Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Dominion, Chapter V
Dominion, Chapter V of 46. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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OF THE CAUSES AND FIRST BEGINNING OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
1 That the laws of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace. 2. That the laws of nature, in the state of nature, are silent. 3. That the security of living according to the laws of nature, consists in the concord of many persons. 4. That the concord of many persons is not constant enough for a lasting peace. 5. The reason why the government of certain brute creatures stands firm in concord only, and why not of men. 6. That not only consent, but union also, is required to establish the peace of men. 7. What union is. 8. In union, the right of all men is conveyed to one. 9. What civil society is. 10. What a civil person is. 11. What it is to have the supreme power, and what to be a subject 12. Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.
That the laws of nature suffice not for the conservation of peace.
1 It is of itself manifest that the actions of men proceed from the will, and the will from hope and fear, insomuch as when they shall see a greater good or less evil likely to happen to them by the breach than observation of the laws, they will wittingly violate them. The hope therefore which each man hath of his security and self-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour, either openly or by stratagem. Whence we may understand, that the natural laws, though well understood, do not instantly secure any man in their practice; and consequently, that as long as there is no caution had from the invasion of others, there remains to every man that same primitive right of self-defence by such means as either he can or will make use of, that is, a right to all things, or the right of war. And it is sufficient for the fulfilling of the natural law, that a man be prepared in mind to embrace peace when it may be had.
That the laws of nature, in a state of nature, are silent.
2 It is a trite saying, that all laws are silent in the time of war, and it is a true one, not only if we speak of the civil, but also of the natural laws, provided they be referred not to the mind, but to the actions of men, by chap. iii. art. 27. And we mean such a war, as is of all men against all men; such as is the mere state of nature; although in the war of nation against nation, a certain mean was wont to be observed. And therefore in old time, there was a manner of living, and as it were a certain economy, which they called ληστρικὴν, living by rapine; which was neither against the law of nature (things then so standing), nor void of glory to those who exercised it with valour, not with cruelty. Their custom was, taking away the rest, to spare life, and abstain from oxen fit for plough, and every instrument serviceable to husbandry. Which yet is not so to be taken, as if they were bound to do thus by the law of nature; but that they had regard to their own glory herein, lest by too much cruelty they might be suspected guilty of fear.
That the security of living according to the laws of nature, consists in the agreement of many.
3 Since therefore the exercise of the natural law is necessary for the preservation of peace, and that for the exercise of the natural law security is no less necessary; it is worth the considering what that is which affords such a security. For this matter nothing else can be imagined, but that each man provide himself of such meet helps, as the invasion of one on the other may be rendered so dangerous, as either of them may think it better to refrain than to meddle. But first, it is plain that the consent of two or three cannot make good such a security; because that the addition but of one, or some few on the other side, is sufficient to make the victory undoubtedly sure, and heartens the enemy to attack us. It is therefore necessary, to the end the security sought for may be obtained, that the number of them who conspire in a mutual assistance be so great, that the accession of some few to the enemy’s party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to assure the victory.
That the agreement of many is not constant enough to preserve a lasting peace.
4 Furthermore, how great soever the number of them is who meet on self-defence, if yet they agree not among themselves of some excellent means whereby to compass this, but every man after his own manner shall make use of his endeavours, nothing will be done; because that, divided in their opinions, they will be a hinderance to each other; or if they agree well enough to some one action, through hope of victory, spoil, or revenge, yet afterward, through diversity of wits and counsels, or emulation and envy, with which men naturally contend, they will be so torn and rent, as they will neither give mutual help nor desire peace, except they be constrained to it by some common fear. Whence it follows that the consent of many, (which consists in this only, as we have already defined in the foregoing section, that they direct all their actions to the same end and the common good), that is to say, that the society proceeding from mutual help only, yields not that security which they seek for, who meet and agree in the exercise of the above-named laws of nature; but that somewhat else must be done, that those who have once consented for the common good to peace and mutual help, may by fear be restrained lest afterwards they again dissent, when their private interest shall appear discrepant from the common good.
