Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Part II, Chapter XXX, 3
Part II, Chapter XXX, 3 of 101. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it selfe, as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was made. That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator, and the meaning of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood by few, than many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the Law, is multiplication of ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply, (by too much diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words, is without the compasse of the Law. And this is a cause of many unnecessary Processes. For when I consider how short were the Lawes of antient times; and how they grew by degrees still longer; me thinks I see a contention between the Penners, and Pleaders of the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe the later; and the later to evade their circumscriptions; and that the Pleaders have got the Victory. It belongeth therefore to the Office of a Legislator, (such as is in all Common-wealths the Supreme Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,) to make the reason Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law it selfe, as short, but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be.
It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right application of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the offender, or of others by his example; the severest Punishments are to be inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most Danger to the Publique; such as are those which proceed from malice to the Government established; those that spring from contempt of Justice; those that provoke Indignation in the Multitude; and those, which unpunished, seem Authorised, as when they are committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites of men in Authority: For Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the Actors, and Authors of Injustice; but against all Power that is likely to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act of one of his Sonnes, he was driven out of Rome, and the Monarchy it selfe dissolved. But Crimes of Infirmity; such as are those which proceed from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the Fact be a great Crime, or not, there is place many times for Lenity, without prejudice to the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is such place for it, is required by the Law of Nature. The Punishment of the Leaders, and teachers in a Commotion; not the poore seduced People, when they are punished, can profit the Common-wealth by their example. To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which may in great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no better instructed.
In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign, to apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit to the Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End; and is then done, when they that have well served the Common-wealth, are with as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible, so well recompenced, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better. To buy with Mony, or Preferment, from a Popular ambitious Subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the mindes of the People, has nothing of the nature of Reward; (which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of Gratitude, but of Fear: nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the Dammage of the Publique. It is a contention with Ambition, like that of Hercules with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the stubbornnesse of one Popular man, is overcome with Reward, there arise many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischiefe, in hope of like Benefit: and as all sorts of Manifacture, so also Malice encreaseth by being vendible. And though sometimes a Civill warre, may be differred, by such wayes as that, yet the danger growes still the greater, and the Publique ruine more assured. It is therefore against the Duty of the Soveraign, to whom the Publique Safety is committed, to Reward those that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, than after a longer time with greater.
Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours; I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government of the Common-wealth. For this word Counsell, Consilium, corrupted from Considium, is a large signification, and comprehendeth all Assemblies of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of Facts past, and of Law for the present. I take it here in the first sense onely: And in this sense, there is no choyce of Counsell, neither in a Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the persons Counselling are members of the person Counselled. The choyce of Counsellours therefore is to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that endeavoureth not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the most able, dischargeth not his Office as he ought to do. The most able Counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill Counsell, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the Peace, and Defence of the Common-wealth. It is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from publique troubles; but the signes that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences, and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of the Publique affaires, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them a great deale the lesse. For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any Art, is a great degree of the knowledge of the same Art; because no man can be assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is first taught to understand them. But the best signes of Knowledge of any Art, are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. Good Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter of State, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we shall think there needs no method in the study of the Politiques, (as there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of certain persons, to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance; it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be marks of difference in time following, between their Posterity, and the posterity of their Subjects; which Priviledges being inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Soveraign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their Right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, than adhaereth naturally to their abilities.
And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the benefit of their Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Advice, and reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an Assembly, by way of Orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences of action; and are lesse subject to be carried away to contradiction, through Envy, Emulation, or other Passions arising from the difference of opinion.
The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations, but onely the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes that look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informations, and complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty, to be diligently taken notice of. For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.
A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall not be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently cannot performe that office with good successe. He must therefore be Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall and Fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his Souldiers. This is Popularity, and breeds in the Souldiers both desire, and courage, to recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the Mutinous, or negligent Souldiers. But this love of Souldiers, (if caution be not given of the Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing to Soveraign Power; especially when it is in the hands of an Assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the safety of the People, both that they be good Conductors, and faithfull subjects, to whom the Soveraign Commits his Armies.
