Section 56
Original German
§ 56.
Allgemeine Anmerkung zu den transscendentalen Ideen.
Die Gegenstände, welche uns durch Erfahrung gegeben werden, sind uns in vielerlei Absicht unbegreiflich, und es können viele Fragen, auf die uns das Naturgesetz führt, wenn sie bis zu einer gewissen Höhe, aber immer diesen Gesetzen gemäß getrieben werden, gar nicht aufgelöset werden, z. B. woher Materien einander anziehen. Allein wenn wir die Natur ganz und gar verlassen, oder im Fortgange ihrer Verknüpfung alle mögliche Erfahrung übersteigen, mithin uns in bloße Ideen vertiefen, alsdann können wir nicht sagen, daß uns der Gegenstand unbegreiflich sei, und die Natur der Dinge uns unauflösliche Aufgaben vorlege; denn wir haben es alsdann gar nicht mit der Natur oder überhaupt mit gegebenen Objecten, sondern blos mit Begriffen zu thun, die in unserer Vernunft lediglich ihren Ursprung haben, und mit bloßen Gedanken-Wesen, in Ansehung deren alle Aufgaben, die aus dem Begriffe derselben entspringen, müssen aufgelöset werden können, weil die Vernunft von ihrem eigenen Verfahren allerdings vollständige Rechenschaft geben kann und muß349.1. Da die psychologische, kosmologische und theologische Ideen lauter reine Vernunftbegriffe sind, die in keiner Erfahrung gegeben werden können, so sind uns die Fragen, die uns die Vernunft in Ansehung ihrer vorlegt, nicht durch die Gegenstände, sondern durch bloße Maximen der Vernunft um ihrer Selbstbefriedigung willen aufgegeben und müssen insgesammt hinreichend beantwortet werden können; welches auch dadurch geschieht, daß man zeigt, daß sie Grundsätze sind, unsern Verstandesgebrauch zur durchgängigen Einhelligkeit, Vollständigkeit und synthetischen Einheit zu bringen, und so fern blos von der Erfahrung, aber im Ganzen derselben gelten. Obgleich aber ein absolutes Ganze der Erfahrung unmöglich ist, so ist doch die Idee eines Ganzen der Erkenntniß nach Principien überhaupt dasjenige, was ihr allein eine besondere Art der Einheit, nämlich die von einem System, verschaffen kann, ohne die unser Erkenntniß nichts als Stückwerk ist und zum höchsten Zwecke (der immer nur das System aller Zwecke ist) nicht gebraucht werden kann; ich verstehe aber hier nicht blos den praktischen, sondern auch den höchsten Zweck des speculativen Gebrauchs der Vernunft.
Die transscendentale Ideen drücken also die eigenthümliche Bestimmung der Vernunft aus, nämlich als eines Princips der systematischen Einheit des Verstandesgebrauchs. Wenn man aber diese Einheit der Erkenntnißart dafür ansieht, als ob sie dem Objecte der Erkenntniß anhänge; wenn man sie, die eigentlich blos regulativ ist, für constitutiv hält und sich überredet, man könne vermittelst dieser Ideen seine Kenntniß weit über alle mögliche Erfahrung, mithin auf transscendente Art erweitern, da sie doch blos dazu dient, Erfahrung in ihr selbst der Vollständigkeit so nahe wie möglich zu bringen, d. i. ihren Fortgang durch nichts einzuschränken, was zur Erfahrung nicht gehören kann: so ist dieses ein bloßer Mißverstand in Beurtheilung der eigentlichen Bestimmung unserer Vernunft und ihrer Grundsätze und eine Dialektik, die theils den Erfahrungsgebrauch der Vernunft verwirrt, theils die Vernunft mit sich selbst entzweiet.
Beschluß von der Grenzbestimmung der reinen Vernunft.
349.1. Herr Platner in seinen Aphorismen sagt daher mit Scharfsinnigkeit § 728, 729: „Wenn die Vernunft ein Kriterium ist, so kann kein Begriff möglich sein, welcher der menschlichen Vernunft unbegreiflich ist. — In dem Wirklichen allein findet Unbegreiflichkeit statt. Hier entsteht die Unbegreiflichkeit aus der Unzulänglichkeit der erworbenen Ideen.“ — Es klingt also nur paradox und ist übrigens nicht befremdlich, zu sagen, in der Natur sei uns vieles unbegreiflich (z. B. das Zeugungsvermögen), wenn wir aber noch höher steigen und selbst über die Natur hinaus gehen, so werde uns wieder alles begreiflich; denn wir verlassen alsdann ganz die Gegenstände, die uns gegeben werden können, und beschäftigen uns blos mit Ideen, bei denen wir das Gesetz, welches die Vernunft durch sie dem Verstande zu seinem Gebrauch in der Erfahrung vorschreibt, gar wohl begreifen können, weil es ihr eigenes Product ist.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 56.
General Remark on the Transcendental Ideas.
