Section 22
Original German
§ 22.
Die Summe hievon ist diese: die Sache der Sinne ist, anzuschauen; die des Verstandes, zu denken. Denken aber ist Vorstellungen in einem Bewußtsein vereinigen. Diese Vereinigung entsteht entweder blos relativ aufs Subject und ist zufällig und subjectiv, oder sie findet schlechthin statt und ist nothwendig oder objectiv. Die Vereinigung der Vorstellungen in einem Bewußtsein ist das Urtheil. Also ist Denken so viel als Urtheilen, oder Vorstellungen auf Urtheile überhaupt beziehen. Daher sind Urtheile entweder blos subjectiv, wenn Vorstellungen auf ein Bewußtsein in einem Subject allein bezogen und in ihm vereinigt werden; oder sie sind objectiv, wenn sie in einem Bewußtsein überhaupt, d. i. darin nothwendig, vereinigt werden. Die logische Momente aller Urtheile sind so viel mögliche Arten, Vorstellungen in einem Bewußtsein zu vereinigen. Dienen aber eben dieselben als Begriffe, so sind sie Begriffe von der nothwendigen Vereinigung derselben in einem Bewußtsein, mithin Principien objectiv gültiger Urtheile. Diese Vereinigung in einem Bewußtsein ist entweder analytisch, durch die Identität, oder synthetisch, durch die Zusammensetzung und Hinzukunft verschiedener Vorstellungen zu einander. Erfahrung besteht in der synthetischen Verknüpfung der Erscheinungen (Wahrnehmungen) in einem Bewußtsein, so fern dieselbe nothwendig ist. Daher sind reine Verstandesbegriffe diejenige, unter denen alle Wahrnehmungen zuvor müssen subsumirt werden, ehe sie zu Erfahrungsurtheilen dienen können, in welchen die synthetische Einheit der Wahrnehmungen als nothwendig und allgemeingültig vorgestellt wird.305.1
305.1. Wie stimmt aber dieser Satz, daß Erfahrungsurtheile Nothwendigkeit in der Synthesis der Wahrnehmungen enthalten sollen, mit meinem oben vielfältig eingeschärften Satze, daß Erfahrung als Erkenntniß a posteriori blos zufällige Urtheile geben könne? Wenn ich sage: Erfahrung lehrt mir etwas, so meine ich jederzeit nur die Wahrnehmung, die in ihr liegt, z. B. daß auf die Beleuchtung des Steins durch die Sonne jederzeit Wärme folge, und also ist der Erfahrungssatz so fern allemal zufällig. Daß diese Erwärmung nothwendig aus der Beleuchtung durch die Sonne erfolge, ist zwar in dem Erfahrungsurtheile (vermöge des Begriffs der Ursache) enthalten, aber das lerne ich nicht durch Erfahrung, sondern umgekehrt, Erfahrung wird allererst durch diesen Zusatz des Verstandesbegriffs (der Ursache) zur Wahrnehmung erzeugt. Wie die Wahrnehmung zu diesem Zusatze komme, darüber muß die Kritik im Abschnitte von der transscendentalen Urtheilskraft Seite 137 u. f. nachgesehen werden.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 22.
The sum of the matter is this: the business of the senses is to intuit; that of the understanding, to think. Thinking, however, is uniting representations in one consciousness. This unification either arises merely in relation to the subject and is contingent and subjective, or takes place unconditionally and is necessary or objective. The unification of representations in one consciousness is judgment. Thus thinking is the same as judging, or referring representations to judgments in general. Judgments are therefore either merely subjective, when representations are referred solely to a consciousness in one subject and united in it, or objective, when they are united in a consciousness in general, that is, necessarily united in it. The logical moments of all judgments are so many possible ways of uniting representations in one consciousness. But when these very same moments serve as concepts, they are concepts of the necessary unification of representations in one consciousness, and hence principles of objectively valid judgments. This unification in one consciousness is either analytic, through identity, or synthetic, through the combination and addition of different representations to one another. Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances (perceptions) in one consciousness, insofar as this connection is necessary. Thus pure concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must first be subsumed before they can serve for judgments of experience, in which the synthetic unity of perceptions is represented as necessary and universally valid.305.1
305.1. But how does this proposition, that judgments of experience must contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions, agree with the proposition I have repeatedly stressed above, that experience, as a posteriori cognition, can yield only contingent judgments? When I say that experience teaches me something, I always mean only the perception contained in it: for example, that whenever the sun shines on the stone, warmth follows. To that extent the experiential proposition is always contingent. That this warming follows necessarily from the sun's illumination is indeed contained in the judgment of experience, by virtue of the concept of cause; but I do not learn this through experience. On the contrary, experience is first generated by this addition of the understanding's concept (of cause) to perception. As to how perception comes to receive this addition, one must consult the Critique, in the section on the transcendental power of judgment, page 137 and following.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 22.
Here is the result. The task of the senses is to intuit. The task of the understanding is to think. Thinking means uniting representations in one consciousness. This unification either occurs only in relation to the subject, in which case it is contingent and subjective, or it occurs without qualification, in which case it is necessary or objective. A judgment is the unification of representations in one consciousness. So thinking amounts to judging, or to relating representations to judgments in general. Judgments are therefore either merely subjective, when representations are related only to a consciousness in one subject and united in it, or objective, when they are united in a consciousness in general, that is, necessarily in it. The logical functions of all judgments are so many possible ways of uniting representations in one consciousness. But when these same functions serve as concepts, they are concepts of the necessary unification of representations in one consciousness. They are therefore principles of objectively valid judgments. This unification in one consciousness is either analytic, through identity, or synthetic, through the combining and adding of different representations to one another. Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances, or perceptions, in one consciousness, insofar as that connection is necessary. Pure concepts of the understanding are therefore the concepts under which all perceptions must first be brought before they can serve in judgments of experience. In those judgments the synthetic unity of perceptions is represented as necessary and universally valid.305.1
305.1. But how does the claim that judgments of experience must contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions agree with my earlier, repeatedly stressed claim that experience, as a posteriori cognition, can provide only contingent judgments? When I say that experience teaches me something, I always mean only the perception it contains. For example, warmth always follows the sun's shining on the stone. To that extent, the proposition drawn from experience is always contingent. The judgment of experience does contain the claim that this warming follows necessarily from the sun's shining, by virtue of the concept of cause. But I do not learn this through experience. On the contrary, experience is first produced by adding this concept of the understanding—the concept of cause—to perception. For how perception comes to receive this addition, consult the Critique, in the section on the transcendental power of judgment, page 137 and following.
About this section
Section 22 is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 29 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.