D — De la Liberté
Original French
A.
Voilà une batterie de canons qui tire à nos oreilles, avez-vous la liberté de l’entendre ou de ne l’entendre pas?
B.
Sans doute, je ne peux pas m’empêcher de l’entendre.
A.
Voulez-vous que ce canon emporte votre tête, & celles de vôtre femme & de vôtre fille qui se proménent avec vous?
B.
Quelle proposition me faites-vous là? je ne peux pas tant que je suis de sens rassis vouloir chose pareille, cela m’est impossible.
A.
Bon, vous entendez nécessairement ce canon, & vous voulez nécessairement ne pas mourir vous & votre famille d’un coup de canon à la promenade, vous n’avez ni le pouvoir de ne pas entendre, ni le pouvoir de vouloir rester ici.
B.
Cela est clair.
A.
Vous avez en conséquence fait une trentaine de pas pour être à l’abri du canon, vous avez eu le pouvoir de marcher avec moi ce peu de pas?
B.
Cela est encor très-clair.
A.
Et si vous aviez été paralitique, vous n’auriez pu éviter d’être exposé à cette batterie, vous n’auriez pas eu le pouvoir d’être où vous êtes, vous auriez nécessairement entendu & reçu un coup de canon, & vous seriez mort nécessairement.
B.
Rien n’est plus véritable.
A.
En quoi consiste donc votre liberté, si ce n’est dans le pouvoir que votre individu a exercé de faire ce que votre volonté exigeait d’une nécessité absolue.
B.
Vous m’embarassez; la liberté n’est donc autre chose que le pouvoir de faire ce que je veux.
A.
Réfléchissez y, & voyez si la liberté peut être entendue autrement.
B.
En ce cas mon chien de chasse est aussi libre que moi; il a nécessairement la volonté de courir quand il voit un liévre, & le pouvoir de courir s’il n’a pas mal aux jambes. Je n’ai donc rien au dessus de mon chien, vous me réduisez à à l’état des bêtes.
A.
Voilà les pauvres sophismes des pauvres sophistes qui vous ont instruit. Vous voilà bien malade d’être libre comme vôtre chien! Eh ne ressemblez-vous pas à votre chien en mille choses? la faim, la soif, la veille, le dormir, les cinq sens ne vous sont-ils pas communs avec lui? voudriez-vous avoir l’odorat autrement que par le nez? pourquoi voulez-vous avoir la liberté autrement que lui?
B.
Mais j’ai une ame qui raisonne beaucoup, & mon chien ne raisonne guères. Il n’a presque que des idées simples, & moi j’ai mille idées métaphisiques.
A.
Eh bien, vous êtes mille fois plus libre que lui, c’est-à-dire,vous avez mille fois plus de pouvoir de penser que lui, mais vous n’êtes pas libre autrement que lui.
B.
Quoi? je ne suis pas libre de vouloir ce que je veux?
A.
Qu’entendez-vous par là?
B.
J’entends ce que tout le monde entend; ne dit-on pas tous les jours, les volontés sont libres?
A.
Un proverbe n’est pas une raison; expliquez vous mieux.
B.
J’entends que je suis libre de vouloir comme il me plaira.
A.
Avec votre permission, cela n’a pas de sens; ne voyez-vous pas qu’il est ridicule de dire, je veux vouloir. Vous voulez nécessairement en conséquence des idées qui se sont présentées à vous. Voulez-vous vous marier, oui on non?
B.
Mais si je vous disais que je ne veux ni l’un ni l’autre?
A.
Vous répondriez comme celui qui disait, les uns croyent le cardinal Mazarin mort, les autres le croyent vivant, & moi je ne crois ni l’un ni l’autre.
B.
Eh bien, je veux me marier.
A.
Ah! c’est répondre cela. Pourquoi voulez-vous vous marier?
B.
Parce que je suis amoureux d’une jeune fille, belle, douce, bien élevée, assez riche, qui chante très-bien, dont les parents sont de très-honnêtes gens, & que je me flate d’être aimé d’elle, & fort bien venu de sa famille.
A.
Voilà une raison. Vous voyez que vous ne pouvez vouloir sans raison. Je vous déclare que vous êtes libre de vous marier, c’est-à-dire, que vous avez le pouvoir de signer le contract.
B.
Comment! je ne peux vouloir sans raison? Eh que deviendra cet autre proverbe, sit pro ratione voluntas; ma volonté est ma raison, je veux parce que je veux?
A.
Cela est absurde, mon cher ami; il y aurait en vous un effet sans cause.
B.
Quoi! lorsque je joue à pair ou non, j’ai une raison de choisir pair plutôt qu’impair?
A.
Oui sans doute.
B.
Et quelle est cette raison, s’il vous plaît?
A.
