Religion, Chapter XV, 2

10 All signs of the mind are either words or deeds, and so all worship consists of words or deeds. Both fall into three kinds. The first is praise, a public declaration of goodness; the second is a public declaration of present power, called magnifying, μεγάλυνειν; the third is a public declaration of happiness, or of power secure for the future as well, called μακαρισμὸς. Every kind of honor, I say, can be discerned in deeds as well as words. We praise and celebrate in words when we do so by direct assertion, or categorically, by attributes or titles: we may call this direct, categorical praise and celebration, as when we declare the person we honor to be generous, strong, or wise. We praise and celebrate in deeds when we do so by implication or supposition: thanksgiving implies goodness, obedience implies power, and congratulation implies happiness.

One kind is natural, another arbitrary.

11 Whether we wish to praise a man in words or deeds, we will find some things that signify honor to everyone. Among attributes are general terms for virtues and powers that cannot be taken in a bad sense, such as good, fair, strong, just, and the like; among acts are obedience, thanksgiving, prayers, and others of that kind, which are always understood to acknowledge virtue and power. Other things signify honor to some, scorn to others, and neither to still others. Among attributes these include words variously understood, according to different opinions, as virtues or vices, honorable or dishonorable things: that a man killed his enemy, that he fled, that he is a philosopher or an orator, and the like. Some hold these in honor, others in contempt. Among deeds they include acts that depend on local custom or the provisions of civil laws: uncovering one's head in greeting, taking off one's shoes, bending the body, asking for something while standing, prostrate, or kneeling, and other ceremonial forms. Worship that is always considered honorable by all may be called natural; worship that varies with place and custom, arbitrary.

One kind is commanded, another voluntary.

12 Moreover, worship may be commanded by the one worshipped, or it may be voluntary, chosen by the worshipper. When it is commanded, the acts that express it signify honor not by virtue of the acts themselves but because they are commanded: they immediately signify obedience, and obedience signifies power. Commanded worship thus consists in obedience. Voluntary worship is honorable only by the nature of its acts: if they signify honor to observers, it is worship; if not, it is an insult. Again, worship may be public or private. Public worship cannot be voluntary from the standpoint of each individual worshipper, though it can be from the standpoint of the commonwealth. For what is done voluntarily depends on the will of the person doing it, so that there would be not one form of worship but as many as there are worshippers, unless the will of all were united under one person's command. Private worship, however, may be voluntary if done secretly; anything done openly is constrained either by laws or by modesty, which is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act.

The end or aim of worship.

13 To understand the aim and end of worshipping others, we must consider why men delight in being worshipped. We must accept what we have shown elsewhere: joy consists in a man's contemplating virtue, strength, knowledge, beauty, friends, or any power whatever as his own, or as though it were his own. It is nothing but a glory or triumph of the mind, which conceives itself honored—that is, loved and feared—and thus assured of men's services and assistance. Now because men believe a person powerful when they see him honored, that is, esteemed powerful by others, worship increases his honor, and an opinion of power brings him real power. The aim of one who either commands worship or permits himself to be worshipped is therefore to win as many people as possible to obey him, whether through love or fear.

The natural laws concerning God's attributes.

