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Dominion, Chapter VII, 1
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OF THE THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRACY, ARISTOCRACY, MONARCHY
1 That there are three kinds of government only, democracy, aristocracy, monarchy. 2. That oligarchy is not a diverse form of government distinct from aristocracy, nor anarchy any form at all. 3. That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy. 4. That there cannot be a mixed state, fashioned out of these several species. 5. That democracy, except there be certain times and places of meeting prefixed, is dissolved. 6. In a democracy the intervals of the times of meeting must be short, or the administration of government during the interval committed to some one. 7. In a democracy, particulars contract with particulars to obey the people: the people is obliged to no man. 8. By what acts aristocracy is constituted. 9. In an aristocracy the nobles make no compact, neither are they obliged to any citizen or to the whole people. 10. The nobles must necessarily have their set meetings. 11. By what acts monarchy is constituted. 12. Monarchy is by compact obliged to none for the authority it hath received. 13. Monarchy is ever in the readiest capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to good government 14. What kind of sin that is, and what sort of men are guilty of it, when the city performs not its office towards the citizens, nor the citizens towards the city. 15. A monarch made without limitation of time hath power to elect his successor. 16. Of limited monarchs. 17. A monarch, retaining his right of government, cannot by any promise whatsoever be conceived to have parted with his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his authority. 18. How a citizen is freed from subjection.
There are three kinds of government only; democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.
1 We have already spoken of a city by institution in its genus; we will now say somewhat of its species. As for the difference of cities, it is taken from the difference of the persons to whom the supreme power is committed. This power is committed either to one man, or council, or some one court consisting of many men. Furthermore, a council of many men consists either of all the citizens, insomuch as every man of them hath a right to vote, and an interest in the ordering of the greatest affairs, if he will himself; or of a part only. From whence there arise three sorts of government; the one, when the power is in a council where every citizen hath a right to vote; and it is called a democracy. The other, when it is in a council, where not all, but some part only have their suffrages; and we call it an aristocracy. The third is that, when the supreme authority rests only in one; and it is styled a monarchy. In the first, he that governs is called δῆμος, the people; in the second, the nobles; in the third, the monarch.
Oligarchy is no state of a city distinct from aristocracy; neither is anarchy any state at all.
2 Now, although ancient writers of politics have introduced three other kinds of government opposite to these; to wit, anarchy or confusion to democracy; oligarchy, that is, the command of some few, to aristocracy, and tyranny to monarchy; yet are not these three distinct forms of government, but three diverse titles given by those who were either displeased with that present government or those that bare rule. For men, by giving names, do usually not only signify the things themselves, but also their own affections, as love, hatred, anger, and the like. Whence it happens that what one man calls a democracy, another calls an anarchy; what one counts an aristocracy, another esteems an oligarchy; and whom one titles a king, another styles him a tyrant. So as we see, these names betoken not a diverse kind of government, but the diverse opinions of the subjects concerning him who hath the supreme power. For first, who sees not that anarchy is equally opposite to all the aforenamed forms? For that word signifies that there is no government at all, that is, not any city. But how is it possible that no city should be the species of a city? Furthermore, what difference is there between an oligarchy, which signifies the command of a few or grandees, or an aristocracy, which is that of the prime or chief heads, more than that men differ so among themselves, that the same things seem not good to all men? Whence it happens that those persons, who by some are looked on as the best, are by others esteemed to be the worst of all men.
That a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy.
3 But men, by reason of their passions, will very hardly be persuaded that a kingdom and tyranny are not diverse kinds of cities; who though they would rather have the city subject to one than many, yet do they not believe it to be well governed unless it accord with their judgments. But we must discover by reason, and not by passion, what the difference is between a king and a tyrant. But first, they differ not in this, that a tyrant hath the greater power; for greater than the supreme cannot be granted; nor in this, that one hath a limited power, the other not; for he whose authority is limited, is no king, but his subject that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in their manner of acquisition; for if in a democratical or aristocratical government some one citizen should, by force, possess himself of the supreme power, if he gain the consent of all the citizens, he becomes a legitimate monarch; if not, he is an enemy, not a tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a king who governs well, and he a tyrant that doth otherwise. The case therefore is brought to this pass; that a king, legitimately constituted in his government, if he seem to his subjects to rule well and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a king; if not, they count him a tyrant. Wherefore we see a kingdom and tyranny are not diverse forms of government, but one and the self-same monarch hath the name of a king given him in point of honour and reverence to him, and of a tyrant in way of contumely and reproach. But what we frequently find in books said against tyrants, took its original from Greek and Roman writers, whose government was partly democratical, and partly aristocratical, and therefore not tyrants only, but even kings were odious to them.
