Thomas Hobbes · Complete work
Part I, Chapter X, 2
Part I, Chapter X, 2 of 101. Read it here for reference, or continue through the entire work without leaving the reader.
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Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God. Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality, Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are Dishonourable.
Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is Pusillanimity.
All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these are Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or Folly, Dishonourable.
Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of Power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is Dishonourable. For the gravity of the Former, is like the steddinesse of a Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later, like the steddinesse of a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.
To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office, great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is Dishonourable.
To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because they the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.
Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable; as signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.
Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. Therefore the ancient Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems, committing Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: In so much as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries; nor in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts: of whose praises, in a hymne of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolen away the Cattell of Appollo, from his Herdsmen.
Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common-wealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but rather a lawfull Trade, not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other Nations; as is manifest by the Histories of antient time. And at this day, in this part of the world, private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; and the ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one, or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into the Lists to avoyd disgrace.
Scutchions, and coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any eminent Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power consisteth either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Germans. For there never was any such thing known, where the German Customes were unknown. Nor is it now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The antient Greek Commanders, when they went to war, had their Shields painted with such Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a signe of Poverty, and of a common Souldier: but they transmitted not the Inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families: but they were the Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia, Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when in great numbers they either ayded the Romans, or made their own Conquests in these Westerne parts of the world.
For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their beginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or Masters of Families, that continually had wars one with another; those Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might, when they were Covered with Arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament, both painted their Armor, or their Scutchion, or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent and visible mark upon the Crest of their Helmets. And his ornament both of the Armes, and Crest, descended by inheritance to their Children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the Old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt thought fit. But when many such Families, joyned together, made a greater Monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish Scutchions, was made a private Office a part. And the issue of these Lords, is the great and antient Gentry; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and rapine; or Castles, Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and other notes of War; nothing being then in honour, but vertue military. Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers manners of Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned from it, for encouragement, or recompence to their service. All which, by an observing Reader, may be found in such ancient Histories, Greek and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their times.
Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron, are Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the Soveraigne Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles of Office, and Command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latine Duces, being Generalls in War: Counts, Comites, such as bare the Generall company out of friendship; and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: Marquises, Marchiones, were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds of the Empire. Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the Empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of the German Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gaules, and signifies a Great man; such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom they employed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified the same in the Language of the Gaules, that Vir in Latine; and thence to Bero, and Baro: so that such men were called Berones, and after Barones; and (in Spanish) Varones. But he that would know more particularly the originall of Titles of Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens most excellent Treatise of that subject. In processe of time these offices of Honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peacable government, were turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-wealth: and men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command: and other Titles also, were devised to the same end.
WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power, or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.
For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the well discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being absent, one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man, and valuable for some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and Employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For Merit, praesupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.
CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete 1651 English text (introduction, forty-seven chapters, review and conclusion) for fidelity, the author’s force and cadence, and modern clarity. Hobbes’s marginal summaries are omitted.
Good fortune, if it lasts, is honorable, as a sign of God's favor. Ill fortune and losses are dishonorable. Riches are honorable, for they are power; poverty is dishonorable. Magnanimity, generosity, hope, courage, and confidence are honorable, for they spring from an awareness of power. Pusillanimity, stinginess, fear, and distrust are dishonorable.
Timely resolution, or deciding what one is to do, is honorable, because it shows contempt for small difficulties and dangers. Irresolution is dishonorable, as a sign that one attaches too much weight to slight obstacles and slight advantages. For when a person has weighed matters as long as time permits and still does not decide, the difference in their weight can only be small. To remain undecided, then, is to overvalue small things, which is pusillanimity.
All actions and words that spring, or seem to spring, from great experience, knowledge, discretion, or wit are honorable, for all these are forms of power. Actions or words that spring from error, ignorance, or folly are dishonorable.
Gravity, insofar as it appears to come from a mind occupied with something else, is honorable, because occupation is a sign of power. But when it appears to come from a wish to look grave, it is dishonorable. The gravity of the former resembles the steadiness of a ship laden with merchandise; that of the latter, the steadiness of a ship ballasted with sand and other rubbish.