Why the government of some brute creatures stands firm in concord alone, and not so of men.
5 Aristotle reckons among those animals which he calls politic, not man only, but divers others, as the ant, the bee, &c.; which, though they be destitute of reason, by which they may contract and submit to government, notwithstanding by consenting, that is to say, ensuing or eschewing the same things, they so direct their actions to a common end, that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any seditions. Yet is not their gathering together a civil government, and therefore those animals not to be termed political; because their government is only a consent, or many wills concurring in one object, not (as is necessary in civil government) one will. It is very true, that in those creatures living only by sense and appetite, their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need of anything more to secure it, and by consequence to preserve peace among them, than barely their natural inclination. But among men the case is otherwise. For, first, among them there is a contestation of honour and preferment; among beasts there is none: whence hatred and envy, out of which arise sedition and war, is among men; among beasts no such matter. Next, the natural appetite of bees, and the like creatures, is conformable; and they desire the common good, which among them differs not from their private. But man scarce esteems anything good, which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment, more than that which others do possess. Thirdly, those creatures which are void of reason, see no defect, or think they see none, in the administration of their commonweals; but in a multitude of men there are many who, supposing themselves wiser than others, endeavour to innovate, and divers innovators innovate divers ways; which is a mere distraction and civil war. Fourthly, these brute creatures, howsoever they may have the use of their voice to signify their affections to each other, yet want they that same art of words which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind, whereby good is represented to it as being better, and evil as worse than in truth it is. But the tongue of man is a trumpet of war and sedition: and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant speeches thundered and lightened, and confounded whole Greece itself. Fifthly, they cannot distinguish between injury and harm; thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellows. But those men are of most trouble to the republic, who have most leisure to be idle; for they use not to contend for public places, before they have gotten the victory over hunger and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutal creatures is natural; that of men by compact only, that is to say, artificial. It is therefore no matter of wonder, if somewhat more be needful for men to the end they may live in peace. Wherefore consent or contracted society, without some common power whereby particular men may be ruled through fear of punishment, doth not suffice to make up that security, which is requisite to the exercise of natural justice.
That not only consent, but union also, is required to establish the peace of men.
6 Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting defence, it is requisite that, in those necessary matters which concern peace and self-defence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot be done, unless every man will so subject his will to some other one, to wit, either man or council, that whatsoever his will is in those things which are necessary to the common peace, it be received for the wills of all men in general, and of every one in particular. Now the gathering together of many men, who deliberate of what is to be done or not to be done for the common good of all men, is that which I call a council.
What union is.
7 This submission of the wills of all those men to the will of one man or one council, is then made, when each one of them obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will of that one man or council, to which he hath submitted himself; that is, that he refuse him not the use of his wealth and strength against any others whatsoever; for he is supposed still to retain a right of defending himself against violence: and this is called union. But we understand that to be the will of the council, which is the will of the major part of those men of whom the council consists.
In union, the right of all men is transferred to one.
8 But though the will itself be not voluntary, but only the beginning of voluntary actions; (for we will not to will, but to act); and therefore falls least of all under deliberation and compact; yet he who submits his will to the will of another, conveys to that other the right of his strength and faculties. Insomuch as when the rest have done the same, he to whom they have submitted, hath so much power, as by the terror of it he can conform the wills of particular men unto unity and concord.
What civil society is.
9 Now union thus made, is called a city or civil society; and also a civil person. For when there is one will of all men, it is to be esteemed for one person; and by the word one, it is to be known and distinguished from all particular men, as having its own rights and properties. Insomuch as neither any one citizen, nor all of them together, (if we except him, whose will stands for the will of all), is to be accounted a city. A city therefore, (that we may define it), is one person, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to be received for the will of them all; so as he may use all the power and faculties of each particular person to the maintenance of peace, and for common defence.
