Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Dominion, Chapter VI, 1
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OF THE RIGHT OF HIM, WHETHER COUNCIL OR ONE MAN ONLY, WHO HATH THE SUPREME POWER IN THE CITY
1 There can no right be attributed to a multitude out of civil society, nor any action to which they have not under seal consented. 2. The right of the greater number consenting, is the beginning of a city. 3. That every man retains a right to protect himself according to his own free will, so long as there is no sufficient regard had to his security. 4. That a coercive power is necessary to secure us. 5. What the sword of justice is. 6. That the sword of justice belongs to him, who hath the chief command. 7. That the sword of war belongs to him also. 8. All judicature belongs to him too. 9. The legislative power is his only. 10. The naming of magistrates and other officers of the city belongs to him. 11 Also the examination of all doctrines. 12. Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable. 13. That the command his citizens have granted is absolute, and what proportion of obedience is due to him. 14. That the laws of the city bind him not. 15. That no man can challenge a propriety to anything against his will. 16. By the laws of the city only we come to know what theft, murder, adultery, and injury is. 17. The opinion of those who would constitute a city, where there should not be any one endued with an absolute power. 18. The marks of supreme authority. 19. If a city be compared with a man, he that hath the supreme power is in order to the city, as the human soul is in relation to the man. 20. That the supreme command cannot by right be dissolved through their consents, by whose compacts it was first constituted.
There can no right be attributed to a multitude, considered out of civil society; nor any action, to which they have not given their particular consents.
1 We must consider, first of all, what a multitude8 of men, gathering themselves of their own free wills into society, is; namely, that it is not any one body, but many men, whereof each one hath his own will and his peculiar judgment concerning all things that may be proposed. And though by particular contracts each single man may have his own right and propriety, so as one may say this is mine, the other, that is his; yet will there not be anything of which the whole multitude, as a person distinct from a single man, can rightly say, this is mine, more than another’s. Neither must we ascribe any action to the multitude, as its own; but if all or more of them do agree, it will not be an action, but as many actions as men. For although in some great sedition, it is commonly said, that the people of that city have taken up arms; yet is it true of those only who are in arms, or who consent to them. For the city, which is one person, cannot take up arms against itself. Whatsoever, therefore, is done by the multitude, must be understood to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being in the multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the things that were done by it, must be judged to have done nothing. Besides, in a multitude not yet reduced into one person, in that manner as hath been said, there remains that same state of nature in which all things belong to all men; and there is no place for meum and tuum, which is called dominion and propriety, by reason that that security is not yet extant, which we have declared above to be necessarily requisite for the practice of the natural laws.
The beginning of a city is the right of the major part agreeing.
2 Next, we must consider that every one of the multitude, by whose means there may be a beginning to make up the city, must agree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be propounded by any one in the assembly, that be received for the will of all, which the major part shall approve of; for otherwise there will be no will at all of a multitude of men, whose wills and votes differ so variously. Now, if any one will not consent, the rest, notwithstanding, shall among themselves constitute the city without him. Whence it will come to pass, that the city retains its primitive right against the dissenter; that is, the right of war, as against an enemy.
That every man retains a right of protecting himself according to his own judgment, as long as he is not secured.
3 But because we said in the foregoing chapter, the sixth article, that there was required to the security of men, not only their consent, but also the subjection of their wills in such things as were necessary to peace and defence; and that in that union and subjection the nature of a city consisted; we must discern now in this place, out of those things which may be propounded, discussed, and stated in an assembly of men, all whose wills are contained in the will of the major part, what things are necessary to peace and common defence. But first of all, it is necessary to peace, that a man be so far forth protected against the violence of others, that he may live securely; that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether safe from mutual harms, so as they cannot be hurt or injuriously killed, is impossible; and, therefore, comes not within deliberation. But care may be had, there be no just cause of fear; for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others; which if it be not had, no man is supposed to have submitted himself to aught, or to have quitted his right to all things, before that there was a care had of his security.
That a coercive power is necessary for security.
4 It is not enough to obtain this security, that every one of those who are now growing up into a city, do covenant with the rest, either by words or writing, not to steal, not to kill, and to observe the like laws; for the pravity of human disposition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties through conscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our security, not by compacts, but by punishments; and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evil to have done it, than not to have done it. For all men, by a necessity of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the less evil.
