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Dominion, Chapter VI, 3
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20 Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by virtue of the compacts which each single citizen or subject mutually makes with the other; but all contracts, as they receive their force from the contractors, so by their consent they lose it again and are broken: perhaps some may infer hence, that by the consent of all the subjects together the supreme authority may be wholly taken away. Which inference, if it were true, I cannot discern what danger would thence by right arise to the supreme commanders. For since it is supposed that each one hath obliged himself to each other; if any one of them shall refuse, whatsoever the rest shall agree to do, he is bound notwithstanding. Neither can any man without injury to me, do that which by contract made with me he hath obliged himself not to do. But it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen, that all the subjects together, not so much as one excepted, will combine against the supreme power. Wherefore there is no fear for rulers in chief, that by any right they can be despoiled of their authority. If, notwithstanding, it were granted that their right depended only on that contract which each man makes with his fellow-citizen, it might very easily happen that they might be robbed of that dominion under pretence of right. For subjects being called either by the command of the city, or seditiously flocking together, most men think that the consents of all are contained in the votes of the greater part; which in truth is false. For it is not from nature that the consent of the major part should be received for the consent of all, neither is it true in tumults; but it proceeds from civil institution: and is then only true, when that man or court which hath the supreme power, assembling his subjects, by reason of the greatness of their number allows those that are elected a power of speaking for those who elected them; and will have the major part of voices, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discussed, to be as effectual as the whole. But we cannot imagine that he who is chief, ever convened his subjects with intention that they should dispute his right; unless weary of the burthen of his charge, he declared in plain terms that he renounces and abandons his government. Now, because most men through ignorance esteem not the consent of the major part of citizens only, but even of a very few, provided they be of their opinion, for the consent of the whole city; it may very well seem to them, that the supreme authority may by right be abrogated, so it be done in some great assembly of citizens by the votes of the greater number. But though a government be constituted by the contracts of particular men with particulars, yet its right depends not on that obligation only; there is another tie also towards him who commands. For each citizen compacting with his fellow, says thus: I convey my right on this party, upon condition that you pass yours to the same: by which means, that right which every man had before to use his faculties to his own advantage, is now wholly translated on some certain man or council for the common benefit. Wherefore what by the mutual contracts each one hath made with the other, what by the donation of right which every man is bound to ratify to him that commands, the government is upheld by a double obligation from the citizens; first, that which is due to their fellow-citizens; next, that which they owe to their prince. Wherefore no subjects, how many soever they be, can with any right despoil him who bears the chief rule of his authority, even without his own consent.
8 Multitude, &c.] The doctrine of the power of a city over its citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the difference which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a multitude ruled. For such is the nature of a city, that a multitude or company of citizens not only may have command, but may also be subject to command; but in diverse senses. Which difference I did believe was clearly enough explained in the first article; but by the objections of many against those things which follow, I discern otherwise. Wherefore it seemed good to me, to the end I might make a fuller explication, to add these few things.
By multitude, because it is a collective word, we understand more than one: so as a multitude of men is the same with many men. The same word, because it is of the singular number, signifies one thing; namely, one multitude. But in neither sense can a multitude be understood to have one will given to it by nature, but to each a several; and therefore neither is any one action whatsoever to be attributed to it. Wherefore a multitude cannot promise, contract, acquire right, convey right, act, have, possess, and the like, unless it be every one apart, and man by man; so as there must be as many promises, compacts, rights, and actions, as men. Wherefore a multitude is no natural person. But if the same multitude do contract one with another, that the will of one man, or the agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received for the will of all; then it becomes one person. For it is endued with a will, and therefore can do voluntary actions, such as are commanding, making laws, acquiring and transferring of right, and so forth; and it is oftener called the people, than the multitude. We must therefore distinguish thus. When we say the people or multitude wills, commands, or doth anything, it is understood that the city which commands, wills and acts by the will of one, or the concurring wills of more; which cannot be done but in an assembly. But as oft as anything is said to be done by a multitude of men, whether great or small, without the will of that man or assembly of men, that is understood to be done by a subjected people; that is, by many single citizens together; and not proceeding from one will, but from diverse wills of diverse men, who are citizens and subjects, but not a city.
