Part II, Chapter XIX, 2

Though there are only three kinds of sovereignty, as I have shown—monarchy, where one man holds it; democracy, where the general assembly of subjects holds it; and aristocracy, where it belongs to an assembly of certain people nominated or otherwise distinguished from the rest—someone surveying the particular commonwealths that have existed and still exist may find them hard to fit into those three kinds. He may therefore be inclined to imagine other forms, arising from mixtures of these. Consider elective kingdoms, in which kings receive sovereign power for a time, or kingdoms in which a king's power is limited: most writers nevertheless call these governments monarchies. Similarly, when a popular or aristocratic commonwealth conquers an enemy country and rules it through a president, procurator, or other magistrate, the government may at first appear democratic or aristocratic. It is not. Elective kings are not sovereigns but ministers of the sovereign; nor are limited kings sovereigns, but ministers of those who hold sovereign power. Provinces subject to the democracy or aristocracy of another commonwealth are governed not democratically or aristocratically, but monarchically.

First, consider an elective king whose power lasts for his lifetime, as it does in many parts of Christendom today, or for a fixed number of years or months, as did the power of Roman dictators. If he has the right to appoint his successor, he is no longer elective but hereditary. If he has no power to choose his successor, some other known man or assembly must have the power to elect a new ruler after his death. Otherwise the commonwealth dies and dissolves with him, returning to the condition of war. If it is known who may confer sovereignty after his death, it is also known that sovereignty rested with them before his death: no one has the right to give away what he has no right to possess and retain if he wishes. But if no one can confer sovereignty after the death of the first elected ruler, then that ruler has the power—indeed, is obliged by the Law of Nature—to establish a successor, so that those who entrusted him with government will not fall back into the miserable condition of civil war. Consequently, when elected, he was an absolute sovereign.

Secondly, a king whose power is limited is not superior to those who have the power to limit it; and one who is not superior is not supreme, that is, not sovereign. Sovereignty therefore always resided in the assembly with the right to limit him. The government is consequently not a monarchy, but either a democracy or an aristocracy, as in ancient Sparta, where the kings had the privilege of leading armies but sovereignty belonged to the Ephori.

Thirdly, though the Roman people once governed the land of Judea, for example, through a president, Judea was not therefore a democracy. Its people were not governed by an assembly they had any right to enter. Nor was it an aristocracy, since they were not governed by an assembly anyone among them could join by their election. They were governed by one person. That person was an assembly of the people—a democracy—with respect to the people of Rome, but a monarch with respect to the people of Judea, who had no right to participate in the government. Where a people is governed by an assembly chosen from among themselves, the government is called a democracy or an aristocracy; where an assembly not of their choosing governs them, it is a monarchy—not of one man over another, but of one people over another.

All these forms of government are made of mortal material: not only monarchs but whole assemblies die. The preservation of human peace therefore requires that, just as provision was made for an artificial man, provision must also be made for an artificial eternity of life. Without it, those governed by an assembly would return to the condition of war in every generation, and those governed by one man as soon as their ruler died. This artificial eternity is what people call the right of succession.

No form of government is complete unless the present sovereign controls the succession. If that right belongs to any other individual or private assembly, it belongs to a subject and may be taken over by the sovereign at his pleasure; consequently the right belongs to the sovereign himself. If it belongs to no particular person, but is left to a fresh choice, the commonwealth is dissolved, and the right falls to whoever can seize it, contrary to the intention of those who instituted the commonwealth for lasting, not temporary, security.

In a democracy, the whole assembly cannot cease to exist unless the multitude to be governed ceases to exist. Questions about the right of succession therefore have no place in this form of government.

In an aristocracy, when a member of the assembly dies, the choice of his replacement belongs to the assembly as sovereign, which has the right to choose all counselors and officers. For whatever the representative does as actor, every subject does as author. The sovereign assembly may empower others to elect new members to fill its seats, but the election is still made by its authority and may be revoked by that same authority when the public interest requires it.

The present monarch has the right to determine the succession. The greatest difficulty concerning succession arises in monarchy: at first sight, it is not obvious who is to appoint the successor, nor, often, whom he has appointed. Both questions require more exact reasoning than most people are accustomed to employ. To answer who appoints the successor of a monarch holding sovereign authority—for elective kings and princes hold sovereign power in its exercise only, not as their own property—we must consider that either the present holder has the right to determine the succession, or the right returns to the dissolved multitude. The death of one who holds sovereign power as his own leaves the multitude without any sovereign, that is, without a representative to unite them and make them capable of acting together at all. They therefore cannot elect a new monarch. Each has an equal right to submit to whoever he thinks most capable of protecting him, or to defend himself by his own sword if he can. This is a return to confusion and to the war of every man against every man, contrary to the purpose for which monarchy was first instituted. Clearly, then, the institution of monarchy always leaves the choice of successor to the judgment and will of the current holder.

As for the question that may sometimes arise of whom the reigning monarch has designated to inherit his power, the answer is determined by his express words and testament, or by other sufficient tacit signs.

