Part I — Analytic of the Beautiful

13 of 21 parts in Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant

Original German

Erster Theil. Kritik der ästhetischen Urtheilskraft.

Erster Abschnitt. 203 Analytik der ästhetischen Urtheilskraft.

Erstes Buch. Analytik des Schönen.

Erstes Moment des Geschmacksurtheils⁴ der Qualität nach.

1 Das Geschmacksurtheil ist ästhetisch.

Um zu unterscheiden, ob etwas schön sei oder nicht, beziehen wir die Vorstellung nicht durch den Verstand auf das Object zum Erkenntnisse, sondern durch die Einbildungskraft (vielleicht mit dem Verstande verbunden) A 4 auf das Subject und das Gefühl der Lust oder Unlust desselben. Das Geschmacksurtheil ist also kein Erkenntnißurtheil, mithin nicht logisch, sondern ästhetisch, worunter man dasjenige versteht, dessen Bestimmungsgrund nicht anders als subjectiv sein kann. Alle Beziehung der Vorstellungen, selbst die der Empfindungen aber kann objectiv sein (und da bedeutet sie das Reale einer empirischen Vorstellung); nur nicht die auf 204 das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, wodurch gar nichts im Objecte bezeichnet wird, sondern in der das Subject, wie es durch die Vorstellung afficirt wird, sich selbst fühlt.

Ein regelmäßiges, zweckmäßiges Gebäude mit seinem Erkenntnißvermögen (es sei in deutlicher oder verworrener Vorstellungsart) zu befassen, ist ganz etwas anders, als sich dieser Vorstellung mit der Empfindung des Wohlgefallens bewußt zu sein. Hier wird die Vorstellung gänzlich auf das Subject und zwar auf das Lebensgefühl desselben unter dem Namen des Gefühls der Lust oder Unlust bezogen: welches ein ganz besonderes Unterscheidungs- und Beurtheilungsvermögen gründet, das zum Erkenntniß nichts beiträgt, sondern nur die gegebene Vorstellung im Subjecte A 5 gegen das ganze Vermögen der Vorstellungen hält, dessen sich das Gemüth im Gefühl seines Zustandes bewußt wird. Gegebene Vorstellungen in einem Urtheile können empirisch (mithin ästhetisch) sein; das Urtheil aber, das durch sie gefällt wird, ist logisch, wenn jene nur im Urtheile auf das Object bezogen werden. Umgekehrt aber, wenn die gegebenen Vorstellungen gar rational wären, würden aber in einem Urtheile lediglich auf das Subject (sein Gefühl) bezogen, so sind sie sofern jederzeit ästhetisch.

2 Das Wohlgefallen, welches das Geschmacksurtheil bestimmt, ist ohne alles Interesse.

Interesse wird das Wohlgefallen genannt, was wir mit der Vorstellung der Existenz eines Gegenstandes verbinden. Ein solches hat daher immer zugleich Beziehung auf das Begehrungsvermögen, entweder als Bestimmungsgrund desselben, oder doch als mit dem Bestimmungsgrunde desselben nothwendig zusammenhängend. Nun will man aber, wenn die Frage ist, ob etwas schön sei, nicht wissen, ob uns oder irgend jemand an der Existenz der Sache irgend etwas gelegen sei, oder auch nur gelegen sein könne; sondern, wie wir sie in der bloßen Betrachtung (Anschauung oder Reflexion) beurtheilen. Wenn mich jemand fragt, ob ich den Palast, den ich vor mir A 6 sehe, schön finde, so mag ich zwar sagen: ich liebe dergleichen Dinge nicht, die blos für das Angaffen gemacht sind, oder, wie jener Irokesische Sachem, ihm gefalle in Paris nichts besser als die Garküchen; ich kann noch überdem auf die Eitelkeit der Großen auf gut Rousseauisch schmälen, welche den Schweiß des Volks auf so entbehrliche Dinge verwenden; ich kann 205 mich endlich gar leicht überzeugen, daß, wenn ich mich auf einem unbewohnten Eilande ohne Hoffnung jemals wieder zu Menschen zu kommen befände, und ich durch meinen bloßen Wunsch ein solches Prachtgebäude hinzaubern könnte, ich mir auch nicht einmal diese Mühe darum geben würde, wenn ich schon eine Hütte hätte, die mir bequem genug wäre. Man kann mir alles dieses einräumen und gutheißen; nur davon ist jetzt nicht die Rede. Man will nur wissen, ob die bloße Vorstellung des Gegenstandes in mir mit Wohlgefallen begleitet sei, so gleichgültig ich auch immer in Ansehung der Existenz des Gegenstandes dieser Vorstellung sein mag. Man sieht leicht, daß es auf das, was ich aus dieser Vorstellung in mir selbst mache, nicht auf das, worin ich von der Existenz des Gegenstandes abhänge, ankomme, um zu sagen, er sei schön, und zu beweisen, ich habe Geschmack. Ein jeder muß eingestehen, daß dasjenige Urtheil über Schönheit, worin sich das mindeste Interesse mengt, sehr parteilich und kein reines Geschmacksurtheil sei. Man muß nicht im mindesten für die Existenz der Sache eingenommen, sondern in diesem Betracht ganz gleichgültig A 7 sein, um in Sachen des Geschmacks den Richter zu spielen.

Wir können aber diesen Satz, der von vorzüglicher Erheblichkeit ist, nicht besser erläutern, als wenn wir dem reinen, uninteressirten⁵ Wohlgefallen im Geschmacksurtheile dasjenige, was mit Interesse verbunden ist, entgegensetzen: vornehmlich wenn wir zugleich gewiß sein können, daß es nicht mehr Arten des Interesse gebe, als die eben jetzt namhaft gemacht werden sollen.

3 Das Wohlgefallen am Angenehmen ist mit Interesse verbunden.

Angenehm ist das, was den Sinnen in der Empfindung gefällt. Hier zeigt sich nun sofort die Gelegenheit, eine ganz gewöhnliche Verwechselung der doppelten Bedeutung, die das Wort Empfindung haben kann, zu rügen und darauf aufmerksam zu machen. Alles Wohlgefallen (sagt oder denkt man) ist selbst Empfindung (einer Lust). Mithin 206 ist alles, was gefällt, eben hierin, daß es gefällt, angenehm (und nach den A 8 verschiedenen Graden oder auch Verhältnissen zu andern angenehmen Empfindungen anmuthig, lieblich, ergötzend, erfreulich u. s. w.). Wird aber das eingeräumt, so sind Eindrücke der Sinne, welche die Neigung, oder Grundsätze der Vernunft, welche den Willen, oder bloße reflectirte Formen der Anschauung, welche die Urtheilskraft bestimmen, was die Wirkung auf das Gefühl der Lust betrifft, gänzlich einerlei. Denn diese wäre die Annehmlichkeit in der Empfindung seines Zustandes, und da doch endlich alle Bearbeitung unserer Vermögen aufs Praktische ausgehen und sich darin als in ihrem Ziele vereinigen muß, so könnte man ihnen keine andere Schätzung der Dinge und ihres Werths zumuthen, als die in dem Vergnügen besteht, welches sie versprechen. Auf die Art, wie sie dazu gelangen, kommt es am Ende gar nicht an; und da die Wahl der Mittel hierin allein einen Unterschied machen kann, so könnten Menschen einander wohl der Thorheit und des Unverstandes, niemals aber der Niederträchtigkeit und Bosheit beschuldigen: weil sie doch alle, ein jeder nach seiner Art die Sachen zu sehen, nach einem Ziele laufen, welches für jedermann das Vergnügen ist.

Wenn eine Bestimmung des Gefühls der Lust oder Unlust Empfindung genannt wird, so bedeutet dieser Ausdruck etwas ganz anderes, als wenn ich die Vorstellung einer Sache (durch Sinne, als eine zum Erkenntnißvermögen gehörige Receptivität) Empfindung nenne. Denn im letzern A 9 Falle wird die Vorstellung auf das Object, im erstern aber lediglich auf das Subject bezogen und dient zu gar keinem Erkenntnisse, auch nicht zu demjenigen, wodurch sich das Subject selbst erkennt.

Wir verstehen aber in der obigen Erklärung unter dem Worte Empfindung eine objective Vorstellung der Sinne; und um nicht immer Gefahr zu laufen, mißgedeutet zu werden, wollen wir das, was jederzeit blos subjectiv bleiben muß und schlechterdings keine Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes ausmachen kann, mit dem sonst üblichen Namen des Gefühls benennen. Die grüne Farbe der Wiesen gehört zur objectiven Empfindung, als Wahrnehmung eines Gegenstandes des Sinnes; die Annehmlichkeit derselben aber zur subjectiven Empfindung, wodurch kein Gegenstand vorgestellt wird: d. i. zum Gefühl, wodurch der Gegenstand als Object des Wohlgefallens (welches kein Erkenntniß desselben ist) betrachtet wird.

Daß nun mein Urtheil über einen Gegenstand, wodurch ich ihn für 207 angenehm erkläre, ein Interesse an demselben ausdrücke, ist daraus schon klar, daß es durch Empfindung eine Begierde nach dergleichen Gegenstande rege macht, mithin das Wohlgefallen nicht das bloße Urtheil über ihn, sondern die Beziehung seiner Existenz auf meinen Zustand, sofern er durch ein solches Object afficirt wird, voraussetzt. Daher man von dem Angenehmen nicht blos sagt: es gefällt, sondern: es vergnügt. Es ist nicht A 10 ein bloßer Beifall, den ich ihm widme, sondern Neigung wird dadurch erzeugt; und zu dem, was auf die lebhafteste Art angenehm ist, gehört so gar kein Urtheil über die Beschaffenheit des Objects, daß diejenigen, welche immer nur auf das Genießen ausgehen (denn das ist das Wort, womit man das Innige des Vergnügens bezeichnet), sich gerne alles Urtheilens überheben.