That there can no mixed state be formed out of these forenamed kinds of government.
4 There are, who indeed do think it necessary that a supreme command should be somewhere extant in a city; but if it should be in any one, either man or council, it would follow, they say, that all the citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this condition, they imagine that there may be a certain form of government compounded of those three kinds we have spoken of, yet different from each particular; which they call a mixed monarchy, or mixed aristocracy, or mixed democracy, according as any one of these three sorts shall be more eminent than the rest. For example, if the naming of magistrates and the arbitration of war and peace should belong to the King, judicature to the Lords, and contribution of monies to the People, and the power of making laws to all together, this kind of state would they call a mixed monarchy forsooth. But if it were possible that there could be such a state, it would no whit advantage the liberty of the subject. For as long as they all agree, each single citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be: but if they disagree, the state returns to a civil war and the right of the private sword; which certainly is much worse than any subjection whatsoever. But that there can be no such kind of government,14 hath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing chapter, art. 6-12.
That democracy, except it have certain times and places of meeting prescribed, is dissolved.
5 Let us see a little now, in the constituting of each form of government what the constitutors do. Those who met together with intention to erect a city, were almost in the very act of meeting, a democracy. For in that they willingly met, they are supposed obliged to the observation of what shall be determined by the major part; which, while that convent lasts, or is adjourned to some certain days and places, is a clear democracy. For that convent, whose will is the will of all the citizens, hath the supreme authority; and because in this convent every man is supposed to have a right to give his voice, it follows that it is a democracy, by the definition given in the first article of this chapter. But if they depart and break up the convent, and appoint no time or place where and when they shall meet again, the public weal returns to anarchy and the same state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the state of all men warring against all. The people, therefore, retains the supreme power, no longer than there is a certain day and place publicly appointed and known, to which whosoever will may resort. For except that be known and determined, they may either meet at divers times and places, that is, in factions, or not at all; and then it is no longer δῆμος, the people, but a dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attribute any action or right. Two things therefore frame a democracy; whereof one, to wit, the perpetual prescription of convents, makes δῆμον, the people; the other, which is a plurality of voices, τὸ κράτος, or the power.
In democracy, the intervals of the times of convening must be short, or the administration of the government committed to some one.
6 Furthermore, it will not be sufficient for the people, so as to maintain its supremacy, to have some certain known times and places of meeting, unless that either the intervals of the times be of less distance, than that anything may in the meantime happen whereby, by reason of the defect of power, the city may be brought into some danger; or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be, during the interval, granted to some one man or council. For unless this be done, there is not that wary care and heed taken for the defence and peace of single men, which ought to be; and therefore it will not deserve the name of a city, because that in it, for want of security, every man’s right of defending himself at his own pleasure returns to him again.
In a democracy, particulars contract with particulars to obey the people: the people is obliged to no man.
7 Democracy is not framed by contract of particular persons with the people, but by mutual compacts of single men each with other. But hence it appears, in the first place, that the persons contracting must be in being before the contract itself. But the people is not in being before the constitution of government, as not being any person, but a multitude of single persons; wherefore there could then no contract pass between the people and the subject. Now, if after that government is framed, the subject make any contract with the people, it is in vain; because the people contains within its will the will of that subject, to whom it is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may at its own will and pleasure disengage itself, and by consequence is now actually free. But in the second place, that single persons do contract each with other, may be inferred from hence; that in vain sure would the city have been constituted, if the citizens had been engaged by no contracts to do or omit what the city should command to be done or omitted. Because, therefore, such kind of compacts must be understood to pass as necessary to the making up of a city, but none can be made (as is already shewed) between the subject and the people; it follows, that they must be made between single citizens, namely, that each man contract to submit his will to the will of the major part, on condition that the rest also do the like. As if every one should say thus: I give up my right unto the people for your sake, on condition that you also deliver up yours for mine.
