Part II, Chapter XXXI, 2

To know what worship of God the light of nature teaches us, I shall begin with his attributes. First, plainly, we ought to attribute existence to him, for no one can intend to honor what he thinks does not exist.

Second, philosophers who said the world, or the soul of the world, was God spoke of him unworthily and denied his existence. For God means the cause of the world; to say that the world is God is to say that it has no cause, and thus that there is no God.

Third, to say that the world was not created but is eternal is to deny that there is a God, since what is eternal has no cause.

Fourth, those who think they are granting God repose when they deny that he cares for mankind take away his honor: they remove men's love and fear of him, which are the root of honor.

Fifth, in matters signifying greatness and power, to call him finite is not to honor him. Attributing to God less than we can does not show a will to honor him, and finite is less than we can attribute, since it is easy to add more to anything finite.

Therefore it does not honor him to attribute shape to him, for every shape is finite;

Nor to say that we conceive or imagine him, or hold an idea of him in our minds, for everything we conceive is finite;

Nor to attribute parts or totality to him, since these are attributes only of finite things;

Nor to say he is in this or that place, for whatever is in a place is bounded and finite;

Nor that he moves or rests, for both attributes assign him a place;

Nor that there are more gods than one, since this implies that all are finite: there cannot be more than one infinite being. Nor should we ascribe to him Passions involving grief, such as repentance, anger, and mercy; or want, such as appetite, hope, and desire; or any passive faculty—unless we speak metaphorically, meaning not the Passion but its effect. For Passion is power limited by something else.

Thus, when we attribute a will to God, we must understand it not as a rational appetite like the human will, but as the power by which he brings everything about.

The same applies when we attribute to him sight and other acts of sense, or knowledge and understanding. In us these are nothing but a commotion of the mind, raised by external things pressing upon the organic parts of the human body. Nothing of that sort exists in God; since these things depend on natural causes, they cannot be attributed to him.

Anyone who would attribute nothing to God that natural reason does not warrant must use either negative attributes, such as infinite, eternal, and incomprehensible; superlatives, such as Most High and Most Great; or indefinite attributes, such as good, just, holy, and creator. He must use these as though he meant not to declare what God is—for that would confine him within the limits of our imagination—but to express how greatly we admire him and how ready we are to obey him. This is a sign of humility and of a will to honor him as much as we can. For there is only one name to signify our conception of his nature: I AM; and only one name for his relation to us: God, which includes Father, King, and Lord.

Concerning acts of divine worship, reason gives a most general precept: they must be signs of an intention to honor God. The first are prayers. It was not the craftsmen who made images who were thought to make them gods, but the people who prayed to them.

Second is thanksgiving. In divine worship it differs from prayer only because prayers precede the benefit and thanks follow it; the purpose of both is to acknowledge God as the author of all benefits, past and future.

Third are gifts—that is, sacrifices and offerings, if they are of the best—which are signs of honor, for they are acts of thanksgiving.

Fourth, to swear by none but God is naturally a sign of honor: it acknowledges that God alone knows the heart, and that no man's wit or strength can shield a perjurer from God's vengeance.

Fifth, it is part of rational worship to speak of God with care; this shows fear of him, and fear acknowledges his power. It follows that God's name must not be used rashly or to no purpose, which is to use it in vain. Its use has a purpose only in an oath ordered by the Common-wealth to establish certainty in judgments, or in an oath between Common-wealths to avoid war. It also follows that disputing about God's nature is contrary to his honor. For we suppose that in this natural kingdom of God nothing can be known except by natural reason, that is, from the principles of natural science. These principles are so far from teaching us anything of God's nature that they cannot teach us even our own nature or the nature of the smallest living creature. Therefore when men dispute about the attributes of God from the principles of natural reason, they only dishonor him. In the attributes we give God we should consider not their meaning as philosophical truth, but their meaning as a pious intention to do him the greatest honor we can. Failure to recognize this has produced volumes of disputes about God's nature, tending not to his honor but to the honor of our own cleverness and learning, and amounting only to thoughtless and vain abuses of his sacred name.

