Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Part II, Chapter XX, 1
Part II, Chapter XX, 1 of 101. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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OF DOMINION PATERNALL AND DESPOTICALL
A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Soveraign Power is acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise all the actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his Power.
And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their Soveraign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such Covenants, as proceed from fear of death, or violence, voyd: which if it were true, no man, in any kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged to Obedience. It is true, that in a Common-wealth once Instituted, or acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the Lawes; But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he may lawfully performe, and doth not, it is not the Invalidity of the Covenant, that absolveth him, but the Sentence of the Soveraign. Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: But when the Soveraign, who is the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that exorted the promise, as by the Author of such absolution.
But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same in both. His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre, and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours, Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of Rewards, and punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons whereof, are the same which are alledged in the precedent Chapter, for the same Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.
Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Conquest. The right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over his Children; and is called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Dominion over his Child because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God hath ordained to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally Parents: the Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong equally to both; and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two Masters. And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War. In Common-wealths, this controversie is decided by the Civill Law: and for the most part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in favour of the Father; because for the most part Common-wealths have been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families. But the question lyeth now in the state of meer Nature; where there are supposed no lawes of Matrimony; no lawes for the Education of Children; but the Law of Nature, and the naturall inclination of the Sexes, one to another, and to their children. In this condition of meer Nature, either the Parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the Child by Contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the Contract. We find in History that the Amazons Contracted with the Men of the neighbouring Countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue Male should be sent back, but the Female remain with themselves: so that the dominion of the Females was in the Mother.
If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the condition of Meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother: and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is first in the power of the Mother; so as she may either nourish, or expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the Dominion over it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find, and nourish it, the Dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.
If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers power: and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Soveraign Queen marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother; because the Father also is her subject.
If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a Child, and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the Right of the Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the Dominion followeth the Dominion of the place of his residence. For the Soveraign of each Country hath Dominion over all that reside therein.
He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over their Childrens Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man, hath Dominion over all that is his; without which, Dominion were but a Title, without the effect.
The Right of Succession to Paternall dominion, proceedeth in the same manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy; of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.
Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some Writers call DESPOTICALL, from Despotes, which signifieth a Lord, or Master; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant. And this Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the Vanquished, to avoyd the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by other sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word Servant (whether it be derived from Servire, to Serve, or from Servare, to Save, which I leave to Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly called Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him.
It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over the Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he commeth in, and submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor obliged by an enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the Victor longer, than in his own discretion hee shall think fit.
And that men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter, (which the Greeks called Zogria, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury of the Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life, with Ransome, or Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given, but deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then onely is his life in security, and his service due, when the Victor hath trusted him with his corporall liberty. For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters.
The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorising whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case the Master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete 1651 English text (introduction, forty-seven chapters, review and conclusion) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Hobbes’s marginal summaries are omitted.
OF PATERNAL AND DESPOTIC DOMINION
A Common-wealth by acquisition is one in which sovereign power is acquired by force. It is acquired by force when men, individually or in a group by majority vote, authorize all the actions of the man or assembly that holds their lives and liberty in its power, for fear of death or imprisonment.
This kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differs from sovereignty by institution only in this: men who choose their sovereign do so from fear of one another, not from fear of the one they institute; here, by contrast, they subject themselves to the one they fear. In both cases they act from fear. This should be noted by those who hold that all Covenants arising from fear of death or violence are void: if that were true, no man in any kind of Common-wealth could be bound to obedience. It is true that in a Common-wealth already instituted or acquired, promises arising from fear of death or violence are not Covenants, and do not bind, when what is promised is contrary to the laws. But the reason is not that the promise was made in fear; it is that the person promising has no right to the thing promised. Moreover, when he may lawfully perform his promise but fails to do so, it is not the invalidity of the Covenant that absolves him, but the sovereign's sentence. Otherwise, whenever a man lawfully promises, he unlawfully breaks his promise. But when the sovereign, who is the actor, acquits him, he is acquitted by the one who exacted the promise, as the author of that absolution.
