words (i. 15) also say: “The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is near; repent and believe the gospel.” They make it quite clear that entry into God’s kingdom requires no virtues other than repentance and faith. The obedience necessary for salvation, then, is simply the will or effort to obey: to act according to God’s laws. These include the moral laws, which are the same for everyone, and the civil laws: the commands of sovereigns on temporal matters and ecclesiastical laws on spiritual matters. The latter two kinds of laws differ among cities and Churches and are known through their public proclamation and rulings.
What faith is, and how it differs from profession, knowledge, and opinion.
4 To understand Christian faith, we must define faith in general and distinguish it from other acts of the mind with which it is often confused. The object of faith in the general sense—the thing believed—is always a proposition. That is, it is an affirmative or negative statement we accept as true. But we accept propositions for different reasons, so these kinds of acceptance have different names. Sometimes we agree to propositions without accepting them in our minds. We may do so temporarily, until we have examined their truth by considering their consequences; this is called supposing. We may also agree outright from fear of the law; this is profession, or an outward declaration. Or we may agree voluntarily, out of courtesy to people we respect or to keep the peace with others; this is unconditional yielding. But when we accept propositions as true, we always have reasons of our own. These reasons come either from the proposition itself or from the person presenting it. They come from the proposition itself when we recall what its words usually mean by common agreement. Our assent is then called knowledge or science. If we cannot recall any certain meaning for the words, and understand them now one way and now another, we are said to think. For example, suppose someone proposes that two and three make five. We recall that speakers of our language have agreed on the order of number words, as if by a contract necessary to human society. Under that agreement, “five” names the number of units in two and three taken together. If a person accepts the proposition as true because two and three together are the same as five, that assent is called knowledge. Knowing this truth is simply recognizing that we made it ourselves. The people whose choice and rules of speech call || “two,” ||| “three,” and ||||| “five” also make the proposition “two and three taken together make five” true. Likewise, if we remember what “theft” and “injury” mean, we can tell from the words themselves whether theft is an injury. Truth is the same as a true proposition. A proposition is true when the word that follows, which logicians call the predicate, includes within its scope the word that comes before, which they call the subject. To know a truth is to remember that we ourselves made it by using words in that way. Plato’s old saying that knowledge is memory was not rash or ill considered. Sometimes words have a fixed, defined meaning by convention, yet ordinary use bends them so far from it, whether for decoration or deception, that it is very hard to recall the ideas for which the words were first assigned. Doing so demands sharp judgment and great care. Many words also have no proper, fixed meaning that stays the same everywhere. We understand them not on their own, but through other signs used with them. Third, some words name things that cannot be conceived. We have no conception of what those words name, so we search in vain for the truth of propositions made from such words alone. In these cases, as we examine definitions to find out whether a proposition is true, we may think it true or false according to our expectation of finding an answer. Either judgment alone is called thinking or believing; the two together are called doubting. But if our reasons for accepting a proposition come not from the proposition itself but from the person who presents it—someone we consider too learned to be mistaken and see no reason to suspect of deceit—our assent is called faith. It rests not on our own confidence but on another person’s knowledge. When we believe through confidence in people, we are said to trust them or trust in them. This shows, first, the difference between faith and profession. Faith always includes inward assent; profession does not. Faith is inward conviction, while profession is outward compliance. Next is the difference between faith and opinion: opinion rests on our own reasoning, faith on our high regard for someone else. Finally, knowledge works through a proposition deliberately, breaking it down and chewing it over; faith swallows it whole. Explaining the words used to state a question helps us gain knowledge. Indeed, definition is the only way to know. But it works against faith. Things beyond human understanding that we are asked to believe do not become clearer through explanation. Instead they become more obscure and harder to believe. Someone who tries to demonstrate the mysteries of faith by natural reason is like a sick person who insists on chewing beneficial but bitter pills before swallowing them. The person immediately spits them up, though swallowing them whole might have provided a cure.