Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Religion, Chapter XVII, 6
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26 The act of retaining sins is that which is called by the Church excommunication, and by St. Paul delivering over to Satan. The word excommunication sounding the same with ἀποσυάγωγον poiein], casting out of the synagogue, seems to be borrowed from the Mosaical law; wherein they who were by the priest adjudged leprous, were commanded (Levit. xiii. 46) to be kept apart out of the camp, until by the judgment of the priest they were again pronounced clean, and by certain rites, among which the washing of the body was one, were purified. From hence in process of time it become a custom of the Jews, not to receive those who passed from Gentilism to Judaism, supposing them to be unclean, unless they were first washed; and those who dissented from the doctrine of the synagogue, they cast out of the synagogue. By resemblance of this custom, those that came to Christianity, whether they were Jews or Gentiles, were not received into the Church without baptism; and those that dissented from the Church, were deprived of the Church’s communion. Now, they were therefore said to be delivered over to Satan, because all that was out of the Church, was comprehended within his kingdom. The end of this kind of discipline was, that being destitute for a time of the grace and spiritual privileges of the Church, they might be humbled to salvation; but the effect in regard of secular matters, that being excommunicated, they should not only be prohibited all congregations or churches, and the participation of the mysteries, but as being contagious they should be avoided by all other Christians, even more than heathen. For the apostle allowed to accompany with heathen; but with these, not so much as to eat (1 Cor. v. 10-11). Seeing then the effect of excommunication is such, it is manifest, in the first place, that a Christian city cannot be excommunicated. For a Christian city is a Christian Church, (as hath been declared above, in art. 21), and of the same extension; but a Church cannot be excommunicated. For either she must excommunicate herself, which is impossible; or she must be excommunicated by some other Church; and this, either universal or particular. But seeing an universal Church is no person, (as hath been proved in art. 22), and therefore neither acts nor does any thing, it cannot excommunicate any man; and a particular Church by excommunicating another Church, doth nothing. For where there is not one common congregation, there cannot be any excommunication. Neither if some one Church (suppose that of Jerusalem), should have excommunicated another, (suppose that of Rome), would it any more have excommunicated this, than herself: for he that deprives another of his communion, deprives himself also of the communion of that other. Secondly, no man can excommunicate the subjects of any absolute government all at once, or forbid them the use of their temples or their public worship of God. For they cannot be excommunicated by a Church, which themselves do constitute. For if they could, there would not only not remain a Church, but not so much as a commonweal, and they would be dissolved of themselves; and this were not to be excommunicated or prohibited. But if they be excommunicated by some other Church, that Church is to esteem them as heathen. But no Christian Church, by the doctrine of Christ, can forbid the heathen to gather together and communicate among themselves, as it shall seem good to their cities; especially if they meet to worship Christ, although it be done in a singular custom and manner: therefore also not the excommunicated, who are to be dealt with as heathen. Thirdly, a prince who hath the sovereign power, cannot be excommunicated. For by the doctrine of Christ, neither one nor many subjects together can interdict their prince any public or private places, or deny him entrance into any assembly whatsoever, or prohibit him the doing of what he will with his own jurisdiction. For it is treason among all cities, for any one or many subjects jointly to arrogate to themselves any authority over the whole city. But they who arrogate to themselves an authority over him who hath the supreme power of the city, do arrogate the same authority over the city itself. Besides, a sovereign prince, if he be a Christian, hath this further advantage; that the city whose will is contained in his, is that very thing which we call a Church. The Church therefore excommunicates no man, but whom it excommunicates by the authority of the prince. But the prince excommunicates not himself; his subjects therefore cannot do it. It may be indeed, that an assembly of rebellious citizens or traitors may pronounce the sentence of excommunication against their prince; but not by right. Much less can one prince be excommunicated by another; for this would prove not an excommunication, but a provocation to war by the way of affront. For since that is not one Church, which is made up of citizens belonging to two absolute cities, for want of power of lawfully assembling them, (as hath been declared before, in art. 22); they who are of one Church are not bound to obey another, and therefore cannot be excommunicated for their disobedience. Now, what some may say, that princes, seeing they are members of the universal Church, may also by the authority of the universal Church be excommunicated, signifies nothing: because the universal Church, (as hath been showed in art. 22), is not one person, of whom it may be said that she acted, decreed, determined, excommunicated, absolved, and the like personal attributes; neither hath she any governor upon earth, at whose command she may assemble and deliberate. For to be guide of the universal Church, and to have the power of assembling her, is the same thing as to be governor and lord over all the Christians in the world; which is granted to none, but God only.