The rights and consequences of sovereignty, however, are the same in both cases. Its power cannot be transferred to another without the sovereign's consent; he cannot forfeit it; he cannot be accused of injury by any of his subjects; they cannot punish him. He judges what is necessary for peace, and judges doctrines. He is the sole legislator, the supreme judge of controversies, and the judge of the times and occasions for war and peace. It belongs to him to choose magistrates, counselors, commanders, and all other officers and ministers, and to determine rewards and punishments, honor and rank. The reasons are the same as those given in the preceding chapter for these same rights and consequences of sovereignty by institution.
Dominion is acquired in two ways: by generation and by conquest. The right of dominion by generation is the right a parent has over his children, and is called PATERNAL. It is not derived from generation in the sense that a parent has dominion over his child merely because he begot him, but from the child's consent, expressed or otherwise sufficiently declared. For God has ordained that man have a helper in generation, and there are always two who are equally parents. Dominion over the child should therefore belong equally to both, and the child should be equally subject to both—which is impossible, for no man can obey two masters. Those who have attributed dominion to the man alone, as the more excellent sex, are mistaken. The difference of strength or prudence between man and woman is not always such that their right can be determined without war. In Common-wealths the civil law decides this dispute, and its decision favors the father for the most part, though not always, because Common-wealths have for the most part been founded by the fathers, not the mothers, of families. But our question concerns the state of mere nature, in which we suppose there are no laws of marriage, no laws governing the education of children, but only the Law of Nature and the natural inclinations of the sexes toward each other and toward their children. In this condition of mere nature, either the parents settle dominion over the child between themselves by contract, or they do not settle it at all. If they do, the right passes according to their contract. We find in history that the Amazons made a contract with the men of neighboring countries, to whom they went to conceive children, that male offspring would be sent back but female offspring would remain with them; thus dominion over the daughters lay with their mother.
If there is no contract, dominion belongs to the mother. In the condition of mere nature, where there are no marriage laws, the father cannot be known unless the mother declares who he is; the right of dominion over the child therefore depends on her will and consequently belongs to her. Again, the infant is first in its mother's power: she may either nourish or expose it. If she nourishes it, it owes its life to her and is therefore bound to obey her rather than anyone else; consequently dominion over it is hers. But if she exposes it and another person finds and nourishes it, dominion belongs to the person who nourishes it. For the child ought to obey the one who preserves it: since the preservation of life is the end for which one person becomes subject to another, everyone is supposed to promise obedience to the person who has it in his power to save or destroy him.
If the mother is the father's subject, the child is in the father's power; and if the father is the mother's subject, as when a sovereign queen marries one of her subjects, the child is subject to the mother, because the father is her subject too.
If a man and woman who are monarchs of two separate kingdoms have a child and make a contract about which of them shall have dominion over the child, the right of dominion passes according to that contract. If they make no contract, dominion follows the dominion of the place where the child resides. For the sovereign of each country has dominion over all who live there.
Whoever has dominion over a child also has dominion over that child's children. For whoever has dominion over a person's body has dominion over all that belongs to that person; without this, dominion would be a title without effect.
The right of succession to paternal dominion proceeds in the same manner as the right of succession to monarchy, of which I have already spoken sufficiently in the preceding chapter.
Dominion acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is what some writers call DESPOTIC, from despotes, meaning lord or master; it is the dominion of a master over his servant. The victor acquires this dominion when the vanquished person, to escape the immediate stroke of death, Covenants by express words or other sufficient signs of his will that, so long as his life and bodily liberty are allowed him, the victor may make use of them as he pleases. After making such a Covenant the vanquished person is a SERVANT, and not before. For by servant—whether the word derives from servire, to serve, or servare, to save, a dispute I leave to grammarians—I do not mean a captive kept in prison or chains until the one who captured him, or bought him from his captor, decides what to do with him. Such men, commonly called slaves, have no obligation at all: they may justly break their chains or prison, and kill or take captive their master. I mean instead one who, after being captured, is allowed bodily liberty, and whom the master trusts on his promise neither to run away nor to do him violence.