But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular, that is, reverenced and beloved of his People, there is no danger at all from the Popularity of a Subject. For Souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with their Captain; though they love him, against their Soveraign, when they love not onely his Person, but also his Cause. And therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed the Power of their Lawfull Soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles, to save the People from the shame of receiving them. To have a known Right to Soveraign Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family: Nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their Armies. For the greatest and most active part of Mankind, has never hetherto been well contented with the present.
Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body. And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes, (such of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the Author of Nature, are Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of Kings, are Lawes. But of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings, and as King also of a peculiar People, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.
CHAPTER XXXI. OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete 1651 English text (introduction, forty-seven chapters, review and conclusion) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Hobbes’s marginal summaries are omitted.
Clarity lies less in the words of a law themselves than in a statement of the causes and motives for which it was made. Such a statement reveals the lawgiver's meaning, and once that meaning is known, the law is easier to understand in few words than in many. Every word is open to ambiguity, so multiplying the words in the body of a law multiplies its ambiguities. Excessive diligence also seems to imply that whoever can evade the wording is beyond the law's reach; this gives rise to many needless lawsuits. When I consider how brief ancient laws were, and how they have gradually grown longer, I seem to see a contest between the drafters and the pleaders of the law: the first trying to confine the second, the second trying to escape their confines, and the pleaders winning. It is therefore the lawgiver's office—the supreme representative in every Common-wealth, whether one man or an assembly—to make clear why the law was made, and to make the law itself as brief as possible while using proper and meaningful terms.
It is also the Sovereign's office to apply punishments and rewards rightly. The purpose of punishment is not revenge or the release of anger, but correction of the offender or of others through his example. The severest punishments must therefore be imposed for crimes that pose the greatest danger to the public: crimes arising from malice toward the established government; from contempt for justice; crimes that stir indignation among the people; and crimes that, if left unpunished, seem to have official approval, as when they are committed by the sons, servants, or favorites of people in authority. For indignation turns people not only against the perpetrators and instigators of injustice, but also against any power likely to protect them. Thus Tarquin was driven from Rome and the monarchy itself dissolved because of the outrageous act of one of his sons. But crimes of weakness, arising from intense provocation, great fear, dire necessity, or ignorance of whether an act is a grave offense, often admit of leniency without harm to the Common-wealth; and when there is room for leniency, the Law of Nature requires it. It is the punishment of leaders and teachers in a disturbance, not of the poor people led astray, that can benefit the Common-wealth as an example. To be severe with the people is to punish ignorance for which the Sovereign may be largely responsible, since he failed to instruct them better.
Likewise the Sovereign's office and duty require him always to assign rewards so that they benefit the Common-wealth, which is their purpose and end. He does this when those who have served the Common-wealth well are compensated, at the lowest possible cost to the public treasury, generously enough to encourage others both to serve it as faithfully as they can and to study the arts that will enable them to serve it better. To buy the peace of a popular and ambitious subject with money or advancement, so that he stops making harmful impressions on the minds of the people, is no reward: rewards are intended for past service, not misconduct. Such payment is a sign not of gratitude but of fear; it harms the public rather than benefiting it. This struggle against ambition resembles Hercules' struggle against the many-headed Hydra: for every head he defeated, three more sprang up. Similarly, when one popular man's obstinacy is overcome by a reward, many others follow his example and cause the same trouble in hope of the same advantage. Malice, like every other product, grows more plentiful when it can be sold. A civil war may sometimes be postponed by these means, but the danger continues to grow and the public ruin becomes more certain. It is therefore against the duty of the Sovereign, who is entrusted with public safety, to reward those who seek greatness by disturbing their country's peace. He should instead oppose them at the outset, accepting a small danger rather than confronting a greater one later.