C’est que l’idée d’impair s’est présentée à votre esprit plutôt que l’idée opposée. Il serait plaisant qu’il y eût des cas où vous voulez parce qu’il y a une cause de vouloir, & qu’il y eût quelques cas où vous voulussiez sans cause. Quand vous voulez vous marier,vous en sentez la raison dominante évidemment; vous ne la sentez pas quand vous jouez à pair ou non; & cependant il faut bien qu’il y en ait une.
B.
Mais encor une fois, je ne suis donc pas libre?
A.
Votre volonté n’est pas libre, mais vos actions le sont; vous êtes libre de faire quand vous avez le pouvoir de faire.
B.
Mais tous les livres que j’ai lûs sur la liberté d’indifférence......
A.
Sont des sottises; il n’y a point de liberté d’indifférence; c’est un mot destitué de sens, inventé par des gens qui n’en avaient guères.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation of the 73 articles in the 1764 first edition, made directly from the French and reviewed against the scan-collated French text. The author’s notes, quotations and verse are retained. Historical ethnic labels, including offensive terms, are retained from the 1764 text.
A.
“Here is a battery of cannon firing in our ears. Are you free to hear it or not to hear it?”
B.
“Certainly, I cannot help hearing it.”
A.
“Do you want this cannon to carry off your head, and those of your wife and daughter, who are walking with you?”
B.
“What a suggestion! As long as I am in my right mind, I cannot want such a thing. It is impossible for me.”
A.
“Good. You necessarily hear this cannon, and you necessarily want neither yourself nor your family to be killed by a cannonball while out walking. You have neither the power not to hear it nor the power to want to remain here.”
B.
“That is clear.”
A.
“You have consequently taken some thirty steps to find shelter from the cannon. You had the power to walk these few steps with me?”
B.
“That, too, is perfectly clear.”
A.
“And if you had been paralyzed, you could not have avoided exposure to this battery; you would not have had the power to be where you are. You would necessarily have heard and received a cannon shot, and you would necessarily have died.”
B.
“Nothing could be truer.”
A.
“What, then, does your freedom consist in, if not the power you exercised as an individual to do what your will demanded of absolute necessity?”
B.
“You puzzle me. So freedom is nothing but the power to do what I want?”
A.
“Reflect on it, and see whether freedom can be understood otherwise.”
B.
“In that case my hunting dog is as free as I am. He necessarily has the will to run when he sees a hare, and the power to run if his legs are not injured. Then I have nothing above my dog: you reduce me to the condition of beasts.”
A.
“There are the poor sophisms of the poor sophists who taught you. What a dreadful misfortune, to be free like your dog! Do you not resemble your dog in a thousand things? Do you not share hunger, thirst, waking, sleeping, the five senses with him? Would you want to smell with something other than your nose? Why do you want to possess freedom in a different way from him?”
B.
“But I have a soul that reasons a great deal, and my dog reasons very little. He has almost nothing but simple ideas, while I have a thousand metaphysical ideas.”
A.
“Well then, you are a thousand times freer than he is—that is, you have a thousand times more power to think than he has; but you are not free in a different way.”
B.
“What? I am not free to want what I want?”
A.
“What do you mean by that?”
B.
“I mean what everyone means. Do people not say every day, ‘The will is free’?”
A.
“A proverb is not an argument. Explain yourself better.”
B.
“I mean that I am free to will as I please.”
A.
“With your permission, that has no meaning. Do you not see that it is ridiculous to say, ‘I will to will’? You necessarily will as a consequence of the ideas that have presented themselves to you. Do you want to marry, yes or no?”
B.
“But what if I told you I want neither?”
A.
“You would be answering like the man who said, ‘Some believe Cardinal Mazarin dead, others believe him alive, and I believe neither.’”
B.
“Well, I want to marry.”
A.
“Ah, that is an answer! Why do you want to marry?”
B.
“Because I am in love with a young woman who is beautiful, gentle, well brought up, fairly rich, sings very well, and has thoroughly respectable parents; and I flatter myself that she loves me and that her family welcomes me warmly.”
A.
“There is a reason. You see that you cannot will without a reason. I declare that you are free to marry—that is, you have the power to sign the contract.”
B.
“What! I cannot will without a reason? Then what becomes of that other proverb, sit pro ratione voluntas: my will is my reason; I want to because I want to?”
A.
“That is absurd, my dear friend. There would be an effect in you without a cause.”
B.
“What! When I play odd or even, I have a reason for choosing even rather than odd?”
A.
“Yes, certainly.”
B.
“And what is that reason, please?”
A.
“It is that the idea of odd presented itself to your mind before the opposite idea. It would be amusing if there were cases in which you will because there is a cause for willing, and other cases in which you willed without a cause. When you want to marry, you plainly feel the prevailing reason; you do not feel it when you play odd or even, yet there must be one.”