The interpretation of Scripture depends on the authority of the city.
27 It hath been showed above in art. 18, that the authority of interpreting the Holy Scriptures consisted not in this, that the interpreter might without punishment expound and explicate his sentence and opinion taken thence unto others, either by writing or by his own voice; but that others have not a right to do or teach aught contrary to his sentence; insomuch as the interpretation we speak of, is the same with the power of defining in all manner of controversies to be determined by sacred Scriptures. Now we must show that that power belongs to each Church; and depends on his or their authority who have the supreme command, provided that they be Christians. For if it depend not on the civil authority, it must either depend on the opinion of each private subject, or some foreign authority. But among other reasons, the inconveniences that must follow private opinions, cannot suffer its dependance on them. Of which this is the chief; that not only all civil obedience would be taken away (contrary to Christ’s precept); but all human society and peace would be dissolved (contrary to the laws of nature). For seeing every man is his own interpreter of Scripture, that is to say, since every man makes himself judge of what is pleasing and displeasing unto God; they cannot obey their princes, before that they have judged whether their commands be conformable to the word of God, or not. And thus either they obey not, or they obey for their own opinion’s sake; that is to say, they obey themselves, not their sovereign; civil obedience therefore is lost. Again, when every man follows his own opinion, it is necessary that the controversies which rise among them, should become innumerable and indeterminable; whence there will breed among men, who by their own natural inclinations do account all dissensions an affront, first hatred, then brawls and wars; and thus all manner of peace and society would vanish. We have furthermore for an example, that which God under the old law required to be observed concerning the book of the law; namely, that it should be transcribed and publicly used; and he would have it to be the canon of divine doctrine, but the controversies about it not to be determined by private persons, but only by the priests. Lastly, it is our Saviour’s precept, that if there be any matter of offence between private persons, they should hear the Church. Wherefore it is the Church’s duty to define controversies; it therefore belongs not to private men, but to the Church to interpret Scriptures. But that we may know that the authority of interpreting God’s Word, that is to say, of determining all questions concerning God and religion, belongs not to any foreign person whatsoever; we must consider, first, what weight such a power has in the minds of the citizens, and their actions. For no man can be ignorant that the voluntary actions of men, by a natural necessity, do follow those opinions which they have concerning good and evil, reward and punishment. Whence it happens, that necessarily they would choose rather to obey those, by whose judgment they believe that they shall be eternally happy or miserable. Now, by whose judgment it is appointed what doctrines are necessary to salvation, by their judgment do men expect their eternal bliss or perdition; they will therefore yield them obedience in all things. Which being thus, most manifest it is, that those subjects, who believe themselves bound to acquiesce to a foreign authority in those doctrines which are necessary to salvation, do not per se constitute a city, but are the subjects of that foreign power. Nor therefore, although some sovereign prince should by writing grant such an authority to any other, yet so as he would be understood to have retained the civil power in his own hands, shall such a writing be valid, or transfer aught necessary for the retaining or good administration of his command. For by chap. II. art. 4, no man is said to transfer his right, unless he give some proper sign, declaring his will to transfer it. But he who hath openly declared his will to keep his sovereignty, cannot have given a sufficient sign of transferring the means necessary for the keeping it. This kind of writing therefore will not be a sign of will, but of ignorance in the contractors. We must consider next, how absurd it is for a city or sovereign to commit the ruling of his subjects’ consciences to an enemy; for they are, as hath been showed above in chap. V. art. 6, in an hostile state, whosoever have not joined themselves into the unity of one person. Nor contradicts it this truth, that they do not always fight: for truces are made between enemies. It is sufficient for an hostile mind, that there is suspicion; that the frontiers of cities, kingdoms, empires, strengthened with garrisons, do with a fighting posture and countenance, though they strike not, yet as enemies mutually behold each other. Lastly, how unequal is it to demand that, which by the very reason of your demand you confess to be the right of another. I am the interpreter of Scriptures to you, who are the subject of another state. Why? By what covenants passed between you and me? By divine authority. Whence known? Out of holy Scripture: behold the book, read it. In vain, unless I may also interpret the same for myself. That interpretation therefore doth by right belong to me, and the rest of my private fellow-subjects; which we both deny. It remains therefore that in all Christian Churches, that is to say, in all Christian cities, the interpretation of sacred Scripture, that is to say, the right of determining all controversies, depends on and derives from the authority of that man or council, which hath the sovereign power of the city.