What a civil person is.
10 But although every city be a civil person, yet every civil person is not a city; for it may happen that many citizens, by the permission of the city, may join together in one person, for the doing of certain things. These now will be civil persons; as the companies of merchants, and many other convents. But cities they are not, because they have not submitted themselves to the will of the company simply and in all things, but in certain things only determined by the city, and on such terms as it is lawful for any one of them to contend in judgment against the body itself of the sodality; which is by no means allowable to a citizen against the city. Such like societies, therefore, are civil persons subordinate to the city.
What it is to have the supreme power, what to be subject.
11 In every city, that man or council, to whose will each particular man hath subjected his will so as hath been declared, is said to have the supreme power, or chief command, or dominion. Which power and right of commanding, consists in this, that each citizen hath conveyed all his strength and power to that man or council; which to have done, because no man can transfer his power in a natural manner, is nothing else than to have parted with his right of resisting. Each citizen, as also every subordinate civil person, is called the subject of him who hath the chief command.
Two kinds of cities, natural, and by institution.
12 By what hath been said, it is sufficiently showed in what manner and by what degrees many natural persons, through desire of preserving themselves and by mutual fear, have grown together into a civil person, whom we have called a city. But they who submit themselves to another for fear, either submit to him whom they fear, or some other whom they confide in for protection. They act according to the first manner, who are vanquished in war, that they may not be slain; they according to the second, who are not yet overcome, that they may not be overcome. The first manner receives its beginning from natural power, and may be called the natural beginning of a city; the latter from the council and constitution of those who meet together, which is a beginning by institution. Hence it is that there are two kinds of cities; the one natural, such as the paternal and despotical; the other institutive, which may be also called political. In the first, the lord acquires to himself such citizens as he will; in the other, the citizens by their own wills appoint a lord over themselves, whether he be one man or one company of men, endued with the command in chief. But we will speak, in the first place, of a city political or by institution; and next, of a city natural.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Molesworth’s index is omitted.
OF THE CAUSES AND FIRST BEGINNING OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
1 The laws of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace. 2. In the state of nature, the laws of nature are silent. 3. Security in living according to the laws of nature depends on the agreement of many people. 4. The agreement of many is not constant enough to preserve lasting peace. 5. Why the government of certain animals rests securely on concord alone, but that of human beings does not. 6. Not only consent but union is required to establish peace among human beings. 7. What union is. 8. In union the right of all is transferred to one. 9. What civil society is. 10. What a civil person is. 11. What it is to possess supreme power, and what it is to be a subject. 12. Two kinds of cities: natural and instituted.
The laws of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace.
1 It is plain in itself that human actions proceed from the will, and the will from hope and fear. When people see that breaking the laws is likely to bring them a greater good or a lesser evil than observing them, they will knowingly break them. Each person’s hope for security and self-preservation therefore rests on the ability, by force or cunning, to frustrate a neighbor, openly or by stratagem. From this we can understand that the laws of nature, however well understood, do not immediately secure anyone who practices them. Consequently, so long as there is no protection against others’ attacks, everyone retains the original right to defend himself by whatever means he can or will use—that is, the right to everything, or the right of war. And to fulfill the law of nature, it is enough to be ready in one’s mind to embrace peace when it can be had.
In the state of nature, the laws of nature are silent.
2 The familiar saying that all laws fall silent in wartime is true, not only of civil laws but also of natural laws, provided we apply them to human actions and not to the mind, as explained in chap. iii. art. 27. We mean a war of all against all, such as exists in the bare state of nature; although in war between nations certain limits were customarily observed. In ancient times, therefore, there was a way of life, almost an established economy, which they called ληστρικὴν, living by plunder. As things then stood, it was neither contrary to the law of nature nor without glory for those who practiced it with courage rather than cruelty. Their custom, while taking all else, was to spare lives and leave untouched oxen fit for plowing and every tool useful for farming. This is not to say that the law of nature bound them to act so, but that they cared for their own glory, lest excessive cruelty make them seem afraid.