By what acts an aristocracy is framed.
8 An aristocracy or council of nobles endowed with supreme authority, receives its original from a democracy, which gives up its right unto it. Where we must understand that certain men distinguished from others, either by eminence of title, blood, or some other character, are propounded to the people, and by plurality of voices are elected; and being elected, the whole right of the people or city is conveyed on them, insomuch as whatsoever the people might do before, the same by right may this court of elected nobles now do. Which being done, it is clear that the people, considered as one person, its supreme authority being already transferred on these, is no longer now in being.
In an aristocracy the nobles make no contract, nor are they obliged to any citizen, or to the whole people.
9 As in democracy the people, so in an aristocracy the court of nobles is free from all manner of obligation. For seeing subjects not contracting with the people, but by mutual compacts among themselves, were tied to all that the people did; hence also they were tied to that act of the people, in resigning up its right of government into the hands of nobles. Neither could this court, although elected by the people, be by it obliged to anything. For being electedelected, the people is at once dissolved, as was declared above, and the authority it had as being a person, utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the obligation which was due to the person, must also vanish, and perish together with it.
The nobles must necessarily have their set meetings.
10 Aristocracy hath these considerations, together with democracy. First, that without an appointment of some certain times and places, at which the court of nobles may meet, it is no longer a court, or one person, but a dissolute multitude without any supreme power. Secondly, that the times of their assembling cannot be disjoined by long intervals without prejudice to the supreme power, unless its administration be transferred to some one man. Now the reasons why this happens, are the same which we set down in the fifth article.
By what acts a monarchy is framed.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
ON THE THREE KINDS OF GOVERNMENT: DEMOCRACY, ARISTOCRACY, AND MONARCHY
1 There are only three kinds of government: democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. 2. Oligarchy is not a form of government distinct from aristocracy, nor is anarchy a form of government at all. 3. Tyranny is not a state distinct from a legitimate monarchy. 4. There can be no mixed state fashioned from these several kinds. 5. Democracy dissolves unless definite times and places of assembly are prescribed. 6. In a democracy, the intervals between assemblies must be short, or the administration of government during those intervals must be entrusted to someone. 7. In a democracy, individuals covenant with one another to obey the people; the people are obliged to no one. 8. The acts by which aristocracy is established. 9. In an aristocracy, the nobles make no covenant and are obliged neither to any citizen nor to the people as a whole. 10. The nobles must necessarily have appointed meetings. 11. The acts by which monarchy is established. 12. The monarch is obliged by no covenant to anyone for the authority he has received. 13. The monarch is always ready to exercise all the acts required for good government. 14. What kind of sin is committed, and by whom, when the city fails in its duty toward its citizens or its citizens toward the city. 15. A monarch appointed without a time limit has power to choose his successor. 16. On monarchs appointed for a limited term. 17. A monarch who retains his right of government cannot, by any promise whatever, be understood to have surrendered his right to the means necessary for exercising his authority. 18. How a citizen is released from subjection.
There are only three kinds of government: democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.
1 We have already discussed a city established by institution as a genus; now we shall say something about its species. Cities differ according to the persons entrusted with supreme power. That power is entrusted either to one man or to a council or assembly of many. Such a council consists either of all the citizens, each having a right to vote and, if he chooses, a share in deciding the greatest affairs, or of only some of them. Hence arise three kinds of government: when power belongs to a council in which every citizen has a right to vote, it is called democracy; when it belongs to a council in which only some, not all, have votes, we call it aristocracy; and when supreme authority rests with one person alone, it is called monarchy. In the first, the ruler is called δῆμος, the people; in the second, the nobles; in the third, the monarch.