A Christian city must interpret Scriptures by clergymen.
28 Now because there are two kinds of controversies: the one about spiritual matters, that is to say, questions of faith, the truth whereof cannot be searched into by natural reason; such are the questions concerning the nature and office of Christ, of rewards and punishments to come, of the sacraments, of outward worship, and the like: the other, about questions of human science, whose truth is sought out by natural reason and syllogisms, drawn from the covenants of men, and definitions, that is to say, significations received by use and common consent of words; such as are all questions of right and philosophy; for example, when in matter of right it is questioned, whether there be a promise and covenant, or not, that is nothing else but to demand whether such words, spoken in such a manner, be by common use and consent of the subjects a promise or covenant; which if they be so called, then it is true that a contract is made; if not, then it is false: that truth therefore depends on the compacts and consents of men. In like manner, when it is demanded in philosophy, whether the same thing may entirely be in divers places at once; the determination of the question depends on the knowledge of the common consent of men, about the signification of the word entire. For if men, when they say a thing is entirely somewhere, do signify by common consent that they understand nothing of the same to be elsewhere; it is false that the same thing is in divers places at once. That truth therefore depends on the consents of men, and by the same reason, in all other questions concerning right and philosophy. And they who do judge that anything can be determined, contrary to this common consent of men concerning the appellations of things, out of obscure places of Scripture; do also judge that the use of speech, and at once all human society, is to be taken away. For he who hath sold a whole field, will say he meant one whole ridge; and will retain the rest as unsold. Nay, they take away reason itself; which is nothing else but a searching out of the truth made by such consent. This kind of questions, therefore, need not be determined by the city by way of interpretation of Scriptures; for they belong not to God’s Word, in that sense wherein the Word of God is taken for the Word concerning God; that is to say, for the doctrine of the gospel. Neither is he who hath the sovereign power in the Church, obliged to employ any ecclesiastical doctors for the judging of any such kind of matters as these. But for the deciding of questions of faith, that is to say, concerning God, which transcend human capacity, we stand in need of a divine blessing, (that we may not be deceived at least in necessary points), to be derived from Christ himself by the imposition of hands. For, seeing to the end we may attain to eternal salvation we are obliged to a supernatural doctrine, and which therefore it is impossible for us to understand; to be left so destitute as that we can be deceived in necessary points, is repugnant to equity. This infallibility our Saviour Christ promised (in those things which are necessary to salvation) to his apostles until the day of judgment; that is to say, to the apostles, and pastors succeeding the apostles, who were to be consecrated by the imposition of hands. He therefore, who hath the sovereign power in the city, is obliged as a Christian, where there is any question concerning the mysteries of faith, to interpret the Holy Scriptures by clergymen lawfully ordained. And thus in Christian cities, the judgment both of spiritual and temporal matters belongs unto the civil authority. And that man or council who hath the supreme power, is head both of the city and of the Church; for a Church and a Christian city is but one thing.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
