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Section 43

51 of 72 sections in Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant

Original German

§ 43.

Es ist jederzeit in der Kritik mein größtes Augenmerk gewesen, wie ich nicht allein die Erkenntnißarten sorgfältig unterscheiden, sondern auch alle zu jeder derselben gehörige Begriffe aus ihrem gemeinschaftlichen Quell ableiten könnte, damit ich nicht allein dadurch, daß ich unterrichtet wäre, woher sie abstammen, ihren Gebrauch mit Sicherheit bestimmen konnte, sondern auch den noch nie vermutheten, aber unschätzbaren Vortheil hätte, die Vollständigkeit in der Aufzählung, Classificirung und Specificirung der Begriffe a priori, mithin nach Principien zu erkennen. Ohne dieses ist in der Metaphysik alles lauter Rhapsodie, wo man niemals weiß, ob dessen, was man besitzt, gnug ist, oder ob und wo noch etwas fehlen möge. Freilich kann man diesen Vortheil auch nur in der reinen Philosophie haben, von dieser aber macht derselbe auch das Wesen aus.

Da ich den Ursprung der Kategorien in den vier logischen Functionen aller Urtheile des Verstandes gefunden hatte, so war es ganz natürlich, den Ursprung der Ideen in den drei Functionen der Vernunftschlüsse zu suchen; denn wenn einmal solche reine Vernunftbegriffe (transscendentale Ideen) gegeben sind, so könnten sie, wenn man sie nicht etwa für angeboren halten will, wohl nirgends anders als in derselben Vernunfthandlung angetroffen werden, welche, so fern sie blos die Form betrifft, das Logische der Vernunftschlüsse, so fern sie aber die Verstandesurtheile in Ansehung einer oder der andern Form a priori als bestimmt vorstellt, transscendentale Begriffe der reinen Vernunft ausmacht.

Der formale Unterschied der Vernunftschlüsse macht die Eintheilung derselben in kategorische, hypothetische und disjunctive nothwendig. Die darauf gegründete Vernunftbegriffe enthalten also erstlich die Idee des vollständigen Subjects (Substantiale), zweitens die Idee der vollständigen Reihe der Bedingungen, drittens die Bestimmung aller Begriffe in der Idee eines vollständigen Inbegriffs des Möglichen.330.1 Die erste Idee war psychologisch, die zweite kosmologisch, die dritte theologisch; und da alle drei zu einer Dialektik Anlaß geben, doch jede auf ihre eigene Art, so gründete sich darauf die Eintheilung der ganzen Dialektik der reinen Vernunft in den Paralogismus, die Antinomie und endlich das Ideal derselben, durch welche Ableitung man völlig sicher gestellt wird, daß alle Ansprüche der reinen Vernunft hier ganz vollständig vorgestellt sind, und kein einziger fehlen kann, weil das Vernunftvermögen selbst, als woraus sie allen ihren Ursprung nehmen, dadurch gänzlich ausgemessen wird.

330.1. Im disjunctiven Urtheile betrachten wir alle Möglichkeit respectiv auf einen gewissen Begriff als eingetheilt. Das ontologische Princip der durchgängigen Bestimmung eines Dinges überhaupt (von allen möglichen entgegengesetzten Prädicaten kommt jedem Dinge eines zu), welches zugleich das Princip aller disjunctiven Urtheile ist, legt den Inbegriff aller Möglichkeit zum Grunde, in welchem die Möglichkeit jedes Dinges überhaupt als bestimmbar angesehen wird. Dieses dient zu einer kleinen Erläuterung des obigen Satzes: daß die Vernunfthandlung in disjunctiven Vernunftschlüssen der Form nach mit derjenigen einerlei sei, wodurch sie die Idee eines Inbegriffs aller Realität zu Stande bringt, welche das Positive aller einander entgegengesetzten Prädicate in sich enthält.

Musean translation

Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.

§ 43.

Throughout the Critique, my chief concern has been not only to distinguish the kinds of cognition carefully, but also to derive all the concepts belonging to each from their common source. In this way, knowing where they originate would not only enable me to determine their use with certainty; I would also gain the previously unsuspected but inestimable advantage of knowing, a priori and thus from principles, that the enumeration, classification, and specification of these concepts were complete. Without this, everything in metaphysics is mere rhapsody: one never knows whether what one possesses is enough, or whether and where something may still be missing. Admittedly, this advantage is possible only in pure philosophy; but it also constitutes the very essence of that philosophy.