What the sword of justice is.
5 Now, the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one, when every man contracts not to assist him who is to be punished. But I will call this right, the sword of justice. But these kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves or their near friends are to suffer.
That the sword of justice belongs to him who hath the chief command.
6 Because, therefore, for the security of particular men, and, by consequence, for the common peace, it is necessary that the right of using the sword for punishment be transferred to some man or council; that man or council is necessarily understood by right to have the supreme power in the city. For he that by right punisheth at his own discretion, by right compels all men to all things which he himself wills; than which a greater command cannot be imagined.
That the sword of war belongs to him also.
7 But in vain do they worship peace at home, who cannot defend themselves against foreigners; neither is it possible for them to protect themselves against foreigners, whose forces are not united. And therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars, that there be some one council or one man, who hath the right to arm, to gather together, to unite so many citizens, in all dangers and on all occasions, as shall be needful for common defence against the certain number and strength of the enemy; and again, as often as he shall find it expedient, to make peace with them. We must understand, therefore, that particular citizens have conveyed their whole right of war and peace unto some one man or council; and that this right, which we may call the sword of war, belongs to the same man or council, to whom the sword of justice belongs. For no man can by right compel citizens to take up arms and be at the expenses of war, but he who by right can punish him who doth not obey. Both swords therefore, as well this of war as that of justice, even by the constitution itself of a city and essentially do belong to the chief command.
The power of judicature belongs to him.
8 But because the right of the sword, is nothing else but to have power by right to use the sword at his own will, it follows, that the judgment of its right use pertains to the same party; for if the power of judging were in one, and the power of executing in another, nothing would be done. For in vain would he give judgment, who could not execute his commands; or, if he executed them by the power of another, he himself is not said to have the power of the sword, but that other, to whom he is only an officer. All judgment therefore, in a city, belongs to him who hath the swords; that is, to him who hath the supreme authority.
The legislative power is his also.
9 Furthermore, since it no less, nay, it much more conduceth to peace, to prevent brawls from arising than to appease them being risen; and that all controversies are bred from hence, that the opinions of men differ concerning meum and tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evil, honest and dishonest, and the like; which every man esteems according to his own judgment: it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another’s, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life. But those rules and measures are usually called the civil laws, or the laws of the city, as being the commands of him who hath the supreme power in the city. And the civil laws (that we may define them) are nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chief authority in the city, for direction of the future actions of his citizens.
That the naming of magistrates and officers belongs to him also.
10 Furthermore, since the affairs of the city, both those of war and peace, cannot possibly be all administered by one man or one council without officers and subordinate magistrates; and that it appertaineth to peace and common defence, that they to whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies, to search into neighbouring councils, prudently to wage war, and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the city, should also rightly exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason that they depend on, and be chosen by him who hath the chief command both in war and in peace.
The examination of doctrine belongs to him likewise.
11 It is also manifest, that all voluntary actions have their beginning from, and necessarily depend on the will; and that the will of doing or omitting aught, depends on the opinion of the good and evil, of the reward or punishment which a man conceives he shall receive by the act or omission: so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each. Wherefore, by evident and necessary inference, we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of peace, that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens, by which they may imagine that either by right they may not obey the laws of the city, that is, the commands of that man or council to whom the supreme power is committed, or that it is lawful to resist him, or that a less punishment remains for him that denies, than for him that yields obedience. For if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of natural death, another forbid it under pain of eternal death, and both by their own right, it will follow that the citizens, although innocent, are not only by right punishable, but that the city itself is altogether dissolved. For no man can serve two masters; nor is he less, but rather more a master, whom we believe we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he whom we obey for fear of temporal death. It follows therefore that this one, whether man or court, to whom the city hath committed the supreme power, have also this right; that he both judge what opinions9 and doctrines are enemies unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be taught.
Whatsoever he doth is unpunishable.
12 Last of all, from this consideration, that each citizen hath submitted his will to his who hath the supreme command in the city, so as he may not employ his strength against him; it follows manifestly, that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands, must not be punished. For as he who hath not power enough, cannot punish him naturally, so neither can he punish him by right, who by right hath not sufficient power.