4 Das Wohlgefallen am Guten ist mit Interesse verbunden.

Gut ist das, was vermittelst der Vernunft durch den bloßen Begriff gefällt. Wir nennen einiges wozu gut (das Nützliche), was nur als Mittel gefällt; ein anderes aber an sich gut, was für sich selbst gefällt. In beiden ist immer der Begriff eines Zwecks, mithin das Verhältniß der Vernunft zum (wenigstens möglichen) Wollen, folglich ein Wohlgefallen am Dasein eines Objects oder einer Handlung, d. i. irgend ein Interesse, enthalten.

Um etwas gut zu finden, muß ich jederzeit wissen, was der Gegenstand für ein Ding sein solle, d. i. einen Begriff von demselben haben. Um Schönheit woran zu finden, habe ich das nicht nöthig. Blumen, freie Zeichnungen, ohne Absicht in einander geschlungene Züge, unter dem A 11 Namen des Laubwerks, bedeuten nichts, hängen von keinem bestimmten Begriffe ab und gefallen doch. Das Wohlgefallen am Schönen muß von der Reflexion über einen Gegenstand, die zu irgend einem Begriffe (unbestimmt welchem) führt, abhängen und unterscheidet sich dadurch auch vom Angenehmen, welches ganz auf der Empfindung beruht.

Zwar scheint das Angenehme mit dem Guten in vielen Fällen einerlei zu sein. So wird man gemeiniglich sagen: alles (vornehmlich dauerhafte) Vergnügen ist an sich selbst gut; welches ungefähr so viel heißt, als: dauerhaft-angenehm oder gut sein, ist einerlei. Allein man kann bald bemerken, daß dieses blos eine fehlerhafte Wortvertauschung sei, da die Begriffe, welche diesen Ausdrücken eigenthümlich anhängen, keinesweges 208 gegen einander ausgetauscht werden können. Das Angenehme, das als ein solches den Gegenstand lediglich in Beziehung auf den Sinn vorstellt, muß allererst durch den Begriff eines Zwecks unter Principien der Vernunft gebracht werden, um es als Gegenstand des Willens gut zu nennen. Daß dieses aber alsdann eine ganz andere Beziehung auf das Wohlgefallen sei, wenn ich das, was vergnügt, zugleich gut nenne, ist daraus zu ersehen, daß beim Guten immer die Frage ist, ob es blos mittelbar-gut oder unmittelbar-gut (ob nützlich oder an sich gut) sei; da hingegen beim Angenehmen hierüber gar nicht die Frage sein kann, indem das Wort jederzeit etwas bedeutet, was unmittelbar gefällt. (Eben so ist es auch mit dem, A 12 was ich schön nenne, bewandt.)

Selbst in den gemeinsten Reden unterscheidet man das Angenehme vom Guten. Von einem durch Gewürze und andre Zusätze den Geschmack erhebenden Gerichte sagt man ohne Bedenken, es sei angenehm, und gesteht zugleich, daß es nicht gut sei: weil es zwar unmittelbar den Sinnen behagt, mittelbar aber, d. i. durch die Vernunft, die auf die Folgen hinaus sieht, betrachtet, mißfällt. Selbst in der Beurtheilung der Gesundheit kann man noch diesen Unterschied bemerken. Sie ist jedem, der sie besitzt, unmittelbar angenehm (wenigstens negativ, d. i. als Entfernung aller körperlichen Schmerzen). Aber um zu sagen, daß sie gut sei, muß man sie noch durch die Vernunft auf Zwecke richten, nämlich daß sie ein Zustand ist, der uns zu allen unsern Geschäften aufgelegt macht. In Absicht der Glückseligkeit glaubt endlich doch jedermann, die größte Summe (der Menge sowohl als Dauer nach) der Annehmlichkeiten des Lebens ein wahres, ja sogar das höchste Gut nennen zu können. Allein auch dawider sträubt sich die Vernunft. Annehmlichkeit ist Genuß. Ist es aber auf diesen allein angelegt, so wäre es thöricht, scrupulös in Ansehung der Mittel zu sein, die ihn uns verschaffen, ob er leidend, von der Freigebigkeit der Natur, oder durch Selbstthätigkeit und unser eignes Wirken erlangt wäre. Daß aber eines Menschen Existenz an sich einen Werth habe, welcher blos lebt (und A 13 in dieser Absicht noch so sehr geschäftig ist), um zu genießen, sogar wenn er dabei Andern, die alle eben so wohl nur aufs Genießen ausgehen, als Mittel dazu aufs beste beförderlich wäre und zwar darum, weil er durch Sympathie alles Vergnügen mit genösse: das wird sich die Vernunft nie überreden lassen. Nur durch das, was er thut ohne Rücksicht auf Genuß, in voller Freiheit und unabhängig von dem, was ihm die Natur auch leidend verschaffen könnte, giebt er seinem Dasein als der Existenz einer Person 209 einen absoluten Werth; und die Glückseligkeit ist mit der ganzen Fülle ihrer Annehmlichkeit bei weitem nicht ein unbedingtes Gut⁶.

Aber ungeachtet aller dieser Verschiedenheit zwischen dem Angenehmen und Guten kommen beide doch darin überein: daß sie jederzeit mit einem Interesse an ihrem Gegenstande verbunden sind, nicht allein das Angenehme, § 3, und das mittelbar Gute (das Nützliche), welches als Mittel zu irgend einer Annehmlichkeit gefällt, sondern auch das schlechterdings und in aller Absicht Gute, nämlich das moralische, welches das höchste Interesse bei sich führt. Denn das Gute ist das Object des Willens (d. i. A 14 eines durch Vernunft bestimmten Begehrungsvermögens). Etwas aber wollen und an dem Dasein desselben ein Wohlgefallen haben, d. i. daran ein Interesse nehmen, ist identisch.

5 Vergleichung der drei specifisch verschiedenen Arten des Wohlgefallens.

Das Angenehme und Gute haben beide eine Beziehung auf das Begehrungsvermögen und führen sofern, jenes ein pathologisch-bedingtes (durch Anreize, stimulos), dieses ein reines praktisches Wohlgefallen bei sich, welches nicht bloß durch die Vorstellung des Gegenstandes, sondern zugleich durch die vorgestellte Verknüpfung des Subjects mit der Existenz desselben bestimmt wird. Nicht bloß der Gegenstand, sondern auch die Existenz desselben gefällt. Dagegen ist das Geschmacksurtheil bloß contemplativ, d. i. ein Urtheil, welches, indifferent in Ansehung des Daseins eines Gegenstandes, nur seine Beschaffenheit mit dem Gefühl der Lust und Unlust zusammenhält. Aber diese Contemplation selbst ist auch nicht auf Begriffe gerichtet; denn das Geschmacksurtheil ist kein Erkenntnißurtheil (weder ein theoretisches noch praktisches) und daher auch nicht auf Begriffe gegründet, oder auch auf solche abgezweckt.

Das Angenehme, das Schöne, das Gute bezeichnen also drei verschiedene Verhältnisse der Vorstellungen zum Gefühl der Lust und Unlust, in A 15 210 Beziehung auf welches wir Gegenstände oder Vorstellungsarten von einander unterscheiden. Auch sind die jedem angemessenen Ausdrücke, womit man die Complacenz in denselben bezeichnet, nicht einerlei. Angenehm heißt Jemandem das, was ihn vergnügt; schön, was ihm blos gefällt; gut, was geschätzt, gebilligt, d. i. worin von ihm ein objectiver Werth gesetzt wird. Annehmlichkeit gilt auch für vernunftlose Thiere; Schönheit nur für Menschen, d. i. thierische, aber doch vernünftige Wesen, aber auch nicht blos als solche (z. B. Geister), sondern zugleich als thierische; das Gute aber für jedes vernünftige Wesen überhaupt; ein Satz, der nur in der Folge seine vollständige Rechtfertigung und Erklärung bekommen kann. Man kann sagen: daß unter allen diesen drei Arten des Wohlgefallens das des Geschmacks am Schönen einzig und allein ein uninteressirtes und freies Wohlgefallen sei; denn kein Interesse, weder das der Sinne, noch das der Vernunft, zwingt den Beifall ab. Daher könnte man von dem Wohlgefallen sagen: es beziehe sich in den drei genannten Fällen auf Neigung, oder Gunst, oder Achtung. Denn Gunst ist das einzige freie Wohlgefallen. Ein Gegenstand der Neigung und einer, welcher durch ein Vernunftgesetz uns zum Begehren auferlegt wird, lassen uns keine Freiheit, uns selbst irgend woraus einen Gegenstand der Lust zu machen. Alles Interesse setzt Bedürfniß voraus, oder bringt eines A 16 hervor; und als Bestimmungsgrund des Beifalls läßt es das Urtheil über den Gegenstand nicht mehr frei sein.

Was das Interesse der Neigung beim Angenehmen betrifft, so sagt jedermann: Hunger ist der beste Koch, und Leuten von gesundem Appetit schmeckt alles, was nur eßbar ist; mithin beweiset ein solches Wohlgefallen keine Wahl nach Geschmack. Nur wenn das Bedürfniß befriedigt ist, kann man unterscheiden, wer unter Vielen Geschmack habe, oder nicht. Eben so giebt es Sitten (Conduite) ohne Tugend, Höflichkeit ohne Wohlwollen, Anständigkeit ohne Ehrbarkeit u. s. w. Denn wo das sittliche Gesetz spricht, da giebt es objectiv weiter keine freie Wahl in Ansehung dessen, was zu thun sei; und Geschmack in seiner Aufführung (oder in Beurtheilung anderer ihrer) zeigen, ist etwas ganz anderes, als seine moralische Denkungsart äußern: denn diese enthält ein Gebot und bringt ein Bedürfniß hervor, da hingegen der sittliche Geschmack mit den Gegenständen des Wohlgefallens nur spielt, ohne sich an einen zu hängen.

Aus dem ersten Momente gefolgerte Erklärung des Schönen. 211

Geschmack ist das Beurtheilungsvermögen eines Gegenstandes oder einer Vorstellungsart durch ein Wohlgefallen oder Mißfallen ohne alles Interesse. Der Gegenstand eines solchen Wohlgefallens heißt schön.

Zweites Moment A 17 des Geschmacksurtheils, nämlich seiner Quantität nach.