He makes his choice by express words or testament when he declares it in his lifetime, viva voce or in writing, as the first emperors of Rome declared who should be their heirs. The word heir does not in itself mean a person's children or closest relatives; it means whoever he declares in any way that he wishes to succeed to his estate. If a monarch expressly declares by speech or writing that someone shall be his heir, that person acquires the right to be monarch immediately upon the death of his predecessor.

When neither testament nor express words exist, other natural signs of the monarch's will must be followed. One such sign is custom. Where custom gives succession unconditionally to the closest relative, that relative has the right to succeed; if the will of the reigning monarch had differed, he could easily have said so during his lifetime. Likewise, where custom favors the nearest male relative, that man has the right to succeed for the same reason. The same holds if custom favors a female relative. Any custom a person could overturn with a word but does not overturn is a natural sign that he wishes it to continue.

Where neither custom nor testament provides an answer, we must understand, first, that a monarch wishes the government to remain monarchic, since he has approved that government in his own person. Secondly, he prefers his own child, male or female, to anyone else, for people are presumed by nature to favor their own children above those of others; and among their own children, a male above a female, since men are by nature better suited than women to laborious and dangerous undertakings. Thirdly, in the absence of children of his own, he prefers a brother to a stranger, and generally a closer blood relative to a more distant one. The nearer relative is always presumed to be nearer in affection, and clearly a person gains the most reflected honor from the distinction of his nearest kin.

But if a monarch may lawfully determine the succession by contract or testament, some may object that a grave disadvantage follows: he can sell or give his right to rule to a foreigner. Foreigners—that is, people unused to living under the same government and speaking the same language—commonly undervalue one another, and such a transfer may lead to the oppression of his subjects. This is indeed a grave disadvantage, but it does not necessarily arise from subjection to foreign government; it arises from the incompetence of rulers ignorant of the true principles of politics. When the Romans conquered many nations, therefore, they made their rule more acceptable by removing this grievance as far as they thought necessary: they sometimes bestowed not only the privileges but also the name of Romans on whole nations, and sometimes on leading men of each conquered nation. They admitted many such men to the Senate and to offices of responsibility even in the city of Rome. This was the aim of our most wise King, King James, when he sought to unite his two realms of England and Scotland. Had he succeeded, he would in all likelihood have prevented the civil wars that now make both kingdoms miserable. A monarch's disposition of the succession by will is therefore no injury to the people, though the faults of many princes have sometimes made it disadvantageous. Another argument for its lawfulness is that every disadvantage that might arise from giving a kingdom to a foreigner may also arise from a marriage with foreigners that lets the right of succession pass to them; yet everyone regards such marriages as lawful.

As I have shown, there are only three kinds of sovereignty: monarchy, in which one person holds it; democracy, in which the general assembly of subjects holds it; and aristocracy, in which it belongs to an assembly of particular people chosen or otherwise set apart from the rest. Yet someone looking at the actual Commonwealths that have existed and still exist may find it hard to fit them into these three kinds. That person may think there are additional forms combining them. Consider elective kingdoms, where kings receive sovereign power for a time, or kingdoms where a king's power is limited. Most writers still call these governments monarchies. Or consider a popular or aristocratic Commonwealth that conquers an enemy's country and governs it through a president, procurator, or other official. At first this may look like democratic or aristocratic government. But it is not. Elected kings are not sovereigns but servants of the sovereign. Kings with limited power are likewise servants of whoever holds sovereign power. And provinces under another Commonwealth's democracy or aristocracy are not governed democratically or aristocratically; they are governed monarchically.

First, take an elected king whose power lasts for his lifetime, as it does in many Christian countries today, or for a set number of years or months, as the power of Roman dictators did. If he has the right to appoint his successor, the office is hereditary rather than elective. If he cannot choose his successor, then either a known person or assembly can choose a new king after his death, or the Commonwealth dies and breaks apart with him, returning to the state of war. If we know who has the power to give sovereignty after his death, we also know that sovereignty already belonged to them. No one has the right to give away something they have no right to possess and keep, if they choose. But if no one has the right to grant sovereignty after the first elected king dies, then he has the power, and indeed a duty under the Law of Nature, to appoint a successor. He must keep the people who trusted him to govern from falling back into the misery of civil war. So when he was elected, he was an absolute sovereign.

Second, a king whose power is limited is not above the person or people who can limit it. Whoever is not above them is not supreme, and therefore is not sovereign. Sovereignty has always belonged to the assembly with the right to limit the king. The government is therefore a democracy or aristocracy, not a monarchy. This was once true in Sparta: kings had the privilege of leading the armies, but sovereignty belonged to the Ephori.

Third, consider the time when the Roman People governed Judea, for example, through a president. Judea was not a democracy, because it was not governed by an assembly that any Judean had a right to join. Nor was it an aristocracy, because it was not governed by an assembly that anyone could join by election of the Judeans. Instead, one person governed Judea. From the Romans' viewpoint that person was an assembly of the people, a democracy. From the Judeans' viewpoint, since they had no right to participate in government, that person was a monarch. When people are governed by an assembly they choose from among themselves, the government is called a democracy or aristocracy. But when the assembly governing them is not their own choice, it is a monarchy—not the rule of one individual over another, but of one people over another people.