That he hath an absolute dominion granted him by his citizens, and what proportion of obedience is due unto him.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
OF THE RIGHT OF THE PERSON, WHETHER A COUNCIL OR A SINGLE MAN, WHO HOLDS SUPREME POWER IN THE CITY
1 No right can be attributed to a multitude outside civil society, nor any action to which its members have not individually consented. 2. The right of the consenting majority is the beginning of a city. 3. Everyone retains the right to protect himself according to his own judgment so long as his security is not sufficiently provided for. 4. Coercive power is necessary to secure us. 5. What the sword of justice is. 6. The sword of justice belongs to whoever holds the supreme command. 7. The sword of war belongs to him as well. 8. All judicial authority belongs to him too. 9. Legislative power belongs to him alone. 10. The appointment of magistrates and other officers of the city belongs to him. 11. So does the examination of all doctrines. 12. Whatever he does cannot be punished. 13. The command his citizens have granted him is absolute, and what measure of obedience they owe him. 14. The laws of the city do not bind him. 15. No one can claim property in anything against his will. 16. Only through the laws of the city do we know what theft, murder, adultery, and injury are. 17. The opinion of those who would establish a city without anyone endowed with absolute power. 18. The marks of supreme authority. 19. If a city is compared with a man, the holder of supreme power stands to the city as the human soul stands to a man. 20. The supreme command cannot rightfully be dissolved by the consent of those whose compacts first established it.
No right can be attributed to a multitude considered outside civil society, nor any action to which its members have not each given consent.
1 First we must consider what a multitude8 of men, coming together of their own free will into society, is: not one body, but many men, each with his own will and his own judgment concerning anything that may be proposed. And though, by individual contracts, each man may have his own right and property, so that one can say, “This is mine,” and another, “That is his,” there will still be nothing of which the whole multitude, as a person distinct from an individual man, can say with better right than anyone else, “This is mine.” Nor should we attribute any action to the multitude as its own: even if all or most of them agree, there is not one action but as many actions as there are men. Thus, although during a great uprising people commonly say that the people of the city have taken up arms, this is true only of those who bear arms or consent to those who do. The city, being one person, cannot take up arms against itself. Whatever the multitude does, therefore, must be understood as done by each of the people who compose it; and anyone who was among them but neither consented to nor assisted in what they did must be judged to have done nothing. Moreover, among a multitude not yet made into one person in the manner described, the same state of nature persists in which all things belong to all men. There is no place for mine and yours, which are called dominion and property, because the security we have declared indispensable to the practice of the laws of nature does not yet exist.
The beginning of a city is the right of the majority who agree.
2 Next we must consider that each person in the multitude through which a city may begin must agree with the rest that, in matters proposed by anyone in the assembly, what the majority approves shall be accepted as the will of all. Otherwise there will be no will at all belonging to a multitude whose individual wills and votes differ so widely. If anyone refuses to consent, the rest may nevertheless establish the city among themselves without him. Hence the city retains its original right against the dissenter: the right of war against an enemy.
Everyone retains the right to protect himself according to his own judgment as long as he is not secure.
3 In the sixth article of the preceding chapter we said that men's security required not only their consent but also the submission of their wills in matters necessary to peace and defense, and that the nature of a city consisted in that union and submission. We must now distinguish, among the matters that can be proposed, discussed, and settled in an assembly of men whose wills are all contained in the will of the majority, those things necessary to peace and common defense. First, peace requires that a man be protected against the violence of others far enough to live securely—that is, to have no just cause to fear them while he does them no injury. It is impossible to make men altogether safe from harming one another, so that they can neither be injured nor unlawfully killed; that is therefore no matter for deliberation. But it is possible to take care that there be no just cause for fear. Security is the end for which men submit themselves to others; if it is not provided, no one can be presumed to have submitted to anyone or relinquished his right to all things before provision was made for his security.
Coercive power is necessary for security.
