Section 55
Original German
§ 55.
III. Theologische Idee. (Kritik S. 571 u. f.)
Die dritte transscendentale Idee, die zu dem allerwichtigsten, aber, wenn er blos speculativ betrieben wird, überschwenglichen (transscendenten) und eben dadurch dialektischen Gebrauch der Vernunft Stoff giebt, ist das Ideal der reinen Vernunft. Da die Vernunft hier nicht, wie bei der psychologischen und kosmologischen Idee von der Erfahrung anhebt und durch Steigerung der Gründe wo möglich zur absoluten Vollständigkeit ihrer Reihe zu trachten verleitet wird, sondern gänzlich abbricht und aus bloßen Begriffen von dem, was die absolute Vollständigkeit eines Dinges überhaupt ausmachen würde, mithin vermittelst der Idee eines höchst vollkommnen Urwesens zur Bestimmung der Möglichkeit, mithin auch der Wirklichkeit aller andern Dinge herabgeht: so ist hier die bloße Voraussetzung eines Wesens, welches, obzwar nicht in der Erfahrungsreihe, dennoch zum Behuf der Erfahrung um der Begreiflichkeit der Verknüpfung, Ordnung und Einheit der letzteren willen gedacht wird, d. i. die Idee, von dem Verstandesbegriffe leichter wie in den vorigen Fällen zu unterscheiden. Daher konnte hier der dialektische Schein, welcher daraus entspringt, daß wir die subjective Bedingungen unseres Denkens für objective Bedingungen der Sachen selbst und eine nothwendige Hypothese zur Befriedigung unserer Vernunft für ein Dogma halten, leicht vor Augen gestellt werden; und ich habe daher nichts weiter über die Anmaßungen der transscendentalen Theologie zu erinnern, da das, was die Kritik hierüber sagt, faßlich, einleuchtend und entscheidend ist.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 55.
III. Theological Idea. (Critique, p. 571 ff.)
The third transcendental idea, which supplies material for the most important use of reason—a use that, if pursued merely speculatively, is extravagant (transcendent), and for that very reason dialectical—is the ideal of pure reason. Here reason does not, as with the psychological and cosmological ideas, begin from experience and find itself tempted, by ascending through grounds, to strive if possible for the absolute completeness of their series. Instead, it breaks off entirely and descends from mere concepts of what would constitute the absolute completeness of a thing in general—hence by means of the idea of a supremely perfect original being—to determine the possibility, and thus also the actuality, of all other things. Here, therefore, the mere presupposition of a being that is thought, though not in the series of experience, nevertheless for the sake of experience, to make its connection, order, and unity comprehensible—that is, the idea—is easier to distinguish from a concept of the understanding than in the previous cases. Hence the dialectical illusion could easily be brought to light here: it arises from our taking the subjective conditions of our thinking for objective conditions of things themselves, and a hypothesis necessary to satisfy our reason for a dogma. I therefore have nothing further to observe about the pretensions of transcendental theology, since what the Critique says on this subject is intelligible, evident, and decisive.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 55.
III. The theological idea. (Kritik S. 571 u. f.)
The third transcendental idea is the ideal of pure reason. It supplies material for reason's most important use. But if pursued merely speculatively, this use goes beyond experience, becoming transcendent and therefore dialectical. With the psychological and cosmological ideas, reason starts from experience. It is then tempted to ascend through grounds in search, if possible, of absolute completeness in their series. Here, by contrast, reason breaks off entirely. It starts from mere concepts of what would make up the absolute completeness of a thing in general. Through the idea of a supremely perfect original being, it then descends to determine the possibility, and thus also the actuality, of all other things. Here, then, we merely assume a being that is not in the series of experience, but is still thought for the purposes of experience, to make its connection, order, and unity comprehensible. This assumption, the idea, is easier to distinguish from a concept of the understanding than in the previous cases. The dialectical illusion could therefore be brought to light easily here. It arises when we take the subjective conditions of our thinking for objective conditions of things themselves, and a hypothesis necessary to satisfy our reason for a dogma. So I have nothing further to say about the pretensions of transcendental theology. What the Critique says about them is understandable, evident, and decisive.
About this section
Section 55 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 65 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.