Every form of government is made of mortal people: not only monarchs but entire assemblies die. To preserve peace, people must provide a kind of artificial eternal life for their artificial person, the Commonwealth. Without it, those governed by an assembly would return to war in every generation, while those governed by one person would return to war as soon as their ruler died. People call this artificial eternity the right of succession.

No form of government is complete unless the present sovereign controls succession. If some other private person or private assembly controls it, that person or assembly is a subject, and the sovereign can take the power back whenever he wants. So the right still belongs to the sovereign. If no particular person holds it and a fresh choice must be made, then the Commonwealth dissolves and the right passes to whoever can seize it. That goes against the intention of its founders, who wanted lasting security, not temporary security.

In a democracy, the full assembly cannot disappear unless the multitude it governs disappears. So questions about the right of succession do not arise in that form of government.

In an aristocracy, when a member of the assembly dies, the assembly chooses a replacement. It is the sovereign, and choosing all counselors and officers belongs to the sovereign. Every subject is the author of what the representative does as their actor. The sovereign assembly may give others the authority to elect new people to fill vacancies in its body. Even then, the election takes place by the assembly's authority, and the assembly can withdraw that authority when the public interest requires it.

The Present Monarch Has the Right to Decide Succession. The greatest difficulty concerning the right of succession arises in a monarchy. At first it may not be clear who has the right to appoint a successor. Often it is not clear whom that person has appointed. Both questions demand closer reasoning than people usually practice. To determine who appoints the successor of a monarch who holds sovereign power—for elective kings and princes properly have only the use of sovereign power, not ownership of it—consider the alternatives. Either the present holder has the right to decide succession, or the right belongs to the multitude once it has dissolved. When the monarch who owns sovereign power dies, the multitude has no sovereign. It has no representative to unite it and enable it to act as one. It therefore cannot elect a new monarch. Each person has an equal right to submit to whoever seems best able to protect them, or to protect themselves by force if they can. That would mean returning to disorder and a war of everyone against everyone, the very condition monarchy was originally established to avoid. So the institution of monarchy always leaves the choice of successor to the judgment and will of the present monarch.

A second question sometimes arises: whom has the current monarch chosen to inherit his power? His spoken or written declaration settles it, or else sufficiently clear signs that he has not stated directly.

He makes an express declaration when he states his choice in speech during his lifetime, viva voce, or in writing in a will. The first Emperors of Rome declared their heirs this way. The word “heir” does not necessarily mean a man's children or closest relatives. It means whoever he declares should inherit his estate. So if a monarch expressly names someone as his heir, orally or in writing, that person acquires the right to be monarch immediately upon the previous monarch's death.

If there is no will or express declaration, we must look for other natural signs of the monarch's wishes. One such sign is custom. If the custom is for the closest relative to succeed regardless of anything else, that relative has the right of succession. Had the previous holder wanted something else, he could easily have said so during his lifetime. Likewise, if custom gives the right to the closest male relative, that man has the right of succession for the same reason. The same applies if custom favors a female relative. A person's failure to overturn a custom that they could overturn with a word is a natural sign that they want it to continue.

Where there is neither a relevant custom nor a will, we should assume, first, that a monarch wishes government to remain monarchical, since he approved of that form by holding it himself. Second, we should assume that he prefers a child of his own, whether male or female, over anyone else. People are presumed naturally more willing to advance their own children than someone else's, and among their own children to prefer a male to a female, because men are naturally better suited to physically demanding and dangerous work. Third, if he has no children, we should assume he prefers a brother to a stranger, and generally a closer blood relative to a more distant one. We presume that closer relatives have stronger affection for one another. Clearly, too, a person gains more reflected honor from the standing of their closest relatives.

Someone might object that allowing a monarch to decide succession by a contract or a will has a serious disadvantage. He could sell or give his right to govern to a foreigner. Foreigners—people unused to living under the same government or speaking the same language—commonly undervalue one another, so this could lead to oppression of the subjects. This is indeed a serious disadvantage. But it does not necessarily result from being governed by foreigners. It comes from rulers who do not understand the true principles of politics. When the Romans conquered many nations, they made their government easier to accept by easing this grievance as much as they thought necessary. Sometimes they gave entire nations, and sometimes prominent people from each conquered nation, not only the privileges but also the name of Romans. They admitted many to the Senate and to positions of responsibility even in the city of Rome. Our very wise King, King James, pursued the same aim in seeking to unite his two kingdoms of England and Scotland. Had he achieved that union, it would very likely have prevented the civil wars now bringing misery to both kingdoms. A monarch therefore does no injury to the people by choosing a successor in his will, even though the faults of many princes have sometimes made this inconvenient. Another argument for its lawfulness is that marrying foreigners can also lead to a foreigner inheriting a kingdom and cause every disadvantage of giving it to one. Yet everyone considers such marriages lawful.

Chapter XX. Of Paternal and Despotic Dominion