26 Retaining sins is what the Church calls excommunication, and St. Paul calls handing over to Satan. The word excommunication, corresponding in meaning to “casting out of the synagogue,” seems to derive from Mosaic law: those whom the priest judged to have leprosy were commanded (Levit. xiii. 46) to remain outside the camp until the priest pronounced them clean again, and certain rites, including washing the body, purified them. From this arose, over time, a Jewish custom of not receiving converts from Gentile religion into Judaism, on the supposition that they were unclean, until they had first been washed; those who dissented from the synagogue's doctrine were expelled from the synagogue. Following this custom, converts to Christianity, whether Jews or Gentiles, were not admitted to the Church without baptism; those who dissented from the Church were deprived of its communion. They were said to be handed over to Satan because everything outside the Church lay within his kingdom. The purpose of this discipline was that, deprived for a time of the Church's grace and spiritual privileges, they might be humbled and saved. Its effect in secular affairs, however, was that the excommunicated were excluded not only from all congregations or churches and from participation in the mysteries, but, as if contagious, were shunned by other Christians even more than heathens. The apostle allowed association with heathens; with the excommunicated, one was not even to eat (1 Cor. v. 10-11). Given this effect of excommunication, it is clear, first, that a Christian city cannot be excommunicated. A Christian city is a Christian Church, as shown above in art. 21, and the two have the same extent; but a Church cannot be excommunicated. It would either have to excommunicate itself, which is impossible, or be excommunicated by another Church, whether universal or particular. But since the universal Church is not a person, as proved in art. 22, and therefore neither acts nor does anything, it cannot excommunicate anyone. A particular Church accomplishes nothing by excommunicating another, for where there is no common congregation there can be no excommunication. If one Church, say Jerusalem, were to excommunicate another, say Rome, it would no more excommunicate Rome than itself: whoever denies another his communion also denies himself communion with the other. Second, no one can excommunicate all the subjects of an absolute government together or forbid them to use their temples or worship God publicly. They cannot be excommunicated by a Church that they themselves constitute. If they could, not only would no Church remain, but no commonwealth either; they would dissolve themselves, which is not excommunication or prohibition. If they are excommunicated by another Church, that Church must regard them as heathens. But under Christ's teaching no Christian Church can forbid heathens to assemble and hold communion among themselves as their cities think fit, especially if they gather to worship Christ, even according to a distinct custom and manner. Nor, therefore, can it forbid those excommunicated, who must be treated as heathens. Third, a prince who holds sovereign power cannot be excommunicated. Under Christ's teaching, no subject, singly or in company with others, can bar his prince from any public or private place, deny him entry to any assembly whatever, or prevent him from doing as he wishes within his own jurisdiction. In every city it is treason for one or more subjects to claim authority over the entire city. Those who claim authority over the holder of supreme power in the city claim the same authority over the city itself. A sovereign prince who is a Christian has a further advantage: the city whose will is contained in his will is itself what we call a Church. The Church therefore excommunicates no one except by the prince's authority. The prince does not excommunicate himself, and his subjects therefore cannot do so. An assembly of rebellious citizens or traitors may indeed pronounce excommunication against their prince, but without right. Still less can one prince be excommunicated by another: that would be not excommunication but an affront provoking war. Citizens belonging to two absolute cities do not form one Church, since there is no power lawfully to assemble them, as explained in art. 22. The members of one Church are not bound to obey another and cannot be excommunicated for failing to obey it. Some may say that princes, as members of the universal Church, can be excommunicated by its authority. This means nothing. As shown in art. 22, the universal Church is not a person of whom one can say that she acted, decreed, decided, excommunicated, absolved, or performed any similar personal act. Nor has she any earthly governor at whose command she could assemble and deliberate. To guide the universal Church and have the power to assemble her is the same as to govern and rule all the Christians in the world, a power belonging to God alone.
The interpretation of Scripture depends on the city's authority.