Oligarchy is not a state of a city distinct from aristocracy, nor is anarchy any state at all.
2 Ancient political writers have indeed introduced three other kinds of government in opposition to these: anarchy, or disorder, against democracy; oligarchy, or rule by a few, against aristocracy; and tyranny against monarchy. Yet these are not three distinct forms of government, but three different names given by people dissatisfied either with the existing government or with its rulers. In naming things, people commonly express not only what those things are but also their own feelings—love, hatred, anger, and the like. Thus what one man calls democracy another calls anarchy; what one regards as aristocracy another judges oligarchy; and the man one calls a king another calls a tyrant. These names, then, indicate not different kinds of government but the subjects’ different opinions of whoever holds supreme power. To begin with, who does not see that anarchy is equally opposed to every form named above? The word means that there is no government at all, and therefore no city. But how could the absence of a city be a species of city? Again, what difference is there between oligarchy, meaning rule by a few or by the powerful, and aristocracy, meaning rule by the leading or chief men, except that people disagree so much that the same men do not seem good to everyone? Those whom some regard as the best are judged by others to be the worst of all.
Tyranny is not a state distinct from a legitimate monarchy.
3 Because of their passions, people will hardly be persuaded that kingship and tyranny are not different kinds of cities. Although they would rather see the city subject to one ruler than to many, they do not believe it well governed unless its government agrees with their own judgment. Yet we must determine by reason, not passion, the difference between king and tyrant. First, they do not differ because the tyrant has greater power: nothing greater than supreme power can be granted. Nor do they differ because the power of one is limited and the other’s is not: a person whose authority is limited is not king, but subject to whoever limits it. Nor, finally, do they differ in the way they acquire power. If one citizen in a democracy or aristocracy seizes supreme power by force, he becomes a legitimate monarch if he wins the consent of all the citizens; if he does not, he is an enemy, not a tyrant. They differ, therefore, only in the exercise of command: one who governs well is called a king, and one who does otherwise a tyrant. It comes down to this: if subjects think a legitimately established king rules well and to their liking, they give him the name of king; otherwise they call him a tyrant. Kingship and tyranny, then, are not different forms of government. The very same monarch is called king to honor and revere him, and tyrant to insult and reproach him. What we so often read in books against tyrants originated with Greek and Roman authors, whose governments were partly democratic and partly aristocratic; thus kings themselves, not merely tyrants, were hateful to them.
No mixed state can be formed from these kinds of government.
4 Some admit that supreme command must exist somewhere in a city, but argue that if it rests in one man or one council, all citizens must be slaves. To escape this condition, they imagine a form of government compounded from the three kinds we have described, though different from each of them separately. They call it a mixed monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, according to which of the three elements predominates. For instance, suppose appointing magistrates and deciding on war and peace belonged to the king, judging to the lords, raising money to the people, and making laws to all together: this state, they say, would be a mixed monarchy. But even if such a state were possible, it would not advance the subject’s liberty at all. As long as they all agree, every citizen is as completely subject as he can be; if they disagree, the state reverts to civil war and the private right of the sword, which is surely far worse than any subjection. That no such government can exist14 has been adequately demonstrated in the preceding chapter, art. 6-12.
Democracy dissolves unless definite times and places of assembly are prescribed.
5 Let us now examine what those who establish each form of government actually do. People gathered with the intention of founding a city are, by the very act of gathering, almost a democracy. For because they assemble willingly, they are understood to have bound themselves to observe what a majority decides. So long as that assembly continues, or is adjourned to definite days and places, it is plainly a democracy. Its will is the will of all the citizens, and it holds supreme authority; and since everyone in the assembly is understood to have a right to vote, it is a democracy by the definition in the first article of this chapter. But if they disperse and dissolve the assembly without setting a time or place to meet again, the commonwealth returns to anarchy and to the condition it occupied before they assembled: the war of everyone against everyone. The people, therefore, retain supreme power only so long as a definite day and place are publicly appointed and known, where anyone who wishes may attend. Unless these are known and settled, they may assemble at different times and places—that is, in factions—or not at all. Then they are no longer δῆμος, the people, but a scattered multitude to which no action or right can be attributed. Two things therefore constitute a democracy: the permanent appointment of assemblies makes δῆμον, the people; a majority of votes makes τὸ κράτος, the power.
