Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Part I, Chapter XI
Part I, Chapter XI of 101. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS
By MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Morals; But those qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in Peace, and Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis Ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations of all men, tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ onely in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.
So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it a home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind.
Competition of Riches, Honour, command, or other power, enclineth to Contention, Enmity, and War: because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other. Particularly, competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glory of the other.
Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common Power: because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the protection might be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour.
Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason. On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by warre; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.
Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a common Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and consequently protection from some other Power than their own.
Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgement they value; for of these men whom we contemn, we contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as being joyes, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may rebound thereby to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.
To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall, greater benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfiet love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wishes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldome; which is to ones equall, hateful. But to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge our superiour, enclines to love; because the obligation is no new depession: and cheerfull acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall; from whence proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.
To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate, enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge, or forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.
Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.
Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition, better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented,) to strike first. And in sedition, men being alwayes in the procincts of Battell, to hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtilty of Wit.
Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when danger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered.
Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.
Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisdome, both to themselves and others
Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently to lose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, tis a signe, the difference of Motives, the one way and the other, are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is pusillanimity.
Frugality,(though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by Reward.
Confidence In Others From Ignorance Of The Marks Of Wisdome and Kindnesse Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that have it; because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming Kindnesse. Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later gives them caution against danger from others.
Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.
Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of understanding, disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.
From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it, Haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but has onely a greater tincture of choler.
From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one.
Adhaerence To Custome, From Ignorance Of The Nature Of Right And Wrong Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equity, Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been the custome to punish; and that Just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an Example, or (as the Lawyers which onely use the false measure of Justice barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and Masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome to reason, and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding from custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is the cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the Pen and the Sword: whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, That The Three Angles Of A Triangle Should Be Equall To Two Angles Of A Square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.
Adhaerence To Private Men, From Ignorance Of The Causes Of Peace Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to the causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it comes to passe, that in all places, men that are grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their anger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, and other Officers of the publique Revenue; and adhaere to such as find fault with the publike Government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme Authority, for feare of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.
Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as to believe many times impossibilities: for such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibility. And Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth them to lying: so that Ignorance it selfe without Malice, is able to make a man bothe to believe lyes, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.
Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage.
Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternall; though they cannot have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himselfe, there is somewhat there, which men call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he feeles; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea, or Image of him in his mind.
And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distresse to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good successe, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to passe, that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods. And this Feare of things invisible, is the naturall Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that worship, or feare that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.
And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.
CHAPTER XII. OF RELIGION
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete 1651 English text (introduction, forty-seven chapters, review and conclusion) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Hobbes’s marginal summaries are omitted.
OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS
By manners I do not mean here the decencies of behavior—how one person should greet another, or wash one's mouth or pick one's teeth before company, and other such points of minor morality—but those qualities of humankind that bear on living together in peace and unity. To this end we must recognize that happiness in this life does not consist in the repose of a satisfied mind. There is no such finis ultimus, or ultimate aim, nor any summum bonum, or greatest good, of the kind discussed in the books of the old moral philosophers. A person whose desires have ended can no more live than one whose senses and imagination have stopped. Happiness is a continual progress of desire from one object to another, the attainment of the first being always only the path to the next. The reason is that the object of human desire is not merely to enjoy something once, for an instant, but to secure forever the way to satisfy future desire. And so the voluntary actions and inclinations of everyone tend not only to obtain a contented life but to secure it; they differ only in their methods. These differences arise partly from the diverse Passions of different people, and partly from the difference in what each knows or believes about the causes that bring about the desired effect.
Thus I place first, as a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire for power after power that ceases only in death. The reason is not always that a person hopes for more intense pleasure than has already been attained, or cannot be content with moderate power. Rather, no one can secure the power and means of living well now possessed without acquiring more. That is why kings, whose power is greatest, strive to secure it at home by laws and abroad by wars. When this is done a new desire succeeds it: in some, for fame through fresh conquest; in others, for ease and sensual pleasure; in others, for admiration or flattery for excellence in some art or other ability of mind.
Competition for riches, honor, command, or other power inclines people toward contention, hostility, and war, because one competitor's way to obtain what he desires is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the other. Competition for praise in particular inclines people to revere antiquity. They contend with the living, not the dead; and attribute more than is due to the dead in order to dim the glory of the living.
The desire for ease and sensual delight disposes people to obey a common power, because such desires lead one to abandon the protection that could be hoped for from one's own industry and labor.