4 To obtain this security, it is not enough that everyone now joining in the formation of a city covenant with the rest, whether orally or in writing, not to steal, not to kill, and to observe similar laws. The corruption of human disposition is plain to everyone, and experience shows too well how little the consciousness of promises keeps men to their duties when punishment is removed. We must therefore provide for our security not by compacts but by punishments. Provision is sufficient when the punishments fixed for every injury are so great that committing it plainly proves a greater evil than refraining from it. For all men, by a necessity of nature, choose what appears to them the lesser evil.
What the sword of justice is.
5 The right to punish is understood to be given to someone when every man contracts not to assist the person who is to be punished. I call this right the sword of justice. Men observe contracts of this kind well enough, for the most part, until they or their close friends are the ones who must suffer.
The sword of justice belongs to whoever holds the supreme command.
6 Since the security of individuals, and consequently the common peace, requires the transfer of the right to use the sword for punishment to some man or council, that man or council must be understood to hold supreme power in the city by right. For whoever has the right to punish at his own discretion has the right to compel all men to do whatever he wills; no greater command can be imagined.
The sword of war belongs to him as well.
7 Those who cultivate peace at home do so in vain if they cannot defend themselves against foreigners; nor can they defend themselves against foreigners unless their forces are united. Thus the preservation of individuals requires some one council or one man with the right to arm, assemble, and unite as many citizens as may be needed for common defense against the enemy's known numbers and strength, in every danger and on every occasion, and to make peace with that enemy whenever he finds it expedient. We must therefore understand that individual citizens have transferred their entire right of war and peace to some one man or council; and this right, which we may call the sword of war, belongs to the same man or council that holds the sword of justice. For no one can rightfully compel citizens to take up arms and bear the costs of war except the one who can rightfully punish a citizen who disobeys. Both swords, then—of war and of justice—belong essentially to the supreme command by the very constitution of a city.
Judicial power belongs to him.
8 Since the right of the sword is nothing but the rightful power to use the sword at one's own will, the judgment of its proper use belongs to the same party. If the power to judge belonged to one and the power to execute judgment to another, nothing would be done: a judge unable to carry out his commands would judge in vain; and if he carried them out by another's power, the sword would belong not to him but to the other, for whom he would be merely an officer. All judgment in a city therefore belongs to whoever holds the swords—that is, to whoever holds supreme authority.
Legislative power belongs to him as well.
9 Moreover, preventing quarrels is no less conducive to peace—indeed, much more so—than settling them once they have arisen. Every controversy arises because men differ in their opinions about mine and yours, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable, and the like, each judging these according to his own view. It therefore belongs to the same supreme power to establish common rules for everyone and proclaim them publicly, so that each man may know what is called his and what another's, what is just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable, good and evil—in short, what is to be done and what avoided in our common life. These rules and standards are usually called civil laws, or laws of the city, because they are the commands of whoever holds supreme power in the city. To define them, civil laws are nothing other than the commands of the holder of supreme authority in the city, directing the future actions of its citizens.
The appointment of magistrates and officers belongs to him as well.
10 Furthermore, one man or council cannot possibly administer all the city's affairs, in war and peace, without officers and subordinate magistrates. Peace and common defense require that those charged with rightly judging controversies, investigating the counsels of neighboring peoples, waging war prudently, and attending carefully in all respects to the city's welfare should also exercise their offices by right. It accords with reason, then, that they depend upon and be chosen by the holder of supreme command in both war and peace.
The examination of doctrine belongs to him likewise.
11 It is also plain that all voluntary actions begin in, and necessarily depend upon, the will; and that the will to do or omit something depends on a man's opinion of the good or evil, the reward or punishment, that he expects from doing or omitting it. Thus every man's actions are governed by his opinions. It follows clearly and necessarily that peace has a deep interest in preventing the teaching of opinions or doctrines that might lead citizens to imagine that they may rightfully disobey the city's laws—the commands of the man or council entrusted with supreme power—or lawfully resist him, or that disobedience carries a lesser punishment than obedience. For if one authority commands something on pain of natural death, while another forbids it on pain of eternal death, and both act by their own right, citizens, though innocent, will not only be rightfully liable to punishment: the city itself will be utterly dissolved. No man can serve two masters; nor is the one we believe we must obey for fear of damnation less a master than the one we obey for fear of temporal death—he is more so. It follows that the one man or court to whom the city has committed supreme power also has the right both to judge what opinions9 and doctrines are hostile to peace and to forbid their teaching.
