Book I, 1258b–1260b

Since some have1258b40 written about these matters,

such as Charetides of Paros and1259a1 Apollodorus of Lemnos on farming both open fields and planted land, and likewise others on other subjects, anyone concerned with these matters should study them from those writings. There are also the scattered accounts of the means by which some people have succeeded in wealth-getting,5 which we must collect. For all these are useful to those who value wealth-getting: the case of Thales of Miletus, for example. This is an insight into wealth-getting, which people attribute to him because of his wisdom, but it happens to be of general application. For when people reproached him for his poverty, claiming the uselessness10 of philosophy, they say that he foresaw from his study of the stars that there would be a large olive crop. While it was still winter, he obtained a little money and paid deposits on all the olive presses in Miletus and Chios, hiring them cheaply because no one was bidding against him. When the season15 came and many presses were suddenly sought at once, he hired them out on whatever terms he wished. By collecting a great deal of money, he showed that it is easy for philosophers to become rich if they wish, but that this is not what they care about. Thales, then, is said to have displayed his wisdom in this way. But, as20 we said, this device in wealth-getting is generally applicable whenever someone can establish a monopoly for himself. For this reason some cities too adopt this source of revenue when they lack resources: they establish a monopoly in goods for sale. In Sicily, someone who had money deposited with him bought up all the iron from25 the ironworks. Afterward, when the merchants arrived from the trading centers, he was the only seller. He did not raise the price greatly, but nevertheless, on his fifty talents, he gained a hundred. When Dionysius learned of this, he told him to take his money away, but no longer to30 remain in Syracuse, since he was finding sources of revenue disadvantageous to Dionysius' own affairs. Yet this insight and that of Thales are the same: both contrived to establish a monopoly for themselves. It is useful for statesmen too to know these things. For many cities need wealth-getting and such35 sources of revenue, just as a household does, and even more; hence some of those who take part in public life concern themselves with these matters alone.

There were three parts of household management—one, mastery, which we discussed earlier; another, paternal rule; and the third, marital rule. For a man rules both wife and children as free people,1259a40 both of them, but not with the same manner of rule,

rather,1259b1 he rules his wife politically and his children as a king. For the male is by nature more fitted to lead than the female, unless their relation is in some way contrary to nature; and the older and fully developed is more fitted to lead than the younger and undeveloped. In political rule, then,5 in most cases the ruler and the ruled exchange places, since they tend to be equal in nature and to differ in nothing. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled, they seek a distinction in outward appearance, forms of address, and honors, as Amasis also said in his account of the footbath. But the male always, in relation to10 the female, stands in this way. Rule over children is kingly, for the parent rules both by affection and by seniority, which is the form of kingly rule. For this reason Homer rightly addressed Zeus as "Father of men and gods," (Hom. Il. 1.544) the king of them all. For by nature15 a king must differ from his subjects, yet be of the same kind; and this is the relation of the older to the younger and of the parent to the child.

It is evident, then, that household management is more concerned with human beings than with acquiring inanimate things, and1259b20 with their virtue rather than that of property, which we call wealth; and more with free people than with slaves. First, concerning slaves, one might ask whether a slave has any virtue beyond the virtues of an instrument and a servant, any other virtue more honorable than these, such as moderation, courage, justice, and25 the other such dispositions; or whether he has none beyond bodily service. Either answer presents a difficulty. For if slaves have these virtues, how will they differ from free people? But if they do not, that is absurd, since they are human beings and share in reason. The question is much the same concerning a woman and a child:30 do they too have virtues, and must a woman be moderate, courageous, and just, and can a child be either intemperate or moderate, or not? We must therefore examine this generally concerning those who rule and those who are ruled by nature: is their virtue the same or different? For if both must share in nobility and goodness,35 why should one rule and the other be ruled once and for all? Nor can they differ by having more or less of it: ruling and being ruled differ in kind, whereas more and less do not. But if one must have virtue and the other need not, that is strange. For if the ruler is not moderate and just,40 how will he rule well? And if the ruled person is not, how will he be ruled1260a1 well?

For if he is intemperate and cowardly, he will do none of what he ought. It is evident, then, that both must share in virtue, but that there must be differences in this virtue, as there are among those ruled by nature. This is already indicated by the facts concerning1260a5 the soul. For in the soul there is by nature a ruling element and a ruled element, whose virtues we say are different: those of the rational and the irrational elements, for example. It is clear, then, that the same holds in other cases, so that there are by nature several kinds of ruler and ruled. For the free person, in his relation to the slave,10 rules in one way, the male rules the female in another, and the man the child in another. The parts of the soul are present in all of them, but present differently. For the slave has no deliberative element at all; the female has it, but it lacks authority; the child has it, but it is incomplete.15 For this reason the ruler must possess intellectual virtue in its complete form, since the task belongs without qualification to the directing craftsman, and reason is the directing craftsman; each of the others must possess as much as falls to his share. We must suppose, then, that the same necessarily holds for the moral virtues: all must share in them, but not in the same20 way, rather as much as each requires for his own task. Thus it is evident that moral virtue belongs to all those mentioned, and that moderation is not the same in a woman and a man, nor courage and justice, as Socrates thought. Rather, the one's courage is fitted for rule and the other's for service; and the same holds for the other virtues.