Security in living according to the laws of nature depends on the agreement of many people.
3 The practice of the law of nature is necessary to preserve peace, and security is equally necessary to practice that law. It is therefore worth considering what can provide such security. Nothing can be imagined except that each person gather such suitable help as will make an attack by either party on the other so dangerous that each thinks it better to hold back than to interfere. First, plainly, the consent of two or three people cannot supply such security: adding just one or a few to the other side is enough to make victory certain and embolden the enemy to attack us. To attain the security sought, therefore, the number who join in mutual assistance must be so great that the addition of a few to the enemy’s side cannot matter enough to assure its victory.
The agreement of many is not constant enough to preserve lasting peace.
4 Moreover, however large the number who assemble for self-defense, if they do not agree among themselves on some effective means of achieving it, but each employs his efforts in his own way, nothing will be accomplished; divided in opinion, they will hinder one another. Even if the hope of victory, spoils, or revenge makes them agree well enough on one action, afterward differences in judgment and counsel, rivalry and envy—by which people naturally contend—will tear them so apart that they will neither help one another nor desire peace unless compelled by some common fear. It follows that the consent of many, consisting only, as we defined it in the preceding section, in directing all their actions to the same end and the common good—that is, an association based solely on mutual help—does not provide the security sought by those who join together to practice the laws of nature named above. Something further must be done, so that those who have once agreed on peace and mutual help for the common good may be restrained by fear from falling into disagreement later, when their private interests diverge from the common good.
Why the government of certain animals rests securely on concord alone, but that of human beings does not.
5 Aristotle counts among the animals he calls political not only human beings but various others, including ants and bees. Although they lack the reason with which to make contracts and submit to government, by agreeing—that is, by pursuing or avoiding the same things—they direct their actions toward a common end, and their gatherings are not subject to sedition. Still, their gathering is not civil government, and these animals should not be called political, for their government is merely agreement, or many wills converging on one object, not, as civil government requires, one will. It is true that among creatures living only by sense and appetite, this harmony of minds lasts so well that nothing further than their natural inclination is needed to secure it and thus preserve peace among them. Among human beings it is otherwise. First, people compete for honor and precedence; beasts do not. Thus hatred and envy, from which sedition and war arise, exist among people and not among beasts. Second, the natural desires of bees and similar creatures coincide: they seek the common good, which for them does not differ from their private good. But a person hardly thinks anything good unless its enjoyment gives him some distinction beyond what others possess. Third, creatures without reason perceive no defect—or think they perceive none—in the administration of their communities. In a multitude of people, however, many who suppose themselves wiser than others strive to introduce changes; different reformers propose different changes, producing sheer division and civil war. Fourth, although these animals may use their voices to signal their feelings to one another, they lack that art of speech needed to stir the mind by representing good as better, and evil as worse, than it really is. The human tongue, however, is a trumpet of war and sedition. Pericles, it is said, sometimes thundered and flashed lightning through his eloquence and threw all Greece itself into confusion. Fifth, these creatures cannot distinguish injustice from harm; so long as things go well with them, they do not blame their fellows. But the people who trouble the city most are those with the most leisure to be idle: they do not customarily struggle for public office until they have conquered hunger and cold. Finally, the agreement of those animals is natural; the agreement of human beings exists only by compact and is therefore artificial. It is no wonder, then, that human beings need something more in order to live in peace. Consent, or an association formed by contract, without a common power to govern individuals through fear of punishment, cannot furnish the security needed to practice natural justice.
Not only consent but union is required to establish peace among human beings.
6 Since the convergence of many wills on the same end does not suffice to preserve peace and provide lasting defense, there must be a single will shared by all in the necessary matters concerning peace and self-defense. This cannot be accomplished unless each person subjects his will to that of one other—either a person or a council—so that this one’s will in matters necessary to the common peace is accepted as the will of all collectively and of each individually. By a council I mean a gathering of people who deliberate over what should and should not be done for the common good of all.