6 Das Schöne ist das, was ohne Begriffe als Object eines allgemeinen Wohlgefallens vorgestellt wird.

Diese Erklärung des Schönen kann aus der vorigen Erklärung desselben, als eines Gegenstandes des Wohlgefallens ohne alles Interesse, gefolgert werden. Denn das, wovon jemand sich bewußt ist, daß das Wohlgefallen an demselben bei ihm selbst ohne alles Interesse sei, das kann derselbe nicht anders als so beurtheilen, daß es einen Grund des Wohlgefallens für jedermann enthalten müsse. Denn da es sich nicht auf irgend eine Neigung des Subjects (noch auf irgend ein anderes überlegtes Interesse) gründet, sondern da der Urtheilende sich in Ansehung des Wohlgefallens, welches er dem Gegenstande widmet, völlig frei fühlt: so kann er keine Privatbedingungen als Gründe des Wohlgefallens auffinden, an die sich sein Subject allein hinge, und muß es daher als in demjenigen begründet ansehen, was er auch bei jedem andern voraussetzen kann; folglich muß er glauben Grund zu haben, jedermann ein ähnliches Wohlgefallen zuzumuthen. Er wird daher vom Schönen so sprechen, als ob Schönheit A 18 eine Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes und das Urtheil logisch (durch Begriffe vom Objecte eine Erkenntniß desselben ausmachend) wäre; ob es gleich nur ästhetisch ist und bloß eine Beziehung der Vorstellung des Gegenstandes auf das Subject enthält: darum weil es doch mit dem logischen die Ähnlichkeit hat, daß man die Gültigkeit desselben für jedermann daran voraussetzen kann. Aber aus Begriffen kann diese Allgemeinheit auch nicht entspringen. Denn von Begriffen giebt es keinen Übergang zum Gefühle der Lust oder Unlust (ausgenommen in reinen praktischen Gesetzen, die aber ein Interesse bei sich führen, dergleichen mit dem reinen Geschmacksurtheile 212 nicht verbunden ist). Folglich muß dem Geschmacksurtheile mit dem Bewußtsein der Absonderung in demselben von allem Interesse ein Anspruch auf Gültigkeit für jedermann ohne auf Objecte gestellte Allgemeinheit anhängen, d. i. es muß damit ein Anspruch auf subjective Allgemeinheit verbunden sein.

7 Vergleichung des Schönen mit dem Angenehmen und Guten durch obiges Merkmal.

In Ansehung des Angenehmen bescheidet sich ein jeder: daß sein Urtheil, welches er auf ein Privatgefühl gründet, und wodurch er von einem Gegenstande sagt, daß er ihm gefalle, sich auch bloß auf seine Person einschränke. Daher ist er es gern zufrieden, daß, wenn er sagt: der Canariensect A 19 ist angenehm, ihm ein anderer den Ausdruck verbessere und ihn erinnere, er solle sagen: er ist mir angenehm; und so nicht allein im Geschmack der Zunge, des Gaumens und des Schlundes, sondern auch in dem, was für Augen und Ohren jedem angenehm sein mag. Dem einen ist die violette Farbe sanft und lieblich, dem andern todt und erstorben. Einer liebt den Ton der Blasinstrumente, der andre den von den Saiteninstrumenten. Darüber in der Absicht zu streiten, um das Urtheil anderer, welches von dem unsrigen verschieden ist, gleich als ob es diesem logisch entgegen gesetzt wäre, für unrichtig zu schelten, wäre Thorheit; in Ansehung des Angenehmen gilt also der Grundsatz: ein jeder hat seinen eigenen Geschmack (der Sinne).

Mit dem Schönen ist es ganz anders bewandt. Es wäre (gerade umgekehrt) lächerlich, wenn jemand, der sich auf seinen Geschmack etwas einbildete, sich damit zu rechtfertigen gedächte: dieser Gegenstand (das Gebäude, was wir sehen, das Kleid, was jener trägt, das Concert, was wir hören, das Gedicht, welches zur Beurtheilung aufgestellt ist) ist für mich schön. Denn er muß es nicht schön nennen, wenn es bloß ihm gefällt. Reiz und Annehmlichkeit mag für ihn vieles haben, darum bekümmert sich niemand; wenn er aber etwas für schön ausgiebt, so muthet er andern eben dasselbe Wohlgefallen zu: er urtheilt nicht bloß für sich, sondern für A 20 jedermann und spricht alsdann von der Schönheit, als wäre sie eine Eigenschaft der Dinge. Er sagt daher: die Sache ist schön, und rechnet nicht etwa darum auf Anderer Einstimmung in sein Urtheil des Wohlgefallens, 213 weil er sie mehrmals mit dem seinigen einstimmig befunden hat, sondern fordert es von ihnen. Er tadelt sie, wenn sie anders urtheilen, und spricht ihnen den Geschmack ab, von dem er doch verlangt, daß sie ihn haben sollen; und sofern kann man nicht sagen: ein jeder hat seinen besondern Geschmack. Dieses würde so viel heißen, als: es giebt gar keinen Geschmack, d. i. kein ästhetisches Urtheil, welches auf jedermanns Beistimmung rechtmäßigen Anspruch machen könnte.

Gleichwohl findet man auch in Ansehung des Angenehmen, daß in der Beurtheilung desselben sich Einhelligkeit unter Menschen antreffen lasse, in Absicht auf welche man doch einigen den Geschmack abspricht, andern ihn zugesteht und zwar nicht in der Bedeutung als Organsinn, sondern als Beurtheilungsvermögen in Ansehung des Angenehmen überhaupt. So sagt man von jemanden, der seine Gäste mit Annehmlichkeiten (des Genusses durch alle Sinne) so zu unterhalten weiß, daß es ihnen insgesammt gefällt: er habe Geschmack. Aber hier wird die Allgemeinheit nur comparativ genommen; und da giebt es nur generale (wie die empirischen alle sind), nicht universale Regeln, welche letzteren das Geschmacksurtheil über das Schöne sich unternimmt oder darauf Anspruch macht. Es A 21 ist ein Urtheil in Beziehung auf die Geselligkeit, sofern sie auf empirischen Regeln beruht. In Ansehung des Guten machen die Urtheile zwar auch mit Recht auf Gültigkeit für jedermann Anspruch; allein das Gute wird nur durch einen Begriff als Object eines allgemeinen Wohlgefallens vorgestellt, welches weder beim Angenehmen noch beim Schönen der Fall ist.

8 Die Allgemeinheit des Wohlgefallens wird in einem Geschmacksurtheile nur als subjectiv vorgestellt.

Diese besondere Bestimmung der Allgemeinheit eines ästhetischen Urtheils, die sich in einem Geschmacksurtheile antreffen läßt, ist eine Merkwürdigkeit, zwar nicht für den Logiker, aber wohl für den Transscendental-Philosophen, welche seine nicht geringe Bemühung auffordert, um den Ursprung derselben zu entdecken, dafür aber auch eine Eigenschaft unseres Erkenntnißvermögens aufdeckt, welche ohne diese Zergliederung unbekannt geblieben wäre.

Zuerst muß man sich davon völlig überzeugen: daß man durch das 214 Geschmacksurtheil (über das Schöne) das Wohlgefallen an einem Gegenstande jedermann ansinne, ohne sich doch auf einem Begriffe zu gründen (denn da wäre es das Gute); und daß dieser Anspruch auf Allgemeingültigkeit A 22 so wesentlich zu einem Urtheil gehöre, wodurch wir etwas für schön erklären, daß, ohne dieselbe dabei zu denken, es niemand in die Gedanken kommen würde, diesen Ausdruck zu gebrauchen, sondern alles, was ohne Begriff gefällt, zum Angenehmen gezählt werden würde, in Ansehung dessen man jeglichem seinen Kopf für sich haben läßt, und keiner dem andern Einstimmung zu seinem Geschmacksurtheile zumuthet, welches doch im Geschmacksurtheile über Schönheit jederzeit geschieht. Ich kann den ersten den Sinnen-Geschmack, den zweiten den Reflexions-Geschmack nennen: sofern der erstere bloß Privaturtheile, der zweite aber vorgebliche gemeingültige (publike), beiderseits aber ästhetische (nicht praktische) Urtheile über einen Gegenstand bloß in Ansehung des Verhältnisses seiner Vorstellung zum Gefühl der Lust und Unlust fällt. Nun ist es doch befremdlich, daß, da von dem Sinnengeschmack nicht allein die Erfahrung zeigt, daß sein Urtheil (der Lust oder Unlust an irgend etwas) nicht allgemein gelte, sondern jedermann auch von selbst so bescheiden ist, diese Einstimmung andern nicht eben anzusinnen (ob sich gleich wirklich öfter eine sehr ausgebreitete Einhelligkeit auch in diesen Urtheilen vorfindet), der Reflexions-Geschmack, der doch auch oft genug mit seinem Anspruche auf die allgemeine Gültigkeit seines Urtheils (über das Schöne) für jedermann abgewiesen wird, wie die Erfahrung lehrt, gleichwohl es möglich finden könne (welches er A 23 auch wirklich thut) sich Urtheile vorzustellen, die diese Einstimmung allgemein fordern könnten, und sie in der That für jedes seiner Geschmacksurtheile jedermann zumuthet, ohne daß die Urtheilenden wegen der Möglichkeit eines solchen Anspruchs in Streite sind, sondern sich nur in besondern Fällen wegen der richtigen Anwendung dieses Vermögens nicht einigen können.

Hier ist nun allererst zu merken, daß eine Allgemeinheit, die nicht auf Begriffen vom Objecte (wenn gleich nur empirischen) beruht, gar nicht logisch, sondern ästhetisch sei, d. i. keine objective Quantität des Urtheils, sondern nur eine subjective enthalte, für welche ich auch den Ausdruck Gemeingültigkeit, welcher die Gültigkeit nicht von der Beziehung einer Vorstellung auf das Erkenntnißvermögen, sondern auf das Gefühl der Lust und Unlust für jedes Subject bezeichnet, gebrauche. (Man kann sich aber auch desselben Ausdrucks für die logische Quantität des Urtheils bedienen, 215 wenn man nur dazusetzt objective Allgemeingültigkeit zum Unterschiede von der bloß subjectiven, welche allemal ästhetisch ist.)