This becomes clearer still in the particulars1260a25 when we examine them. For those who speak in general terms deceive themselves when they say that virtue is the soul's being in good condition, or acting rightly, or something of this sort. Those who enumerate the virtues, as Gorgias does, speak far better than those who define them in this way. Thus we must accept the sort of distinction the poet made concerning a woman, and hold that it applies30 in every case: "Silence brings adornment to a woman," (Soph. Aj. 293) but this no longer holds for a man. Since the child is incomplete, it is clear that his32 virtue too is not relative to himself in his present state, but to his end and to the one who guides him; likewise the slave's virtue is relative to his master. We laid it down that the slave is useful for necessary tasks, so it is clear that he needs only a little virtue: enough that neither intemperance nor cowardice makes him fail in his work. One might ask, if what has just been said is true, whether craftsmen too will need virtue, since they often fail in their work through intemperance. Or is there a very great difference here? For the40 slave shares in his master's life, whereas the craftsman is further removed, and virtue falls to his share only to the extent that slavery does.

For the mechanical craftsman1260b1 has a certain limited slavery; and the slave is among those who are such by nature, but no shoemaker is, nor any of the other craftsmen. It is evident, then, that the master must be the source of this kind of virtue in the slave, but not by possessing the mastery that teaches the5 work itself. For this reason those who deprive slaves of reasoned speech and say that commands alone should be used are mistaken: slaves need admonition even more than children do.

Let our distinctions on these matters stand in this form. But concerning husband and wife, children and father, and concerning1260b10 the virtue of each, and their dealings with one another—what is good and what is not, and how the good should be pursued and the bad avoided—we must discuss these in our treatment of constitutions. For every household is a part of a city, and these are parts of a household; and we must consider the part in relation to the whole15 in respect of virtue. We must therefore educate both children and women with a view to the constitution, if indeed it makes any difference to the city's being good that its children and women should be good. It must make a difference: for women are half the free population, and from children,20 those who share in the constitution arise. Thus, since these matters have been distinguished and the remaining ones must be discussed elsewhere, let us leave our present arguments as complete, make a new beginning, and first examine those who have pronounced upon the best constitution.

Since some people have1258b40 written about these subjects,

for example Charetides of Paros and1259a1 Apollodorus of Lemnos on farming both open fields and planted land, and others on other subjects, anyone interested should study these matters in their writings. The scattered accounts of how some people have succeeded in making money,5 we should also collect. For all these are useful to people who value money-making. One example is the story of Thales of Miletus. It involves an insight into money-making. People credit it to him because of his wisdom, but it is actually something of general application. People criticized him for his poverty, saying this showed the uselessness10 of philosophy. The story goes that he realized from his study of the stars that there would be a large olive crop. While it was still winter, he got together a little money and put down deposits on all the olive presses in Miletus and Chios. He rented them cheaply, since no one was bidding against him. When the season15 came, many presses were needed all at once and suddenly. He rented them out on whatever terms he wanted and collected a lot of money. He showed that philosophers can easily get rich if they want to, but that this isn't what they care about. Thales is said to have demonstrated his wisdom in this way. But, as20 we said, this is a generally applicable way of making money, if someone can set up a monopoly for himself. This is why some cities also use this means of raising money when they are short of it: they set up a monopoly on goods for sale. In Sicily, someone used money deposited with him to buy up all the iron from25 the ironworks. Later, when the merchants arrived from the trading centers, he was the only seller. He didn't raise the price very much, but still made a hundred talents on top of his fifty. When Dionysius heard about this, he told the man to take his money away, but no longer to30 stay in Syracuse. The man was finding ways of making money that harmed Dionysius's own interests. Still, this insight and Thales's were the same: both managed to create a monopoly for themselves. Knowing these things is also useful for political rulers. Many cities need money-making and such35 sources of income, just as a household does, and even more. This is why some people in public life concern themselves only with these matters.

Household management had three parts. One was mastery, which we discussed earlier. Another was a father's rule, and the third was a husband's rule. A man rules both his wife and his children as free people,1259a40 but he doesn't rule both in the same way.