27 It was shown above in art. 18 that authority to interpret holy Scripture does not consist in an interpreter's freedom to explain to others, in writing or speech and without punishment, the judgment and opinion he draws from it. Rather, it consists in others' having no right to act or teach contrary to his judgment. The interpretation at issue is therefore the power to decide every kind of controversy to be settled by sacred Scripture. We must now show that this power belongs to each Church and depends on the authority of whoever holds supreme command there, provided they are Christians. If it does not depend on civil authority, it must rest either on the opinion of each private subject or on some foreign authority. Among other objections, the consequences of private opinions make the first alternative intolerable. Most important, all civil obedience would be lost, contrary to Christ's command, and all human society and peace dissolved, contrary to the laws of nature. For if each person is his own interpreter of Scripture, and so judges for himself what pleases or displeases God, no one can obey his prince before judging whether the prince's commands accord with God's word. People will then either refuse obedience or obey for the sake of their own opinion; in other words, they will obey themselves and not their sovereign. Civil obedience is thus lost. Again, when everyone follows his own opinion, the controversies arising among them must become countless and impossible to settle. Since people are naturally inclined to regard disagreement as an affront, these controversies will breed first hatred, then quarrels and wars, and every form of peace and society will disappear. We have, besides, the example of what God required under the old law concerning the book of the law: it was to be copied and used publicly, and he made it the canon of divine doctrine; but disputes over it were to be decided not by private people but only by priests. Finally, our Savior commands private individuals who have a grievance against one another to hear the Church. It is therefore the Church's duty to decide controversies, and the interpretation of Scripture belongs to the Church, not to private individuals. To see that authority to interpret God's word—that is, to decide every question concerning God and religion—belongs to no foreign person whatever, we must first consider the force such a power has over citizens' minds and actions. Everyone knows that human voluntary actions necessarily follow people's opinions about good and evil, reward and punishment. People will therefore necessarily prefer to obey those by whose judgment they believe they will be eternally happy or miserable. They look for eternal bliss or perdition according to the judgment of those who determine which doctrines are necessary for salvation, and will consequently obey those judges in everything. It is thus perfectly clear that subjects who believe themselves bound to submit to a foreign authority concerning doctrines necessary for salvation do not by themselves constitute a city: they are subjects of that foreign power. Accordingly, even if a sovereign prince granted such authority to someone else in writing, intending nonetheless to retain civil power in his own hands, that writing would be invalid and would transfer nothing needed to retain or properly administer his command. By chap. II. art. 4, no one is said to transfer his right unless he gives some unmistakable sign of his will to transfer it. Someone who has openly declared his will to keep his sovereignty cannot have given sufficient sign of transferring the means required to preserve it. Such a document therefore signifies not the parties' will, but their ignorance. Next we must consider how absurd it is for a city or sovereign to entrust the governance of his subjects' consciences to an enemy. As shown above in chap. V. art. 6, all who have not joined into the unity of one person stand in a state of hostility. The fact that they do not always fight does not contradict this: enemies make truces. Suspicion is enough to reveal a hostile disposition. The frontiers of cities, kingdoms, and empires, fortified with garrisons, face one another in a posture and expression of combat; though they do not strike, they look upon each other as enemies. Finally, how unreasonable it is to demand what the very grounds of your demand concede to be someone else's right. “I am the interpreter of Scripture for you, a subject of another state.” Why? On what covenant between us? “By divine authority.” How is that known? “From holy Scripture: here is the book; read it.” To no purpose, unless I may interpret it for myself as well. The right of interpretation therefore belongs to me and my fellow private subjects, which we both deny. It remains, then, that in every Christian Church—that is, every Christian city—the interpretation of sacred Scripture, or the right to decide all controversies, depends on and derives from the authority of the man or council holding the city's sovereign power.
A Christian city must interpret Scripture through clergymen.