Fear of death and wounds has the same effect, and for the same reason. Conversely, needy and hardy people, dissatisfied with their present condition, and all those ambitious for military command, are inclined to perpetuate the causes of war and to stir up trouble and sedition. There is no military honor except through war, nor any comparable hope of improving a bad hand except by arranging a new shuffle.
Desire for knowledge and the arts of peace inclines people to obey a common power, for such desire includes a desire for leisure, and consequently for protection by some power other than their own.
Desire for praise disposes people to praiseworthy actions that please those whose judgment they value; for we also despise the praise of people we despise. Desire for fame after death does the same. And though after death we have no sensation of praise bestowed on us on earth—such joys being either swallowed up by the unspeakable joys of heaven or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell—such fame is not vain. People take pleasure in it now by foreseeing it and the benefit it may bring their descendants; though they cannot see that benefit yet, they imagine it, and whatever gives pleasure to the senses gives pleasure also to the imagination.
To receive from someone we consider our equal greater benefits than we can hope to repay disposes us to counterfeit love while secretly feeling hatred. It puts a person in the position of a desperate debtor who, avoiding his creditor's sight, silently wishes him where he would never see him again. For benefits impose obligations, and obligation is bondage, which is hateful when owed to an equal. But receiving benefits from someone we acknowledge as our superior inclines us to love, because the obligation is no new abasement; and cheerful acceptance, which people call gratitude, honors the benefactor in a way generally taken as repayment. Receiving benefits even from an equal or inferior likewise disposes us to love as long as there is hope of repaying them. In the recipient's intention the obligation is one of mutual aid and service; hence arises a rivalry over who will surpass the other in doing good, the noblest and most fruitful contest possible, in which the victor is pleased with victory and the other gets revenge by acknowledging it.
To have done someone more harm than one can, or is willing to, make amends for inclines the doer to hate the sufferer. For the doer must expect either revenge or forgiveness, both of which are hateful.
Fear of oppression disposes a person to strike first or to seek help through association, for there is no other way to secure one's life and liberty.
In tumult and sedition, those who distrust their own cunning are better placed to win than those who think themselves wise or crafty. The latter like to deliberate; the former, fearing they will be outwitted, strike first. And in sedition, when people are always poised for battle, holding together and using every advantage of force is a better stratagem than any subtlety of wit can devise.
Vainglorious people who, without being aware of any great ability in themselves, delight in imagining themselves valiant are inclined only to show off, not to act. For when danger or difficulty appears, they expect nothing but exposure of their inadequacy.
Vainglorious people who measure their ability by others' flattery or the good fortune of some earlier action, without sound grounds for hope in true self-knowledge, are inclined to commit themselves rashly and, when danger or difficulty draws near, to withdraw if they can. Since they see no path to safety, they prefer to risk their honor, which an excuse may repair, rather than their lives, for which no remedy suffices.
People with a strong opinion of their own wisdom in government are disposed to ambition, because without public employment as counselors or magistrates the honor of their wisdom is lost. Eloquent speakers are therefore inclined to ambition, for eloquence appears to be wisdom both to themselves and to others.
Pusillanimity disposes people to irresolution and thus to miss occasions and the best opportunities for action. For if they have deliberated until the time for action approaches and it is still not clear what is best, that is a sign that the motives on either side differ little. Not to decide then is to lose the occasion by weighing trifles; that is pusillanimity.
Frugality, though a virtue in poor people, makes a person ill-suited to accomplish deeds that require the strength of many people at once. For it weakens their effort, which must be nourished and kept vigorous by reward.
Confidence in Others from Ignorance of the Signs of Wisdom and Kindness. Eloquence coupled with flattery disposes people to trust those who possess them, because the former appears to be wisdom, the latter kindness. Add a military reputation, and people are disposed to attach and subject themselves to such men. The first two give assurance against danger from the men themselves; the last gives assurance against danger from others.
Lack of knowledge, that is, ignorance of causes, disposes—or rather compels—a person to rely on the advice and authority of others. For everyone concerned with the truth must rely, if not on their own opinion, on that of someone else whom they think wiser than themselves and see no reason to suspect of deception.
Ignorance of what words mean—that is, lack of understanding—disposes people to take on trust not only truths they do not know, but also the errors and, what is more, the nonsense of those they trust. Neither error nor nonsense can be detected without a thorough understanding of words.
From this same ignorance it follows that people give different names to one and the same thing according to their different Passions. Those who approve of a private opinion call it an opinion; those who dislike it call it heresy. Yet heresy means nothing more than private opinion, only colored by greater anger.