Sixth, natural reason dictates that prayers, thanksgivings, offerings, and sacrifices should each be the best of their kind and most expressive of honor. Prayers and thanksgivings, for example, should be spoken in words and phrases that are neither hasty, frivolous, nor coarse, but beautiful and well composed; otherwise we do not honor God as much as we can. The heathens were therefore absurd to worship images as gods, but reasonable to do so in verse and with music, both vocal and instrumental. Likewise it was reasonable that the beasts and gifts they offered and their actions in worship should express complete submission and commemorate benefits received, since all proceeded from an intention to honor him.

Seventh, reason directs us to worship God not only in secret but also, and especially, in public, before other people. Otherwise the inducement of others to honor him—the most acceptable aspect of honor—is lost.

Lastly, obedience to his laws, which in this case are the Laws of Nature, is the greatest worship of all. Just as obedience is more acceptable to God than sacrifice, so contempt for his commands is the greatest insult of all. These are the laws of divine worship that natural reason dictates to private men.

But since a Common-wealth is only one person, it too ought to offer God only one form of worship. It does so when it commands private people to perform that worship publicly. This is public worship, whose defining property is uniformity: actions performed in different ways by different people cannot be called one public worship. Thus where many forms of worship arising from the different religions of private individuals are permitted, there can be said to be no public worship, nor can the Common-wealth be said to have any religion at all.

Since words, and therefore God's attributes, acquire their meaning by human agreement and institution, those attributes must be held to signify honor that men intend to signify it. Whatever private individuals can do by their own wills where reason is the only law, the Common-wealth can do by its will through civil laws. And since a Common-wealth has no will and makes no laws except through the will of whoever holds Sovereign Power, the attributes the sovereign ordains as signs of honor in the worship of God must be accepted and used as such by private people in their public worship.

But not all actions are signs by convention. Some are naturally signs of honor and others of contempt. The latter—actions men would be ashamed to do before those they revere—cannot be made part of divine worship by human authority; nor can the former, such as decent, modest, humble conduct, ever be separated from it. Yet there are infinitely many actions and gestures indifferent in themselves. Those that the Common-wealth ordains for public and universal use as signs of honor and as part of God's worship must be accepted and used as such by its subjects. And the words of Scripture, “It is better to obey God than men,” apply to the kingdom of God by covenant, not by nature.

Having spoken briefly of the natural kingdom of God and his natural laws, I will add to this chapter only a short account of his natural punishments. No human action in this life fails to begin a chain of consequences so long that no human foresight can see to its end. Pleasant and unpleasant events are linked together in this chain, so that whoever does something for pleasure must also undertake to bear all the pains attached to it. These pains are the natural punishments of actions that begin more harm than good. Thus intemperance is naturally punished by disease; rashness by misfortune; injustice by the violence of enemies; pride by ruin; cowardice by oppression; negligent government by princes by rebellion; and rebellion by slaughter. For since punishments follow breaches of law, natural punishments must naturally follow breaches of the Laws of Nature; they follow as natural effects, not as arbitrary ones.

So much for the constitution, nature, and right of sovereigns, and for the duty of subjects as derived from the principles of natural reason. Now, when I consider how different this doctrine is from the practice of most of the world, especially those western regions that have learned their morals from Rome and Athens, and how much depth of moral philosophy is required of those who administer Sovereign Power, I am close to believing my labor as useless as Plato's Common-wealth. For he too holds that disorders of state and changes of government through civil war cannot be ended until sovereigns become philosophers. But I consider again that the science of natural justice is the only science necessary for sovereigns and their chief ministers; that they need not be burdened, as Plato requires, with the mathematical sciences beyond encouraging their study through good laws; and that neither Plato nor any other philosopher has yet ordered and sufficiently, or even plausibly, proved all the theorems of moral doctrine by which men might learn both to govern and to obey. I therefore regain some hope that one day this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign who will consider it for himself—it is short, and I think clear—without the help of any interested or envious interpreter, and who, by exercising undivided sovereignty to protect its public teaching, will turn this speculative truth into practical benefit.