What union is.
7 This submission of everyone’s will to the will of one person or one council occurs when each person binds himself by contract to every other not to resist the will of the person or council to whom he has submitted: that is, not to deny that person or council the use of his wealth and strength against anyone else whatsoever. He is still understood to retain a right to defend himself against violence. This is called union. And by the will of the council we mean the will of the majority of its members.
In union the right of all is transferred to one.
8 The will itself is not voluntary, but is only the beginning of voluntary actions: we do not will to will; we will to act. Thus the will, least of all things, can be made the subject of deliberation and compact. Nevertheless, a person who submits his will to another’s transfers to that other the right to his strength and abilities. When everyone else does likewise, the one to whom they submit possesses so much power that the fear it inspires can bring individual wills into unity and concord.
What civil society is.
9 A union so formed is called a city, or civil society, and also a civil person. Where all have one will, it must be regarded as one person, identified by the word one and distinguished from all individual people as possessing its own rights and properties. Consequently, neither any single citizen nor all the citizens together—excepting the one whose will stands for the will of all—is to be reckoned the city. We may therefore define a city as one person whose will, by the compact of many people, is to be accepted as the will of them all, so that he may use the strength and abilities of each individual to maintain peace and provide common defense.
What a civil person is.
10 Although every city is a civil person, not every civil person is a city. Many citizens may, with the city’s permission, join into one person for the performance of certain acts. They will then be civil persons, as are companies of merchants and many other associations; but they are not cities. They have not submitted their wills to the company absolutely and in all things, but only in certain matters determined by the city, and on terms under which any member may lawfully bring a suit against the association as a body. No citizen may do that against the city. Associations of this kind are therefore civil persons subordinate to the city.
What it is to possess supreme power, and what it is to be a subject.
11 In every city, the person or council to whose will each individual has subjected his own, in the manner described, is said to hold supreme power, chief command, or dominion. This power and right of command consists in every citizen’s transfer of all his strength and power to that person or council; since no one can transfer his power in a physical sense, doing so means nothing other than relinquishing his right to resist. Each citizen, and likewise each subordinate civil person, is called a subject of the one who holds chief command.
Two kinds of commonwealths: natural and instituted.
12 What has been said shows sufficiently how, and through what stages, many natural persons have grown together through the desire to preserve themselves and through mutual fear into a civil person, which we have called a city. But those who submit to another out of fear submit either to the person they fear or to someone else whom they trust to protect them. Those conquered in war, seeking to avoid being killed, act in the first way; those not yet conquered, seeking to avoid conquest, act in the second. The first way begins with natural power and may be called the natural beginning of a city; the second begins with the deliberation and constitution of those who meet together, and is a beginning by institution. Hence there are two kinds of cities: the natural, such as paternal and despotic cities, and the instituted, which may also be called political. In the first, the lord acquires such citizens as he chooses; in the second, citizens by their own wills appoint a lord over themselves, whether one person or an assembly endowed with supreme command. We shall speak first of a political or instituted city, and then of a natural one.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from Hobbes’s own 1651 English version of De Cive, complete (epistle, preface, eighteen chapters with annotations; Molesworth’s 1841 text). Molesworth’s index is omitted.
THE CAUSES AND FIRST BEGINNING OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
1 The laws of nature are not enough to preserve peace. 2. In the state of nature, the laws of nature are silent. 3. Living securely by the laws of nature requires many people to agree. 4. Their agreement is not stable enough to preserve lasting peace. 5. Why some animals can govern themselves by agreement alone, but people cannot. 6. Human peace requires not only agreement but union. 7. What union is. 8. In union, everyone's right is transferred to one person. 9. What civil society is. 10. What a civil person is. 11. What it means to have supreme power, and what it means to be a subject. 12. Two kinds of commonwealth: natural and established by agreement.