To be conspicuous—that is, to be known for wealth, office, great deeds, or some other eminent good—is honorable, as a sign of the power for which one is conspicuous. Obscurity, on the contrary, is dishonorable.
To descend from conspicuous parents is honorable, because their descendants more easily obtain the aid and friendship of their ancestors' associates. Descent from obscure parents, on the contrary, is dishonorable.
Actions that spring from equity and bring loss are honorable, as signs of magnanimity; for magnanimity is a sign of power. Cunning, evasion, and neglect of equity, on the contrary, are dishonorable.
Nor does it alter the question of honor whether an action, provided it is great and difficult and thus a sign of much power, is just or unjust: honor consists only in the opinion of power. Thus the ancient pagans did not think they dishonored the gods, but rather honored them greatly, when their poems portrayed them committing rape, theft, and other great yet unjust or unclean acts. Nothing in Jupiter is so celebrated as his adulteries, nor in Mercury as his frauds and thefts. His highest praise in a hymn of Homer is that, born in the morning, he had invented music by noon and before night had stolen Apollo's cattle from his herdsmen.
Among human beings, too, before great Common-wealths were established, being a pirate or a highway robber was thought no dishonor, but rather a lawful occupation—not only among the Greeks but among all other nations, as ancient histories show. And today, in this part of the world, private duels are and always will be honorable, though unlawful, until honor is ordained for those who refuse them and disgrace for those who issue the challenge. For duels are sometimes effects of courage, and courage always rests on strength or skill, which are power; though for the most part they arise from rash words and fear of dishonor in one or both combatants, who, having committed themselves rashly, are driven into the lists to escape disgrace.
Hereditary shields and coats of arms are honorable where they carry eminent privileges; otherwise they are not. Their power consists either in those privileges, in riches, or in something else equally honored in other people. This kind of honor, commonly called gentry, comes from the ancient Germans. Nothing of the kind was ever known where German customs were unknown, nor is it now practiced anywhere the Germans have not inhabited. Ancient Greek commanders going to war painted their shields with designs of their choice, so that an unpainted buckler signified poverty and the status of an ordinary soldier; but they did not pass these devices down as an inheritance. The Romans passed down the marks of their families, but these were images of their ancestors, not their devices. Among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and America there is, and never has been, any such practice. The Germans alone had this custom, from whom it passed into England, France, Spain, and Italy, when large numbers of them either aided the Romans or made conquests of their own in these western parts of the world.
For Germany, like every other country in its beginnings, was anciently divided among countless petty lords, or heads of families, continually at war with one another. These lords, chiefly so that their followers might recognize them when they were covered in armor, and partly for ornament, painted their armor, shields, or coats with the image of some beast or other thing, and placed a prominent, visible mark on the crest of their helmets. This ornament of arms and crest descended by inheritance to their children: to the eldest unchanged, and to the rest with some distinguishing mark, as the old master—called in Dutch the Here-alt—thought fit. But when many such families joined to form a greater monarchy, this duty of the herald, distinguishing shields, was made a separate office. The descendants of these lords are the great and ancient gentry, whose arms mostly display living creatures noted for courage and rapacity, or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars, palisades, and other signs of war; for nothing then was held in honor but military virtue. Later, not only kings but popular Common-wealths granted various kinds of shields to those departing for war or returning from it, as encouragement or reward for their service. An attentive reader can find all this in the ancient Greek and Latin histories that mention the German people and their customs in those times.