It is therefore not victory that gives the right of dominion over the vanquished, but the vanquished person's own Covenant. Nor is he bound because he is conquered—that is, beaten and captured or put to flight—but because he comes in and submits to the victor. Nor is the victor bound to spare an enemy who surrenders without a promise of life merely because that enemy has yielded to his discretion: such surrender binds the victor no longer than he, in his discretion, sees fit.
What men do when they ask for what is now called quarter, which the Greeks called zogria, taking alive, is to escape the victor's immediate fury by submitting, and to bargain for their lives with ransom or service. Thus one who receives quarter has not been granted his life, but has had his death deferred pending further deliberation; he has not surrendered on condition of life, but at the victor's discretion. His life becomes secure, and his service due, only when the victor trusts him with bodily liberty. Slaves who work in prisons or fetters do so not from duty but to avoid the cruelty of their taskmasters.
The master of the servant is also master of all the servant has, and may demand the use of it—his goods, his labor, his servants, and his children—as often as he sees fit. For the servant holds his life from his master under the Covenant of obedience: he acknowledges and authorizes whatever the master does. If the master kills him, puts him in chains, or otherwise punishes him for refusing obedience, the servant himself is the author of the act and cannot accuse the master of injury.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete 1651 English text (introduction, forty-seven chapters, review and conclusion). Hobbes’s marginal summaries are omitted.
ON PARENTAL AND MASTERLY RULE
A commonwealth by acquisition is one in which sovereign power is gained by force. This happens when people, individually or together by a majority vote, authorize every act of a man or assembly that holds their lives and freedom in its power. They do so because they fear death or imprisonment.
This kind of rule, or sovereignty, differs from sovereignty established by agreement in only one respect. People who choose a sovereign that way do it because they fear one another, not the person they appoint. Here they submit to the person they fear. In both cases they act out of fear. Those who say that all covenants made from fear of death or violence are invalid should note this. If they were right, nobody in any kind of commonwealth could be obliged to obey. It is true that, once a commonwealth has been established or acquired, a promise made out of fear of death or violence is not a binding covenant if what is promised breaks the law. But that is not because the promise was made out of fear. It is because the person making it has no right to promise that thing. Also, when a person can lawfully carry out a promise and does not, it is not the covenant's invalidity that releases him. Only the sovereign's judgment does that. Otherwise, whenever a person makes a lawful promise, he breaks it unlawfully. But when the sovereign, who acts on behalf of the people, releases him, the person who demanded the promise releases him too, since that person authorized the sovereign's act.
The rights and consequences of sovereignty are the same in both cases. Sovereign power cannot be transferred to another without the sovereign's consent. The sovereign cannot forfeit it. Subjects cannot accuse the sovereign of injuring them or punish the sovereign. The sovereign decides what is necessary for peace and judges doctrines. The sovereign alone makes laws, and is the highest judge in disputes and in decisions about when to make war or peace. The sovereign chooses magistrates, counselors, commanders, and every other officer and minister. The sovereign determines rewards and punishments, honors, and ranks. The reasons are the same ones given in the previous chapter for these rights and consequences when sovereignty is established by agreement.