In a democracy, intervals between assemblies must be short, or the administration of government must be entrusted to someone.
6 Moreover, to preserve its supremacy, the people need more than fixed, known times and places of assembly. Either the intervals must be too short for anything to happen in the meantime that could endanger the city through a lack of power, or the exercise of supreme authority during the interval must be granted to one man or council. Otherwise, the careful provision for the defense and peace of individuals that ought to exist is absent. Such a society will not deserve to be called a city, because its lack of security returns to every man the right to defend himself as he pleases.
In a democracy, individuals covenant with one another to obey the people; the people are obliged to no one.
7 Democracy is established not by contracts between individuals and the people, but by mutual covenants among individuals. Consider, first, that contracting parties must exist before the contract. The people, however, do not exist before government is established: they are not yet a person, but a multitude of individuals. Thus there could be no contract then between the people and a subject. If a subject contracts with the people after government has been formed, the contract is futile: the people’s will already contains the will of the subject to whom it is supposedly obliged, so it can release itself whenever it pleases and is, in consequence, already free. Second, we may infer that individuals contract with one another because the city would certainly have been established in vain if its citizens had made no covenants to do or refrain from doing whatever the city commanded. Since covenants of this kind are necessary to constitute a city, and none can be made between subject and people, as we have shown, they must be made among individual citizens. Each therefore covenants to submit his will to the will of the majority on condition that the others do likewise, as though each said: “For your sake I give my right to the people, provided you give yours for my sake.”
The acts by which an aristocracy is established.
8 An aristocracy, or council of nobles endowed with supreme authority, originates in a democracy that transfers its right to that council. We must understand that certain men distinguished from others by eminence of title, descent, or some other mark are presented to the people and elected by a majority of votes. Once they are elected, the entire right of the people or city passes to them, so that this council of elected nobles may now by right do whatever the people could do before. After this, the people considered as one person no longer exist, since their supreme authority has passed to the nobles.
In an aristocracy, the nobles make no covenant and are obliged neither to any citizen nor to the people as a whole.
9 As the people in a democracy are free from every obligation, so is the council of nobles in an aristocracy. For subjects, bound not by contracts with the people but by mutual covenants among themselves, were bound to everything the people did, including its act of transferring its right of government to the nobles. Nor could the council, though elected by the people, be placed under any obligation by them. Upon its election the people dissolve, as stated above, and the authority they held as one person vanishes utterly. Thus any obligation owed to that person must vanish and perish along with it.
The nobles must necessarily have appointed meetings.
10 Aristocracy shares these requirements with democracy. First, without appointed times and places for the council of nobles to meet, it is no longer a council or one person, but a dispersed multitude without supreme power. Second, long intervals between meetings damage that supreme power unless its administration is entrusted to one man. The reasons are the same as those given in the fifth article.
The acts by which a monarchy is established.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
The Three Kinds of Government: Democracy, Aristocracy, Monarchy
1 There are only three kinds of government: democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. 2. Oligarchy is not a different form of government from aristocracy, and anarchy is not a form of government at all. 3. Tyranny is not a different kind of state from a lawful monarchy. 4. There cannot be a mixed state made out of these different kinds. 5. Democracy dissolves unless times and places for meetings are fixed in advance. 6. In a democracy, the intervals between meetings must be short, or the administration of government during the interval must be entrusted to someone. 7. In a democracy, individuals covenant with one another to obey the people; the people is obligated to no one. 8. How aristocracy is established. 9. In an aristocracy, the nobles make no covenant and owe no obligation to any citizen or to the whole people. 10. The nobles must have regular meetings. 11. How monarchy is established. 12. The monarch owes no obligation by covenant for the authority he has received. 13. A monarch is always ready to carry out all the acts good government requires. 14. What kind of sin it is, and who commits it, when the city fails in its duty to the citizens, or the citizens fail in theirs to the city. 15. A monarch appointed with no time limit has the power to choose his successor. 16. Monarchs whose terms are limited. 17. A monarch who retains his right to govern cannot be understood, by any promise, to have given up his right to the means needed to exercise his authority. 18. How a citizen is freed from subjection.