Titles of honor, such as duke, count, marquis, and baron, are honorable because they signify the value placed on their holders by the Soveraigne Power of the Common-wealth. In former times these were titles of office and command, derived in some cases from the Romans, in others from the Germans and French. Dukes, in Latin duces, were generals in war; counts, comites, were those who accompanied the general as friends and were left to govern and defend conquered and pacified places; marquises, marchiones, were counts who governed the marches or borders of the empire. These titles of duke, count, and marquis entered the empire around the time of Constantine the Great, from the customs of the German militia. Baron, however, appears to have been a title of the Gauls, meaning a great man: one of the king's or prince's men employed near his person in war. It seems to derive through ber and bar from vir, which in the language of the Gauls meant the same as vir in Latin, and thence through bero and baro; such men were called berones and later barones, and in Spanish varones. Anyone wishing to learn more precisely the origin of titles of honor can find it, as I found this account, in Mr. Selden's excellent treatise on the subject. In time, owing to troubles and for reasons of good and peaceful government, these honorable offices became mere titles, serving chiefly to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects within the Common-wealth. Men were made dukes, counts, marquises, and barons of places in which they had neither possession nor command; and other titles were devised for the same purpose.
Worthiness differs from a person's worth or value, and also from merit or desert. It consists in a particular power or ability for the thing of which that person is said to be worthy; this particular ability is usually called fitness or aptitude.
The person worthiest to be a commander, a judge, or the holder of any other charge is the one best fitted with the qualities needed to discharge it well. The person worthiest of riches has the qualities most necessary to use them well. Even without any of these qualities, one may nevertheless be a worthy person, valuable for something else. Again, someone may be worthy of riches, office, and employment without having any claim to receive them before another, and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve them. For merit presupposes a right, and that the thing deserved is owed by promise. I shall say more of this later, when I discuss contracts.
CHAPTER XI. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the complete 1651 English text (introduction, forty-seven chapters, review and conclusion). Hobbes’s marginal summaries are omitted.
Good fortune, if it lasts, brings honor because it is a sign of God's favor. Bad fortune and losses bring dishonor. Wealth brings honor because it gives power. Poverty brings dishonor. Greatness of spirit, generosity, hope, courage, and confidence bring honor because they come from knowing one has power. Smallness of spirit, stinginess, fear, and lack of confidence bring dishonor.
Making a decision in time about what to do brings honor. It shows that one is not deterred by small difficulties and dangers. Indecision brings dishonor because it shows that one places too much weight on minor obstacles and advantages. If someone has weighed the alternatives as long as time allows and still cannot decide, their relative weight must differ only slightly. Failure to decide then means placing too much weight on small things, which shows smallness of spirit.
Actions and words that come, or seem to come, from much experience, knowledge, judgment, or wit bring honor. All these qualities give power. Actions and words that come from error, ignorance, or foolishness bring dishonor.
A serious manner brings honor if it seems to come from having one's mind on something else, since being occupied is a sign of power. But it brings dishonor if it seems intended merely to give an impression of seriousness. The first kind of seriousness resembles the steadiness of a ship loaded with merchandise. The second resembles the steadiness of a ship weighted with sand and other junk.
Being prominent—that is, known for wealth, office, great deeds, or any outstanding good quality—brings honor. It signals the power for which the person is known. Being unknown, by contrast, brings dishonor.
Having well-known parents brings honor, because their descendants can more easily gain the help and friendship of their ancestors' associates. Coming from an obscure family, by contrast, brings dishonor.
Acting fairly despite a loss brings honor because it shows greatness of spirit, which is a sign of power. Deceit, evasiveness, and disregard for fairness bring dishonor.
Whether a deed is just or unjust makes no difference to the honor it brings, provided it is great and difficult and thus shows great power. Honor depends solely on what people think of someone's power. That is why the ancient pagans thought they were greatly honoring the gods, not dishonoring them, when their poems showed the gods committing rape, theft, and other great but unjust or indecent acts. Nothing is celebrated more in Jupiter than his adulteries, or in Mercury than his frauds and thefts. Indeed, in a hymn by Homer, Mercury's greatest praise is that he was born in the morning, invented music at noon, and before nightfall stole Apollo's cattle from their herdsmen.