Nun ist ein objectiv allgemeingültiges Urtheil auch jederzeit subjectiv, d. i. wenn das Urtheil für alles, was unter einem gegebenen Begriffe enthalten ist, gilt, so gilt es auch für jedermann, der sich einen Gegenstand durch diesen Begriff vorstellt. Aber von einer subjectiven Allgemeingültigkeit, d. i. der ästhetischen, die auf keinem Begriffe A 24 beruht, läßt sich nicht auf die logische schließen: weil jene Art Urtheile gar nicht auf das Object geht. Eben darum aber muß auch die ästhetische Allgemeinheit, die einem Urtheile beigelegt wird, von besonderer Art sein, weil sie das Prädicat der Schönheit nicht mit dem Begriffe des Objects, in seiner ganzen logischen Sphäre betrachtet, verknüpft und doch eben dasselbe über die ganze Sphäre der Urtheilenden ausdehnt.

In Ansehung der logischen Quantität sind alle Geschmacksurtheile einzelne Urtheile. Denn weil ich den Gegenstand unmittelbar an mein Gefühl der Lust und Unlust halten muß und doch nicht durch Begriffe, so können jene nicht die Quantität objectiv-gemeingültiger Urtheile haben; obgleich, wenn die einzelne Vorstellung des Objects des Geschmacksurtheils nach den Bedingungen, die das letztere bestimmen, durch Vergleichung in einen Begriff verwandelt wird, ein logisch allgemeines Urtheil daraus werden kann: z. B. die Rose, die ich anblicke, erkläre ich durch ein Geschmacksurtheil für schön. Dagegen ist das Urtheil, welches durch Vergleichung vieler einzelnen entspringt: die Rosen überhaupt sind schön, nunmehr nicht bloß als ästhetisches, sondern als ein auf einem ästhetischen gegründetes logisches Urtheil ausgesagt. Nun ist das Urtheil: die Rose ist (im Geruche) angenehm, zwar auch ein ästhetisches und einzelnes, aber kein Geschmacks-, sondern ein Sinnenurtheil. Es unterscheidet sich nämlich vom ersteren darin: daß das Geschmacksurtheil eine ästhetische A 25 Quantität der Allgemeinheit, d. i. der Gültigkeit für jedermann, bei sich führt, welche im Urtheile über das Angenehme nicht angetroffen werden kann. Nur allein die Urtheile über das Gute, ob sie gleich auch das Wohlgefallen an einem Gegenstande bestimmen, haben logische, nicht bloß ästhetische Allgemeinheit; denn sie gelten vom Object, als Erkenntnisse desselben, und darum für jedermann.

Wenn man Objecte bloß nach Begriffen beurtheilt, so geht alle Vorstellung der Schönheit verloren. Also kann es auch keine Regel geben, nach der jemand genöthigt werden sollte, etwas für schön anzuerkennen. Ob 216 ein Kleid, ein Haus, eine Blume schön sei: dazu läßt man sich sein Urtheil durch keine Gründe oder Grundsätze aufschwatzen. Man will das Object seinen eignen Augen unterwerfen, gleich als ob sein Wohlgefallen von der Empfindung abhinge; und dennoch, wenn man den Gegenstand alsdann schön nennt, glaubt man eine allgemeine Stimme für sich zu haben und macht Anspruch auf den Beitritt von jedermann, da hingegen jede Privatempfindung nur für den Betrachtenden allein und sein Wohlgefallen entscheiden würde.

Hier ist nun zu sehen, daß in dem Urtheile des Geschmacks nichts postulirt wird, als eine solche allgemeine Stimme in Ansehung des Wohlgefallens ohne Vermittlung der Begriffe; mithin die Möglichkeit eines A 26 ästhetischen Urtheils, welches zugleich als für jedermann gültig betrachtet werden könne. Das Geschmacksurtheil selber postulirt nicht jedermanns Einstimmung (denn das kann nur ein logisch allgemeines, weil es Gründe anführen kann, thun); es sinnt nur jedermann diese Einstimmung an, als einen Fall der Regel, in Ansehung dessen es die Bestätigung nicht von Begriffen, sondern von anderer Beitritt erwartet. Die allgemeine Stimme ist also nur eine Idee (worauf sie beruhe, wird hier noch nicht untersucht). Daß der, welcher ein Geschmacksurtheil zu fällen glaubt, in der That dieser Idee gemäß urtheile, kann ungewiß sein; aber daß er es doch darauf beziehe, mithin daß es ein Geschmacksurtheil sein solle, kündigt er durch den Ausdruck der Schönheit an. Für sich selbst aber kann er durch das bloße Bewußtsein der Absonderung alles dessen, was zum Angenehmen und Guten gehört, von dem Wohlgefallen, was ihm noch übrig bleibt, davon gewiß werden; und das ist alles, wozu er sich die Beistimmung von jedermann verspricht: ein Anspruch, wozu unter diesen Bedingungen er auch berechtigt sein würde, wenn er nur wider sie nicht öfter fehlte und darum ein irriges Geschmacksurtheil fällte.

9 A 27 Untersuchung der Frage: ob im Geschmacksurtheile das Gefühl der Lust vor der Beurtheilung des Gegenstandes, oder diese vor jener vorhergehe.

Die Auflösung dieser Aufgabe ist der Schlüssel zur Kritik des Geschmacks und daher aller Aufmerksamkeit würdig.

Ginge die Lust an dem gegebenen Gegenstande vorher, und nur die 217 allgemeine Mittheilbarkeit derselben sollte im Geschmacksurtheile der Vorstellung des Gegenstandes zuerkannt werden, so würde ein solches Verfahren mit sich selbst im Widerspruche stehen. Denn dergleichen Lust würde keine andere, als die bloße Annehmlichkeit in der Sinnenempfindung sein und daher ihrer Natur nach nur Privatgültigkeit haben können, weil sie von der Vorstellung, wodurch der Gegenstand gegeben wird, unmittelbar abhinge.

Also ist es die allgemeine Mittheilungsfähigkeit des Gemüthszustandes in der gegebenen Vorstellung, welche als subjective Bedingung des Geschmacksurtheils demselben zum Grunde liegen und die Lust an dem Gegenstande zur Folge haben muß. Es kann aber nichts allgemein mitgetheilt werden als Erkenntniß und Vorstellung, sofern sie zum Erkenntniß gehört. Denn sofern ist die letztere nur allein objectiv und hat nur dadurch einen allgemeinen Beziehungspunkt, womit die Vorstellungskraft Aller zusammenzustimmen A 28 genöthigt wird. Soll nun der Bestimmungsgrund des Urtheils über diese allgemeine Mittheilbarkeit der Vorstellung bloß subjectiv, nämlich ohne einen Begriff vom Gegenstande, gedacht werden, so kann er kein anderer als der Gemüthszustand sein, der im Verhältnisse der Vorstellungskräfte zu einander angetroffen wird, sofern sie eine gegebene Vorstellung auf Erkenntniß überhaupt beziehen.

Die Erkenntnißkräfte, die durch diese Vorstellung ins Spiel gesetzt werden, sind hiebei in einem freien Spiele, weil kein bestimmter Begriff sie auf eine besondere Erkenntnißregel einschränkt. Also muß der Gemüthszustand in dieser Vorstellung der eines Gefühls des freien Spiels der Vorstellungskräfte an einer gegebenen Vorstellung zu einem Erkenntnisse überhaupt sein. Nun gehören zu einer Vorstellung, wodurch ein Gegenstand gegeben wird, damit überhaupt daraus Erkenntniß werde, Einbildungskraft für die Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung und Verstand für die Einheit des Begriffs, der die Vorstellungen vereinigt. Dieser Zustand eines freien Spiels der Erkenntnißvermögen bei einer Vorstellung, wodurch ein Gegenstand gegeben wird, muß sich allgemein mittheilen lassen: weil Erkenntniß als Bestimmung des Objects, womit gegebene Vorstellungen (in welchem Subjecte es auch sei) zusammen stimmen A 29 sollen, die einzige Vorstellungsart ist, die für jedermann gilt.

Die subjective allgemeine Mittheilbarkeit der Vorstellungsart in einem Geschmacksurtheile, da sie, ohne einen bestimmten Begriff vorauszusetzen, Statt finden soll, kann nichts anders als der Gemüthszustand in dem 218 freien Spiele der Einbildungskraft und des Verstandes (sofern sie unter einander, wie es zu einem Erkenntnisse überhaupt erforderlich ist, zusammen stimmen) sein, indem wir uns bewußt sind, daß dieses zum Erkenntniß überhaupt schickliche subjective Verhältniß eben so wohl für jedermann gelten und folglich allgemein mittheilbar sein müsse, als es eine jede bestimmte Erkenntniß ist, die doch immer auf jenem Verhältniß als subjectiver Bedingung beruht.

Diese bloß subjective (ästhetische) Beurtheilung des Gegenstandes, oder der Vorstellung, wodurch er gegeben wird, geht nun vor der Lust an demselben vorher und ist der Grund dieser Lust an der Harmonie der Erkenntnißvermögen; auf jener Allgemeinheit aber der subjectiven Bedingungen der Beurtheilung der Gegenstände gründet sich allein diese allgemeine subjective Gültigkeit des Wohlgefallens, welches wir mit der Vorstellung des Gegenstandes, den wir schön nennen, verbinden.

Daß, seinen Gemüthszustand, selbst auch nur in Ansehung der Erkenntnißvermögen, mittheilen zu können, eine Lust bei sich führe, könnte man aus dem natürlichen Hange des Menschen zur Geselligkeit (empirisch A 30 und psychologisch) leichtlich darthun. Das ist aber zu unserer Absicht nicht genug. Die Lust, die wir fühlen, muthen wir jedem andern im Geschmacksurtheile als nothwendig zu, gleich als ob es für eine Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes, die an ihm nach Begriffen bestimmt ist, anzusehen wäre, wenn wir etwas schön nennen; da doch Schönheit ohne Beziehung auf das Gefühl des Subjects für sich nichts ist. Die Erörterung dieser Frage aber müssen wir uns bis zur Beantwortung derjenigen: ob und wie ästhetische Urtheile a priori möglich sind, vorbehalten.

