Religion, Chapter XV, 3

These, then, are the principal natural laws concerning the worship of God—those, I mean, which reason dictates to every individual. To whole commonwealths, each of which is one person, the same natural reason further commands uniform public worship. Acts done by individuals according to their private reasoning are not acts of the commonwealth, and therefore are not its worship. What the commonwealth does, however, is understood to be done at the command of the person or persons holding sovereignty, and therefore with the consent of all the subjects—that is, uniformly.

In the natural kingdom of God, the commonwealth may prescribe whatever worship it pleases.

16 The natural laws laid out in the preceding article concerning divine worship command only that natural signs of honor be given. But we must consider that signs are of two kinds: natural signs and signs made by agreement, whether express or tacit. Since the use of words and names in every language arises by convention, it can also be changed by convention: what derives its force from the will of men can be changed again or abolished by the same men acting in agreement. Thus names attributed to God by human convention can also be withdrawn by human convention. And whatever men can do by agreement, the commonwealth can do. It therefore belongs by right to the commonwealth—that is, to those who wield its entire power—to judge which names or titles for God are more honorable and which less; in other words, which doctrines about God's nature and works are to be held and professed. Actions, however, signify not by human convention but by nature, as effects are signs of their causes. Some actions are always signs of contempt toward those in whose presence they are done, such as exposing the body's uncleanness or doing anything men would be ashamed to do before people they respect. Others are always signs of honor, such as approaching and speaking decently and humbly, giving way, or yielding in some matter of private advantage. The commonwealth can change nothing about these acts. But countless other acts are in themselves neither honorable nor insulting. These can be made signs of honor by the commonwealth's institution, and when so made they really become such signs. We may therefore understand that we must obey whatever the commonwealth commands to be used as a sign of honoring God—that is, as worship—provided it is capable of being instituted as a sign of honor. For whatever the commonwealth commands to be used as a sign of honor is a sign of honor.

When God rules by nature alone, the commonwealth—that is, the man or council holding sovereignty under God—is the interpreter of all laws.

17 We have already explained what God's laws, sacred and secular, are when he governs by nature alone. But since everyone can err in reasoning, and men do in fact differ in opinion about most actions, it may further be asked whom God would have interpret right reason, that is, his laws. As to secular laws—by which I mean those concerning justice and men's conduct toward one another—we have demonstrated from what was said earlier about the constitution of a commonwealth that reason assigns all judgment to the commonwealth. Judgment is nothing but the interpretation of laws. It follows that everywhere commonwealths, meaning those who hold sovereign power, interpret the laws. As to sacred laws, we must consider what has already been demonstrated in chap. V. art. 13: every subject has transferred as much right as he could to the person or persons holding supreme authority. He could transfer his right to judge the proper manner of honoring God; therefore he has transferred it. That he could do so is clear from this: before a commonwealth was constituted, every man had to derive the manner of honoring God from his own private reason. But every man can submit his private reason to the reason of the whole commonwealth. Moreover, if each man followed his own reason in worshipping God, amid such a diversity of worshippers one would be likely to judge another's worship unbecoming or impious; neither would appear to the other to honor God. Thus even the worship most consonant with reason would not be worship, because worship by nature is a sign of inward honor. But a sign is something by which something else becomes known to others; there can therefore be no sign of honor unless others recognize it as such. Again, a sign made by men's consent is a true sign; hence what becomes a sign of honor by men's consent—that is, by the commonwealth's command—is honorable. It is therefore not contrary to God's will, as declared through reason alone, to give him such signs of honor as the commonwealth commands. Subjects can thus transfer their right to judge the manner of God's worship to the person or persons holding sovereign power. Indeed, they must do so. Otherwise every absurd opinion about God's nature, and every ridiculous ceremony ever practiced by any nation, would be on display at once in the same commonwealth. Every man would then believe all the others were affronting God, so that it could not truly be said of anyone that he worshipped God. For no one worships God—that is, honors him outwardly—except by doing those things that appear to others to honor him. We may conclude, therefore, that when God rules by nature alone, the interpretation of all laws, sacred and secular alike, rests with the authority of the commonwealth: the man or council entrusted with sovereign power. Whatever God commands, he commands through its voice; and conversely, whatever its rulers command concerning either the manner of honoring God or secular affairs is commanded by God himself.

Certain doubts resolved.