Likewise, before large Common-wealths were established, people did not consider piracy or highway robbery dishonorable. They regarded both as lawful trades, among the Greeks and other peoples alike, as ancient histories show. Today, in this part of the world, private duels are considered honorable, though illegal. They always will be until honor is given to those who refuse a challenge, and disgrace to those who issue one. Duels sometimes do result from courage, which always rests on strength or skill, both forms of power. But most result from reckless speech and fear of dishonor in one or both combatants. Having committed themselves rashly, they are driven into the fighting ground to avoid disgrace.
Hereditary shields and coats of arms bring honor when they carry important privileges, but not otherwise. Their power lies in those privileges, or in wealth, or in something else honored equally in other people. This kind of honor, commonly called gentility, came from the ancient Germans. It was never known where German customs were unknown, and it is not in use now where Germans have never settled. Ancient Greek commanders painted their shields with designs of their own choosing when they went to war. An unpainted shield was a sign of poverty and of an ordinary soldier. But they did not pass their designs down as inheritances. Romans passed down their families' identifying marks, but these were images of their ancestors, not their designs. Nothing like hereditary coats of arms exists or ever existed among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and America. This was solely a German custom. It spread from them to England, France, Spain, and Italy when large numbers of Germans either helped the Romans or made conquests of their own in these western regions.
In ancient times Germany, like every country at its beginning, was divided among countless minor lords or heads of families. They were constantly at war with one another. These lords painted their armor, shields, or coats with images of animals or other things. They also put a prominent visible mark on their helmets' crests. Their chief purpose was to be recognizable to their followers while covered in armor, but they also wanted decoration. The decoration of both shield and crest passed to their children: unchanged to the eldest, and to the others with some distinguishing feature chosen by the old master, called the Here-alt in Dutch. When many such families combined into a larger monarchy, the herald's task of distinguishing shields became a separate official position. The descendants of these lords make up the great and ancient gentry. Most of their coats of arms show living creatures known for courage and predation, or castles, battlements, belts, weapons, bars, palisades, and other symbols of war. At that time only military excellence brought honor. Later, kings and popular Common-wealths alike granted various kinds of coats of arms to people going to war or returning from it, to encourage or reward their service. A careful reader can find all this in the ancient Greek and Latin histories that describe the German people and their customs in those times.
Titles of honor, such as Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron, bring honor. They show the value the Soveraigne power of the Common-wealth places on their holders. In earlier times these were titles of office and command, some derived from Romans, others from Germans and French people. Dukes, or Duces in Latin, were generals in war. Counts, or Comites, were those who accompanied a general as his friends and were left in charge of governing and defending conquered, pacified places. Marquises, or Marchiones, were counts who governed the marches, or borders, of the empire. The titles Duke, Count, and Marquis entered the empire around the time of Constantine the Great from the practices of the German military. Baron seems to have been a title from Gaul, meaning a great man: one of a king's or prince's men kept near him for war. It seems to derive from Vir, which became Ber and Bar, words with the same meaning in the language of the Gauls that Vir had in Latin. These in turn became Bero and Baro, so that such men were called Berones, later Barones, and, in Spanish, Varones. Anyone seeking more detail about the origins of titles of honor can find it, as I did for this account, in Mr. Selden's excellent treatise on the subject. Over time, because of troubles and for reasons of good and peaceful government, these honorable offices turned into mere titles. Their main function became to distinguish subjects' precedence, rank, and order within the Common-wealth. Men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of places over which they had neither possession nor command. Other titles were invented for the same purpose.
Worthiness differs from a person's worth or value, and also from merit or desert. It consists of having a particular power or ability for whatever the person is said to be worthy of. That particular ability is commonly called fitness or aptitude.
The person most worthy to be a commander, a judge, or the holder of any other responsibility is the one whose qualities best equip them to carry it out well. The person most worthy of riches has the qualities best suited to using them well. Someone who lacks any of these qualities can still be a worthy person, valuable for something else. Moreover, a person can be worthy of riches, office, or employment without having a claim to receive them ahead of anyone else. So that person cannot be said to merit or deserve them. Merit presupposes a right, and assumes that what is deserved is owed by promise. I will say more about this later when discussing contracts.
CHAPTER XI. ON THE DIFFERENCE OF MANNERS