Jetzt beschäftigen wir uns noch mit der mindern Frage: auf welche Art wir uns einer wechselseitigen subjectiven Übereinstimmung der Erkenntnißkräfte unter einander im Geschmacksurtheile bewußt werden, ob ästhetisch durch den bloßen innern Sinn und Empfindung, oder intellectuell durch das Bewußtsein unserer absichtlichen Thätigkeit, womit wir jene ins Spiel setzen.

Wäre die gegebene Vorstellung, welche das Geschmacksurtheil veranlaßt, ein Begriff, welcher Verstand und Einbildungskraft in der Beurtheilung des Gegenstandes zu einem Erkenntnisse des Objects vereinigte, so wäre das Bewußtsein dieses Verhältnisses intellectuell (wie im objectiven Schematism der Urtheilskraft, wovon die Kritik handelt). Aber das Urtheil wäre auch alsdann nicht in Beziehung auf Lust und Unlust gefällt, 219 mithin kein Geschmacksurtheil. Nun bestimmt aber das Geschmacksurtheil A 31 unabhängig von Begriffen das Object in Ansehung des Wohlgefallens und des Prädicats der Schönheit. Also kann jene subjective Einheit des Verhältnisses sich nur durch Empfindung kenntlich machen. Die Belebung beider Vermögen (der Einbildungskraft und des Verstandes) zu unbestimmter, aber doch vermittelst des Anlasses der gegebenen Vorstellung einhelliger Thätigkeit, derjenigen nämlich, die zu einem Erkenntniß überhaupt gehört, ist die Empfindung, deren allgemeine Mittheilbarkeit das Geschmacksurtheil postulirt. Ein objectives Verhältniß kann zwar nur gedacht, aber, so fern es seinen Bedingungen nach subjectiv ist, doch in der Wirkung auf das Gemüth empfunden werden; und bei einem Verhältnisse, welches keinen Begriff zum Grunde legt (wie das der Vorstellungskräfte zu einem Erkenntnißvermögen überhaupt), ist auch kein anderes Bewußtsein desselben, als durch Empfindung der Wirkung, die im erleichterten Spiele beider durch wechselseitige Zusammenstimmung belebten Gemüthskräfte (der Einbildungskraft und des Verstandes) besteht, möglich. Eine Vorstellung, die als einzeln und ohne Vergleichung mit andern dennoch eine Zusammenstimmung zu den Bedingungen der Allgemeinheit hat, welche das Geschäft des Verstandes überhaupt ausmacht, bringt die Erkenntnißvermögen in die proportionirte Stimmung, die wir zu allem Erkenntnisse fordern und daher auch für jedermann, der durch Verstand und A 32 Sinne in Verbindung zu urtheilen bestimmt ist (für jeden Menschen), gültig halten.

Aus dem zweiten Moment gefolgerte Erklärung des Schönen.

Schön ist das, was ohne Begriff allgemein gefällt.

Drittes Moment der Geschmacksurtheile nach der Relation der Zwecke, welche in ihnen in Betrachtung gezogen wird.

10 Von der Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt.

Wenn man, was ein Zweck sei, nach seinen transscendentalen Bestimmungen (ohne etwas Empirisches, dergleichen das Gefühl der Lust ist, 220 vorauszusetzen) erklären will: so ist Zweck der Gegenstand eines Begriffs, sofern dieser als die Ursache von jenem (der reale Grund seiner Möglichkeit) angesehen wird; und die Causalität eines Begriffs in Ansehung seines Objects ist die Zweckmäßigkeit (forma finalis). Wo also nicht etwa bloß die Erkenntniß von einem Gegenstande, sondern der Gegenstand selbst (die Form oder Existenz desselben) als Wirkung nur als durch einen Begriff von der letztern möglich gedacht wird, da denkt man sich einen Zweck. Die Vorstellung der Wirkung ist hier der Bestimmungsgrund ihrer Ursache A 33 und geht vor der letztern vorher. Das Bewußtsein der Causalität einer Vorstellung in Absicht auf den Zustand des Subjects, es in demselben zu erhalten, kann hier im Allgemeinen das bezeichnen, was man Lust nennt; wogegen Unlust diejenige Vorstellung ist, die den Zustand der Vorstellungen zu ihrem eigenen Gegentheile zu bestimmen (sie abzuhalten oder wegzuschaffen) den Grund enthält.

Das Begehrungsvermögen, sofern es nur durch Begriffe, d. i. der Vorstellung eines Zwecks gemäß zu handeln, bestimmbar ist, würde der Wille sein. Zweckmäßig aber heißt ein Object, oder Gemüthszustand, oder eine Handlung auch, wenn gleich ihre Möglichkeit die Vorstellung eines Zwecks nicht nothwendig voraussetzt, bloß darum, weil ihre Möglichkeit von uns nur erklärt und begriffen werden kann, sofern wir eine Causalität nach Zwecken, d. i. einen Willen, der sie nach der Vorstellung einer gewissen Regel so angeordnet hätte, zum Grunde derselben annehmen. Die Zweckmäßigkeit kann also ohne Zweck sein, sofern wir die Ursachen dieser Form nicht in einem Willen setzen, aber doch die Erklärung ihrer Möglichkeit nur, indem wir sie von einem Willen ableiten, uns begreiflich machen können. Nun haben wir das, was wir beobachten, nicht immer nöthig durch Vernunft (seiner Möglichkeit nach) einzusehen. Also können wir eine Zweckmäßigkeit der Form nach, auch ohne daß wir ihr einen Zweck A 34 (als die Materie des nexus finalis) zum Grunde legen, wenigstens beobachten und an Gegenständen, wiewohl nicht anders als durch Reflexion bemerken.

11 221 Das Geschmacksurtheil hat nichts als die Form der Zweckmäßigkeit eines Gegenstandes (oder der Vorstellungsart desselben) zum Grunde.

Aller Zweck, wenn er als Grund des Wohlgefallens angesehen wird, führt immer ein Interesse, als Bestimmungsgrund des Urtheils über den Gegenstand der Lust, bei sich. Also kann dem Geschmacksurtheil kein subjectiver Zweck zum Grunde liegen. Aber auch keine Vorstellung eines objectiven Zwecks, d. i. der Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes selbst nach Principien der Zweckverbindung, mithin kein Begriff des Guten kann das Geschmacksurtheil bestimmen: weil es ein ästhetisches und kein Erkenntnißurtheil ist, welches also keinen Begriff von der Beschaffenheit und innern oder äußern Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes durch diese oder jene Ursache, sondern bloß das Verhältniß der Vorstellungskräfte zu einander, sofern sie durch eine Vorstellung bestimmt werden, betrifft.

Nun ist dieses Verhältniß in der Bestimmung eines Gegenstandes, A 35 als eines schönen, mit dem Gefühle einer Lust verbunden, die durch das Geschmacksurtheil zugleich als für jedermann gültig erklärt wird; folglich kann eben so wenig eine die Vorstellung begleitende Annehmlichkeit als die Vorstellung von der Vollkommenheit des Gegenstandes und der Begriff des Guten den Bestimmungsgrund enthalten. Also kann nichts anders als die subjective Zweckmäßigkeit in der Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes ohne allen (weder objectiven noch subjectiven) Zweck, folglich die bloße Form der Zweckmäßigkeit in der Vorstellung, wodurch uns ein Gegenstand gegeben wird, sofern wir uns ihrer bewußt sind, das Wohlgefallen, welches wir ohne Begriff als allgemein mittheilbar beurtheilen, mithin den Bestimmungsgrund des Geschmacksurtheils ausmachen.

12 Das Geschmacksurtheil beruht auf Gründen a priori.

Die Verknüpfung des Gefühls einer Lust oder Unlust als einer Wirkung mit irgend einer Vorstellung (Empfindung oder Begriff) als ihrer Ursache a priori auszumachen, ist schlechterdings unmöglich; denn das wäre ein Causalverhältniß, welches (unter Gegenständen der Erfahrung) nur 222 jederzeit a posteriori und vermittelst der Erfahrung selbst erkannt werden A 36 kann. Zwar haben wir in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft wirklich das Gefühl der Achtung (als eine besondere und eigenthümliche Modification dieses Gefühls, welches weder mit der Lust noch Unlust, die wir von empirischen Gegenständen bekommen, recht übereintreffen will) von allgemeinen sittlichen Begriffen a priori abgeleitet. Aber wir konnten dort auch die Gränzen der Erfahrung überschreiten und eine Causalität, die auf einer übersinnlichen Beschaffenheit des Subjects beruhte, nämlich die der Freiheit, herbei rufen. Allein selbst da leiteten wir eigentlich nicht dieses Gefühl von der Idee des Sittlichen als Ursache her, sondern bloß die Willensbestimmung wurde davon abgeleitet. Der Gemüthszustand aber eines irgend wodurch bestimmten Willens ist an sich schon ein Gefühl der Lust und mit ihm identisch, folgt also nicht als Wirkung daraus: welches letztere nur angenommen werden müßte, wenn der Begriff des Sittlichen als eines Guts vor der Willensbestimmung durch das Gesetz vorherginge; da alsdann die Lust, die mit dem Begriffe verbunden wäre, aus diesem als einer bloßen Erkenntniß vergeblich würde abgeleitet werden.