18 Against this, someone may first ask: does it follow that we must obey the commonwealth if it directly commands us to affront God or forbids us to worship him? I say it does not follow, and we must not obey. No one can understand an affront, or a refusal to worship at all, as a manner of worship. Before the commonwealth was constituted, moreover, no one who acknowledged God's rule had the right to deny him the honor then due to him; therefore no one could transfer to the commonwealth a right to command such things. Next, suppose it is asked whether the commonwealth must be obeyed if it commands something to be said or done that does not directly dishonor God, but from which dishonorable consequences could be drawn by reasoning: for example, if it commanded us to worship God in an image before people who considered that honorable. It must indeed be done.¹⁹ Worship is instituted as a sign of honor, and worshipping him thus is a sign of honor and increases God's honor among those who regard it as such. Or suppose it commands us to call God by a name whose meaning we do not know, or whose agreement with the word “God” we cannot understand: that too must be done. For something we do for the sake of honor, knowing no better, is a sign of honor if it is taken as such; to refuse it, therefore, is to refuse to increase God's honor. The same judgment applies to all disputable attributes and actions concerning the worship of God guided by reason alone. For although such commands may sometimes be contrary to right reason and thus sins in those who issue them, they are not contrary to right reason or sinful in subjects. In disputed matters, the right reason of subjects is that which submits to the reason of the commonwealth. Finally, suppose the man or council holding supreme power commands that he himself be worshipped with the same attributes and acts used in worshipping God. Must we obey? Many things can be attributed to both God and men: men too can be praised and magnified. Many acts, too, can be used in worshipping either God or men. What matters is what the attributes and acts signify. We must therefore refrain, even if princes command it, from attributes by which we declare our belief that any man possesses sovereignty independent of God, or is immortal or infinitely powerful, and the like. We must likewise refrain from acts signifying the same things: praying to someone absent; asking him for things only God can give, such as rain and fair weather; offering him what God alone can accept, such as offerings and burnt sacrifices; or giving him a form of worship than which no greater could be given, such as sacrifice. These things seem intended to make us think that God does not rule, contrary to what we assumed at the outset. But kneeling, prostration, or any other bodily act whatsoever may lawfully be used even in civil worship, since these may signify only an acknowledgment of civil power. Divine worship is distinguished from civil worship not by the body's movement, position, attire, or gesture, but by what we declare ourselves to believe about the one we worship. If we cast ourselves down before a man intending thereby to declare that we esteem him as God, that is divine worship. If we do the same thing to signify our acknowledgment of civil power, it is civil worship. Nor is divine worship distinguished from civil worship by an act usually designated by the words λατρεία and δουλεία: the former marks the servant's duty, the latter the servant's condition, and both designate the same act in different degrees.

What sin is in the natural kingdom of God, and what treason against the Divine Majesty is.

19 From what has been said, we may gather that when God reigns by natural reason alone, his subjects sin, first, if they break the moral laws set out in chapters II. and III.; second, if they break the laws or commands of the commonwealth in matters concerning justice; third, if they fail to worship God κατὰ τὰ νόμικα; fourth, if they fail to profess before men, in words and deeds, that there is one God, most good, most great, most blessed, the Supreme King of the world and of all worldly kings—in other words, if they do not worship God. This fourth sin in God's natural kingdom is, according to what was said in art. 2 of the preceding chapter, treason against the Divine Majesty: it is a denial of divine power, or atheism. For sins proceed here just as they would if we supposed a sovereign king who was absent and ruled through his viceroy. People would surely transgress against him if they failed to obey his viceroy in everything, except where that viceroy usurped the kingdom for himself or sought to give it to another. But those who obeyed the viceroy so absolutely as not to admit this exception might be said to be guilty of treason.

18 By reason of their weakness.] If anyone finds this difficult, I ask him to consider silently whether, if there were two omnipotent beings, either would be bound to obey the other. I believe he will admit that neither would. If that is true, then so is what I have maintained: men are subject to God because they are not omnipotent. Indeed, when our Savior warned Paul, who was then an enemy of the Church, not to kick against the goads, he seems to demand obedience of Paul because Paul lacked the power to resist.

19 It must indeed be done.] In art. 14 of this chapter we said that those who assigned limits to God violated the natural law concerning his worship. Now those who worship him in an image assign him limits; hence they do what they ought not to do. This passage therefore seems to contradict the former one. First, however, we must understand that those compelled by authority do not set bounds on God: the people commanding them do. Those who worship unwillingly do, in fact, worship; but they stand or fall wherever their lawful sovereign commands them to stand or fall. Second, when I say it must be done, I do not mean at every time and in every place, but only on the supposition that there is no rule for worshipping God other than the dictates of human reason. In that case the will of the commonwealth takes the place of reason. But in God's kingdom by covenant, whether old or new, where idolatry is expressly forbidden, we must not worship in this way even if the commonwealth commands us to do so. Anyone who perceived a contradiction between this and art. 14 will surely cease to think so if he considers this distinction.