14 To understand what worship of God natural reason prescribes, let us begin with his attributes. First, clearly, we must grant that he exists: we cannot wish to honor one whom we believe does not exist. Next, the philosophers who said that God was the world or the soul of the world—that is, a part of it—spoke unworthily of God. They attribute nothing to him, but deny his existence altogether. For by “God” we mean the cause of the world. In saying that the world is God, they say that it has no cause, which is the same as saying that there is no God. Likewise, those who maintain that the world is not created but eternal deny it has a cause, since an eternal thing can have no cause; thus they too deny there is a God. Those who impute idleness to him and deprive him of the government of the world and mankind also have a miserable conception of God. Even if they acknowledge him to be omnipotent, if he takes no care of things here below, that tired maxim applies to them: quod supra nos, nihil ad nos; what is above us is no concern of ours. Since they have no reason either to love or fear him, he will in truth be to them as though he did not exist. Moreover, among attributes signifying greatness or power, none signifying something finite or limited is any sign of a mind disposed to honor him. We do not honor God worthily if we ascribe to him less power or greatness than we possibly can. But every finite thing is less than we can conceive, since we can always easily assign something more to it. No shape, therefore, must be assigned to God, for all shapes are finite; nor should we say he can be conceived or comprehended by imagination or any other faculty of our soul, for whatever we conceive is finite. And although the word “infinite” signifies a conception of the mind, it does not follow that we have a conception of an infinite thing. In calling something infinite, we signify no positive reality, but only the incapacity of our own minds: it is as if we said we do not know whether or where it is bounded. Nor do those speak with sufficient honor of God who say that we have an idea of him in our minds. An idea is a conception, and we have no conception except of something finite. Nor do those honor him who say that he has parts or is some definite whole, since these too are attributes of finite things; or that he is in a place, since only something bounded and limited in extent on every side can be said to be in a place; or that he moves or rests, since both presuppose existence in a place; or that there are many Gods, since there cannot be many infinites. Furthermore, among attributes concerning happiness, those signifying sorrow are unworthy of God—unless taken not as passions but, by metonymy, for their effects—such as repentance, anger, and pity. So too are attributes signifying want, such as appetite, hope, craving, and the kind of love called lust. These signify poverty, for no one can be understood to desire, hope for, or wish for anything he does not lack and need. Nor may we attribute to him any passive capacity: to suffer belongs to a limited power, dependent on another. When we attribute a will to God, therefore, we must not conceive it as like ours, which is called rational desire; for if God desires, he is in want, and to say so would be an insult. Rather, we must suppose some likeness we cannot conceive. Likewise, when we attribute sight and other acts of sense to him, or knowledge or understanding—which in us are nothing but a commotion of the mind produced by external objects pressing upon the organs—we must not suppose any such thing happens to the Deity. Such a thing would mark a power dependent on another, not the most blessed being. Anyone who wishes to ascribe to God only the titles reason commands must use either negative terms, such as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible, etc.; superlatives, such as most good, most great, most powerful, etc.; or indefinite terms, such as good, just, strong, creator, king, and the like. He must use them not in an attempt to declare what God is—which would confine him within the narrow bounds of our imagination—but to confess his own wonder and obedience, as befits humility and a mind offering all the honor it can. For reason dictates only one name signifying God's nature: existent, or simply, that he is. It dictates one more name with regard to his relation to us: God, a name embracing King, Lord, and Father alike.

The actions by which we naturally offer worship.

15 Concerning the outward acts by which God must be worshipped, as with his titles, reason gives one most general command: they must signify a mind offering honor. Included among these, first, are prayers.

“He who fashions sacred faces in gold or marbleDoes not make gods; he who prays does.”

For prayers are signs of hope, and hope acknowledges divine power or goodness.

Second comes thanksgiving, a sign of the same feeling, except that prayers precede a benefit while thanks follow it.

Third come gifts, that is, offerings and sacrifices, for these are forms of thanksgiving.

Fourth, we must swear by no one else. A man's oath calls down the wrath of someone who knows whether he has deceived another, and can punish him if he has, however powerful he may be. This is true of God alone. For if there were a man from whom his subjects' malice could not be concealed and whom no human power could resist, a pledge alone would suffice without an oath: that man could punish anyone who broke it. For precisely that reason no oath would be needed.

Fifth, we must speak cautiously of God: caution shows fear, and fear acknowledges power. From this precept it follows that we must not take God's name in vain or use it rashly, for both are thoughtless; nor should we swear when there is no need, for then the oath is vain. There is no need except between commonwealths, to prevent or put an end to a conflict of force that must arise when promises are not kept, or within a commonwealth, to give greater certainty to judicial proceedings. We must not dispute about the divine nature either. For in God's natural kingdom everything is supposed to be investigated by reason alone, that is, from the principles of natural science. Yet these principles are so far from yielding knowledge of God's nature that they do not even bring us to a complete understanding of all the qualities of our own bodies or of any other creatures. Such disputes, therefore, yield nothing but rashly applied names for the Divine Majesty, measured by the small extent of our conceptions. It follows also, as regards the right of God's kingdom, that those speak rashly and thoughtlessly who say that this or that is incompatible with divine justice. Even men take it as an insult when their children dispute their rights or measure their justice by any standard other than their commands.

Sixth, whatever is offered in prayers, thanksgivings, and sacrifices must be the best of its kind and most expressive of honor. Prayers, for instance, must not be rash, frivolous, or commonplace, but beautiful and well composed. Although it was absurd for the pagans to worship God in an image, it was not contrary to reason for them to use poetry and music in their temples.

Offerings, too, must be clean and gifts lavish, and they must express submission or gratitude, or commemorate benefits received. All these things arise from a desire to give honor.

Seventh, God must be worshipped not only privately but openly and publicly, in the sight of all. Worship is the more acceptable the more it inspires honor and esteem in others, as explained above in art. 13. Unless others see it, therefore, what is most pleasing in our worship disappears.