9 Judge what opinions, &c. There is scarce any principle, neither in the worship of God nor in human sciences, from whence there may not spring dissensions, discords, reproaches, and by degrees war itself. Neither doth this happen by reason of the falsehood of the principle, but of the disposition of men, who, seeming wise to themselves, will needs appear such to all others. But though such dissensions cannot be hindered from arising, yet may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme power, that they prove no hindrance to the public peace. Of these kinds of opinions, therefore, I have not spoken in this place. There are certain doctrines wherewith subjects being tainted, they verily believe that obedience may be refused to the city, and that by right they may, nay ought, to oppose and fight against chief princes and dignities. Such are those which, whether directly and openly, or more obscurely and by consequence, require obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed. I deny not but this reflects on that power which many, living under other government, ascribe to the chief head of the Church of Rome, and also on that which elsewhere, out of that Church, bishops require in their’s to be given to them; and last of all, on that liberty which the lower sort of citizens, under pretence of religion, do challenge to themselves. For what civil war was there ever in the Christian world, which did not either grow from, or was nourished by this root? The judgment therefore of doctrines, whether they be repugnant to civil obedience or not, and if they be repugnant, the power of prohibiting them to be taught, I do here attribute to the civil authority. For since there is no man who grants not to the city the judgment of those things which belong to its peace and defence, and it is manifest that the opinions which I have already recited do relate to its peace; it follows necessarily, that the examination of those opinions, whether they be such or not, must be referred to the city; that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.
10 Absolute.] A popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion, and the citizens oppose it not. For, in the gathering together of many men, they acknowledge the face of a city; and even the unskilful understand, that matters there are ruled by council. Yet monarchy is no less a city than democraty; and absolute kings have their counsellors, from whom they will take advice, and suffer their power, in matters of greater consequence, to be guided but not recalled. But it appears not to most men, how a city is contained in the person of a king. And therefore they object against absolute command: first, that if any man had such a right, the condition of the citizens would be miserable. For thus they think; he will take all, spoil all, kill all; and every man counts it his only happiness, that he is not already spoiled and killed. But why should he do thus? Not because he can; for unless he have a mind to it, he will not do it. Will he, to please one or some few, spoil all the rest? First, though by right, that is, without injury to them, he may do it, yet can he not do it justly, that is, without breach of the natural laws and injury against God. And therefore there is some security for subjects in the oaths which princes take. Next, if he could justly do it, or that he made no account of his oath, yet appears there no reason why he should desire it, since he finds no good in it. But it cannot be denied, but a prince may sometimes have an inclination to do wickedly. But grant then, that thou hadst given him a power which were not absolute, but so much only as sufficed to defend thee from the injuries of others; which, if thou wilt be safe, is necessary for thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? For he that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency to oppress all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that human affairs cannot be without some inconvenience. And this inconvenience itself is in the citizens, not in the government. For if men could rule themselves, every man by his own command, that is to say, could they live according to the laws of nature, there would be no need at all of a city, nor of a common coercive power. Secondly, they object, that there is no dominion in the Christian world absolute. Which, indeed, is not true; for all monarchies, and all other states, are so. For although they who have the chief command, do not all those things they would, and what they know profitable to the city; the reason of that is, not the defect of right in them, but the consideration of their citizens, who busied about their private interest, and careless of what tends to the public, cannot sometimes be drawn to perform their duties without the hazard of the city. Wherefore princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their right; and prudently remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of their right.
11 Propriety received its beginning, &c.] What is objected by some, that the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of cities, was found in fathers of families, that objection is vain; because I have already declared, that a family is a little city. For the sons of a family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their father, distinguished indeed from the rest of the sons of the same family, but not from the propriety of the father himself. But the fathers of divers families, who are subject neither to any common father nor lord, have a common right in all things.
12 What by right he may do, &c.] As often as a citizen is granted to have an action of law against the supreme, that is, against the city, the question is not in that action, whether the city may by right keep possession of the thing in controversy, but whether by the laws formerly made she would keep it; for the law is the declared will of the supreme. Since then the city may raise money from the citizens under two titles, either as tribute, or as debt; in the former case there is no action of law allowed, for there can be no question whether the city have right to require tribute; in the latter it is allowed, because the city will take nothing from its citizens by fraud or cunning, and yet if need require, all they have, openly. And therefore he that condemns this place, saying, that by this doctrine it is easy for princes to free themselves from their debts, he does it impertinently.