It also follows from this that, without study and deep understanding, people cannot distinguish one action performed by many people from many actions performed by a multitude: for example, the single action of all the senators of Rome in killing Catiline from the many actions of a number of senators in killing Caesar. They are therefore disposed to call an action of the people what is in fact a multitude of actions performed by a multitude of people, perhaps led by the persuasion of one person.
Adherence to Custom from Ignorance of the Nature of Right and Wrong. Ignorance of the causes and original establishment of right, equity, law, and justice disposes a person to take custom and example as the rule of conduct: to think unjust whatever it has been customary to punish, and just whatever one can cite an example of being left unpunished and approved—or, as lawyers who use only this false measure of justice crudely call it, a precedent. Such people are like little children, whose only rule of good and bad behavior is correction by parents and teachers, except that children hold steady to their rule, while adults do not. Having grown strong and stubborn, they appeal from custom to reason and from reason to custom as suits their purposes; they abandon custom when their interest requires it and oppose reason whenever reason opposes them. This is why right and wrong are perpetually disputed with both pen and sword, while lines and figures are not: in geometry people do not care what the truth is, because it thwarts no one's ambition, profit, or desire. For I do not doubt that, if the proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two angles of a square had conflicted with anyone's right of dominion or the interests of those who hold dominion, that doctrine would, if not disputed, have been suppressed by burning every book of geometry, as far as the person concerned was able.
Adherence to Private Men from Ignorance of the Causes of Peace. Ignorance of remote causes disposes people to attribute every event to its immediate, instrumental causes, for these are all they perceive. Thus everywhere people aggrieved by payments to the public vent their anger on the tax gatherers—that is, the farmers, collectors, and other officers of public revenue—and attach themselves to critics of the public government. Then, once committed beyond hope of justifying themselves, they turn against the Supreme Authority as well, for fear of punishment or shame at receiving a pardon.
Ignorance of natural causes disposes a person to credulity and often to believe impossibilities: having no knowledge to the contrary, such people cannot see why these things might not be true, since they cannot detect their impossibility. And credulity, because people like to be listened to in company, disposes them to lie. Thus ignorance alone, without malice, can make a person both believe lies and tell them, and sometimes invent them too.
Anxiety about the future disposes people to inquire into the causes of things, because knowing those causes enables them to arrange the present to their best advantage.
Curiosity, or love of knowing causes, draws a person from considering an effect to seek its cause, and then the cause of that cause, until at last one must come to the thought that there is some cause with no prior cause, which exists eternally: what people call God. Thus it is impossible to inquire deeply into natural causes without being inclined thereby to believe in one eternal God, though they can have no idea of him in their minds corresponding to his nature. A person born blind, hearing others speak of warming themselves at a fire and being brought to warm himself there too, can readily grasp and be certain that something called fire is present and causes the heat he feels, yet cannot imagine what it looks like or form an idea of it such as sighted people have. In the same way, from the visible things of this world and their marvelous order a person may conceive that they have a cause called God, without having an idea or image of him in the mind.
And those who make little or no inquiry into the natural causes of things are nevertheless moved by the fear arising from their very ignorance of what has the power to do them great good or harm. They are inclined to suppose and invent various kinds of invisible powers, to stand in awe of their own imaginings, to call upon them in distress, and to thank them when expecting success: thus making the creatures of their own fancy their gods. In this way, from the countless varieties of imagination, people have created countless kinds of gods in the world. This fear of invisible things is the natural seed of what each person calls religion in themselves and superstition in those who worship or fear that power differently.
And because many have observed this seed of religion, some of those observers have been inclined to nurture, tend, and shape it into laws, and to add whatever opinions of the causes of future events they devised that they thought would best enable them to govern others and turn those powers to their greatest advantage.
CHAPTER XII. OF RELIGION
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete 1651 English text (introduction, forty-seven chapters, review and conclusion). Hobbes’s marginal summaries are omitted.
ON THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS
By manners I do not mean etiquette, such as how one person should greet another or how a person should clean their mouth or pick their teeth in company. Those are minor rules of behavior. I mean the human qualities that affect our ability to live together in peace and unity. To understand these, we must consider that happiness in this life does not consist in a satisfied mind at rest. There is no final goal, or greatest good, of the sort described in the books of the old moral philosophers. A person whose desires have ended can no more go on living than someone whose senses and imagination have stopped. Happiness is a continual movement of desire from one thing to another. Getting one thing only opens the way to the next. The reason is that people do not merely want to enjoy something once, for a moment. They want to secure a lasting way to satisfy their future desires. That is why everyone's voluntary actions and inclinations aim not only to obtain a satisfying life but to make it secure. People differ only in how they pursue it. This difference comes partly from the variety of their passions, and partly from their different knowledge or beliefs about what causes the results they want.