Whatever he does cannot be punished.
12 Finally, each citizen has submitted his will to that of the holder of supreme command in the city, so that he may not use his strength against him. It follows plainly that whatever the commander does must go unpunished. For a person who lacks sufficient power cannot punish him in fact; nor can one who lacks sufficient power by right punish him by right.
That his citizens have granted him absolute dominion, and what measure of obedience is due to him.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE PERSON OR COUNCIL HOLDING SUPREME POWER IN THE CITY
1 A multitude outside civil society has no rights as a group and performs no action unless its members have individually agreed to it. 2. The agreement of the majority begins a city. 3. Everyone keeps the right to protect himself as he judges best until his safety is secured. 4. Security requires the power to compel people. 5. What the sword of justice means. 6. The sword of justice belongs to the supreme ruler. 7. So does the sword of war. 8. All judicial power belongs to that ruler too. 9. Only that ruler has legislative power. 10. That ruler appoints magistrates and other city officers. 11 The ruler also examines all doctrines. 12. The ruler's acts cannot be punished. 13. The citizens grant the ruler absolute command, and owe the ruler a certain degree of obedience. 14. The city's laws do not bind the ruler. 15. Nobody can claim property against the ruler's will. 16. Only the city's laws define theft, murder, adultery, and injury. 17. The view of those who want a city without anyone holding absolute power. 18. The signs of supreme authority. 19. In comparison with a human being, the supreme ruler is to the city what the soul is to the person. 20. Those whose covenants first established supreme command cannot rightfully dissolve it by agreeing to do so.
A multitude outside civil society has no rights as a group, and does nothing as a group unless its members individually consent.
1 First, consider what a multitude8 of people who voluntarily come together in a society is. It is not one body, but many people, each with a will and a judgment of his own about every question raised. Individual contracts can give each person rights and property, so that one says, “This is mine,” and another says, “That is his.” But the multitude as a distinct person cannot rightfully say of anything, “This is mine rather than someone else's.” Nor can we attribute any action to the multitude itself. Even if all or most agree, their deed consists of as many actions as there are people acting. During a major uprising, people commonly say that the city's people have taken up arms. In fact, that applies only to those bearing arms or supporting them. The city, which is one person, cannot take up arms against itself. So whatever a multitude does must be understood as the deed of each participant. A member who neither consented to nor helped with it must be judged to have done nothing. Besides, a multitude that has not yet become one person in the way described remains in the state of nature. Everything still belongs to everybody. There is no place for “mine” and “yours,” or for dominion and property, because the security necessary for observing the laws of nature, as explained above, does not yet exist.
The beginning of a city is agreement that the majority has the deciding vote.
2 Next, everyone in the multitude from which a city may arise must agree with the others to accept the majority's decision as the will of all on questions anyone raises in the assembly. Otherwise, people with such different wills and votes will have no collective will at all. If anyone refuses to consent, the rest can still form the city without him. The city then keeps its original right against the dissenter: the right to wage war against an enemy.
Everyone keeps the right to protect himself according to his own judgment until his safety is secured.
3 In article 6 of the preceding chapter, we said that security needs more than agreement. People must also submit their wills in matters necessary to peace and defense. That union and submission constitute a city. We must now identify which matters are necessary to peace and common defense among the questions that can be proposed, debated, and settled in an assembly whose majority represents everyone's will. Above all, peace requires people to be protected against others' violence well enough to live securely. They must have no justified reason to fear others while doing them no injury. It is impossible to guarantee that people will never hurt or unlawfully kill one another, so that is not a possible aim for deliberation. But arrangements can remove justified cause for fear. People submit to others for the sake of security. If they have no security, nobody can be assumed to have submitted to anyone or given up his right to everything before his security was addressed.
Security requires the power to compel people.
4 For security, it is not enough that everyone joining a city promise the others, orally or in writing, not to steal or kill and to follow similar laws. Everyone knows the faults of human nature. Experience shows how little promises and conscience restrain people when punishment is removed. Our security must therefore rest not on covenants but on punishments. The provision is sufficient when penalties for each injury are severe enough that committing it clearly brings a worse outcome than refraining. Human nature makes everyone choose what seems the lesser evil.