Nun ist es auf ähnliche Weise mit der Lust im ästhetischen Urtheile bewandt: nur daß sie hier bloß contemplativ, und ohne ein Interesse am Object zu bewirken, im moralischen Urtheil hingegen praktisch ist. Das Bewußtsein der bloß formalen Zweckmäßigkeit im Spiele der Erkenntnißkräfte A 37 des Subjects bei einer Vorstellung, wodurch ein Gegenstand gegeben wird, ist die Lust selbst, weil es einen Bestimmungsgrund der Thätigkeit des Subjects in Ansehung der Belebung der Erkenntnißkräfte desselben, also eine innere Causalität (welche zweckmäßig ist) in Ansehung der Erkenntniß überhaupt, aber ohne auf eine bestimmte Erkenntniß eingeschränkt zu sein, mithin eine bloße Form der subjectiven Zweckmäßigkeit einer Vorstellung, in einem ästhetischen Urtheile enthält. Diese Lust ist auch auf keinerlei Weise praktisch, weder wie die aus dem pathologischen Grunde der Annehmlichkeit, noch die aus dem intellectuellen des vorgestellten Guten. Sie hat aber doch Causalität in sich, nämlich den Zustand der Vorstellung selbst und die Beschäftigung der Erkenntnißkräfte ohne weitere Absicht zu erhalten. Wir weilen bei der Betrachtung des Schönen, weil diese Betrachtung sich selbst stärkt und reproducirt: welches derjenigen Verweilung analogisch (aber doch mit ihr nicht einerlei) ist, da ein Reiz in der Vorstellung des Gegenstandes die Aufmerksamkeit wiederholentlich erweckt, wobei das Gemüth passiv ist.

13 223 Das reine Geschmacksurtheil ist von Reiz und Rührung unabhängig.

Alles Interesse verdirbt das Geschmacksurtheil und nimmt ihm seine Unpartheilichkeit, vornehmlich wenn es nicht so wie das Interesse der Vernunft A 38 die Zweckmäßigkeit vor dem Gefühle der Lust voranschickt, sondern sie auf dieses gründet; welches letztere allemal im ästhetischen Urtheile über etwas, sofern es vergnügt oder schmerzt, geschieht. Daher Urtheile, die so afficirt sind, auf allgemeingültiges Wohlgefallen entweder gar keinen, oder so viel weniger Anspruch machen können, als sich von der gedachten Art Empfindungen unter den Bestimmungsgründen des Geschmacks befinden. Der Geschmack ist jederzeit noch barbarisch, wo er die Beimischung der Reize und Rührungen zum Wohlgefallen bedarf, ja wohl gar diese zum Maßstabe seines Beifalls macht.

Indessen werden Reize doch öfter nicht allein zur Schönheit (die doch eigentlich bloß die Form betreffen sollte) als Beitrag zum ästhetischen allgemeinen Wohlgefallen gezählt, sondern sie werden wohl gar an sich selbst für Schönheiten, mithin die Materie des Wohlgefallens für die Form ausgegeben: ein Mißverstand, der sich so wie mancher andere, welcher doch noch immer etwas Wahres zum Grunde hat, durch sorgfältige Bestimmung dieser Begriffe heben läßt.

Ein Geschmacksurtheil, auf welches Reiz und Rührung keinen Einfluß haben (ob sie sich gleich mit dem Wohlgefallen am Schönen verbinden lassen), welches also bloß die Zweckmäßigkeit der Form zum Bestimmungsgrunde hat, ist ein reines Geschmacksurtheil.

14 A 39 Erläuterung durch Beispiele.

Ästhetische Urtheile können eben sowohl als theoretische (logische) in empirische und reine eingetheilt werden. Die erstern sind die, welche Annehmlichkeit oder Unannehmlichkeit, die zweiten die, welche Schönheit von einem Gegenstande, oder von der Vorstellungsart desselben aussagen; jene sind Sinnenurtheile (materiale ästhetische Urtheile), diese (als formale) allein eigentliche Geschmacksurtheile.

224 Ein Geschmacksurtheil ist also nur sofern rein, als kein bloß empirisches Wohlgefallen dem Bestimmungsgrunde desselben beigemischt wird. Dieses aber geschieht allemal, wenn Reiz oder Rührung einen Antheil an dem Urtheile haben, wodurch etwas für schön erklärt werden soll.

Nun thun sich wieder manche Einwürfe hervor, die zuletzt den Reiz nicht bloß zum nothwendigen Ingrediens der Schönheit, sondern wohl gar als für sich allein hinreichend, um schön genannt zu werden, vorspiegeln. Eine bloße Farbe, z. B. die grüne eines Rasenplatzes, ein bloßer Ton (zum Unterschiede vom Schalle und Geräusch), wie etwa der einer Violine, wird von den Meisten an sich für schön erklärt; obzwar beide bloß die Materie der Vorstellungen, nämlich lediglich Empfindung, zum Grunde zu haben scheinen und darum nur angenehm genannt zu werden A 40 verdienten. Allein man wird doch zugleich bemerken, daß die Empfindungen der Farbe sowohl als des Tons sich nur sofern für schön zu gelten berechtigt halten, als beide rein sind; welches eine Bestimmung ist, die schon die Form betrifft, und auch das einzige, was sich von diesen Vorstellungen mit Gewißheit allgemein mittheilen läßt: weil die Qualität der Empfindungen selbst nicht in allen Subjecten als einstimmig und die Annehmlichkeit einer Farbe, vorzüglich vor der andern, oder des Tons eines musikalischen Instruments vor dem eines andern sich schwerlich bei jedermann als auf gleiche Art beurtheilt annehmen läßt.

Nimmt man mit Eulern an, daß die Farben gleichzeitig auf einander folgende Schläge (pulsus) des Äthers, so wie Töne der im Schalle erschütterten Luft sind, und, was das Vornehmste ist, das Gemüth nicht bloß durch den Sinn die Wirkung davon auf die Belebung des Organs, sondern auch durch die Reflexion das regelmäßige Spiel der Eindrücke (mithin die Form in der Verbindung verschiedener Vorstellungen) wahrnehme (woran ich doch gar nicht zweifle): so würde Farbe und Ton nicht bloße Empfindungen, sondern schon formale Bestimmung der Einheit eines Mannigfaltigen derselben sein und alsdann auch für sich zu Schönheiten gezählt werden können.

Das Reine aber einer einfachen Empfindungsart bedeutet, daß die Gleichförmigkeit derselben durch keine fremdartige Empfindung gestört A 41 und unterbrochen wird, und gehört bloß zur Form: weil man dabei von der Qualität jener Empfindungsart (ob und welche Farbe, oder ob und welchen Ton sie vorstelle) abstrahiren kann. Daher werden alle einfache Farben, sofern sie rein sind, für schön gehalten; die gemischten haben diesen 225 Vorzug nicht: eben darum weil, da sie nicht einfach sind, man keinen Maßstab der Beurtheilung hat, ob man sie rein oder unrein nennen solle.

Was aber die dem Gegenstande seiner Form wegen beigelegte Schönheit, sofern sie, wie man meint, durch Reiz wohl gar könne erhöht werden, anlangt, so ist dies ein gemeiner und dem ächten, unbestochenen, gründlichen Geschmacke sehr nachtheiliger Irrthum; ob sich zwar allerdings neben der Schönheit auch noch Reize hinzufügen lassen, um das Gemüth durch die Vorstellung des Gegenstandes außer dem trockenen Wohlgefallen noch zu interessiren und so dem Geschmacke und dessen Cultur zur Anpreisung zu dienen, vornehmlich wenn er noch roh und ungeübt ist. Aber sie thun wirklich dem Geschmacksurtheile Abbruch, wenn sie die Aufmerksamkeit als Beurtheilungsgründe der Schönheit auf sich ziehen. Denn es ist so weit gefehlt, daß sie dazu beitrügen, daß sie vielmehr als Fremdlinge, nur sofern sie jene schöne Form nicht stören, wenn der Geschmack noch schwach und ungeübt ist, mit Nachsicht müssen aufgenommen werden.

In der Malerei, Bildhauerkunst, ja allen bildenden Künsten, in der A 42 Baukunst, Gartenkunst, sofern sie schöne Künste sind, ist die Zeichnung das Wesentliche, in welcher nicht, was in der Empfindung vergnügt, sondern bloß was durch seine Form gefällt, den Grund aller Anlage für den Geschmack ausmacht. Die Farben, welche den Abriß illuminiren, gehören zum Reiz; den Gegenstand an sich können sie zwar für die Empfindung belebt, aber nicht anschauungswürdig und schön machen: vielmehr werden sie durch das, was die schöne Form erfordert, mehrentheils gar sehr eingeschränkt und selbst da, wo der Reiz zugelassen wird, durch die erstere allein veredelt.

Alle Form der Gegenstände der Sinne (der äußern sowohl als mittelbar auch des innern) ist entweder Gestalt, oder Spiel; im letztern Falle entweder Spiel der Gestalten (im Raume die Mimik und der Tanz); oder bloßes Spiel der Empfindungen (in der Zeit). Der Reiz der Farben, oder angenehmer Töne des Instruments kann hinzukommen, aber die Zeichnung in der ersten und die Composition in dem letzten machen den eigentlichen Gegenstand des reinen Geschmacksurtheils aus; und daß die Reinigkeit der Farben sowohl als der Töne, oder auch die Mannigfaltigkeit derselben und ihre Abstechung zur Schönheit beizutragen scheint, will nicht so viel sagen, daß sie darum, weil sie für sich angenehm sind, gleichsam einen gleichartigen Zusatz zu dem Wohlgefallen an der Form abgeben, A 43 sondern weil sie diese letztere nur genauer, bestimmter und vollständiger 226 anschaulich machen und überdem durch ihren Reiz die Vorstellung beleben, indem sie die Aufmerksamkeit auf den Gegenstand selbst erwecken und erhalten.

Selbst was man Zierathen (Parerga) nennt, d. i. dasjenige, was nicht in die ganze Vorstellung des Gegenstandes als Bestandstück innerlich, sondern nur äußerlich als Zuthat gehört und das Wohlgefallen des Geschmacks vergrößert, thut dieses doch auch nur durch seine Form: wie Einfassungen der Gemälde, oder Gewänder an Statuen, oder Säulengänge um Prachtgebäude. Besteht aber der Zierath nicht selbst in der schönen Form, ist er wie der goldene Rahmen bloß, um durch seinen Reiz das Gemälde dem Beifall zu empfehlen, angebracht: so heißt er alsdann Schmuck und thut der ächten Schönheit Abbruch.