28 There are two kinds of controversies. One concerns spiritual matters, questions of faith whose truth cannot be discovered by natural reason: questions about Christ's nature and office, future rewards and punishments, the sacraments, outward worship, and the like. The other concerns human knowledge, questions whose truth is sought through natural reason and syllogisms drawn from human covenants and definitions—that is, meanings established by common usage and agreement. These include all questions of right and philosophy. In a question of right, for example, to ask whether a promise or covenant has been made is only to ask whether words spoken in a certain manner are called a promise or covenant by the subjects' common usage and agreement. If they are, then it is true that a contract was made; if not, it is false. That truth therefore depends on human agreements and consent. Likewise, when philosophy asks whether the same thing can be entirely in several places at once, the answer depends on knowing what people commonly agree the word entire means. If, by saying a thing is entirely somewhere, people commonly mean that no part of it is anywhere else, then it is false that the same thing can be in several places at once. This truth also depends on human agreement, as do all other questions of right and philosophy. Those who believe obscure passages of Scripture can decide something contrary to people's common agreement about the names of things thereby believe that speech itself, and with it all human society, should be abolished. Someone who has sold an entire field will claim he meant one entire furrow, and retain the rest as unsold. Indeed, they abolish reason itself, which consists in seeking truth through such agreement. Questions of this kind therefore need not be settled by the city through interpretation of Scripture. They do not concern God's word in the sense of the word concerning God—that is, the doctrine of the gospel. Nor is the holder of sovereign power in the Church bound to employ ecclesiastical teachers to judge any such matters. But to decide questions of faith, questions concerning God that exceed human understanding, we need a divine blessing, derived from Christ himself through the laying on of hands, so that at least we will not be deceived on points necessary to salvation. For since we are obliged to accept a supernatural doctrine in order to attain eternal salvation, a doctrine we cannot therefore understand, it would be contrary to equity to leave us so bereft that we could be deceived on essential points. Our Savior Christ promised this infallibility in matters necessary to salvation to his apostles until the day of judgment: that is, to the apostles and the pastors who would succeed them, consecrated by the laying on of hands. As a Christian, therefore, the holder of sovereign power in a city is obliged, when a question arises about the mysteries of faith, to interpret holy Scripture through lawfully ordained clergymen. Thus, in Christian cities, judgment in spiritual and temporal matters alike belongs to the civil authority. The man or council holding supreme power is head of both the city and the Church, for a Church and a Christian city are one and the same thing.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
26 Retaining sins is what the Church calls excommunication and what St. Paul calls handing someone over to Satan. The word excommunication means casting out of the synagogue and seems to come from the law of Moses. That law commanded people whom a priest judged to have leprosy to remain outside the camp (Levit. xiii. 46). They stayed apart until a priest judged them clean again and they were purified by certain rites, including washing their bodies. In time, this gave rise to a Jewish custom of not admitting converts from Gentile religion to Judaism without first washing them, because they were regarded as unclean. Jews also expelled from the synagogue those who disagreed with its teaching. Following a similar custom, Jews and Gentiles who became Christians were not admitted to the Church without baptism. People who disagreed with the Church were excluded from its communion. They were said to be handed over to Satan because everything outside the Church was included in his kingdom. This discipline was intended to leave them for a time without the Church's grace and spiritual privileges, so that they might be humbled and saved. In worldly matters, the effect was that the excommunicated were barred not only from all congregations or churches and from sharing in the sacred rites. Other Christians were also to avoid them as if they were contagious, even more than they avoided heathens. The apostle allowed Christians to associate with heathens, but told them not even to eat with these people (1 Cor. v. 10-11). Given these effects of excommunication, it is clear, first, that a Christian city cannot be excommunicated. A Christian city is a Christian Church, as explained above in art. 21, and they have exactly the same membership. But a Church cannot be excommunicated. It would have to excommunicate itself, which is impossible, or be excommunicated by another Church, either the universal Church or a particular one. The universal Church is not a person, as shown in art. 22. It cannot act or do anything and so cannot excommunicate anyone. A particular Church achieves nothing by excommunicating another Church, because excommunication cannot exist where there is no common congregation. If, for example, the Church of Jerusalem