These are the main natural laws concerning the worship of God, by which I mean the laws reason teaches each person. But the same natural reason also commands entire cities, each of which is one person, to worship publicly in a uniform way. What individuals do according to their private reasoning is not an act of the city and therefore is not the city’s worship. An act of the city, by contrast, is understood as commanded by whoever holds sovereignty. It therefore has the consent of all the subjects: they act together in the same way.

In God’s natural kingdom, the city may choose what form of worship it wants.

16 The natural laws about divine worship stated in the preceding article require only natural signs of honor. But there are two kinds of signs: natural ones and those established by agreement, either openly or implicitly. Words and names acquire their meanings through convention in every language. The same convention can change their meanings again. Anything that gets its force from people’s choices can be changed or abolished when those people agree to do so. Therefore, names given to God by human convention can be withdrawn by human convention. The city can do what people can do by agreement. The city—or those who hold its collective power—therefore has the right to decide which names and titles honor God more and which honor him less. In other words, it decides what doctrines about God’s nature and actions people must hold and profess. Actions, unlike words, convey meaning naturally rather than by human convention, just as effects are signs of their causes. Some actions always show contempt for those present: actions that expose bodily filth, for example, and anything people are ashamed to do in front of those they respect. Others always show honor, such as approaching and speaking respectfully and humbly, stepping aside, or yielding some private advantage. The city can change nothing about the meaning of these actions. But countless other actions are neither naturally honorable nor naturally insulting. The city can establish these as signs of honor, and once it does, they really become such signs. We can therefore understand why we must obey the city in whatever it commands us to do as a sign of honoring God, that is, as worship, provided the act can serve as a sign of honor. It becomes a sign of honor through the city’s command that it be used as one.

When God rules by nature alone, the city—that is, the person or council holding sovereign authority under God—interprets all the laws.

17 We have already explained which laws, sacred and secular alike, belong to God’s rule by nature alone. But anyone can reason incorrectly, and people disagree about most actions. So we may ask whom God wants to interpret sound reason, and therefore his laws. As for secular laws, meaning those about justice and how people treat one another, what we said earlier about establishing a city demonstrates that all judicial authority belongs to the city. Judging is simply interpreting the laws. It follows that cities everywhere—that is, those holding sovereign power—interpret those laws. As for sacred laws, we must recall what was proved in chap. V. art. 13: every subject has transferred as much right as possible to the person or group with supreme authority. A person could transfer the right to decide how God should be honored, and therefore has done so. We know the person could transfer it because, before a city existed, each person had to use private reason to decide how to honor God. Anyone can submit private reason to the reason of the whole city. Moreover, if each person followed private reason in worshipping God, the many different worshippers would judge each other’s worship improper or irreverent. None would appear to the others to honor God. Even the worship most consistent with reason would then not count as worship. By its nature, worship is a sign of inward honor. A sign must make something known to others, so an act is not a sign of honor unless others recognize it as one. Again, a genuine sign is something people agree to treat as a sign. An act is therefore honorable when people agree to make it a sign of honor—that is, when the city commands it. God’s will, as revealed through reason alone, does not forbid giving him whatever signs of honor the city commands. Subjects can therefore transfer the right to judge how God should be worshipped to those holding sovereign power. Indeed, they must transfer it. Otherwise every absurd opinion about God’s nature and every ridiculous ceremony used by any nation would appear all at once in the same city. Each person would then believe everyone else was insulting God. We could not truly say that anyone worshipped him, since to worship God means to honor him outwardly through acts that others recognize as honoring him. We may therefore conclude that, when God rules through nature alone, the interpretation of all laws, sacred and secular, rests with the city: the person or council entrusted with sovereign power. Whatever God commands, he commands through the sovereign’s voice. Conversely, whatever the sovereign commands about worshipping God or about secular matters is commanded by God himself.

Answers to certain objections.