13 That they were made by an oath or sacrament, &c.] Whether matrimony be a sacrament, (in which sense that word is used by some divines), or not, it is not my purpose to dispute. Only I say, that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live together, that is, granted by the civil law, whether it be a sacrament or not, is surely a legitimate marriage; but that copulation which the city hath prohibited is no marriage, since it is of the essence of marriage to be a legitimate contract. There were legitimate marriages in many places, as among the Jews, the Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved. But with those who permit no such contracts but by a law that they shall never be broke, wedlock cannot be dissolved; and the reason is, because the city hath commanded it to be indissoluble, not because matrimony is a sacrament. Wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to be performed in the temple, to bless, or, if I may say so, to consecrate the husband and wife, will perhaps belong only to the office of clergymen; all the rest namely, who, when, and by what contracts marriages may be made, pertains to the laws of the city.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
20 Supreme command is established by virtue of compacts that each citizen or subject makes mutually with every other. But contracts derive their force from those who make them, and by their consent lose it again and are dissolved. Some may therefore infer that the consent of all the subjects together can entirely abolish supreme authority. If that inference were true, I cannot see what danger it would rightfully pose to supreme rulers. For each is supposed to have bound himself to every other; if even one refuses to join in what the rest agree to do, he remains bound nonetheless. Nor can anyone do to me without injury what he has contracted with me not to do. But we cannot imagine that every subject together, without a single exception, will ever unite against supreme power. Thus rulers need not fear being deprived of their authority by any right. If, nevertheless, it were granted that their right depended only on the contract each man makes with his fellow citizen, they could very easily be stripped of their dominion under a pretense of right. When subjects are summoned by the city's command, or gather seditiously of their own accord, most people think that the votes of the majority contain the consent of all. This is false. It is not by nature that the consent of the majority counts as the consent of all; nor is this true amid tumults. The rule comes from civil institution, and holds only when the man or court with supreme power assembles the subjects and, because of their great number, allows elected representatives to speak for those who elected them, and determines that the majority vote on matters he proposes for discussion shall have the same force as the vote of all. We cannot suppose that a supreme ruler ever convenes his subjects intending them to debate his right, unless, weary of his burden, he declares outright that he renounces and abandons his government. Most men, through ignorance, mistake not only the consent of a majority of citizens but even the consent of a very few, provided those few share their opinion, for the consent of the whole city. They may thus readily suppose that supreme authority can rightfully be abolished if a majority votes for it in some great assembly of citizens. Yet although government is established by contracts between individuals, its right does not rest on that obligation alone: there is also a bond to the one who commands. For each citizen, in making a compact with his fellow, says, “I transfer my right to this person on condition that you transfer yours to the same.” In this way the right each man formerly had to use his powers for his own benefit is now transferred entirely to one particular man or council for the common good. By both the mutual contracts citizens have made with one another and the grant of right each is bound to ratify to the ruler, government is upheld by a double obligation on the citizens: first, what they owe their fellow citizens, and second, what they owe their prince. Thus no subjects, however many there are, can rightfully deprive the supreme ruler of his authority without his own consent.
8 Multitude, etc.] The doctrine of a city's power over its citizens depends almost entirely on understanding the difference between a multitude of men who rule and a multitude who are ruled. The nature of a city is such that a multitude or body of citizens may not only command but also be commanded, though in different senses. I believed this difference was explained clearly enough in the first article; the objections many have raised against what follows have shown me otherwise. I therefore thought it best to add a few words by way of fuller explanation.
By multitude, being a collective word, we mean more than one; thus a multitude of men means the same as many men. But because the word is grammatically singular, it also signifies one thing: one multitude. In neither sense, however, can a multitude be understood to have one will bestowed on it by nature; each man has his separate will, and therefore no single action whatever can be attributed to the multitude. It cannot promise, contract, acquire a right, convey a right, act, hold, possess, or do anything of the kind unless each man does so separately, one by one, making as many promises, compacts, rights, and actions as there are men. Thus a multitude is no natural person. But if the members of that same multitude contract with one another to accept the will of one man, or the agreeing wills of their majority, as the will of all, it becomes one person. Endowed with a will, it can perform voluntary actions such as commanding, making laws, and acquiring and transferring rights; it is more often called the people than the multitude. We must therefore make this distinction. When we say the people or multitude wills, commands, or does something, we mean that the city commands, wills, and acts through the will of one man or the concurring wills of several—which can happen only in an assembly. But whenever something is said to be done by a multitude of men, large or small, without the will of that man or assembly, it is understood as the act of a subject people: many individual citizens acting together, not from a single will but from the different wills of different men, who are citizens and subjects but not a city.