What the sword of justice means.
5 Someone receives the right to punish when each person agrees not to assist the person facing punishment. I call this right the sword of justice. People generally keep agreements of this sort, at least until they or their close friends face punishment.
The sword of justice belongs to the supreme ruler.
6 The safety of individuals, and consequently public peace, requires transferring the right to use the sword for punishment to one person or council. That person or council must therefore have supreme power in the city. Anyone who rightfully punishes at his own discretion can rightfully compel everyone to do what he wishes. No greater power to command can be imagined.
The sword of war belongs to the same ruler.
7 Seeking peace at home is pointless for those who cannot defend themselves against outsiders. They cannot defend themselves unless their forces are united. So the safety of individuals requires one person or council with the right, whenever danger or circumstances require, to arm, gather, and unite as many citizens as necessary for common defense against the enemy's numbers and strength. That ruler must also have the right to make peace with the enemy whenever it seems advisable. We must therefore understand that individual citizens have transferred their entire right of war and peace to one person or council. This right, which we can call the sword of war, belongs to the same person or council as the sword of justice. Only someone who can rightfully punish disobedient citizens can rightfully compel them to take up arms and pay the costs of war. Thus both swords, of war and of justice, belong necessarily and by the city's very constitution to its supreme ruler.
Judicial power belongs to that ruler.
8 The right of the sword is simply the rightful power to use it at one's own discretion. The same person must therefore decide when its use is right. If one person judged and another enforced the judgment, nothing would be done. Judgment is useless if the judge cannot enforce his orders. If he enforces them only through another's power, the other person holds the sword; the judge is merely that person's officer. All judgment in a city therefore belongs to whoever holds the swords, namely the holder of supreme authority.
Legislative power belongs to that ruler too.
9 Preventing quarrels does at least as much for peace as settling them afterward, and indeed much more. Disputes arise because people disagree about mine and yours, just and unjust, beneficial and harmful, good and bad, honorable and dishonorable, and similar distinctions. Everyone judges these matters for himself. The supreme authority must therefore set out common rules publicly for everyone. These rules tell people what belongs to themselves and others, what is just or unjust, honorable or dishonorable, good or bad, and in short what to do or avoid in daily life together. Such rules are usually called civil laws, or the city's laws, because they are commands of whoever holds supreme power there. Civil laws, to define them, are simply the supreme ruler's commands directing citizens' future actions.
That ruler also appoints magistrates and officers.
10 A single person or council cannot manage every public matter in war and peace without subordinate officers and magistrates. Peace and common defense require that those who judge disputes, investigate the plans of neighboring states, conduct war wisely, and carefully look after the city's interests actually perform their jobs properly. It is therefore reasonable for these officers to depend on, and be selected by, the person holding supreme command in war and peace.
The same ruler examines doctrines.
11 Clearly, every voluntary action begins with and depends on the will. A person's choice to act or not act depends on what he thinks is good or bad, and on the reward or punishment he expects from doing or omitting it. Each person's opinions thus govern his actions. It plainly follows that peace greatly depends on preventing citizens from receiving doctrines that lead them to believe they may rightfully disobey the city's laws—that is, the commands of the person or council holding supreme power—or lawfully resist that ruler, or that refusing obedience brings a lighter punishment than complying. Suppose one authority commands an act on pain of ordinary death and another forbids it on pain of eternal death, with both claiming the right to command. Then innocent citizens become liable to punishment by right, and the city itself falls apart. Nobody can serve two masters. Someone we believe we must obey for fear of damnation is more, not less, our master than someone we obey for fear of death in this life. Therefore the person or council to whom the city has entrusted supreme power also has the right to judge which opinions9 and doctrines threaten peace, and to forbid their teaching.
The ruler's acts cannot be punished.
12 Finally, each citizen has submitted his will to the supreme ruler's, and may not use his strength against that ruler. It plainly follows that whatever the ruler does cannot be punished. Someone without enough force cannot punish him in fact; someone without a right to enough force cannot rightfully punish him either.
The citizens grant the ruler absolute dominion, and owe him a certain degree of obedience.