excommunicated the Church of Rome, it would exclude itself just as much as Rome. Anyone who denies another person communion with himself also denies himself communion with that person. Second, no one can excommunicate all the subjects of any absolute government at once, or forbid them to use their places of worship or worship God publicly. The Church they themselves make up cannot excommunicate them. If it could, neither a Church nor even a commonwealth would remain: they would dissolve themselves. That would not be excommunication or prohibition. If another Church excommunicates them, it must regard them as heathens. But Christ's teaching gives no Christian Church the power to forbid heathens to gather and share in worship as their own cities see fit. This is especially true if they gather to worship Christ, even in a distinctive manner. The same holds for the excommunicated, who must be treated as heathens. Third, a prince with sovereign power cannot be excommunicated. Christ's teaching does not permit one subject or many subjects together to bar their prince from any public or private place, deny him entrance to any assembly, or prevent him from exercising his own jurisdiction as he wishes. In every city, it is treason for one subject or several together to claim authority over the whole city. Those who claim authority over the city's supreme ruler claim the same authority over the city itself. A Christian sovereign prince has a further advantage. The city whose will is expressed in his will is precisely what we call a Church. The Church therefore excommunicates someone only through the prince's authority. The prince does not excommunicate himself, so his subjects cannot do so. An assembly of rebellious citizens or traitors may indeed pronounce an excommunication against its prince, but has no right to do it. Still less can one prince excommunicate another. That would not be excommunication but a hostile insult provoking war. Citizens of two independent cities do not make up one Church, because there is no power to summon them lawfully together, as explained in art. 22. Members of one Church are not required to obey another Church and cannot be excommunicated for disobeying it. Some may say that princes are members of the universal Church and may therefore be excommunicated on its authority. That argument accomplishes nothing. As shown in art. 22, the universal Church is not one person that can be said to act, decree, decide, excommunicate, forgive, or do anything else a person does. Nor does it have an earthly ruler who can call it together to deliberate. To lead the universal Church and have power to assemble it is the same as ruling and being lord over all the Christians in the world. That power belongs to God alone.
The authority to interpret Scripture depends on the city's authority.
27 Article 18 showed that authority to interpret Holy Scripture does not simply mean being free to explain one's views about it to others, whether in writing or aloud, without punishment. It means that others have no right to act or teach against the interpreter's decision. The kind of interpretation at issue is thus the power to decide every kind of dispute that is to be settled by Scripture. We must now show that this power belongs to each Church and depends on the authority of whoever has sovereign command there, provided the rulers are Christians. If it does not depend on civil authority, it must depend either on each individual subject's opinion or on some foreign authority. Among other reasons, the harmful results of private opinions rule out depending on them. The most important result is that all civil obedience would disappear, against Christ's command, and all human society and peace would break down, against the laws of nature. If each person interprets Scripture for himself, each person judges for himself what pleases or displeases God. People cannot then obey their princes until they have judged whether the princes' commands agree with God's word. They either refuse to obey or obey because of their own opinions. In the latter case they obey themselves rather than their sovereign, and civil obedience is lost. Also, if everyone follows his own opinion, disputes among them will be countless and impossible to settle. People are naturally inclined to take every disagreement as an insult. Hatred will follow, then quarrels and wars, until all peace and society disappear. We also have the example of what God required under the old law concerning the book of the law. It was to be copied and used publicly, and God meant it to be the standard of divine teaching. But disputes about it were to be settled by the priests alone, not by private individuals. Finally, our Savior commands people involved in a private offense to hear the Church. So the Church's duty is to settle disputes, and the interpretation of Scripture belongs to the Church, not to individuals. We must also understand why authority to interpret God's word—that is, to decide all questions concerning God and religion—cannot belong to any foreign person. First, consider how much such power affects the minds and actions of citizens. Everyone knows that people's voluntary actions necessarily follow their opinions about good and evil, rewards and punishments. They will therefore prefer to obey those whose judgment they believe determines whether they will be eternally happy or miserable. People look to those who decide what teachings are necessary for salvation to determine their eternal happiness or