B.
“But once again, then, I am not free?”
A.
“Your will is not free, but your actions are. You are free to act when you have the power to act.”
B.
“But all the books I have read on freedom of indifference…”
A.
“Are foolishness. There is no freedom of indifference. It is a meaningless expression invented by people who had little sense themselves.”
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Plain English translation of the same 73 articles, made directly from the French and reviewed against the scan-collated French text. The author’s notes, quotations and verse are retained. Historical ethnic labels, including offensive terms, are retained from the 1764 text.
A.
“We can hear that battery of cannons firing. Are you free to hear it or not hear it?”
B.
“Of course I can’t help hearing it.”
A.
“Do you want that cannon to blow your head off? And the heads of your wife and daughter, who are walking with you?”
B.
“What sort of question is that? While I’m in my right mind, I can’t want such a thing. It’s impossible for me.”
A.
“Good. You can’t help hearing that cannon. You can’t help wanting to avoid a cannon shot killing you and your family on your walk. You have no power not to hear it. And you have no power to want to stay here.”
B.
“That’s clear.”
A.
“So you’ve walked some thirty steps to get shelter from the cannon. You had the power to walk those few steps with me?”
B.
“That’s very clear too.”
A.
“And if you’d been paralyzed, you couldn’t have escaped this battery’s fire. You’d have had no power to reach where you are now. You’d have had to hear the cannon shot and take the hit. You’d have had to die.”
B.
“Nothing could be truer.”
A.
“So what’s your freedom, if not the power you used to act? You did what your will demanded as an absolute necessity.”
B.
“Now you’ve confused me. So freedom is just the power to do what I want.”
A.
“Think about it. See whether freedom can mean anything else.”
B.
“Then my hunting dog is as free as I am. He sees a hare and can’t help wanting to run. Unless his legs hurt, he has the power to run. So I have no advantage over my dog. You’re reducing me to the level of animals.”
A.
“That’s the kind of poor argument your poor sophists taught you. What a hardship, being as free as your dog! Don’t you resemble your dog in a thousand ways? You both get hungry and thirsty, stay awake and sleep. You both have five senses, don’t you? Would you want to smell with something other than your nose? Why do you want freedom to work differently for you?”
B.
“But my soul does a lot of reasoning, and my dog hardly reasons at all. He has almost nothing but simple ideas. I have a thousand metaphysical ideas.”
A.
“Well, you’re a thousand times freer than he is. That means your power to think is a thousand times greater than his. But your freedom doesn’t work differently from his.”
B.
“What? Aren’t I free to want what I want?”
A.
“What do you mean by that?”
B.
“I mean what everyone means. Don’t people say every day that our wills are free?”
A.
“A saying isn’t a reason. Explain yourself more clearly.”
B.
“I mean I’m free to want whatever I please.”
A.
“If you don’t mind my saying so, that makes no sense. Don’t you see how ridiculous it is to say, ‘I want to want’? Ideas come into your mind, and what you want necessarily follows from them. Do you want to get married, yes or no?”
B.
“But what if I told you I didn’t want either one?”
A.
“You’d be like the man who said, ‘Some people think Cardinal Mazarin is dead. Others think he’s alive. I don’t believe either one.’”
B.
“All right, I want to get married.”
A.
“Ah, now that’s an answer. Why do you want to get married?”
B.
“Because I’m in love with a young woman. She’s beautiful, gentle, well brought up, fairly rich, and sings very well. Her parents are very decent people. I like to think she loves me and her family welcomes me warmly.”
A.
“There’s a reason. You see, you can’t want something without a reason. I declare you’re free to marry. That means you have the power to sign the contract.”
B.
“What! I can’t want something without a reason? What about that other saying, let will stand for reason? My will is my reason; I want because I want?”
A.
“That’s absurd, my dear friend. You’d have an effect inside you without a cause.”
B.
“What! When I play odds or evens, I have a reason to choose even over odd?”
A.
“Yes, of course.”
B.
“And what’s that reason, please?”
A.
“The idea of odd came into your mind before the opposite idea. Sometimes you want something because there’s a cause for wanting it. Wouldn’t it be strange if at other times you wanted something without a cause? When you want to marry, you clearly feel the main reason. You don’t feel it when you play odds or evens. Yet there must be one.”
B.
“But once again, does that mean I’m not free?”
A.
“Your will isn’t free, but your actions are. You’re free to act when you have the power to act.”
B.
“But all the books I’ve read about freedom of indifference…”
A.
“Are nonsense. There’s no freedom of indifference. It’s a meaningless term invented by people with very little sense.”
About this section
D — De la Liberté is part of Pocket Philosophical Dictionary by Voltaire. This page sets the French original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is article 52 of 73 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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