Section 44
Original German
§ 44.
Es ist bei dieser Betrachtung im Allgemeinen noch merkwürdig, daß die Vernunftideen nicht etwa so wie die Kategorien uns zum Gebrauche des Verstandes in Ansehung der Erfahrung irgend etwas nutzen, sondern in Ansehung desselben völlig entbehrlich, ja wohl gar den Maximen des Vernunfterkenntnisses der Natur entgegen und hinderlich, gleichwohl aber doch in anderer, noch zu bestimmender Absicht nothwendig sind. Ob die Seele eine einfache Substanz sei, oder nicht, das kann uns zur Erklärung der Erscheinungen derselben ganz gleichgültig sein; denn wir können den Begriff eines einfachen Wesens durch keine mögliche Erfahrung sinnlich, mithin in concreto verständlich machen; und so ist er in Ansehung aller verhofften Einsicht in die Ursache der Erscheinungen ganz leer und kann zu keinem Princip der Erklärung dessen, was innere oder äußere Erfahrung an die Hand giebt, dienen. Eben so wenig können uns die kosmologischen Ideen vom Weltanfange oder der Weltewigkeit (a parte ante) dazu nutzen, um irgend eine Begebenheit in der Welt selbst daraus zu erklären. Endlich müssen wir nach einer richtigen Maxime der Naturphilosophie uns aller Erklärung der Natureinrichtung, die aus dem Willen eines höchsten Wesens gezogen worden, enthalten, weil dieses nicht mehr Naturphilosophie ist, sondern ein Geständniß, daß es damit bei uns zu Ende gehe. Es haben also diese Ideen eine ganz andere Bestimmung ihres Gebrauchs als jene Kategorien, durch die und die darauf gebauten Grundsätze Erfahrung selbst allererst möglich ward. Indessen würde doch unsre mühsame Analytik des Verstandes, wenn unsre Absicht auf nichts anders als bloße Naturerkenntniß, so wie sie in der Erfahrung gegeben werden kann, gerichtet wäre, auch ganz überflüssig sein; denn Vernunft verrichtet ihr Geschäfte sowohl in der Mathematik als Naturwissenschaft auch ohne alle diese subtile Deduction ganz sicher und gut: also vereinigt sich unsre Kritik des Verstandes mit den Ideen der reinen Vernunft zu einer Absicht, welche über den Erfahrungsgebrauch des Verstandes hinausgesetzt ist, von welchem wir doch oben gesagt haben, daß er in diesem Betracht gänzlich unmöglich und ohne Gegenstand oder Bedeutung sei. Es muß aber dennoch zwischen dem, was zur Natur der Vernunft und des Verstandes gehört, Einstimmung sein, und jene muß zur Vollkommenheit der letztern beitragen und kann sie unmöglich verwirren.
Die Auflösung dieser Frage ist folgende: Die reine Vernunft hat unter ihren Ideen nicht besondere Gegenstände, die über das Feld der Erfahrung hinauslägen, zur Absicht, sondern fordert nur Vollständigkeit des Verstandesgebrauchs im Zusammenhange der Erfahrung. Diese Vollständigkeit aber kann nur eine Vollständigkeit der Principien, aber nicht der Anschauungen und Gegenstände sein. Gleichwohl, um sich jene bestimmt vorzustellen, denkt sie sich solche als die Erkenntniß eines Objects, dessen Erkenntniß in Ansehung jener Regeln vollständig bestimmt ist, welches Object aber nur eine Idee ist, um die Verstandeserkenntniß der Vollständigkeit, die jene Idee bezeichnet, so nahe wie möglich zu bringen.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 44.
In considering this matter generally, it is also worth noting that ideas of reason do not, like the categories, offer us any aid in using the understanding with regard to experience. They are entirely dispensable for that purpose, and may even oppose and obstruct the maxims of rational cognition of nature; yet they are necessary in another respect, still to be determined. Whether or not the soul is a simple substance can be entirely indifferent to us in explaining its appearances. For no possible experience allows us to make the concept of a simple being sensible, and thus intelligible in concreto; so, with regard to any hoped-for insight into the cause of appearances, it is entirely empty and cannot serve as a principle for explaining what inner or outer experience provides. Nor can the cosmological ideas of the world's beginning or its eternity (a parte ante) help us explain any event in the world itself. Finally, a sound maxim of natural philosophy requires us to refrain from any explanation of nature's arrangement drawn from the will of a supreme being, because this is no longer natural philosophy, but an admission that we have reached the end of it. These ideas therefore have an entirely different intended use from those categories through which, together with the principles built on them, experience itself first became possible. Yet our laborious analytic of the understanding would also be entirely superfluous if our aim were nothing but the mere cognition of nature as it can be given in experience. For reason performs its business quite securely and well, both in mathematics and in natural science, without all this subtle deduction. Our critique of the understanding thus joins with the ideas of pure reason in an aim that lies beyond the understanding's use in experience, although we have said above that, in this regard, such a use is entirely impossible and without object or meaning. Nevertheless, there must be agreement between what belongs to the nature of reason and what belongs to that of the understanding; and the former must contribute to the perfection of the latter and cannot possibly confuse it.
The solution to this question is as follows. In its ideas, pure reason does not aim at particular objects lying beyond the field of experience; it demands only completeness in the use of the understanding within the connected whole of experience. This completeness, however, can only be a completeness of principles, not of intuitions and objects. Yet to represent that completeness determinately, reason thinks of it as the cognition of an object whose cognition is completely determined with regard to those rules. This object, however, is only an idea, intended to bring cognition by the understanding as close as possible to the completeness that the idea designates.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 44.
One further point deserves notice in this general discussion. Unlike the categories, the ideas of reason do not help us use the understanding in relation to experience. In that respect they are completely dispensable. They may even conflict with, and obstruct, the rules for rational knowledge of nature. Yet they are necessary for another purpose, which remains to be determined. Whether or not the soul is a simple substance can make no difference to our explanation of its appearances. No possible experience lets us present the concept of a simple being to the senses, and so make it intelligible in a concrete case. This concept is therefore completely empty when it comes to any hoped-for insight into the cause of appearances. It cannot provide a principle for explaining what either inner or outer experience supplies. Similarly, the cosmological ideas of the world's beginning or its eternity into the past (a parte ante) cannot help us explain any event within the world itself. Finally, a sound rule of natural philosophy requires us to avoid any explanation of nature's organization drawn from the will of a supreme being. That would no longer be natural philosophy. It would be an admission that we had reached the end of what we could do with it. These ideas thus have a purpose quite different from that of the categories and the principles built on them, which first made experience itself possible. Yet our laborious analysis of the understanding would also be entirely unnecessary if our aim were simply knowledge of nature as it can be given in experience. Reason does its work very well and securely in mathematics and natural science without any of this subtle justification. Our critique of the understanding therefore joins with the ideas of pure reason in an aim that goes beyond the understanding's use in experience. We said above, however, that using the understanding beyond experience is entirely impossible and has neither object nor meaning. Still, what belongs to the nature of reason must agree with what belongs to the nature of the understanding. Reason must contribute to the understanding's perfection. It cannot possibly throw it into confusion.
The answer to this question is as follows. In its ideas, pure reason does not aim at special objects lying beyond the field of experience. It only demands completeness in the use of the understanding within the connected whole of experience. This completeness can only be a completeness of principles, not of intuitions and objects. Yet to represent it in a definite way, reason thinks of it as knowledge of an object, with that knowledge completely determined in terms of those rules. But this object is only an idea. Its purpose is to bring the understanding's knowledge as close as possible to the completeness that the idea indicates.
About this section
Section 44 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 52 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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