Since I had found the origin of the categories in the four logical functions of all judgments of the understanding, it was entirely natural to seek the origin of ideas in the three functions of syllogistic inferences. For once such pure concepts of reason (transcendental ideas) are given, then, unless one chooses to regard them as innate, they can surely be found nowhere but in that same act of reason which, insofar as it concerns form alone, constitutes the logical element in syllogistic inferences, but which, insofar as it represents judgments of the understanding as determined a priori with regard to one or another form, constitutes transcendental concepts of pure reason.

The formal difference between syllogistic inferences requires their division into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. The concepts of reason founded on them therefore contain, first, the idea of the complete subject (the substantial); second, the idea of the complete series of conditions; and third, the determination of all concepts in the idea of a complete totality of the possible.330.1 The first idea was psychological, the second cosmological, the third theological; and since all three occasion a dialectic, though each in its own way, this grounded the division of the whole dialectic of pure reason into its paralogism, its antinomy, and finally its ideal. This derivation provides complete assurance that all the claims of pure reason are presented here in their entirety, and that not a single one can be missing, because reason itself, the faculty from which they all originate, is thereby measured out in full.

330.1. In a disjunctive judgment we consider all possibility as divided in relation to a certain concept. The ontological principle of the thoroughgoing determination of a thing in general—of all possible opposed predicates, one belongs to every thing—which is also the principle of all disjunctive judgments, takes as its basis the totality of all possibility, within which the possibility of every thing in general is regarded as determinable. This serves to explain briefly the proposition above: that reason's act in disjunctive syllogisms is, in form, the same as the act by which it brings about the idea of a totality of all reality, containing within itself the positive element of all mutually opposed predicates.

Plain English translation

Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.

§ 43.

Throughout the Critique, my main concern was not just to distinguish the kinds of cognition carefully. I also wanted to derive all the concepts belonging to each kind from their common source. Knowing where they came from would let me determine their use with certainty. It would also give me an invaluable advantage that no one had even suspected before: I could know, a priori and thus from principles, that my listing, classification, and specification of the concepts was complete. Without this, everything in metaphysics is just a disconnected collection. We never know whether what we have is enough, or whether something is still missing, or where. Admittedly, this advantage is available only in pure philosophy. But it also makes up the essence of pure philosophy.

I had found the origin of the categories in the four logical functions of all judgments of the understanding. It was therefore quite natural to look for the origin of ideas in the three functions of rational inferences. For once such pure concepts of reason—transcendental ideas—are given, where else could we find them, unless we chose to regard them as innate? They must be found in the very same act of reason that constitutes the logical element of rational inferences when only its form is considered. When this act represents judgments of the understanding as determined a priori with respect to one form or another, it constitutes transcendental concepts of pure reason.

Differences in the form of rational inferences require us to divide them into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive inferences. The concepts of reason based on these therefore contain, first, the idea of the complete subject (the substantial); second, the idea of the complete series of conditions; and third, the determination of all concepts within the idea of a complete totality of what is possible.330.1 The first idea was psychological, the second cosmological, and the third theological. All three give rise to dialectic, though each in its own way. This supplied the basis for dividing the entire dialectic of pure reason into its paralogism, its antinomy, and finally its ideal. This derivation makes us completely certain that all the claims of pure reason are presented here in full, and that not a single one can be missing. For it measures out the entire faculty of reason itself, from which they all originate.

330.1. In a disjunctive judgment, we regard all possibility in relation to a certain concept as divided up. The ontological principle of the thoroughgoing determination of a thing in general says that, of every pair of possible opposed predicates, one belongs to each thing. This is also the principle of all disjunctive judgments. It takes as its basis the totality of all possibility, within which the possibility of every thing in general is regarded as determinable. This helps explain the proposition above: the act of reason in disjunctive inferences has the same form as the act by which reason produces the idea of a totality of all reality. That idea contains what is positive in all mutually opposed predicates.

About this section

Section 43 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 51 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.

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