First, then, I propose that all human beings have a general tendency: a constant and restless desire for more and more power, which ends only in death. This is not always because someone hopes for more intense pleasure than they already have, or cannot be content with a moderate amount of power. It is because people cannot secure the power and means they now have for living well without gaining more. Thus kings, who have the most power, try to secure it at home through laws and abroad through wars. Once they have done so, new desires follow. Some desire fame through new conquests, some want leisure and bodily pleasure, and others want admiration or flattery for excellence in an art or some other mental ability.
Competition for wealth, honor, command, or any other power leads to conflict, hostility, and war. One competitor can get what they want by killing, subduing, displacing, or repelling the other. Competition for praise in particular encourages respect for the distant past. People compete with the living, not the dead, so they give the dead more credit than they deserve in order to dim the glory of the living.
The desire for ease and bodily pleasure inclines people to obey a common power. A person pursuing these pleasures gives up the protection that their own effort and labor might provide.
Fear of death and injury has the same effect for the same reason. By contrast, needy and hardy people who are unhappy with their present condition tend to keep the causes of war alive and stir up trouble and rebellion. So do people who seek military command. There can be no military honor without war. And the best hope of improving a bad hand is to get the cards shuffled again.
The desire for knowledge and the arts of peace inclines people to obey a common power. It includes a desire for leisure and, therefore, for protection by a power other than their own.
The desire for praise encourages commendable actions, meaning actions that please those whose judgment one values. We also dismiss praise from people we look down on. Wanting fame after death has the same effect. After death we cannot sense the praise people give us on earth. Its pleasures are either overwhelmed by heaven's indescribable joys or wiped out by hell's extreme torments. Yet posthumous fame is not pointless. People take pleasure now in imagining it and the benefit it may bring to their descendants. Although they cannot yet see those benefits, they can imagine them. Whatever gives pleasure when sensed can also give pleasure when imagined.
When someone we consider our equal gives us greater benefits than we can hope to repay, we tend to pretend to love them while secretly hating them. We are like a desperate debtor who avoids seeing a creditor and silently wishes the creditor somewhere they will never meet again. Benefits create obligations, and being under an obligation to an equal feels like bondage and inspires hatred. But receiving benefits from someone we recognize as our superior inclines us to love them, because the obligation does not newly lower our position. Gladly accepting such benefits, which people call gratitude, honors the giver and is generally accepted as repayment. Receiving benefits from an equal or an inferior also encourages love as long as repayment remains possible. The receiver then intends the obligation to involve mutual aid and service. Each tries to outdo the other in giving benefits. No competition is more noble or useful: the winner enjoys winning, and the other gets even by acknowledging the win.
When someone has harmed another person more than they can or are willing to make up for, they tend to hate the person they harmed. They must expect either revenge or forgiveness, and both are hateful to them.
Fear of oppression makes a person act first or seek help through an alliance. There is no other way to secure one's life and freedom.
During riots and rebellions, people who distrust their own cleverness are more likely to win than those who think themselves wise or crafty. The latter want to discuss what to do. The former fear being outmaneuvered and strike first. In a rebellion, people are always on the verge of battle. Staying together and using every advantage of force is a better strategy than anything cleverness can devise.
Some vain people enjoy imagining themselves brave, though they know they have no great ability. They are inclined to show off but not to make an attempt. When danger or difficulty appears, they expect only to have their inadequacy exposed.
Other vain people judge their ability by others' flattery or by the luck of some past action. They lack a firm basis for hope grounded in real self-knowledge. They tend to take reckless risks and then withdraw, if they can, when danger or difficulty draws near. Unable to see a safe way forward, they would rather risk their honor, which an excuse might repair, than their lives, for which there is no remedy.
People who think very highly of their wisdom in government tend to be ambitious. Without a public role as counselors or magistrates, their wisdom gains them no honor. Eloquent speakers therefore tend to be ambitious, since eloquence seems like wisdom both to them and to others.
Smallness of spirit makes people indecisive, causing them to miss the right occasions and best opportunities to act. Suppose they have deliberated until the time for action is near, but it is still not clear which course is best. This means the reasons for choosing either course are not very different in weight. Failing to decide at that point means losing the opportunity by weighing trifles. That is smallness of spirit.
Frugality is a virtue in poor people, but it leaves someone ill-equipped to accomplish things requiring the combined strength of many people. It weakens their efforts, which need rewards to sustain and energize them.