9 Judge what opinions, etc. There is hardly a principle, whether in the worship of God or in the human sciences, from which dissensions, discord, reproaches, and eventually even war might not arise. This happens not because the principle is false but because men, believing themselves wise, insist on appearing wise to everyone else. Though such dissensions cannot be prevented from arising, the exercise of supreme power can restrain them so that they do not disturb the public peace. I have not been speaking here of opinions of that kind. There are doctrines that infect subjects with a firm belief that they may refuse obedience to the city, and that they may—indeed, must—rightfully oppose and fight against supreme rulers and dignitaries. Such doctrines, whether openly and directly or more obscurely by implication, require obedience to persons other than those entrusted with supreme authority. I do not deny that this applies to the power many people under other governments attribute to the supreme head of the Church of Rome; to the power bishops outside that Church elsewhere demand for themselves; and, finally, to the liberty that citizens of the lower orders claim for themselves under the pretense of religion. What civil war has ever occurred in the Christian world that did not grow from this root or draw nourishment from it? I therefore assign to civil authority the judgment whether doctrines conflict with civil obedience and, if they do, the power to prohibit their teaching. Everyone grants the city judgment over matters affecting its peace and defense, and the opinions I have just described plainly affect its peace. It follows necessarily that the examination of whether such opinions are of this kind must be referred to the city—that is, to the holder of supreme authority.
10 Absolute.] A popular state openly claims absolute dominion, and citizens do not oppose its claim. In the gathering of many men they recognize the face of a city, and even the unlearned understand that affairs there are governed by counsel. Yet a monarchy is no less a city than a democracy. Absolute kings, too, have counselors from whom they take advice and permit their power to be guided, but not revoked, in matters of greatest consequence. Most men, however, cannot see how a city is contained in the person of a king. Their first objection to absolute command is that if any man possessed such a right, citizens would be miserable. They imagine he would take everything, plunder everyone, kill everyone, and each would count himself fortunate merely to have escaped plunder and death so far. But why would he do this? Not merely because he can; unless he wishes to, he will not. Would he plunder everyone else to please one man or a few? First, though he may do so by right—that is, without doing them an injury—he cannot do it justly, without violating the laws of nature and injuring God. Thus the oaths princes take offer their subjects some security. Next, even if he could do so justly or cared nothing for his oath, there is still no apparent reason to desire it, since he gains nothing by it. It cannot be denied, however, that a prince may sometimes be inclined to act wickedly. Suppose, then, you had given him a power that was not absolute, but only sufficient to defend you against injury from others—a power you must grant if you wish to be safe. Would you not have all the same things to fear? Anyone strong enough to protect everyone is also strong enough to oppress everyone. The only difficulty, then, is that human affairs cannot be free of inconvenience. And this inconvenience lies in the citizens, not in the government. If men could govern themselves, each by his own command—that is, if they could live according to the laws of nature—there would be no need for a city or a common coercive power. Their second objection is that no dominion in the Christian world is absolute. This is not true: every monarchy and every other state has absolute dominion. Those who hold supreme command do not always do everything they would like, or everything they know would benefit the city. The reason is not a lack of right, but regard for their citizens, whose absorption in private interests and neglect of the public good sometimes make it impossible to bring them to their duties without endangering the city. Princes therefore sometimes refrain from exercising their right, and prudently relinquish something of its exercise, but nothing of the right itself.
11 Property began, etc.] Some object that even before the establishment of cities, fathers of families possessed property in goods. This objection is idle, because I have already explained that a family is a small city. The sons of a family hold property in goods granted them by their father, distinguished from the property of the other sons in the same family, but not from their father's property. Fathers of different families, subject to no common father or lord, have a common right to all things.
12 What he may do by right, etc.] When a citizen is allowed to bring a legal action against the supreme ruler—that is, against the city—the question in that action is not whether the city has the right to keep possession of the disputed thing, but whether she would keep it under laws previously made; for law is the declared will of the supreme ruler. The city may raise money from its citizens on two grounds: as tribute or as debt. In the first case no legal action is allowed, since there can be no question of the city's right to demand tribute. In the second it is allowed, because the city does not wish to take anything from its citizens by fraud or cunning, though in case of need she may openly take all they have. Whoever condemns this passage on the ground that the doctrine makes it easy for princes to discharge their debts thus misses the point.