The objects given to us through experience are incomprehensible to us in many respects. Many questions to which the law of nature leads us cannot be solved at all when pursued to a certain height, though always in accordance with these laws—for example, why materials attract one another. But when we leave nature entirely, or in pursuing its connections exceed all possible experience, and thus immerse ourselves in mere ideas, we cannot then say that the object is incomprehensible to us, and that the nature of things poses insoluble problems for us. For then we are not dealing with nature or with given objects at all, but solely with concepts originating only in our reason, and with mere beings of thought. As regards these, all problems arising from their concept must be capable of solution, because reason certainly can and must give a complete account of its own procedure.349.1 Since the psychological, cosmological, and theological ideas are nothing but pure concepts of reason that cannot be given in any experience, the questions reason poses about them are set for us not by the objects, but by mere maxims of reason for the sake of its own satisfaction; and they must all be capable of a sufficient answer. This is indeed achieved by showing that they are principles for bringing our use of the understanding to thoroughgoing harmony, completeness, and synthetic unity, and that to this extent they hold only of experience, but of experience as a whole. Although an absolute whole of experience is impossible, the idea of a whole of cognition according to principles in general is nevertheless what alone can give cognition a particular kind of unity, namely that of a system. Without this, our cognition is nothing but fragments and cannot be used for the highest purpose, which is always only the system of all purposes. Here, however, I mean not merely the practical purpose, but also the highest purpose of the speculative use of reason.
The transcendental ideas thus express reason's distinctive vocation, namely as a principle of the systematic unity of the use of the understanding. But if we regard this unity of the mode of cognition as though it attached to the object of cognition; if we take what is properly only regulative to be constitutive, and persuade ourselves that by means of these ideas we can extend our knowledge far beyond all possible experience, hence in a transcendent manner, although that unity serves only to bring experience within itself as close as possible to completeness—that is, to restrict its progress by nothing that cannot belong to experience—then this is a mere misunderstanding in judging the proper vocation of our reason and its principles. It is a dialectic that partly confuses reason's use in experience and partly divides reason against itself.
Conclusion: Determining the Boundaries of Pure Reason.
349.1. Thus Mr. Platner says acutely in his Aphorisms, §§ 728, 729: "If reason is a criterion, then no concept can be possible that is incomprehensible to human reason.—Only in the actual is there incomprehensibility. Here incomprehensibility arises from the inadequacy of the ideas acquired."—It therefore only sounds paradoxical, and is otherwise not surprising, to say that much in nature is incomprehensible to us—for example, the power of generation—but that if we ascend still higher and even go beyond nature, everything becomes comprehensible to us again. For then we entirely leave behind the objects that can be given to us, and concern ourselves solely with ideas. With these we can very well comprehend the law that reason, through them, prescribes to the understanding for its use in experience, because this law is reason's own product.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 56.
General remark on the transcendental ideas.
The objects given to us through experience are incomprehensible to us in many respects. Natural laws lead us to many questions that cannot be answered if pursued to a certain height, even when we always follow those laws. One example is why material things attract one another. But suppose we leave nature entirely, or go beyond all possible experience in tracing its connections, and thus immerse ourselves in mere ideas. Then we cannot say that the object is incomprehensible to us, or that the nature of things presents us with insoluble problems. For we are no longer dealing with nature, or with given objects at all. We are dealing only with concepts originating solely in our reason, and with mere beings of thought. Every problem arising from the concept of these beings must be capable of solution. For reason certainly can and must give a complete account of its own procedure.349.1 The psychological, cosmological, and theological ideas are all pure concepts of reason that cannot be given in any experience. So the questions reason puts to us about them are not imposed by objects. They are imposed by mere maxims of reason for its own satisfaction, and all must be capable of an adequate answer. This answer is given by showing that they are principles for bringing our use of the understanding to thorough agreement, completeness, and synthetic unity. To that extent they hold only for experience, but for experience as a whole. Although an absolute whole of experience is impossible, the idea of a whole of cognition according to principles in general is still essential. Only it can give cognition a special kind of unity: the unity of a system. Without this, our cognition is mere patchwork and cannot be used for the highest purpose, which is always only the system of all purposes. Here I mean not merely the practical purpose, but also the highest purpose of reason's speculative use.
The transcendental ideas thus express reason's distinctive function: to be a principle of systematic unity in the use of the understanding. But we may take this unity in our way of knowing as though it belonged to the object known. We may regard it as constitutive, when it is really only regulative. We may persuade ourselves that these ideas let us extend our knowledge far beyond all possible experience, and thus in a transcendent way. In fact, this unity serves only to bring experience itself as close as possible to completeness. That means not restricting its progress by anything that cannot belong to experience. The mistake is therefore simply a misunderstanding of the actual purpose of our reason and its principles. It is a dialectic that partly confuses reason's use in experience and partly divides reason against itself.
Conclusion: determining the boundaries of pure reason.
349.1. In his Aphorisms, § 728, 729, Mr. Platner therefore makes this perceptive remark: “If reason is a criterion, no concept can be possible that is incomprehensible to human reason.—Only in what is actual does incomprehensibility occur. Here incomprehensibility arises from the inadequacy of acquired ideas.”—So it only sounds paradoxical, and is otherwise not surprising, to say that much in nature is incomprehensible to us—for example, the power of reproduction—but that if we rise still higher, even beyond nature, everything becomes comprehensible to us again. For we then leave entirely behind the objects that can be given to us and occupy ourselves only with ideas. In these, we can very well comprehend the law that reason uses them to prescribe to the understanding for its use in experience, because that law is reason's own product.
About this section
Section 56 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 66 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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