PART III. OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH

To find out what worship of God the light of nature teaches us, I will begin with his attributes. First, we must say that God exists. No one can intend to honor something he believes does not exist.

Second, philosophers who said the world, or the soul of the world, was God spoke of him in an unworthy way and denied his existence. God means the cause of the world. To say that the world is God is to say it has no cause, and thus there is no God.

Third, saying that the world was never created but has always existed denies that God exists. Something eternal has no cause.

Fourth, those who think they give God peace by denying that he cares for humanity strip him of his honor. Their claim removes people's love and fear of him, which are the roots of honor.

Fifth, when speaking of God's greatness and power, calling him finite does not honor him. To assign him less than we possibly can shows no desire to honor him. We can always add something more to what is finite.

For this reason, giving God a shape does not honor him, since every shape has limits.

Nor does saying that we can conceive or imagine him, or hold an idea of him in our minds. Everything we can conceive has limits.

Nor should we say that he has parts or is a whole, since these belong only to finite things.

Nor should we say that he occupies a particular place. Anything in a place is bounded and finite.

Nor should we say that he moves or rests. Both imply that he occupies a place.

Nor should we say that there is more than one God, since this implies that each is finite. There cannot be more than one infinite being. Nor should we assign him Passions that involve grief, such as regret, anger, or mercy; Passions that involve a lack, such as appetite, hope, or desire; or any other passive capacity. We can speak this way metaphorically, referring to an effect rather than a Passion. For a Passion involves a power limited by something else.

So when we speak of God's will, we should not understand it as the rational appetite that human will is. We mean the power through which he brings everything about.

The same applies when we assign him sight and other acts of the senses, as well as knowledge and understanding. In us these are disturbances of the mind caused by external things pressing on our bodily organs. Nothing of this kind exists in God. These things depend on natural causes and cannot be assigned to him.

Someone who wants to say nothing about God beyond what natural reason supports must use negative descriptions, such as infinite, eternal, and beyond comprehension; superlatives such as highest and greatest; or indefinite descriptions such as good, just, holy, and creator. We use them not to define what he is, which would confine him within the limits of our imagination, but to show how much we admire him and how ready we are to obey him. That shows humility and a desire to honor him as much as we can. Only one name expresses our understanding of his nature: I AM. And only one name expresses his relation to us: God, a name that includes Father, King, and Lord.

As for acts of worshiping God, reason gives us the broad rule that they must show an intention to honor him. First among these acts are prayers. People did not think that the sculptors who made images turned them into gods. It was the people who prayed to them who did so.

Second comes thanksgiving. In worshiping God it differs from prayer only in timing: prayers come before a benefit and thanks afterward. Both acknowledge that God gives us every benefit, past and future.

Third are gifts, meaning sacrifices and offerings. If we offer the best, they show honor, since they express thanks.

Fourth, swearing by no one but God is naturally a sign of honor. It acknowledges that only God knows the heart and that no person's cleverness or strength can protect someone who swears falsely from God's vengeance.

Fifth, speaking thoughtfully about God is part of worship guided by reason. It shows fear of him, and fear acknowledges his power. Thus we should not use God's name carelessly or without purpose, which is to use it in vain. It serves a purpose only in an oath ordered by the Common-wealth to settle a judgment, or in an oath between Common-wealths to prevent war. Debating God's nature also dishonors him. In God's natural Kingdom, we are assuming that natural reason is the only way to know anything. Natural reason proceeds from the principles of natural science. But those principles cannot teach us God's nature when they cannot even teach us our own nature or that of the smallest living creature. So people who use natural reason to argue about God's attributes only dishonor him. In the attributes we give God, we should look not for a philosophical truth in the words but for a pious intention to give him all the honor we can. Failing to see this has produced volumes debating God's nature. They honor the cleverness and learning of their authors, not God. They amount to thoughtless, pointless misuse of his sacred name.