Rührung, eine Empfindung, wo Annehmlichkeit nur vermittelst augenblicklicher Hemmung und darauf erfolgender stärkerer Ergießung der Lebenskraft gewirkt wird, gehört gar nicht zur Schönheit. Erhabenheit (mit welcher das Gefühl der Rührung verbunden ist) aber erfordert einen andern Maßstab der Beurtheilung, als der Geschmack sich zum Grunde legt; und so hat ein reines Geschmacksurtheil weder Reiz noch Rührung, mit einem Worte keine Empfindung, als Materie des ästhetischen Urtheils, zum Bestimmungsgrunde.

15 A 44 Das Geschmacksurtheil ist von dem Begriffe der Vollkommenheit gänzlich unabhängig.

Die objective Zweckmäßigkeit kann nur vermittelst der Beziehung des Mannigfaltigen auf einen bestimmten Zweck, also nur durch einen Begriff, erkannt werden. Hieraus allein schon erhellt: daß das Schöne, dessen Beurtheilung eine bloß formale Zweckmäßigkeit, d. i. eine Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck, zum Grunde hat, von der Vorstellung des Guten ganz unabhängig sei, weil das letztere eine objective Zweckmäßigkeit, d. i. die Beziehung des Gegenstandes auf einen bestimmten Zweck, voraussetzt.

Die objective Zweckmäßigkeit ist entweder die äußere, d. i. die Nützlichkeit, oder die innere, d. i. die Vollkommenheit des Gegenstandes. Daß das Wohlgefallen an einem Gegenstande, weshalb wir ihn schön nennen, nicht auf der Vorstellung seiner Nützlichkeit beruhen könne, ist aus beiden vorigen Hauptstücken hinreichend zu ersehen: weil es alsdann nicht 227 ein unmittelbares Wohlgefallen an dem Gegenstande sein würde, welches letztere die wesentliche Bedingung des Urtheils über Schönheit ist. Aber eine objective innere Zweckmäßigkeit, d. i. Vollkommenheit, kommt dem Prädicate der Schönheit schon näher und ist daher auch von namhaften Philosophen, doch mit dem Beisatze, wenn sie verworren gedacht A 45 wird, für einerlei mit der Schönheit gehalten worden. Es ist von der größten Wichtigkeit, in einer Kritik des Geschmacks zu entscheiden, ob sich auch die Schönheit wirklich in den Begriff der Vollkommenheit auflösen lasse.

Die objective Zweckmäßigkeit zu beurtheilen, bedürfen wir jederzeit den Begriff eines Zwecks und (wenn jene Zweckmäßigkeit nicht eine äußere [Nützlichkeit], sondern eine innere sein soll) den Begriff eines innern Zwecks, der den Grund der innern Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes enthalte. So wie nun Zweck überhaupt dasjenige ist, dessen Begriff als der Grund der Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes selbst angesehen werden kann: so wird, um sich eine objective Zweckmäßigkeit an einem Dinge vorzustellen, der Begriff von diesem, was es für ein Ding sein solle, voran gehen; und die Zusammenstimmung des Mannigfaltigen in demselben zu diesem Begriffe (welcher die Regel der Verbindung desselben an ihm giebt) ist die qualitative Vollkommenheit eines Dinges. Hiervon ist die quantitative, als die Vollständigkeit eines jeden Dinges in seiner Art, gänzlich unterschieden und ein bloßer Größenbegriff (der Allheit), bei welchem, was das Ding sein solle, schon zum voraus als bestimmt gedacht und nur, ob alles dazu Erforderliche an ihm sei, gefragt wird. Das Formale in der Vorstellung eines Dinges, d. i. die Zusammenstimmung des Mannigfaltigen zu Einem (unbestimmt was es sein solle), giebt A 46 für sich ganz und gar keine objective Zweckmäßigkeit zu erkennen: weil, da von diesem Einen als Zweck (was das Ding sein solle) abstrahirt wird, nichts als die subjective Zweckmäßigkeit der Vorstellungen im Gemüthe des Anschauenden übrig bleibt, welche wohl eine gewisse Zweckmäßigkeit des Vorstellungszustandes im Subject und in diesem eine Behaglichkeit desselben eine gegebene Form in die Einbildungskraft aufzufassen, aber keine Vollkommenheit irgend eines Objects, das hier durch keinen Begriff eines Zwecks gedacht wird, angiebt. Wie z. B., wenn ich im Walde einen Rasenplatz antreffe, um welchen die Bäume im Cirkel stehen, und ich mir dabei nicht einen Zweck, nämlich daß er etwa zum ländlichen Tanze dienen solle, vorstelle, nicht der mindeste Begriff von 228 Vollkommenheit durch die bloße Form gegeben wird. Eine formale objective Zweckmäßigkeit aber ohne Zweck, d. i. die bloße Form einer Vollkommenheit (ohne alle Materie und Begriff von dem, wozu zusammengestimmt wird, wenn es auch bloß die Idee einer Gesetzmäßigkeit überhaupt wäre), sich vorzustellen, ist ein wahrer Widerspruch.

Nun ist das Geschmacksurtheil ein ästhetisches Urtheil, d. i. ein solches, was auf subjectiven Gründen beruht, und dessen Bestimmungsgrund kein Begriff, mithin auch nicht der eines bestimmten Zwecks sein kann. Also wird durch die Schönheit, als eine formale subjective Zweckmäßigkeit, keinesweges eine Vollkommenheit des Gegenstandes als vorgeblich A 47 formale, gleichwohl aber doch objective Zweckmäßigkeit gedacht; und der Unterschied zwischen den Begriffen des Schönen und Guten, als ob beide nur der logischen Form nach unterschieden, der erste bloß ein verworrener, der zweite ein deutlicher Begriff der Vollkommenheit, sonst aber dem Inhalte und Ursprunge nach einerlei wären, ist nichtig: weil alsdann zwischen ihnen kein specifischer Unterschied, sondern ein Geschmacksurtheil eben so wohl ein Erkenntnißurtheil wäre, als das Urtheil, wodurch etwas für gut erklärt wird; so wie etwa der gemeine Mann, wenn er sagt, daß der Betrug unrecht sei, sein Urtheil auf verworrene, der Philosoph auf deutliche, im Grunde aber beide auf einerlei Vernunft-Principien gründen. Ich habe aber schon angeführt, daß ein ästhetisches Urtheil einzig in seiner Art sei und schlechterdings kein Erkenntniß (auch nicht ein verworrenes) vom Object gebe: welches letztere nur durch ein logisches Urtheil geschieht; da jenes hingegen die Vorstellung, wodurch ein Object gegeben wird, lediglich auf das Subject bezieht und keine Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandes, sondern nur die zweckmäßige Form in der Bestimmung der Vorstellungskräfte, die sich mit jenem beschäftigen, zu bemerken giebt. Das Urtheil heißt auch eben darum ästhetisch, weil der Bestimmungsgrund desselben kein Begriff, sondern das Gefühl (des innern Sinnes) jener Einhelligkeit im Spiele der Gemüthskräfte ist, sofern sie nur empfunden werden kann. Dagegen wenn man verworrene Begriffe und das objective A 48 Urtheil, das sie zum Grunde hat, wollte ästhetisch nennen, man einen Verstand haben würde, der sinnlich urtheilt, oder einen Sinn, der durch Begriffe seine Objecte vorstellte, welches beides sich widerspricht. Das Vermögen der Begriffe, sie mögen verworren oder deutlich sein, ist der Verstand; und obgleich zum Geschmacksurtheil, als ästhetischem Urtheile, auch (wie zu allen Urtheilen) Verstand gehört, so gehört er zu demselben 229 doch nicht als Vermögen der Erkenntniß eines Gegenstandes, sondern als Vermögen der Bestimmung des Urtheils und seiner Vorstellung (ohne Begriff) nach dem Verhältniß derselben auf das Subject und dessen inneres Gefühl, und zwar sofern dieses Urtheil nach einer allgemeinen Regel möglich ist.

16 Das Geschmacksurtheil, wodurch ein Gegenstand unter der Bedingung eines bestimmten Begriffs für schön erklärt wird, ist nicht rein.

Es giebt zweierlei Arten von Schönheit: freie Schönheit (pulchritudo vaga), oder die bloß anhängende Schönheit (pulchritudo adhaerens). Die erstere setzt keinen Begriff von dem voraus, was der Gegenstand sein soll; die zweite setzt einen solchen und die Vollkommenheit des Gegenstandes nach demselben voraus. Die Arten der erstern heißen (für sich bestehende) Schönheiten dieses oder jenes Dinges; die andere wird, als einem Begriffe A 49 anhängend (bedingte Schönheit), Objecten, die unter dem Begriffe eines besondern Zwecks stehen, beigelegt.

Blumen sind freie Naturschönheiten. Was eine Blume für ein Ding sein soll, weiß außer dem Botaniker schwerlich sonst jemand; und selbst dieser, der daran das Befruchtungsorgan der Pflanze erkennt, nimmt, wenn er darüber durch Geschmack urtheilt, auf diesen Naturzweck keine Rücksicht. Es wird also keine Vollkommenheit von irgend einer Art, keine innere Zweckmäßigkeit, auf welche sich die Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen beziehe, diesem Urtheile zum Grunde gelegt. Viele Vögel (der Papagei, der Colibrit, der Paradiesvogel), eine Menge Schalthiere des Meeres sind für sich Schönheiten, die gar keinem nach Begriffen in Ansehung seines Zwecks bestimmten Gegenstande zukommen, sondern frei und für sich gefallen. So bedeuten die Zeichnungen à la grecque, das Laubwerk zu Einfassungen oder auf Papiertapeten u. s. w. für sich nichts: sie stellen nichts vor, kein Object unter einem bestimmten Begriffe, und sind freie Schönheiten. Man kann auch das, was man in der Musik Phantasieen (ohne Thema) nennt, ja die ganze Musik ohne Text zu derselben Art zählen.