There are only three kinds of government: democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.
1 We have already discussed what an established city is in general. Now we will discuss its different kinds. Cities differ according to who holds supreme power. It is given either to one man or to an assembly or other body of many people. Such a body consists either of all the citizens, each of whom has the right to vote and to take part in deciding the most important affairs if he wishes, or only of some of them. So there are three kinds of government. In the first, power belongs to an assembly in which every citizen has the right to vote. This is called a democracy. In the second, power belongs to an assembly in which only some citizens, not all, have a vote. We call this an aristocracy. In the third, supreme authority belongs to one person alone. This is called a monarchy. In the first, the ruler is called δῆμος, the people; in the second, the nobles; and in the third, the monarch.
Oligarchy is not a kind of city distinct from aristocracy; nor is anarchy a kind of city at all.
2 Ancient writers on politics have set three other kinds of government against these: anarchy, or disorder, against democracy; oligarchy, or rule by a few, against aristocracy; and tyranny against monarchy. But these are not three distinct forms of government. They are different names used by people who dislike the current government or its rulers. When people name things, they usually express not only what the things are, but also their own feelings, such as love, hatred, and anger. So one person calls a government a democracy and another calls it anarchy. One calls it an aristocracy and another oligarchy. One calls a man a king and another a tyrant. These names indicate different opinions that subjects hold about their supreme ruler, not different kinds of government. To begin with, who cannot see that anarchy is opposed to every form named above? The word means that there is no government at all, and so no city. How could the absence of a city be a kind of city? And what is the difference between oligarchy, meaning rule by a few or by powerful people, and aristocracy, meaning rule by the foremost or leading people? Only that people disagree about which people are good. Those regarded by some as the best are regarded by others as the worst of all.
Tyranny is not a different kind of state from a lawful monarchy.
3 Because of their feelings, people will find it very hard to believe that a kingdom and a tyranny are not different kinds of cities. Even if they would rather have one ruler than many, they do not think the city is well governed unless it is governed according to their own judgment. But we must use reason, not feeling, to find the difference between a king and a tyrant. First, the difference is not that a tyrant has more power, since nothing greater than supreme power can be given. Nor is it that the power of one is limited and the other's is not. A person whose authority another can limit is not a king but a subject of the one who limits it. Finally, the difference is not in how they obtain power. Suppose a citizen seizes supreme power by force in a democracy or aristocracy. If he gains the consent of all the citizens, he becomes a lawful monarch. If he does not, he is an enemy, not a tyrant. The only difference, then, concerns how a ruler uses his power. A person who governs well is called a king, and one who does otherwise is called a tyrant. Thus if a lawfully appointed king seems to his subjects to govern well and as they like, they call him a king. If not, they call him a tyrant. A kingdom and a tyranny are therefore not different forms of government. The very same monarch is called a king as a mark of honor and respect, and a tyrant as an insult and reproach. The attacks on tyrants often found in books came from Greek and Roman writers. Their governments were partly democratic and partly aristocratic, so they disliked not only tyrants but kings as well.
No mixed state can be formed from the kinds of government named above.
4 Some people agree that a city must have supreme authority somewhere. But they say that if it belongs to any one person or assembly, all citizens must become slaves. To avoid that outcome, they imagine a form of government composed of the three kinds already discussed, yet different from each of them. They call it a mixed monarchy, mixed aristocracy, or mixed democracy, depending on which kind has the greatest role. Suppose, for example, that appointing officials and deciding on war and peace belong to the king, judging cases to the lords, deciding financial contributions to the people, and making laws to all of them together. They would call that a mixed monarchy. But even if such a state were possible, it would do nothing for the subject's freedom. While all the authorities agree, every citizen remains as fully subject as anyone could be. If they disagree, the state returns to civil war and to each individual's right to use his own sword. That is certainly much worse than any form of subjection. The previous chapter, art. 6-12, has already shown well enough that such a government is impossible.