Sixth, natural reason tells us that prayers, thanks, offerings, and sacrifices should each be the best of their kind and express honor as clearly as possible. Prayers and thanks, for example, should be spoken in carefully composed, beautiful language, not in hasty, careless, or coarse words. Otherwise we do not honor God as fully as we can. The pagans were therefore foolish to worship images as gods. But using poetry and music, both sung and played on instruments, was reasonable. It was also reasonable that the animals and gifts they offered and the acts they performed in worship showed deep submission and recalled benefits received. They did these things intending to honor him.

Seventh, reason tells us to worship God not only in secret but also, especially, openly before other people. Otherwise we lose the chance to bring others to honor him, which is one of the most valuable ways to honor someone.

Finally, obedience to his Laws, which here means the Laws of Nature, is the greatest worship of all. Obedience is more acceptable to God than sacrifice, while contempt for his commandments is the greatest possible insult. These are the Laws of divine worship that natural reason gives to individuals.

But a Common-wealth is one person, so it should offer God one form of worship. It does so by ordering individuals to worship openly. This is public worship, whose defining feature is uniformity. Actions performed differently by different people do not constitute one act of public worship. Where different kinds of worship are permitted because individuals follow different religions, there is no public worship and the Common-wealth itself has no religion.

Words, and therefore God's attributes, get their meanings from human agreement and convention. We should therefore treat as signs of honor those attributes that people intend as signs of honor. Anything individuals may choose to do where reason is the only law can also be established through civil Laws by the will of the Common-wealth. And a Common-wealth has no will and makes no Laws except through the will of whoever holds Sovereign Power. It follows that individuals should accept and use in public worship the attributes the Sovereign sets as signs of honor to God.

Not every action becomes a sign through convention. Some naturally show honor, while others naturally show contempt. Human authority cannot make actions that people would be ashamed to perform before someone they respect into divine worship. Nor can it remove decent, modest, and humble conduct from worship. But countless other acts and gestures are neither honorable nor insulting in themselves. Subjects should accept and use whichever of these the Common-wealth orders everyone to use openly as signs of honor and part of God's worship. The Scripture's statement “It is better to obey God than men” applies to God's Kingdom by pact, not his Kingdom by nature.

I have now briefly discussed God's natural Kingdom and natural Laws. To finish the chapter I will give a short account of his natural punishments. Every human action begins a chain of consequences so long that no human foresight can see its end. Pleasant and unpleasant events are joined in this chain. Anyone who acts for pleasure must also face all the suffering tied to that action. This suffering is the natural punishment for actions that bring more harm than good. Thus excessive indulgence naturally leads to disease; rashness to accidents; injustice to violence from enemies; pride to ruin; cowardice to oppression; careless rule by princes to rebellion; and rebellion to slaughter. Punishments follow breaches of Laws. Natural punishments must therefore follow breaches of the Laws of Nature as natural consequences, not as penalties chosen at will.

That concludes my account, drawn from the principles of natural reason, of the structure, nature, and Rights of Sovereigns and the duty of subjects. I now consider how far this doctrine is from the practice of most of the world, especially in the West, where people have learned morality from Rome and Athens. I also consider how much moral philosophy those who exercise Sovereign Power must understand. I nearly come to believe my work is as useless as Plato's Common-wealth. Plato also believed that disorder in states and changes of government through civil war could not end until Sovereigns became philosophers. But then I reflect that Sovereigns and their chief ministers need to know only the science of natural justice. They do not need to master mathematics, as Plato requires, beyond encouraging its study through good Laws. Nor has Plato or any other philosopher so far organized and adequately, or even plausibly, proved all the principles of moral teaching from which people could learn both to govern and to obey. So I regain some hope that someday this short and, I think, clear book will reach a Sovereign. Perhaps he will consider it himself without an interpreter who has a personal stake in the matter or envies it. By fully exercising his Sovereignty to protect its public teaching, he might turn this truth in theory into something useful in practice.

PART III. OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH