Part II, Chapter XXII, 1

ON SUBJECT SYSTEMS, POLITICAL AND PRIVATE

Having spoken of the generation, form, and power of a Common-wealth, I shall now speak in turn of its parts. First come systems, which resemble the similar parts, or muscles, of a natural body. By systems I mean any number of people joined in one interest or one business. Some are regular and some irregular. Those are regular in which one man or assembly of men is constituted representative of the whole number; all others are irregular.

Among regular systems, some are absolute and independent, subject to none but their own representative. Only Common-wealths are of this kind; I have spoken of them in the 5 preceding chapters. Others are dependent, that is, subordinate to some Sovereign Power to which every member, including their representative, is subject.

Among subordinate systems, some are political and some private. Political systems, also called political bodies and persons in law, are constituted by authority from the Sovereign Power of the Common-wealth. Private systems are constituted by subjects among themselves or by authority from a foreigner. For no authority derived from foreign power within another's dominion is public there; it is private.

Among private systems, some are lawful and some unlawful: the lawful are those the Common-wealth allows; all others are unlawful. Irregular systems have no representative and consist only in a gathering of people. If such gatherings are not forbidden by the Common-wealth and are not formed with an evil design—as when people gather at markets or shows or for any other harmless purpose—they are lawful. But if their intention is evil or, when their numbers are considerable, unknown, they are unlawful.

In political bodies the representative's power is always limited; it is the Sovereign Power that prescribes its limits. Unlimited power is absolute sovereignty. The Sovereign in every Common-wealth is the absolute representative of all the subjects, so no one else can represent any part of them except insofar as the Sovereign permits. To permit a political body of subjects to have an absolute representative for every purpose would be to surrender the government of that part of the Common-wealth and divide the dominion, contrary to its peace and defense. The Sovereign cannot be understood to have done this by any grant that does not plainly and directly release those subjects from subjection. For conclusions drawn from words are not signs of his will when other conclusions point to the contrary; they are instead signs of error and miscalculation, to which all mankind is too prone.

The limits of the power given to the representative of a political body are to be learned from two things: its writ or letters from the Sovereign, and the law of the Common-wealth.

In the institution or acquisition of an independent Common-wealth, no written instrument is needed, for the representative's power has no limits there except those prescribed by the unwritten Law of Nature. But subordinate bodies need such varied limits on their businesses, times, and places that these could not be remembered without written letters, nor known unless those letters were made public for people to read and also sealed or attested by seals or other lasting signs of Sovereign Authority.

And because it is not always easy, or perhaps even possible, to describe these limits in writing, the ordinary laws common to all subjects must determine what the representative may lawfully do in every case on which the letters are silent. Therefore:

If the representative of a political body is one man, anything he does in the body's name that is authorized neither by his letters nor by the laws is his own act, not that of the body or any of its other members. Beyond the limits prescribed by his letters or the laws, he represents no person's identity but his own. But what he does in accordance with them is everyone's act. For everyone is author of the Sovereign's act, since the Sovereign is their unlimited representative; and the act of one who keeps within the Sovereign's letters is the Sovereign's act, of which every member of the body is therefore author.

But if the representative is an assembly, any decree it makes without authorization from its letters or the laws is the act of the assembly or political body, and of everyone whose vote carried the decree. It is not the act of anyone present who voted against it, or of anyone absent unless he voted for it by proxy. It is the assembly's act because it was carried by a majority. If it is a crime, the assembly may be punished insofar as it is capable of punishment, by dissolution or forfeiture of its letters—which is capital punishment for such artificial, fictitious bodies—or, if the assembly has a common stock in which no innocent member owns a share, by a monetary fine. Nature has exempted all political bodies from corporal penalties. But those who did not vote for the decree are innocent: in matters its letters do not authorize, the assembly cannot represent them, and consequently its votes do not implicate them.

WHEN THE REPRESENTATIVE IS ONE MAN, IF HE BORROWS MONEY OR INCURS A CONTRACTUAL DEBT, HE ALONE IS LIABLE, NOT THE MEMBERS. If the single representative of a political body borrows money from an outsider, someone who does not belong to that body, the debt is the representative's. No letters need limit borrowing, since it is for people to decide for themselves how much to lend. If his letters authorized him to make the members pay what he borrowed, he would thereby have sovereignty over them. The grant would therefore either be void as the product of error, common to human nature, and an insufficient sign of the grantor's will; or, if the grantor affirmed it, the representative would be Sovereign and would not come under the present question, which concerns only subordinate bodies. No member, then, is obliged to pay a debt so borrowed, except the representative himself. The lender, being a stranger to the letters and the body's qualifications, recognizes as his debtors only those who have bound themselves. Since the representative can bind himself and no one else, he alone is the debtor, and must pay out of the common stock, if any exists, or otherwise out of his own estate.

If he incurs a debt by contract or by fine, the case is the same.

But when the representative is an assembly and the debt is owed to an outsider, all those, and only those, who voted to borrow, to enter into the contract that incurred the debt, or to perform the act for which the fine was imposed, are answerable for it. By voting, each bound himself to pay. Anyone who authorizes borrowing is obliged to repay even the whole debt, though payment by any one of them discharges him.

If the debt is owed to a member of the assembly, however, only the assembly is obliged to pay, out of its common stock, if it has any. Being free to vote, if he votes to borrow the money, he votes to repay it. If he votes not to borrow, or is absent, he nevertheless votes for the borrowing by lending; thus he contradicts his former vote and is bound by the later one. He becomes both borrower and lender, and can therefore demand repayment from no individual, but only from the common treasury. If that fails, he has no remedy and no one to complain of but himself: although he knew the assembly's acts and its means to pay, and was under no compulsion, he foolishly lent his money all the same.

SOMETIMES LAWFUL, BUT NEVER AGAINST SOVEREIGN POWER. It is clear from this that in subordinate political bodies subject to a Sovereign Power, it is sometimes not only lawful but expedient for an individual to protest openly against the decrees of the representative assembly and have his dissent recorded or witnessed. Otherwise he might be bound to repay debts contracted and answer for crimes committed by others. In a sovereign assembly, however, he has no such liberty: one who protests there denies its sovereignty; moreover, whatever Sovereign Power commands is justified for the subject by that command, though not always in the sight of God, since every subject is the author of such a command.

The variety of political bodies is almost infinite. They differ not only in the business for which they are constituted, which is of unspeakable variety, but also in the many limitations placed on their times, places, and numbers. As to their business, some are established to govern. First, the government of a province may be entrusted to an assembly whose decisions depend on majority votes; such an assembly is a political body whose power is limited by its commission. The word province means a charge or responsibility for business, entrusted by the person whose business it is to another to administer for him and under him. Thus when a Common-wealth contains several territories with distinct laws or widely separated locations, and their administration is entrusted to different people, the territories where the Sovereign does not reside but governs by commission are called provinces. There are, however, few examples of a province governed by an assembly residing within it. Though the Romans had sovereignty over many provinces, they always governed them by presidents and praetors, not assemblies, as they governed the city of Rome and its neighboring lands. Similarly, when colonies went from England to settle Virginia and the Sommer-Ilands, their government here was entrusted to assemblies in London, yet those assemblies never entrusted the government under them to an assembly there; they sent a single governor to each plantation. For though everyone naturally wishes to take part in government wherever he can be personally present, where he cannot be present he is also naturally inclined to entrust the government of his common interest to a monarchic rather than a popular form. This is also evident among people with large private estates: when they do not wish to undertake the work of managing their affairs, they prefer to trust one servant rather than an assembly of friends or servants. But whatever the actual practice, we may suppose that the government of a province or colony has been entrusted to an assembly. In that case what I must say here is this: any debt contracted by the assembly, or any unlawful act it decrees, is the act only of those who assented, not of those who dissented or were absent, for the reasons already given. Further, an assembly residing outside the bounds of the colony it governs cannot exercise power over the persons or property of its inhabitants by seizing them for a debt or other duty anywhere outside the colony itself. Having neither jurisdiction nor authority elsewhere, it must resort to the remedies allowed by the law of that place. And though the assembly has the right to fine any member who breaks its laws, it has no right to enforce the fine outside the colony itself. What I have said here about the rights of an assembly governing a province or colony applies also to an assembly governing a town, university, college, church, or any other institution with authority over people.

In general, in every political body, if a member believes himself injured by the body itself, judgment of his case belongs to the Sovereign and to the judges the Sovereign has appointed for such cases or appoints for this particular case, not to the body itself. The whole body is his fellow subject in this instance. It is otherwise in a sovereign assembly: if the Sovereign is not judge there, even in his own cause, there can be no judge at all.

OF SYSTEMS OF SUBJECTS, POLITICAL AND PRIVATE

I have described how a Common-wealth is formed, what form it takes, and what power it has. Next I will describe its parts. I will begin with systems, which resemble the similar parts, or muscles, of a natural body. By a system I mean any group of people joined by one interest or one undertaking. Some systems are regular and others irregular. A regular system has one person or an assembly appointed to represent the whole group. All others are irregular.

Some regular systems are absolute and independent, subject only to their own representative. Only Common-wealths are like this. I discussed them in the 5 previous chapters. Others are dependent, or subordinate to a Sovereign Power. Each member and the representative are subject to that power.

Some subordinate systems are political, and others private. Political systems, also called political bodies or persons in law, are formed under the authority of the Common-wealth's Sovereign Power. Private systems are formed by subjects among themselves or under the authority of someone from another country. Authority coming from a foreign power is private, not public, within another sovereign's territory.

Some private systems are lawful, and others unlawful. Those allowed by the Common-wealth are lawful; all others are unlawful. Irregular systems have no representative and consist simply of people gathering. Such gatherings are lawful when the Common-wealth has not forbidden them and they have no bad purpose. People meeting at markets or shows, or for any other harmless purpose, are examples. But a gathering is unlawful if its purpose is bad or, when the number of people is substantial, unknown.

The representative's power in a political body is always limited. The Sovereign Power sets its limits, since unlimited power amounts to absolute Sovereignty. The Sovereign in every Common-wealth is the absolute representative of all its subjects. No one else can represent any of them except to the extent the Sovereign permits. If the Sovereign allowed a political body of subjects to have a representative with absolute power in every matter, the Sovereign would give up government over that part of the Common-wealth. This would divide its rule and work against the subjects' peace and defense. We cannot understand any grant as doing this unless it plainly and directly releases them from subjection. Implications drawn from words are not signs of the Sovereign's will when other implications point in the opposite direction. They are instead signs of error and miscalculation, to which everyone is prone.

Two things show the limits of the power given to the representative of a political body: its written authorization or letters from the Sovereign, and the law of the Common-wealth.

An independent Common-wealth formed by institution or conquest needs no written authorization. Its representative's power has no limits except those set by the unwritten Law of Nature. But subordinate bodies need many different limits on their activities, times, and places. People cannot remember all these without documents or know what they are unless those documents are public letters, available to read and sealed or otherwise marked with a lasting sign of Sovereign Authority.

Such limits are not always easy, or even possible, to describe in writing. Therefore, where the letters say nothing, the ordinary laws that apply to all subjects must determine what the representative may lawfully do. It follows that:

In a political body represented by one person, anything that person does on behalf of the body without authorization from its letters or the laws is that person's act alone. It is not the act of the body or any other member. Outside the limits set by the letters or laws, the person represents no one else. But an act done within those limits is the act of every member. Each person authorizes the acts of the Sovereign, who represents them without limit. An act by someone who stays within the Sovereign's letters is therefore an act of the Sovereign, authorized by every member of the body.

If an assembly represents the body, a decree unauthorized by its letters or the laws is the act of the assembly or political body and of everyone who voted for it. It is not the act of anyone present who voted against it, or of anyone absent unless that person voted by proxy. It is the assembly's act because the majority voted for it. If it is a crime, the assembly can be punished in whatever way is possible for it: by dissolution, by forfeiting its letters—which for such artificial, legal bodies amounts to death—or by a fine, if it has a common fund in which innocent members have no property. Political bodies cannot receive physical punishments. Those who did not vote for the decree are innocent because the assembly cannot represent them in matters its letters do not authorize. They are therefore not implicated by the votes.

When one person represents the body, that person alone, not its members, is liable for money borrowed or owed under a contract. If the single representative of a political body borrows money from an outsider, someone who does not belong to the body, the debt is the representative's. No letters need to limit borrowing, since lenders can choose for themselves how much to lend. If the letters empowered the representative to make members pay what the representative borrows, that person would in effect be their Sovereign. The grant would therefore either be void, as a product of ordinary human error and insufficient evidence of the grantor's will, or, if the grantor confirmed it, the representative would be Sovereign. That would fall outside this discussion of subordinate bodies. No member is obliged to pay this debt except the representative. The outsider lending the money cannot know the body's letters or its conditions. The lender understands only those who have undertaken the debt to be debtors. Since the representative can commit only himself, he alone is the debtor. He must pay from the common fund, if there is one, or otherwise from his own property.

The same rule applies if he incurs a debt through a contract or a fine.

When an assembly represents the body and the debt is owed to an outsider, everyone who voted to borrow the money, enter the contract that created the debt, or do the act that led to the fine is personally responsible for the entire debt. No one else is. By voting, each of them undertook to pay it. A person who authorizes borrowing owes the whole debt, although payment by any one of them releases the others.

But if the debt is owed to a member of the assembly, only the assembly owes payment, from its common fund if it has one. The member had a free vote. If he voted to borrow, he voted to repay. If he voted against borrowing, or was absent, his act of lending nevertheless amounted to a vote to borrow. He contradicted his earlier vote and is bound by his later decision. He is both borrower and lender and therefore cannot demand payment from any individual, only from the common treasury. If it has no money, he has no remedy and no one to blame but himself. He knew the assembly's actions and its ability to pay, was not forced to lend, and nevertheless foolishly lent it money.

Sometimes protest is lawful, but never against Sovereign Power. This shows that in subordinate political bodies, it is sometimes not just lawful but wise for a member to protest openly against a representative assembly's decrees and have the dissent recorded or witnessed. Otherwise that member may have to pay debts or answer for crimes committed by others. But no such right exists in a Sovereign Assembly. A person protesting there denies its Sovereignty. Moreover, for a subject, whatever the Sovereign Power commands is justified by that command, though it is not always justified in God's eyes. Every subject is the author of such a command.

There are almost infinitely many kinds of political bodies. They differ not only in the countless activities for which they are formed, but also in the limits on their duration, location, and number of members. Some are created to govern. For example, the government of a province might be entrusted to an assembly whose decisions depend on a majority vote. That assembly is a political body, and its commission limits its power. The word province means an assigned responsibility: someone gives another person a task to carry out under that person's authority. So when a Common-wealth contains different countries with distinct laws, or countries far apart, and entrusts their government to different people, the countries where the Sovereign does not live but governs through commissions are called provinces. There are few examples, though, of a province governed by an assembly based in the province itself. The Romans ruled many provinces but always governed them through presidents and praetors, not assemblies as they used to govern the city of Rome and nearby territories. Likewise, when England sent colonies to settle Virginia and the Sommer-Ilands, their government here was entrusted to assemblies in London. But those assemblies did not entrust local government to assemblies in the colonies. They sent a governor to each settlement. People naturally want to take part in government when they can be there themselves. When they cannot be there, they are also naturally inclined to put their shared interests under one ruler rather than under a government by many. This can also be seen among people with large private estates: if they do not want the trouble of managing them, they prefer to trust one servant rather than an assembly of friends or servants. Whatever actually happens, we can still suppose that an assembly is given the government of a province or colony. My point is that any debt it incurs and any unlawful act it orders belong only to those who agreed to them, not to dissenters or absentees, for the reasons already given. Also, an assembly based outside the colony it governs cannot seize the persons or property of colonists outside the colony to collect a debt or enforce another obligation. It has no jurisdiction or authority there and must use whatever remedy the law of that place allows. Even if the assembly has the right to fine members who break its laws, it has no right to enforce the fine outside the colony. The same principles concerning the rights of an assembly governing a province or colony apply to an assembly governing a town, university, college, church, or any other group of people.

In general, if a member of any political body believes the body itself has injured him, the Sovereign or judges appointed by the Sovereign, whether generally or for that particular case, must hear his claim. The body itself must not judge it, because the body is his fellow subject. A Sovereign Assembly is different: if the Sovereign cannot judge, even in its own case, there can be no judge at all.