18 Someone may first ask whether this means we must obey the city if it directly orders us to insult God or forbids us to worship him. No, we must not obey in that case. No one can understand insulting God or refusing to worship him altogether as a way of worshipping him. Before cities existed, no one who acknowledged God’s rule had the right to deny him the honor then due to him. Such a person therefore could not transfer to the city a right to command that denial. Next, someone may ask whether we must obey if the city commands us to say or do something that does not directly insult God but could be argued to have insulting consequences. Suppose, for example, it commands us to worship God through an image in the presence of people who consider this honorable. We must obey. Worship is established as a sign of honor. In this case, the act is a sign of honor and increases God’s honor among those who view it that way. Or suppose the city tells us to call God by a name whose meaning we do not know, or whose connection to the word “God” we do not understand. We must obey that too. When we do what we can to show honor, and others regard it as a sign of honor, it is a sign of honor. Refusing it would mean refusing to increase God’s honor. The same judgment applies to all descriptions and actions in purely rational worship of God that are open to debate. Such commands might sometimes conflict with sound reason, and those giving them would therefore sin. Yet obeying them does not conflict with sound reason and is not a sin for the subjects. On disputed matters, sound reason tells subjects to submit their reasoning to the city’s. Finally, suppose the person or council holding supreme power demands to be worshipped with the same descriptions and actions used to worship God. Must we obey? Many descriptions can apply to both God and human beings: people too can be praised and magnified. Many actions can likewise be used to honor either God or people. What matters is what those descriptions and actions mean. We must therefore refuse to use words that show we believe a person has sovereignty independent of God, is immortal, has infinite power, or has similar qualities, even if a ruler commands us to use them. We must also refuse acts conveying the same beliefs: praying to someone who is absent, asking a person for things only God can give, such as rain or good weather, or offering someone things only God can accept, such as offerings and burnt sacrifices. We must not give anyone a form of worship beyond which no greater form can be given, such as sacrifice. Such acts seem meant to make people think God does not rule, contrary to our starting assumption. But kneeling, lying face down, or any other bodily act may lawfully be used in civil worship. These acts can simply acknowledge civil power. Divine worship differs from civil worship not in how the body moves, where it is placed, what it wears, or what gesture it makes, but in what we say we believe about the one we worship. If we bow before a person to show that we regard that person as God, that is divine worship. If the same action shows our acknowledgment of civil authority, it is civil worship. Nor can we distinguish divine from civil worship through any act ordinarily described by the words λατρεία and δουλεία. The former names the duty of servants and the latter their condition; the two refer to degrees of the same action.

What counts as sin in God’s natural kingdom, and what counts as treason against the divine majesty.

19 From what has been said, we can identify the ways subjects sin when God rules through natural reason alone. First, they break the moral laws explained in chapters II. and III. Second, they break the city’s laws or commands concerning justice. Third, they fail to worship God κατὰ τὰ νόμικα, according to the established customs. Fourth, they fail to acknowledge openly, in both words and actions, that there is one God who is best, greatest, and most blessed, the supreme King of the world and every worldly king. In other words, they fail to worship God. According to what was said in the preceding chapter, art. 2, this fourth sin in God’s natural kingdom is treason against the divine majesty. It denies divine power and amounts to atheism. These sins work just as they would if a sovereign king were absent and ruled through a deputy. People would break that king’s laws by disobeying his deputy in any matter, unless the deputy tried to take the kingdom for himself or give it to someone else. But those who obeyed the deputy so completely that they made no such exception could be guilty of treason.

18 Because of their weakness. If anyone finds this difficult, I ask that person to consider silently whether, if there were two all-powerful beings, either would have to obey the other. I think the answer will be that neither would. If that is true, so is what I have said: people are subject to God because they are not all-powerful. Indeed, when our Savior warned Paul, who was then an enemy of the Church, not to kick against the pricks, he seems to have required Paul’s obedience because Paul lacked the power to resist.

19 We must obey. In art. 14 of this chapter, I said that those who assign limits to God break the natural law concerning his worship. Those who worship him through an image assign him limits, so they do what they ought not do. This may seem to contradict what I have said here. First, we must understand that people compelled by authority do not assign God limits; those who command them do. People who worship unwillingly do in fact worship, but whether they stand or fall in this matter depends on what a lawful sovereign commands them to do. Second, when I say that we must obey, I mean only when there is no rule for worshipping God other than human reason. In that case, the city’s will counts as reason. But in God’s kingdom by covenant, whether old or new, idolatry is explicitly forbidden. There we must not worship through an image, even if the city commands it. Once anyone who sees a contradiction between this passage and art. 14 considers that distinction, I am sure the apparent contradiction will disappear.