Another task of the Sovereign is to choose good counselors: those whose advice he takes in governing the Common-wealth. The word counsel, Consilium, corrupted from Considium, has a wide meaning, covering all assemblies of people who sit together not only to deliberate on future action but also to judge past events and present law. Here I use it in the first sense alone. In this sense there is no choice of counselors in democracy or aristocracy, since those giving counsel are members of the person counseled. The choice of counselors therefore belongs to monarchy. A Sovereign who fails to seek out the most capable in every field does not discharge his office as he ought. The best counselors are those who have least hope of gain from giving bad advice and greatest knowledge of what promotes the peace and defense of the Common-wealth. It is hard to know who expects to profit from public turmoil. But reason for suspicion can be found when men whose resources cannot meet their customary expenses flatter the people over grievances that are unreasonable or cannot be remedied; anyone with reason to look can readily observe this. It is harder still to know who has the greatest knowledge of public affairs, and those who have such knowledge have much less need of advisers. Knowing who understands the rules of almost any art already requires considerable knowledge of that art, for no one can judge the truth of another's rules unless he has first learned to understand them. The best signs of mastery of any art are extensive practice and consistently good results. Good counsel comes neither by lot nor by inheritance. There is therefore no more reason to expect sound advice about affairs of state from the rich or noble than to expect them to draw up the dimensions of a fortress, unless we suppose that politics, unlike geometry, needs no disciplined study, only spectatorship—which is false. Politics is the harder of the two fields. In these parts of Europe, a place on the highest council of state has been regarded as the hereditary right of certain people. This custom comes from the conquests of the ancient Germans: many independent lords who joined forces to conquer other nations would not enter the alliance without privileges to distinguish their descendants from the descendants of their subjects in future generations. Such privileges conflict with sovereign power. By the Sovereign's favor their holders may seem to retain them; but if they insist on them as rights, they must gradually lose them, until they have no honor beyond what their abilities naturally earn.
However capable the counselors in any matter, their advice is more useful when each offers his views and reasons separately than when they deliver speeches in an assembly, and when they have considered their advice in advance rather than speaking offhand. They then have more time to examine the consequences of an action and are less likely to be driven into contradiction by envy, rivalry, or other passions arising from differences of opinion.
For matters that concern no other nations, but only the comfort and benefit subjects can enjoy from laws governing internal affairs, the best counsel comes from the general reports and complaints of the people in each province. They know their own needs best and, so long as their requests take nothing from the essential rights of sovereignty, deserve attentive consideration. For without those essential rights, as I have often said, the Common-wealth cannot survive at all.
A commander in chief who is not popular will not be loved or feared by his army as he ought and cannot perform his office successfully. He must therefore be industrious, brave, approachable, generous, and fortunate, so that he gains a reputation for competence and for loving his soldiers. This is popularity: it gives soldiers the desire and courage to earn his favor and shields the general when he must punish mutinous or negligent soldiers with severity. Yet the soldiers' love is dangerous to sovereign power unless their commander's loyalty is assured, especially when sovereign power rests with an assembly that is not popular. For the people's safety, therefore, those to whom the Sovereign commits his armies must be both capable commanders and faithful subjects.
But when the Sovereign himself is popular—that is, revered and loved by his people—there is no danger at all in a subject's popularity. Soldiers are never so generally unjust that they will side with their captain against their Sovereign, however much they love him, when they love both the Sovereign himself and his cause. Accordingly, those who have violently suppressed a lawful Sovereign's power have always, before establishing themselves in his place, had the trouble of devising titles to their rule, to spare the people the shame of accepting them. A recognized right to sovereign power is so popular a quality that its holder needs only to show that he can govern his own household absolutely to win his subjects' hearts, and only to see his enemies' armies disbanded to overcome opposition. For the largest and most active part of mankind has never yet been content with its present condition.
I need say nothing here about the duties of one Sovereign to another, embraced by what is commonly called the Law of Nations, because the Law of Nations and the Law of Nature are the same. Each Sovereign has the same right in securing his people's safety as any individual has in securing the safety of his own body. The same law that tells people without civil government what to do and what to avoid toward one another tells Common-wealths the same—that is, it speaks to the consciences of sovereign princes and sovereign assemblies. For the only court of natural justice is the conscience, where not man but God reigns. His laws, insofar as they bind all mankind, are natural laws when God is considered as the author of nature, and laws when that same God is considered as King of Kings. But of the Kingdome of God as King of Kings, and also as King of a particular people, I shall speak in the remainder of this discourse.