Democracy dissolves unless fixed times and places for meetings are prescribed.
5 Let us now look briefly at what people do when they establish each kind of government. People who meet intending to establish a city become a democracy almost by the act of meeting. Since they meet willingly, they are assumed to be bound to follow what the majority decides. As long as their assembly continues, or adjourns to specified days and places, it is clearly a democracy. The assembly has supreme authority, because its will is the will of all the citizens. And since everyone in it is assumed to have the right to vote, it is a democracy by the definition in this chapter's first article. But suppose they leave and dissolve the assembly without setting a time and place for their next meeting. The commonwealth then returns to anarchy, the condition it was in before they met: everyone at war with everyone. So the people keeps supreme power only while a definite day and place of meeting is publicly appointed and known, where anyone who wishes may attend. Without such an arrangement, they may meet at different times and places as rival factions, or not meet at all. Then they are no longer δῆμος, the people, but a scattered multitude to which we can attribute neither an action nor a right. Democracy therefore has two components. A continuing schedule of meetings creates δῆμον, the people; majority voting creates τὸ κράτος, the power.
In democracy, intervals between meetings must be short, or the administration of government must be entrusted to someone.
6 Having known times and places for meetings will not be enough for the people to keep its supreme authority. Either the intervals between meetings must be shorter than the time in which some event could endanger the city because no power is available to act, or the exercise of supreme authority during those intervals must be entrusted to one man or assembly. Without one of these arrangements, the government will not take the careful measures it should to protect the peace and safety of individuals. It will not deserve to be called a city. Lacking security, everyone again has the right to defend himself as he sees fit.
In a democracy, individuals covenant with one another to obey the people; the people owes no obligation to anyone.
7 Democracy is formed not by contracts between individuals and the people, but by covenants that individuals make with one another. First, the parties to a contract must exist before making it. But before the government is established, the people does not exist as a single person. It is only a collection of individuals. So there could then be no contract between the people and a subject. If a subject makes a contract with the people after the government is formed, it has no force. The people's will includes the will of the very subject to whom it is supposedly obligated. It may therefore release itself whenever it chooses and is, in fact, already free. Second, we can see why individuals must contract with each other. Establishing the city would have been pointless if citizens were not bound by contracts to do what the city commands and refrain from what it forbids. Such covenants are therefore necessary to establish a city. Since, as shown above, no such covenant can be made between a subject and the people, it must be made between individual citizens. Each person agrees to submit his will to the majority's will, on condition that the others do the same. It is as if each said, “For your sake I give my right to the people, provided that you give yours for my sake.”
How an aristocracy is formed.
8 An aristocracy, or council of nobles with supreme authority, begins with a democracy that gives it its right. Certain people, distinguished from the others by title, ancestry, or some other mark, are put forward to the people. The people elects them by majority vote. Once elected, they receive the entire right of the people or city. The elected council of nobles may now rightfully do whatever the people could do before. Once this happens, the people, considered as a single person, no longer exists. Its supreme authority has passed to the nobles.
In an aristocracy, the nobles make no contract and owe no obligation to any citizen or to the whole people.
9 In an aristocracy the council of nobles is free from every obligation, just as the people is in a democracy. Subjects did not contract with the people. Their covenants with one another bound them to accept everything the people did. They were therefore also bound by the people's decision to hand its right of government to the nobles. Nor could the council, though elected by the people, be obligated to the people. As explained above, once the council is elected, the people dissolves and the authority it held as a single person disappears completely. Any obligation owed to that person must disappear with it.
The nobles must have regular meetings.
10 Aristocracy shares these conditions with democracy. First, unless definite times and places are set for meetings of the council of nobles, it ceases to be a council or a single person. It becomes a scattered multitude without supreme power. Second, long intervals between its meetings will undermine supreme power unless the administration of that power is transferred to one man. The reasons are the same as those given in the fifth article.
How a monarchy is formed.