The laws of nature are not enough to preserve peace.
1 It is clear that people's actions come from their will, and their will from hope and fear. When they expect more benefit or less harm from breaking the laws than from obeying them, they will knowingly break them. Each person's hope of safety and survival therefore rests on being able to defeat a neighbor by force or cunning, openly or by a trick. So even when people understand the laws of nature well, following them does not immediately make anyone safe. As long as people have no protection against invasion by others, everyone retains the original right to defend themselves by any means they can or choose to use. That is the right to everything, or the right of war. To fulfill the law of nature, it is enough for someone to be ready in mind to accept peace when peace is possible.
In the state of nature, the laws of nature are silent.
2 People often say that laws are silent in wartime. This is true not only of civil laws but also of natural laws, if we are talking about people's actions rather than their minds, as explained in chap. iii. art. 27. By war we mean a war of everyone against everyone, as in the bare state of nature. In wars between nations, however, people once observed certain limits. In ancient times there was a way of life, almost an economic system, called ληστρικὴν: living by raiding. In those circumstances it did not violate the law of nature, and those who practiced it bravely, rather than cruelly, were not dishonored. They took other things but spared people's lives, as well as oxen fit for plowing and every tool useful in farming. This does not mean the law of nature required them to act this way. They wanted to protect their reputation, because excessive cruelty might make them seem afraid.
Living securely by the laws of nature requires many people to agree.
3 Following the law of nature is necessary for peace. But people must also be secure if they are to follow it. We should therefore consider what can provide that security. The only answer seems to be that each person must gather enough suitable help to make an attack on either side so dangerous that both sides prefer to leave each other alone. An agreement between just two or three people plainly cannot provide that security. Adding only one person, or a few, to the other side could make its victory certain and encourage it to attack us. So the group pledged to help one another must be large enough that a few people joining the enemy would not give it a decisive advantage.
The agreement of many is not stable enough for lasting peace.
4 However many people come together for self-defense, they will accomplish nothing if they cannot agree on a sound way to carry it out. If each acts in their own way, their conflicting views will make them get in one another's way. Suppose they do agree on one action because they hope to win, seize goods, or take revenge. Later, their different ideas and plans, along with the rivalry and envy that naturally divide people, will tear them apart. They will not help one another or seek peace unless a shared fear forces them to do so. Many people's agreement, as defined in the preceding section, means only that they direct their actions toward the same end and the common good. A society based only on mutual help therefore does not give people the security they seek when they agree to follow the laws of nature named above. Something more is necessary. Those who once agreed to pursue peace and help one another for the common good must be kept in line by fear, so that they do not part ways again when their private interests conflict with the common good.
Why some animals can govern themselves by agreement alone, but people cannot.
5 Aristotle counts people among the animals he calls political, but also includes ants, bees, and others. These animals cannot reason, make contracts, or submit to government. Still, they follow or avoid the same things, and so direct their actions toward a common end. As a result, their gatherings do not suffer rebellions. Yet these gatherings are not civil governments, and the animals should not be called political. Their government is merely agreement: many wills directed toward one object. Civil government requires one will. For creatures that live only by sensation and appetite, their shared aims last so well that their natural inclination alone is enough to keep them united and at peace. People are different. First, people compete for honor and rank; animals do not. This gives people hatred and envy, which lead to rebellion and war. Animals have no such problem. Second, bees and similar creatures have matching natural appetites. They want the common good, which for them is the same as their individual good. But a person rarely values a good unless enjoying it gives them something beyond what others have. Third, animals without reason see no defects, or think they see none, in the way their communities are run. In a large group of people, many think themselves wiser than others and try to change things. Different reformers make different changes, bringing disorder and civil war. Fourth, although these animals can use their voices to show one another what they feel, they lack the skill with words that can stir up people's minds by making good seem better and evil seem worse than they really are. The human tongue is a trumpet of war and rebellion. Pericles was said to thunder and flash lightning with his skillful speeches, throwing all of Greece into confusion. Fifth, these animals cannot tell a violation of rights from a harm. As long as things are going well, they do not blame one another. But those who cause the most trouble in a commonwealth are people with the most leisure to be idle. They usually do not compete for public office until they have overcome hunger and cold. Last, agreement among animals comes naturally; among people it comes only by covenant, which makes it artificial. It is no surprise that people need something more to live in peace. Agreement, or a society formed by contract, is not enough to provide the security needed for the practice of natural justice. They also need a common power to govern individuals through fear of punishment.