CHAPTER XXXI. OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete 1651 English text (introduction, forty-seven chapters, review and conclusion). Hobbes’s marginal summaries are omitted.
A law's clarity depends less on its wording than on a statement of the reasons and aims behind it. That statement tells us what the lawmaker meant. Once we know that, a few words can make the law easier to understand than many words can. All words can have more than one meaning, so adding words to the body of a law adds ambiguity. Excessive care with wording also seems to suggest that anyone who finds a way around its exact words is beyond the law's reach. This causes many unnecessary lawsuits. When I think how short ancient laws were and how they grew longer over time, I seem to see a contest between those who draft laws and those who argue cases. The drafters try to limit the lawyers, and the lawyers try to get around those limits. The lawyers have won. The lawmaker, who in every Common-wealth is the supreme representative, whether one person or an assembly, must therefore explain clearly why each law was made. The law itself should be as short as possible while using precise, meaningful terms.
The Sovereign's duty also includes applying punishments and rewards properly. Punishment is meant not for revenge or to vent anger, but to correct the offender or to correct others through his example. The harshest punishments should therefore fall on crimes most dangerous to the public. These include crimes driven by hatred of the established government, crimes arising from contempt for justice, crimes that arouse widespread public anger, and crimes that may seem to have official approval if unpunished, as when the sons, servants, or favorites of powerful people commit them. Public anger turns against not only the people who commit or direct injustice but also any authority likely to protect them. Thus Tarquin was driven out of Rome and the monarchy itself was dissolved because of the outrageous act of one of his sons. But crimes committed through weakness often allow for leniency without harm to the Common-wealth. Such crimes may result from great provocation, fear, or need, or from ignorance about whether an act is a serious crime. Where leniency is possible, the Law of Nature requires it. Punishing the leaders and teachers of a disturbance can set a useful example for the Common-wealth; punishing the poor people they misled cannot. Harshness toward those people punishes ignorance for which the Sovereign may largely be responsible, since it was his fault they were not better taught.
Likewise, the Sovereign has a duty to award benefits only in ways that help the Common-wealth. That is what rewards are for. He does this when he gives people who have served the Common-wealth well enough compensation to encourage others to serve it just as faithfully and to study how to serve it better, while spending as little public money as possible. Paying an ambitious, popular subject money or giving him a high position to make him keep quiet and stop corrupting the people's minds is not a reward. Rewards are for past service, not for harmful behavior. Such payment shows fear, not gratitude, and hurts rather than helps the public. Trying to buy off ambition is like Hercules' struggle with the many-headed monster Hydra: whenever he defeated one head, three more grew in its place. When one popular man's stubbornness is overcome with a payment, his example encourages many more to cause the same trouble in hopes of the same benefit. Just as the sale of manufactured goods increases their production, making malice profitable increases malice. These measures may sometimes postpone a civil war, but they make the danger greater and public ruin more certain. A Sovereign entrusted with public safety therefore violates his duty if he rewards those who seek power by disrupting their country's peace. He should oppose such men early, at a little risk, rather than wait until he faces a greater risk later.