damnation. They will therefore obey those people in everything. Subjects who believe they must accept a foreign authority's judgment about the teachings necessary for salvation do not in themselves form a city. They are subjects of that foreign power. Suppose even that a sovereign prince gave such authority to someone else in writing, while intending to keep civil power for himself. The document would not be valid or transfer anything necessary to retain or properly exercise his command. According to chap. II. art. 4, a person transfers a right only by giving an appropriate sign of his intention to transfer it. Someone who openly declares his intention to keep sovereignty cannot have given a sufficient sign that he intends to transfer the means needed to keep it. Such a document shows that the parties did not understand what they were doing; it does not show an intention to transfer the right. Next, consider how absurd it would be for a city or sovereign to place the government of its subjects' consciences in an enemy's hands. As shown above in chap. V. art. 6, those who have not united as one person are in a state of hostility toward one another. The fact that they do not always fight does not disprove this: enemies can agree to truces. Suspicion is enough to show a hostile attitude. Cities, kingdoms, and empires fortify their borders with garrisons. Though they do not strike, they face and watch one another as enemies ready to fight. Finally, how unreasonable it is to demand something that the grounds of your own demand admit is another person's right. Imagine that I tell you, a subject of another state, “I am your interpreter of Scripture.” Why? What covenant exists between you and me? “Divine authority.” How do we know of it? “From Holy Scripture. Here is the book; read it.” That answer is useless unless I may also interpret the book for myself. The right of interpretation would then belong to me and my fellow private subjects, precisely what we both deny. It follows that in every Christian Church, that is, in every Christian city, the interpretation of Scripture—the right to decide every dispute—depends on and comes from the authority of the person or council holding sovereign power in that city.
A Christian city must have Scripture interpreted by clergymen.
28 There are two kinds of dispute. One concerns spiritual matters: questions of faith whose truth natural reason cannot discover. These include questions about Christ's nature and office, future rewards and punishments, the sacraments, public worship, and similar matters. The other kind concerns human knowledge. Its truth is discovered by natural reason and by arguments based on people's covenants and definitions—that is, the meanings words acquire through usage and common agreement. All questions of right and philosophy are of this kind. For example, when people ask in a matter of right whether a promise and covenant exist, they are simply asking whether subjects ordinarily agree that words spoken in that way constitute a promise or covenant. If those words are called a promise or covenant, it is true that a contract was made. If they are not, it is false. That truth depends on agreements among people. Similarly, when people ask in philosophy whether the same thing can be entirely in several places at once, the answer depends on understanding what people commonly agree the word “entirely” means. If by saying that something is entirely in one place they commonly mean that no part of it is elsewhere, then it is false that it can be in several places at once. That truth, too, depends on people's agreement, as does the truth of every other question of right and philosophy. Some people believe that obscure passages of Scripture can settle such questions against people's common agreement about the names of things. They thereby propose to do away with the use of language and, with it, all human society. Someone who has sold an entire field could claim he meant only one whole furrow and keep the rest as unsold. They also do away with reason itself, which is simply the search for truth by means of these agreed meanings. Therefore a city does not need to settle such questions by interpreting Scripture. They do not concern God's word when “the word of God” means the word about God, or the teaching of the gospel. The person with sovereign power in the Church is not obliged to use Church teachers to judge any such matter. But to settle questions of faith concerning God, which exceed human understanding, we need a divine blessing from Christ himself, transmitted by the laying on of hands. This blessing keeps us from error at least on points necessary for salvation. Eternal salvation requires us to accept a teaching that is supernatural and therefore impossible for us to understand. It would be unfair if we were left so helpless that we could be mistaken about the points necessary for salvation. Our Savior Christ promised this freedom from error, in matters necessary for salvation, to his apostles until the day of judgment. That means the apostles and the pastors who succeeded them, consecrated by the laying on of hands. Thus a city's sovereign, as a Christian, must have lawfully ordained clergymen interpret Holy Scripture whenever a question arises about the mysteries of faith. In Christian cities, civil authority therefore judges both spiritual and worldly matters. The person or council with supreme power is the head of both the city and the Church, because a Church and a Christian city are one and the same thing.