Trusting others because one does not know the signs of wisdom and kindness: Eloquence and flattery incline people to trust those who possess them. Eloquence seems like wisdom, and flattery seems like kindness. Add a military reputation, and people are inclined to follow and submit to those who have all three. The first two make people feel safe from the person they follow; the last makes them feel safe from others.
Lack of scientific knowledge, meaning ignorance of causes, inclines people—or rather forces them—to depend on other people's advice and authority. Everyone concerned with the truth must rely either on their own opinion or on that of someone they regard as wiser, whom they see no reason to suspect of deception.
Ignorance of what words mean—that is, a lack of understanding—makes people accept on trust not only truths they do not know, but also the errors and, worse, the nonsense of people they trust. Without a thorough understanding of words, they cannot detect either error or nonsense.
That same ignorance leads people to give different names to the same thing according to their passions. Those who approve of an individual's belief call it an opinion, while those who dislike it call it heresy. Yet heresy means nothing more than an individual's belief, though the word has a stronger tone of anger.
That same ignorance also prevents people, without careful study and considerable understanding, from distinguishing between a single act of many people and many separate acts by people in a crowd. Consider the difference between the single act of all the senators of Rome in killing Catiline and the separate acts of a number of senators in killing Caesar. People are therefore inclined to call something an act of the people when it is actually a collection of acts by many people, perhaps persuaded by just one person.
Following custom because one does not understand right and wrong: Ignorance of the causes and original basis of right, fairness, law, and justice makes people use custom and example as rules for their actions. They think an act unjust if it has customarily been punished. They think an act just if they can point to an example of it going unpunished and being approved—or to a precedent, as lawyers who use only this faulty measure of justice barbarously call it. They resemble small children, whose only rule for good and bad behavior is whether their parents and teachers punish them. But children stick to their rule, while adults do not. Once grown strong and stubborn, adults appeal from custom to reason and from reason to custom whenever it suits them. They reject custom when their interests demand it and oppose reason whenever reason opposes them. This is why right and wrong are constantly debated with both pen and sword, while lines and figures are not. People do not care which claims about geometry are true, because the subject does not threaten anyone's ambition, profit, or desire. But I have no doubt that, if the claim that the three angles of a triangle equal two angles of a square had conflicted with any person's right to rule or the interests of rulers, it would have been disputed. Or, if not disputed, it would have been suppressed by burning every geometry book, so far as the person concerned had the power to do so.
Following private individuals because one does not know the causes of peace: Ignorance of distant causes inclines people to attribute every event to its immediate, instrumental causes. These are the only causes they notice. So people everywhere who resent payments to the public direct their anger at tax officials: the contractors, collectors, and other public revenue officers. They side with critics of the government. Once they have committed themselves too far to justify their actions, they attack the supreme authority too, fearing punishment or the shame of accepting a pardon.
Ignorance of natural causes makes people gullible, and often leads them to believe impossible things. They know nothing that rules out the things they hear and cannot recognize their impossibility. Gullibility in turn leads to lying, because people like to be listened to in company. Thus ignorance alone, without malice, can make someone believe lies, tell them, and sometimes even invent them.
Anxiety about the future leads people to investigate the causes of things. Knowing the causes helps them arrange present matters to their best advantage.
Curiosity, or the love of knowing causes, leads a person from considering an effect to searching for its cause, and then for the cause of that cause. Eventually they must conclude that there is a cause with no earlier cause, which has existed eternally. People call this cause God. So no one can investigate natural causes deeply without being led toward belief in one eternal God, though they cannot form a mental picture of him that matches his nature. Imagine someone born blind who hears people speak of warming themselves by a fire and is brought close enough to warm themselves. They can easily understand and be sure that something called fire is there, causing the heat they feel. But they cannot picture what it looks like or have the mental image of it that sighted people have. Likewise, seeing the things of this world and their remarkable order, one can understand that they have a cause called God without having a picture or image of him in one's mind.
Other people investigate natural causes little or not at all. They do not know what has the power to do them great good or harm, and that ignorance itself makes them afraid. They are therefore inclined to imagine various kinds of invisible powers and to fear what they themselves have imagined. They call on these powers when in distress and thank them when they expect success, making gods of the creations of their own imagination. Because imaginations vary without limit, people have created countless kinds of gods in the world. Fear of invisible things is the natural seed of what each person calls religion in themselves, but calls superstition in those who worship or fear that power differently.
Many people have noticed this seed of religion. Some who noticed it were inclined to nurture it, shape it, and turn it into laws. They added their own invented explanations of what causes future events, choosing those they thought would best enable them to govern others and make the greatest use of their powers.
CHAPTER XII. ON RELIGION