Instead,1259b1 he rules his wife as a political ruler and his children as a king. The male is by nature more fit to lead than the female, unless the situation has somehow developed against nature. And the older and fully developed is more fit to lead than the younger and not fully developed. As for political systems of rule,5 in most of them the ruler and the ruled change places, since they aim to be equal in nature and not different at all. Even so, when one rules and another is ruled, they look for a difference in outward appearance, forms of address, and honors. This is like the story Amasis told about the footbath. But the male always, in relation to10 the female, stands in this way. Rule over children is kingly. The parent rules both through affection and through seniority, which is the form of kingly rule. So Homer rightly addressed Zeus by saying, "Father of humans and gods," (Hom. Il. 1.544) since he is king of them all. By nature,15 a king must be different from those he rules, but of the same kind. This is the relation of the older to the younger and of the parent to the child.

Clearly, then, household management is more concerned with people than with owning lifeless things, and1259b20 with people's virtue than with the excellence of property, which we call wealth. It is also more concerned with free people than with slaves. First, someone might ask about slaves: does a slave have any virtue beyond the abilities needed as a tool and a servant, something more honorable than these, such as self-control, courage, justice, or25 other qualities of that kind? Or is there nothing beyond bodily services? Either answer presents a problem. If slaves have these virtues, how will they differ from free people? If they don't, that is strange, since they are human and share in reason. Almost the same question arises about a woman and a child:30 do they too have virtues? Must a woman be self-controlled, courageous, and just? Can a child be undisciplined or self-controlled, or not? We need to consider this question generally about those who rule and those who are ruled by nature: is their virtue the same or different? If both must share in goodness and nobility,35 why should one rule and the other be ruled once and for all? They can't differ just by having more or less. Ruling and being ruled differ in kind, while more and less don't. But if one must have virtue and the other needn't, that's surprising. If the ruler isn't self-controlled and just,40 how will he rule well? If the ruled person isn't, how will he be ruled1260a1 well?

If he is undisciplined and cowardly, he won't do anything he should. Clearly, then, both must share in virtue, but there must be differences in that virtue, just as there are among those ruled by nature. What we have said already points to this in1260a5 the soul. In it, one part naturally rules and another is ruled. We say they have different virtues, as with the part that has reason and the part without reason. Clearly, the same holds in other cases too, so there are several kinds of rulers and ruled by nature. A free person, in relation to a slave,10 rules in one way, a male rules a female in another, and a man rules a child in another. All have the parts of the soul, but they have them differently. A slave has no ability to deliberate at all. A female has it, but it has no authority. A child has it, but it isn't fully developed.15 So the ruler must have complete intellectual virtue, since the work belongs without qualification to the person directing it, and reason directs it. Each of the others must have as much as falls to them. We must assume that the same necessarily holds for moral virtues: everyone must share in them, but not in the same20 way. Each must have as much as is needed for their own work. So clearly all those we have mentioned have moral virtue. But a woman's self-control isn't the same as a man's, nor are their courage and justice the same, as Socrates thought. One kind of courage is for ruling, the other for serving. The same holds for the other virtues.

This is even clearer in the details1260a25 when we look at them. People who speak in general terms fool themselves when they say that virtue is a good state of the soul, or acting rightly, or something of that sort. Those who list the virtues, as Gorgias does, speak much better than those who define them in that way. So we should take what the poet said about a woman as the model for thinking30 about all these cases: "Silence gives a woman grace." (Soph. Aj. 293) But this no longer applies to a man. Since a child isn't fully developed, clearly the child's32 virtue isn't measured in relation to the child alone, but in relation to the goal and to the person leading the child. The same goes for a slave in relation to a master. We said that a slave is useful for life's necessities. So clearly a slave needs only a little virtue, just enough not to fall short in his work through lack of self-control or cowardice. If what we just said is true, someone might ask whether craftsmen also need virtue, since they often fall short in their work through lack of self-control. Or is there a very great difference here? The40 slave shares in the master's life, while the craftsman is more distant. He has a share of virtue just to the extent that he shares in slavery.

For the manual craftsman1260b1 has a kind of limited slavery. A slave is one of those who are slaves by nature, but no shoemaker is, nor is any other craftsman. Clearly, then, the master must be responsible for giving the slave this kind of virtue, but not through the master's skill in teaching5 the work. So people are wrong when they deny slaves reasoned discussion and say we should only give them orders. Slaves need advice more than children do.

Let these matters be settled in this way. As for husband and wife, children and father, and concerning1260b10 each person's virtue and their dealings with one another, we must discuss these in our account of constitutions. What is good and what isn't? How should they pursue the good and avoid the bad? Every household is a part of a city, and these people are parts of a household. We must consider the part's virtue in relation to the whole's15 virtue. So we must educate both children and women with a view to the constitution, if having good children and good women makes any difference to having a good city. It must make a difference. Women make up half of the free people, and from children,20 participants in the constitution develop. So, since we have settled these matters and must discuss the rest elsewhere, let's leave this discussion as finished and make another start. First, let's examine those who have made statements about the best constitution.