13 That they were made by an oath or sacrament, etc.] Whether matrimony is a sacrament, as some theologians use the term, is not a question I intend to dispute. I say only that a lawful contract between a man and a woman to live together—one permitted by civil law—is certainly a lawful marriage, sacrament or not; but a union prohibited by the city is no marriage, because being a lawful contract is essential to marriage. In many places, among the Jews, the Greeks, and the Romans, there were lawful marriages that could nevertheless be dissolved. But among those who permit such contracts only under a law that they shall never be broken, marriage cannot be dissolved. The reason is that the city has commanded it to be indissoluble, not that marriage is a sacrament. Thus the ceremonies to be performed in the temple at weddings, to bless or, if I may say so, consecrate husband and wife, may perhaps belong solely to the office of clergy. Everything else—who may marry, when, and by what contracts marriages may be made—belongs to the laws of the city.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
20 Supreme command is established through covenants that individual citizens or subjects make with one another. Contracts get their force from the parties making them, and can be canceled by their agreement. Some might therefore conclude that all the subjects together can agree to abolish supreme authority completely. Even if this were true, I cannot see what danger it would rightfully present to supreme rulers. Each person is assumed to have obligated himself to each other person. If even one refuses to agree, he remains bound regardless of what the rest decide. Nor can anyone act without injuring me when he has contracted with me not to do that act. It is unimaginable that every subject, without a single exception, will unite against supreme power. So rulers need not fear that anyone can rightfully strip them of their authority. Suppose, nevertheless, that their right depended only on the contract each person makes with his fellow citizen. Then they could easily lose their dominion under a pretense of right. When subjects meet at the city's command or gather in a rebellious crowd, most people think a majority vote represents everyone's consent. In fact it does not. Nature does not make the majority's consent count as everyone's, and it does not count as everyone's during riots. That rule comes from the structure of civil society. It applies only when the person or court holding supreme power assembles the subjects and, because they are so numerous, authorizes elected people to speak for those who elected them. The ruler must also authorize majority votes on the questions submitted for discussion to count as votes of the whole assembly. We cannot suppose a ruler would call subjects together to debate his right to rule, unless he was tired of the burden and openly declared that he was giving up his government. Yet most people mistakenly take a majority of citizens—or even a few citizens who share their opinion—to represent the entire city. They might therefore think a large citizens' assembly can rightfully abolish supreme authority by majority vote. Although government is founded on contracts between individuals, its right does not depend on those obligations alone. There is also a bond to the ruler. In making his covenant with another citizen, each says, “I transfer my right to this person on condition that you transfer yours to the same person.” The right each previously held to use his abilities for his own benefit is thereby transferred completely to a particular person or council for the common good. Thus government rests on two obligations for each citizen: the mutual contract with fellow citizens and the transfer of rights he must confirm to the ruler. He owes a duty first to his fellow citizens and second to his sovereign. No number of subjects, therefore, can rightfully take supreme authority away from its holder without that holder's consent.
8 Multitude, and so on.] The doctrine of a city's power over its citizens depends almost entirely on understanding the difference between a multitude that governs and a multitude that is governed. A multitude or body of citizens can both exercise command and be subject to it, but in different senses. I thought article 1 explained this clearly enough. Objections to what follows show me otherwise, so I add these remarks to explain it more fully.
Because “multitude” is a collective word, it means more than one: a multitude of people means many people. But because the word is singular, it also names one thing, a single multitude. Neither meaning gives a multitude a single will by nature. Each individual has a separate will, so no single action of any kind can be assigned to a multitude. A multitude cannot promise, contract, acquire or transfer rights, act, own, possess, or do anything similar except person by person. There must be as many promises, contracts, rights, and actions as there are people. A multitude is therefore not a natural person. But if its members contract with one another to accept the will of one person, or the agreeing wills of a majority, as everyone's will, it becomes one person. It now has a will, and can take voluntary actions such as issuing commands, making laws, and acquiring and transferring rights. We more often call it a people than a multitude. We must therefore make a distinction. When we say that the people or multitude wills, commands, or does something, we mean that the city does so by the will of one person or the agreeing wills of several people. The latter can only act together in an assembly. But when a multitude, large or small, acts without the will of that person or assembly, we mean a people under government: many individual citizens acting together. They do not act from one will, but from the separate wills of different people who are citizens and subjects, not a city.