Another duty of the Sovereign is to choose good counselors, meaning people whose advice he takes in governing the Common-wealth. The word counsel, Consilium, derived in a corrupted form from Considium, has a broad meaning. It includes any assembly of people sitting together, whether to plan future action, judge past events, or decide how present law applies. Here I use it only for advice about future action. In this sense no one chooses counselors in a democracy or aristocracy, because the advisers themselves are members of the body they advise. The choice of counselors therefore belongs to monarchy. A monarch fails in his duty if he does not try to choose the most capable people in each field. The most capable counselors have the least expectation of gaining from bad advice and know the most about what promotes the Common-wealth's peace and defense. It is hard to tell who hopes to benefit from public disorder. But one good reason for suspicion is a man who flatters the people about grievances that are unreasonable or impossible to remedy while his own resources cannot cover his usual expenses. Anyone who needs to know can easily observe these signs. It is even harder to tell who understands public affairs best, though people who understand those affairs have much less need to identify such experts. In almost any field, knowing who understands its rules requires a considerable understanding of the field itself. No one can be sure another person's rules are true without first learning to understand them. The best signs of knowledge in any field are long experience in it and consistently good results. Good advice does not come by chance or inheritance. There is therefore no more reason to expect the rich or noble to give good advice on affairs of state than to expect them to design the dimensions of a fortress. We could only think otherwise if politics, unlike geometry, required no method of study and could be learned just by watching. That is false. Politics is the harder subject of the two. In these parts of Europe, certain people have been thought entitled by inheritance to sit in the highest council of state. This practice comes from the conquests of the ancient Germans. Many independent lords joined together to conquer other nations. They would not join the alliance without privileges that would later distinguish their descendants from their subjects' descendants. These privileges conflict with sovereign power. Such people may appear to keep them through the Sovereign's favor, but if they insist on them as a right, they must gradually lose them. In the end they will have only the honor that naturally comes from their abilities.
However capable the counselors may be, their advice is more useful when each gives his opinion and reasons separately rather than in speeches before an assembly. It is also more useful when they have thought beforehand rather than speaking without preparation. In private and with preparation they have more time to consider the consequences of action. They are also less likely to disagree merely from envy, rivalry, or other passions stirred up by differences of opinion.
On matters that concern only the ease and welfare that subjects can gain through laws about domestic affairs, rather than relations with other nations, the best advice comes from the general reports and complaints of people in each province. They know their own needs best. Their requests should be carefully considered as long as they do not demand anything that reduces the essential rights of sovereignty. Without those rights, as I have often said, the Common-wealth cannot survive at all.
An army's chief commander must be popular with his troops. Otherwise they will neither love nor fear him as they should, and he cannot do his job successfully. He must work hard, be brave, friendly, generous, and fortunate. Then his soldiers will believe both that he is capable and that he cares for them. This popularity makes them eager and bold enough to earn his favor. It also protects the general's authority when he needs to punish soldiers who mutiny or neglect their duties. But unless precautions ensure the commander's loyalty, the soldiers' love is dangerous to sovereign power, especially when that power belongs to an assembly that is not popular. For the people's safety, those to whom the Sovereign entrusts his armies must therefore be both good commanders and loyal subjects.
If the Sovereign himself is popular, meaning his people respect and love him, a subject's popularity poses no danger. Soldiers are never so generally unjust that they will side with a captain they love against their Sovereign when they love both their Sovereign himself and his cause. That is why those who have violently overthrown a lawful Sovereign have always had to invent claims to his position before they could firmly take it. They do this to spare the people the shame of accepting them. A recognized right to sovereign power makes a ruler so popular that, on his side, he needs only to show that he can fully govern his own household to win his subjects' hearts. On his enemies' side, he needs only for them to disband their armies. For the largest and most active part of humanity has never yet been truly satisfied with the present state of affairs.
I need say nothing here about a Sovereign's duties toward other Sovereigns, which fall under what is commonly called the Law of Nations. The Law of Nations and the Law of Nature are the same thing. In seeking his people's safety, each Sovereign has the same right that any individual has in seeking the safety of his own body. The law that tells people who have no civil government what to do and what to avoid in dealing with one another tells Common-wealths the same. That is, it directs the consciences of sovereign princes and sovereign assemblies. The only court of natural justice is conscience, where God, not a human being, reigns. God's laws that bind all humanity are natural laws insofar as he is the author of nature, and laws insofar as the same God is King of Kings. I will discuss the Kingdom of God, both as King of Kings and as King of a particular people, in the remainder of this work.
CHAPTER XXXI. ON THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY NATURE