Finally, we must do our utmost to keep the laws of nature. To slight our master's command is a greater affront than any other; conversely, obedience is more acceptable than all other sacrifices.

10 Every outward sign of what a person thinks is either a word or an action. So all worship takes the form of words or actions. Both come in three kinds. The first is praise, or a public statement of goodness. The second is a public statement of present power: magnifying someone, μεγάλυνειν. The third is a public statement of happiness, or of power that will remain secure in the future; this is called μακαρισμὸς. Each kind of honor can be expressed through actions as well as words. We praise and celebrate someone in words when we make direct statements about that person, using descriptions or titles. We might call this direct, explicit praise and celebration, as when we say that someone we honor is generous, strong, or wise. We do it in actions when the praise is implied by what we do. Thanking someone implies goodness; obeying implies power; congratulating implies happiness.

Some worship is natural and some is determined by convention.

11 When we want to praise someone in words or actions, we find some things that convey honor to everyone. Descriptions include general words for virtues and abilities that cannot be understood as insults, such as good, beautiful, strong, and just. Actions include obedience, thanks, prayers, and similar acts, which always show that we recognize virtue and power. Other things convey honor to some people, but contempt—or nothing at all—to others. Such descriptions are words people judge differently, depending on their opinions about virtue and vice or what is honorable and dishonorable. For example, one man killed his enemy; another fled; someone is a philosopher or an orator. Some people consider these things honorable, others contemptible. The same variation applies to actions governed by local customs or civil laws: uncovering one’s head when greeting someone, removing one’s shoes, bowing, making a request while standing, lying face down, or kneeling, and other ceremonies. Worship that everyone always regards as honorable may be called natural. Worship that varies with place and custom may be called conventional.

Some worship is commanded and some voluntary.

12 Worship can also be commanded by the person being worshipped, or it can be voluntary and chosen by the worshipper. When it is commanded, the actions expressing it show honor not because of the actions themselves but because they were commanded. They directly show obedience, and obedience shows power. Commanded worship therefore consists in obedience. Voluntary worship conveys honor only through the nature of its actions. If onlookers see the actions as signs of honor, they are worship; otherwise they are an insult. Worship can also be public or private. Public worship cannot be voluntary for each individual worshipper, though it can be voluntary for the city. A voluntary act depends on the will of the person doing it. Without one person’s command uniting everyone’s wills, there would be as many forms of worship as worshippers, rather than a single form. Private worship can be voluntary if it is done in secret. Public acts are constrained by law or by concern for appearances, and that conflicts with the nature of voluntary action.

The purpose of worship.

13 To understand the aim of worshipping others, we must consider why people enjoy being worshipped. As we have shown elsewhere, people feel joy when they look at virtue, strength, knowledge, beauty, friends, or any power as their own, or as if it were their own. Joy is a feeling of glory or triumph in the mind. Such people imagine themselves honored—that is, loved and feared—and so imagine that others are ready to serve and help them. People think someone is powerful when they see others honor him and judge him powerful. Worship therefore increases honor, and a reputation for power gives a person actual power. Thus a person who commands worship or allows others to worship him aims to gain as many obedient people as possible through love or fear.

The natural laws concerning descriptions of God.

14 To understand what kind of worship natural reason assigns to God, let us begin with the ways we describe him. First, clearly we must say that he exists. We cannot intend to honor someone we think does not exist. Next, the philosophers who said God was the world or the soul of the world—that is, a part of it—spoke of him in an unworthy way. They did not attribute anything to him. Instead, they denied his existence altogether. By “God” we mean the cause of the world. Calling the world God means saying the world has no cause, which is the same as saying there is no God. Similarly, those who say that the world was not created but has existed forever deny that it has a cause, since something eternal can have no cause. They too deny that God exists. Those who say God is idle and deny that he governs the world and humanity also have a poor understanding of him. Even if they acknowledge that he is all-powerful, their view amounts to that familiar saying, “What is above us does not concern us.” If they have no reason to love or fear him, he might as well not exist for them. Further, when describing his greatness or power, words implying a finite or limited thing do not show an intention to honor him. We fail to honor God adequately if we give him less power or greatness than we possibly can. Anything finite is less than we can imagine, since we can easily add more to any finite amount. We must therefore assign God no shape, since every shape is finite. Nor should we say that imagination or any other power of our minds can form a complete idea of him, since everything we conceive is finite. Although the word “infinite” expresses a thought in our minds, it does not follow that we can conceive of an infinite thing. Calling something infinite says nothing definite about that thing. It expresses a limitation of our minds, as if to say that we do not know whether or where it has a limit. Nor do those who say we have an idea of God in our minds speak of him with enough honor. An idea is a mental conception, and we can conceive only finite things. The same is true of those who say he has parts or is a single whole thing, for these too are descriptions of finite things. Nor should we say he is in a particular place, since only something whose size is bounded on every side can be in a place. Nor should we say he moves or remains still, since either condition assumes that he occupies a place. Nor should we say there are many gods, since there cannot be many infinite beings. As for descriptions of happiness, words signifying sorrow are unworthy of God unless they refer indirectly to the effects of such feelings rather than feelings themselves. Such words include repentance, anger, and pity. Words signifying a lack are likewise unworthy: appetite, hope, desire, and the kind of love called lust. These indicate need, since a person can desire, hope for, or wish for only something he lacks. Nor can we attribute to God any capacity to undergo an experience passively, since being acted on belongs to limited power that depends on another. So when we say God has a will, we must not imagine a will like ours, which is called rational desire. To say God desires something implies he lacks it, an insult to him. Instead, we must assume a likeness we cannot understand. The same applies when we say he sees or senses other things, or that he knows and understands. In us these are nothing but disturbances in the mind produced by external things pressing upon our sense organs. We must not imagine any such thing happens to God. It would imply that his power depends on something else, which is incompatible with perfect blessedness. Anyone who wishes to give God only titles that reason permits must use negative ones, such as infinite, eternal, and beyond our understanding; superlatives, such as best, greatest, and most powerful; or open-ended ones, such as good, just, strong, creator, and king. We use these not to state what God is, which would confine him within the narrow limits of our imagination, but to express our awe and obedience. This is the mark of humility and of a mind giving all the honor it can. Reason gives us only one name that expresses God’s nature: existing, or simply, that he is. It also gives us one name for his relation to us: God, which includes King, Lord, and Father.

The actions by which we naturally worship him.

15 As with God’s titles, reason gives one very general rule for the outward actions by which we worship him: they must show a mind that honors him. First among these actions are prayers.

“Who makes sacred faces out of gold or marbleDoes not make gods; the one who prays makes them.”

Prayers show hope, and hope acknowledges divine power or goodness.

Second comes thanksgiving. It shows the same feeling, but prayer comes before receiving a benefit, while thanks comes afterward.

Third come gifts, that is, offerings and sacrifices. These are forms of thanks.

Fourth, we must swear by no one else. An oath calls down the anger of one who knows whether the speaker is lying and can punish him even if he is very powerful. Only God meets both conditions. If there were a person who could know every malicious intention of his subjects and whom no human power could resist, a promise alone would be enough. That person could punish a broken promise, and there would be no need for an oath.

Fifth, we must speak carefully about God. Care shows fear, and fear recognizes power. It follows that we must not use God’s name pointlessly or carelessly. Both ways of using it are thoughtless. We must not swear oaths without a need, since that is pointless. There is no need for an oath except between cities, to prevent or settle violent conflict that necessarily arises when promises cannot be trusted; or within a city, to make judicial decisions more reliable. Nor must we argue about God’s nature. In God’s natural kingdom, we are assumed to investigate everything through reason alone, using principles of natural science. Yet these principles are so far from giving us knowledge of God’s nature that we cannot even fully understand every quality of our own bodies or of other creatures. Arguments of this kind only lead us to apply names rashly to the divine majesty, based on our limited conceptions. It also follows, as a matter concerning God’s right to rule, that people speak rashly when they say some particular thing is incompatible with divine justice. Even human parents consider it an insult when their children dispute their rights or judge their fairness by any standard other than their commands.

Sixth, whatever we offer in prayers, thanks, and sacrifices must be the best of its kind and most expressive of honor. Prayers must not be hasty, frivolous, or commonplace. They must be beautiful and carefully composed. Although pagans were wrong to worship God in an image, they were not unreasonable to use poetry and music in their places of worship.

Offerings must also be clean and gifts generous. They should express submission or gratitude, or recall benefits received. All these things arise from a wish to honor God.

Seventh, we must worship God not only in private but openly, in public view. Worship pleases him more when it creates more honor and respect in others, as explained above in art. 13. If no one else sees it, the most pleasing part of our worship disappears.

Lastly, we must make every effort to obey the laws of nature. Disregarding a master’s command is a greater insult than any other. Likewise, obedience pleases him more than any sacrifice.