Section 21a
Original German
§ 21. [a].
Um alles Bisherige in einen Begriff zusammenzufassen, ist zuvörderst nöthig, die Leser zu erinnern, daß hier nicht von dem Entstehen der Erfahrung die Rede sei, sondern von dem, was in ihr liegt. Das erstere gehört zur empirischen Psychologie und würde selbst auch da ohne das zweite, welches zur Kritik der Erkenntniß und besonders des Verstandes gehört, niemals gehörig entwickelt werden können.
Erfahrung besteht aus Anschauungen, die der Sinnlichkeit angehören, und aus Urtheilen, die lediglich ein Geschäfte des Verstandes sind. Diejenige Urtheile aber, die der Verstand lediglich aus sinnlichen Anschauungen macht, sind noch bei weitem nicht Erfahrungsurtheile. Denn in einem Fall würde das Urtheil nur die Wahrnehmungen verknüpfen, so wie sie in der sinnlichen Anschauung gegeben sind; in dem letztern Falle aber sollen die Urtheile sagen, was Erfahrung überhaupt, mithin nicht, was die bloße Wahrnehmung, deren Gültigkeit blos subjectiv ist, enthält. Das Erfahrungsurtheil muß also noch über die sinnliche Anschauung und die logische Verknüpfung derselben (nachdem sie durch Vergleichung allgemein gemacht worden) in einem Urtheile etwas hinzufügen, was das synthetische Urtheil als nothwendig und hiedurch als allgemeingültig bestimmt; und dieses kann nichts anders sein als derjenige Begriff, der die Anschauung in Ansehung einer Form des Urtheils vielmehr als der anderen als an sich bestimmt vorstellt, d. i. ein Begriff von derjenigen synthetischen Einheit der Anschauungen, die nur durch eine gegebne logische Function der Urtheile vorgestellt werden kann.
Musean translation
Mouseia’s complete machine-assisted Musean translation, made directly from the complete German of the Prolegomena (AA IV 253–383, all §§1–60 and the Appendix), for fidelity, the steps of Kant’s argument, clarity and structure.
§ 21. [a].
To gather everything said so far into a single concept, it is first necessary to remind readers that we are concerned here not with how experience comes into being, but with what lies within it. The former belongs to empirical psychology, and even there it could never be properly developed without the latter, which belongs to the critique of cognition and especially of the understanding.
Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to sensibility, and of judgments, which are solely the business of the understanding. Yet the judgments the understanding makes merely from sensible intuitions are still very far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment would connect perceptions only as they are given in sensible intuition; in the latter case, however, the judgments are to state what experience in general contains, and hence not what mere perception contains, whose validity is only subjective. Beyond sensible intuition and its logical connection in a judgment—after it has been made universal through comparison—the judgment of experience must therefore add something that determines the synthetic judgment as necessary, and thereby as universally valid. This can be nothing other than the concept that represents the intuition as determined in itself with respect to one form of judgment rather than another: that is, a concept of that synthetic unity of intuitions which can be represented only through a given logical function of judgments.
Plain English translation
Mouseia’s complete Plain English edition, made independently and directly from the same complete German text.
§ 21. [a].
To bring everything said so far together in one concept, readers must first be reminded of something. The issue here is not how experience comes into being, but what it contains. The first question belongs to empirical psychology. Even there it could never be properly worked out without the second question, which belongs to the critique of cognition, and especially of the understanding.
Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to sensibility, and judgments, which are solely the work of the understanding. But judgments that the understanding makes from sensible intuitions alone are still far from being judgments of experience. In the first case the judgment would only connect perceptions as they are given in sensible intuition. In the second case, however, the judgments are meant to state what experience in general contains, not what mere perception contains, whose validity is only subjective. So a judgment of experience must add something to sensible intuition and to its logical connection in a judgment, after comparison has made it general. This addition determines the synthetic judgment as necessary and therefore as universally valid. It can only be the concept that represents the intuition as determined in itself with respect to one form of judgment rather than another. That is, it is a concept of the synthetic unity of intuitions that can be represented only through a given logical function of judgments.
About this section
Section 21a is part of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 28 of 72 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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