Rule over someone is acquired in two ways: through birth and through conquest. The right of rule through birth is the parent's right over a child, called parental rule. It does not arise simply from having conceived the child, as if that alone entitled a parent to rule. It comes from the child's consent, either stated openly or shown by other adequate signs. As for conception, God has given man a helper, and there are always two equally responsible parents. So rule over the child would belong to both equally, and the child would be equally subject to both. That is impossible, because nobody can obey two masters. Some have assigned rule to the man alone on the grounds that his sex is superior. They are mistaken. Men and women do not always differ enough in strength or good judgment for the right to be settled without war. In commonwealths, civil law settles the question. Usually, though not always, it decides for the father, because commonwealths have usually been founded by fathers rather than mothers of families. But the question here concerns the state of nature alone. We assume that there are no marriage laws or laws about raising children, only the Law of Nature and the natural attraction of the sexes to each other and to their children. In this state of nature the parents either settle rule over their child by contract or do not settle it at all. If they settle it, the right goes where the contract says. History tells us that the Amazons contracted with men in neighboring countries, whom they sought out to have children. Sons were to be sent back to the men, while daughters stayed with the women. Thus the mother ruled the daughters.
If there is no contract, rule belongs to the mother. In the state of nature without marriage laws, nobody can know who the father is unless the mother identifies him. So the right to rule the child depends on her choice and therefore belongs to her. Also, a baby is first in its mother's power. She can either feed it or abandon it. If she feeds it, it owes her its life and must obey her rather than anyone else. It follows that she rules it. But if she abandons it and someone else finds and feeds it, that person rules it. A person should obey whoever preserves his life. The purpose of submitting to another person is to preserve life, and everyone is presumed to promise obedience to someone who has the power to save or destroy him.
If the mother is subject to the father, the child is in the father's power. If the father is subject to the mother, as when a sovereign queen marries one of her subjects, the child is subject to the mother, because the father is also her subject.
If a man and woman who rule separate kingdoms have a child and make a contract about who will rule that child, the contract settles the right. If they do not, the right follows the ruler of the place where the child lives. The sovereign of each country rules everyone living there.
Whoever rules a child also rules that child's children. A person who rules someone also rules all that belongs to that person. Otherwise, rule would be a title without any effect.
The right to inherit parental rule passes on in the same way as the right to inherit a monarchy. I have already said enough about that in the previous chapter.
Rule gained through conquest, or victory in war, is what some writers call masterly rule. Their word comes from despotes, meaning a lord or master. It is the master's rule over a servant. The victor gains this rule when the defeated person makes a covenant to avoid immediate death. In words or other adequate signs of his intention, he agrees that, as long as he is allowed to live and move freely, the victor may use his life and freedom as the victor pleases. Only after this covenant does the defeated person become a servant. Whether the word 'servant' comes from servire, meaning 'to serve,' or servare, meaning 'to save,' I leave to grammarians. It does not mean a captive held in prison or chains while the person who captured him, or bought him from his captor, decides what to do with him. Such captives, commonly called slaves, have no obligation at all. They may rightfully break their chains or escape prison, kill their master, or take him captive. A servant, instead, is someone who has been captured but allowed bodily freedom. His master trusts him on his promise not to run away or attack him.
Victory itself does not give the victor the right to rule the defeated person. The defeated person's own covenant does. He is not obliged merely because he was beaten, captured, or driven away. He becomes obliged because he comes in and submits to the victor. Nor must a victor spare an enemy who surrenders without a promise that his life will be spared. An unconditional surrender binds the victor only as long as he thinks fit.
When people ask for what is now called quarter, which the Greeks called zogria, 'taking alive,' they submit to escape the victor's immediate fury. They bargain for their lives by offering ransom or service. So a person who receives quarter has not been granted his life; the decision has only been postponed. He has surrendered at the victor's discretion, not on condition that he will live. His life is secure and his service is owed only when the victor trusts him with bodily freedom. Slaves who work in prisons or chains do not work from duty. They work to avoid their taskmasters' cruelty.
The servant's master is also master of everything the servant has and may demand its use whenever he thinks fit: his goods, his labor, his servants, and his children. The servant holds his life from the master under a covenant to obey. That means accepting and authorizing whatever the master does. If the servant refuses and the master kills him, puts him in chains, or otherwise punishes his disobedience, the servant has authorized that action himself. He cannot accuse the master of doing him an injury.