Human peace requires not only agreement but union.
6 So a shared goal among many people is not enough to keep the peace or provide lasting defense. In matters necessary to peace and self-defense, there must be one will for them all. That can happen only if every person submits their will to that of one other person or one council. The decision of that person or council on matters needed for the common peace must be accepted as the will of everyone together and of each person individually. I call a gathering of people who deliberate about what should or should not be done for everyone's common good a council.
What union is.
7 Everyone submits their will to one person or one council when each person makes a contract with every other person not to oppose the decision of the person or council to whom they have submitted. In other words, they agree not to deny that person or council the use of their wealth and strength against anyone else. They are still understood to retain the right to defend themselves against violence. This arrangement is called union. The will of a council means the will of the majority of its members.
In union, everyone's right is transferred to one person.
8 The will itself is not voluntary; only actions that begin with the will are voluntary. We do not choose to have a will, but choose to act. So the will itself is the last thing that can be subject to deliberation and contract. Yet someone who submits their will to another person transfers to that person the right to use their strength and abilities. When everyone else does the same, the person to whom they submit gains enough power to frighten individuals into bringing their wills into unity and agreement.
What civil society is.
9 A union made this way is called a commonwealth, or civil society, and also a civil person. When everyone has one will, they must be regarded as one person. This single person has rights and property of its own, distinguishing it from any individual member. No single citizen, and not even all the citizens together, counts as the commonwealth if we leave out the person whose will represents everyone's will. To define it, then: a commonwealth is one person whose will, by the covenant of many people, counts as the will of them all. That person may use each individual's power and abilities to maintain peace and provide common defense.
What a civil person is.
10 Every commonwealth is a civil person, but not every civil person is a commonwealth. Many citizens may, with their commonwealth's permission, come together as one person to do certain things. Trading companies and many other associations are civil persons of this kind. But they are not commonwealths. Their members have submitted to the company's will only in particular matters set by the commonwealth, not unconditionally in everything. Any member may lawfully bring a court case against the association itself. A citizen may not do that against the commonwealth. Such associations, then, are civil persons subordinate to the commonwealth.
What it means to have supreme power, and what it means to be a subject.
11 In every commonwealth, the person or council to whose will each individual has submitted, as described above, is said to have supreme power, chief command, or dominion. This power and right to command consists in each citizen's transfer of all their strength and power to that person or council. Since no one can physically transfer their power, doing so simply means giving up the right to resist. Every citizen and every subordinate civil person is called a subject of whoever has chief command.
Two kinds of commonwealth: natural and established by agreement.
12 The account above shows how people, driven by the desire to survive and by mutual fear, have gradually come together to form the civil person we call a commonwealth. But people who submit to someone out of fear may submit either to the person they fear or to someone else they trust for protection. Those defeated in war take the first course to avoid being killed. Those not yet defeated take the second course to avoid defeat. The first way begins with natural power and can be called the natural origin of a commonwealth. The second starts from the council and constitution of those who assemble, so it is an origin by institution. There are therefore two kinds of commonwealth. One is natural, as in rule by fathers or masters. The other is made by institution, and may also be called political. In the first, the ruler takes as citizens whomever he chooses. In the second, citizens willingly appoint someone to rule over them. This may be one person or an assembly of people with supreme command. We will discuss the political commonwealth, established by institution, first, and the natural commonwealth afterward.