9 Judge which opinions, and so on. Almost any principle of divine worship or human learning can produce disagreements, disputes, insults, and eventually war. This is not because the principle is false, but because people who consider themselves wise insist that everyone else see them that way. Such disputes cannot always be prevented from starting, but supreme power can restrain them so that they do not disturb public peace. I was not discussing opinions of that kind. Certain doctrines convince the subjects exposed to them that they may refuse to obey the city, and that they may, or even must, rightfully oppose and fight their supreme rulers and other authorities. Whether openly and directly or less openly by implication, these doctrines demand obedience to someone other than the holders of supreme authority. I do not deny that this applies to the power many people living under other governments attribute to the chief head of the Church of Rome. It also applies to the power that bishops outside that Church demand for themselves in their own churches, and finally to the liberty claimed by lower-ranking citizens on the pretext of religion. Has any civil war in the Christian world not grown from this source or been fed by it? I therefore assign to civil authority the power to judge whether doctrines conflict with civil obedience, and to forbid their teaching when they do. Everyone accepts that the city judges matters affecting its peace and defense. The opinions I have mentioned plainly affect its peace. The city, meaning the supreme ruler, must therefore decide whether particular opinions are of this kind.
10 Absolute.] A popular government openly claims absolute dominion, and its citizens do not object. When they see many people assembled, they recognize the city's public authority. Even people without much understanding see that a council governs its affairs. Yet a monarchy is no less a city than a democracy. Absolute kings have counselors too: they take advice from them and allow their power to be guided in important matters, but not withdrawn. Most people, however, cannot see how a city can exist in the person of a king. Their first objection to absolute rule is that if anyone held such a right, citizens would be miserable. They imagine he would seize everything, ruin everything, and kill everyone, and count themselves lucky not to have been ruined or killed already. But why would he do so? The ability to do it does not mean he will want to. Would he ruin everyone else to please one person or a few? First, even if he can do so by right, without violating a subject's rights, he cannot do it justly, without violating the laws of nature and wronging God. The oaths rulers take therefore offer subjects some security. Second, even if he could do it justly or did not care about his oath, there is no evident reason to want to do it, since he would gain nothing. Of course, a prince may sometimes want to do wrong. But suppose you gave him only enough power to protect you from other people's injuries, not absolute power. You must at least give him that much to be safe. Wouldn't you still have to fear all the same things? Anyone strong enough to protect everyone is also strong enough to oppress everyone. The only difficulty is that human affairs inevitably involve some disadvantages. This particular disadvantage lies with the citizens, not their government. If people could govern themselves, each by his own command—if they could live by the laws of nature—there would be no need for a city or common power to compel them. Their second objection is that no government in the Christian world holds absolute dominion. This is not true: all monarchies and other states do. Supreme rulers do not always do everything they want or everything they know would benefit the city. But this is not because they lack the right. It is because citizens focused on private interests and indifferent to the public good sometimes cannot be made to do their duty without endangering the city. So rulers sometimes refrain from exercising their right, wisely giving up some actions but none of their right.
11 Property began, and so on.] Some object that heads of households owned property before cities were established. This objection is pointless, because I have already explained that a family is a small city. Children in a family own goods allotted to them by their father, separate from what their siblings own, but not separate from the father's property. The fathers of different families who have no common father or master over them have a common right to everything.
12 What he may rightfully do, and so on.] When a citizen is allowed to sue the supreme authority, meaning the city, the issue is not whether the city has the right to keep the disputed property. It is whether, under its existing laws, it would choose to keep it, since law is the supreme ruler's declared will. A city can obtain money from its citizens in two ways: as tribute or as repayment of a debt. In the first case no lawsuit is allowed, since nobody can dispute the city's right to demand tribute. In the second case a suit is allowed, because the city will not take anything from citizens by fraud or trickery, though it can openly take all they have if necessary. Someone who criticizes this passage by saying it lets rulers easily escape their debts misses the point.
13 That they were made by an oath or sacrament, and so on.] I do not intend to debate whether marriage is a sacrament, as some theologians use that term. I say only this: a lawful agreement for a man and woman to live together, permitted by civil law, is unquestionably a lawful marriage whether it is a sacrament or not. A sexual union prohibited by the city is not marriage, since a lawful agreement is essential to marriage. Many peoples, including Jews, Greeks, and Romans, had lawful marriages that could still be dissolved. Where contracts are allowed only under a law declaring them indissoluble, a marriage cannot be dissolved. The reason is the city's command that marriage be permanent, not its status as a sacrament. Religious officials may perhaps have the sole duty to perform wedding ceremonies in a temple, blessing or, if I may put it that way, consecrating the husband and wife. All other matters—who may marry, when, and under which agreements—belong to the city's laws.