In der Beurtheilung einer freien Schönheit (der bloßen Form nach) ist das Geschmacksurtheil rein. Es ist kein Begriff von irgend einem Zwecke, wozu das Mannigfaltige dem gegebenen Objecte dienen und was 230 dieses also vorstellen solle, vorausgesetzt, wodurch die Freiheit der Einbildungskraft, A 50 die in Beobachtung der Gestalt gleichsam spielt, nur eingeschränkt werden würde.

Allein die Schönheit eines Menschen (und unter dieser Art die eines Mannes oder Weibes oder Kindes), die Schönheit eines Pferdes, eines Gebäudes (als Kirche, Palast, Arsenal oder Gartenhaus) setzt einen Begriff vom Zwecke voraus, welcher bestimmt, was das Ding sein soll, mithin einen Begriff seiner Vollkommenheit, und ist also bloß adhärirende Schönheit. So wie nun die Verbindung des Angenehmen (der Empfindung) mit der Schönheit, die eigentlich nur die Form betrifft, die Reinigkeit des Geschmacksurtheils verhinderte: so thut die Verbindung des Guten (wozu nämlich das Mannigfaltige dem Dinge selbst nach seinem Zwecke gut ist) mit der Schönheit der Reinigkeit desselben Abbruch.

Man würde vieles unmittelbar in der Anschauung Gefallende an einem Gebäude anbringen können, wenn es nur nicht eine Kirche sein sollte; eine Gestalt mit allerlei Schnörkeln und leichten, doch regelmäßigen Zügen, wie die Neuseeländer mit ihrem Tettowiren thun, verschönern können, wenn es nur nicht ein Mensch wäre; und dieser könnte viel feinere Züge und einen gefälligeren, sanftern Umriß der Gesichtsbildung haben, wenn er nur nicht einen Mann, oder gar einen kriegerischen vorstellen sollte.

Nun ist das Wohlgefallen an dem Mannigfaltigen in einem Dinge A 51 in Beziehung auf den innern Zweck, der seine Möglichkeit bestimmt, ein auf einem Begriffe gegründetes Wohlgefallen; das an der Schönheit aber ist ein solches, welches keinen Begriff voraussetzt, sondern mit der Vorstellung, wodurch der Gegenstand gegeben (nicht wodurch er gedacht) wird, unmittelbar verbunden ist. Wenn nun das Geschmacksurtheil in Ansehung des letzteren vom Zwecke in dem ersteren, als Vernunfturtheile abhängig gemacht und dadurch eingeschränkt wird, so ist jenes nicht mehr ein freies und reines Geschmacksurtheil.

Zwar gewinnt der Geschmack durch diese Verbindung des ästhetischen Wohlgefallens mit dem intellectuellen darin, daß er fixirt wird und zwar nicht allgemein ist, ihm aber doch in Ansehung gewisser zweckmäßig bestimmten Objecte Regeln vorgeschrieben werden können. Diese sind aber alsdann auch keine Regeln des Geschmacks, sondern bloß der Vereinbarung des Geschmacks mit der Vernunft, d. i. des Schönen mit dem Guten, durch welche jenes zum Instrument der Absicht in Ansehung des letztern brauchbar wird, um diejenige Gemüthsstimmung, die sich selbst erhält und von 231 subjectiver allgemeiner Gültigkeit ist, derjenigen Denkungsart unterzulegen, die nur durch mühsamen Vorsatz erhalten werden kann, aber objectiv allgemein gültig ist. Eigentlich aber gewinnt weder die Vollkommenheit durch die Schönheit, noch die Schönheit durch die Vollkommenheit; A 52 sondern weil es nicht vermieden werden kann, wenn wir die Vorstellung, wodurch uns ein Gegenstand gegeben wird, mit dem Objecte (in Ansehung dessen, was es sein soll) durch einen Begriff vergleichen, sie zugleich mit der Empfindung im Subjecte zusammen zu halten, so gewinnt das gesammte Vermögen der Vorstellungskraft, wenn beide Gemüthszustände zusammen stimmen.

Ein Geschmacksurtheil würde in Ansehung eines Gegenstandes von bestimmtem innern Zwecke nur alsdann rein sein, wenn der Urtheilende entweder von diesem Zwecke keinen Begriff hätte, oder in seinem Urtheile davon abstrahirte. Aber alsdann würde dieser, ob er gleich ein richtiges Geschmacksurtheil fällte, indem er den Gegenstand als freie Schönheit beurtheilte, dennoch von dem andern, welcher die Schönheit an ihm nur als anhängende Beschaffenheit betrachtet (auf den Zweck des Gegenstandes sieht), getadelt und eines falschen Geschmacks beschuldigt werden, obgleich beide in ihrer Art richtig urtheilen: der eine nach dem, was er vor den Sinnen, der andere nach dem, was er in Gedanken hat. Durch diese Unterscheidung kann man manchen Zwist der Geschmacksrichter über Schönheit beilegen, indem man ihnen zeigt, daß der eine sich an die freie, der andere an die anhängende Schönheit halte, der erstere ein reines, der zweite ein angewandtes Geschmacksurtheil fälle.

17 A 53 Vom Ideale der Schönheit.

Es kann keine objective Geschmacksregel, welche durch Begriffe bestimmte, was schön sei, geben. Denn alles Urtheil aus dieser Quelle ist ästhetisch; d. i. das Gefühl des Subjects und kein Begriff eines Objects ist sein Bestimmungsgrund. Ein Princip des Geschmacks, welches das allgemeine Kriterium des Schönen durch bestimmte Begriffe angäbe, zu suchen, ist eine fruchtlose Bemühung, weil, was gesucht wird, unmöglich und an sich selbst widersprechend ist. Die allgemeine Mittheilbarkeit der Empfindung (des Wohlgefallens oder Mißfallens) und zwar eine solche, die ohne Begriff Statt findet, die Einhelligkeit, so viel möglich, aller Zeiten und 232 Völker in Ansehung dieses Gefühls in der Vorstellung gewisser Gegenstände: ist das empirische, wiewohl schwache und kaum zur Vermuthung zureichende Kriterium der Abstammung eines so durch Beispiele bewährten Geschmacks von dem tief verborgenen, allen Menschen gemeinschaftlichen Grunde der Einhelligkeit in Beurtheilung der Formen, unter denen ihnen Gegenstände gegeben werden.

Daher sieht man einige Producte des Geschmacks als exemplarisch an: nicht als ob Geschmack könne erworben werden, indem er anderen nachahmt. Denn der Geschmack muß ein selbst eigenes Vermögen sein; wer aber ein Muster nachahmt, zeigt, sofern als er es trifft, zwar Geschicklichkeit, A 54 aber nur Geschmack, sofern er dieses Muster selbst beurtheilen kann.⁷ Hieraus folgt aber, daß das höchste Muster, das Urbild des Geschmacks, eine bloße Idee sei, die jeder in sich selbst hervorbringen muß, und wonach er alles, was Object des Geschmacks, was Beispiel der Beurtheilung durch Geschmack sei, und selbst den Geschmack von jedermann beurtheilen muß. Idee bedeutet eigentlich einen Vernunftbegriff und Ideal die Vorstellung eines einzelnen als einer Idee adäquaten Wesens. Daher kann jenes Urbild des Geschmacks, welches freilich auf der unbestimmten Idee der Vernunft von einem Maximum beruht, aber doch nicht durch Begriffe, sondern nur in einzelner Darstellung kann vorgestellt werden, besser das Ideal des Schönen genannt werden, dergleichen wir, wenn wir gleich nicht im Besitze desselben sind, doch in uns hervorzubringen streben. Es wird aber bloß ein Ideal der Einbildungskraft sein, eben darum weil es nicht auf Begriffen, sondern auf der Darstellung beruht; das Vermögen A 55 der Darstellung aber ist die Einbildungskraft. — Wie gelangen wir nun zu einem solchen Ideale der Schönheit? A priori oder empirisch? Imgleichen: welche Gattung des Schönen ist eines Ideals fähig?

Zuerst ist wohl zu bemerken, daß die Schönheit, zu welcher ein Ideal gesucht werden soll, keine vage, sondern durch einen Begriff von objectiver Zweckmäßigkeit fixirte Schönheit sein, folglich keinem Objecte eines ganz reinen, sondern dem eines zum Theil intellectuirten Geschmacksurtheils 233 angehören müsse. D. i. in welcher Art von Gründen der Beurtheilung ein Ideal Statt finden soll, da muß irgend eine Idee der Vernunft nach bestimmten Begriffen zum Grunde liegen, die a priori den Zweck bestimmt, worauf die innere Möglichkeit des Gegenstandes beruht. Ein Ideal schöner Blumen, eines schönen Ameublements, einer schönen Aussicht läßt sich nicht denken. Aber auch von einer bestimmten Zwecken anhängenden Schönheit, z. B. einem schönen Wohnhause, einem schönen Baume, schönen Garten u. s. w., läßt sich kein Ideal vorstellen; vermuthlich weil die Zwecke durch ihren Begriff nicht genug bestimmt und fixirt sind, folglich die Zweckmäßigkeit beinahe so frei ist, als bei der vagen Schönheit. Nur das, was den Zweck seiner Existenz in sich selbst hat, der Mensch, der sich durch Vernunft seine Zwecke selbst bestimmen, oder, wo er sie von der äußern Wahrnehmung hernehmen muß, doch mit wesentlichen und allgemeinen Zwecken zusammenhalten und die Zusammenstimmung mit jenen alsdann A 56 auch ästhetisch beurtheilen kann: dieser Mensch ist also eines Ideals der Schönheit, so wie die Menschheit in seiner Person, als Intelligenz, des Ideals der Vollkommenheit unter allen Gegenständen in der Welt allein fähig.

Hiezu gehören aber zwei Stücke: erstlich die ästhetische Normalidee, welche eine einzelne Anschauung (der Einbildungskraft) ist, die das Richtmaß seiner Beurtheilung, als eines zu einer besonderen Thierspecies gehörigen Dinges, vorstellt; zweitens die Vernunftidee, welche die Zwecke der Menschheit, sofern sie nicht sinnlich vorgestellt werden können, zum Princip der Beurtheilung seiner Gestalt macht, durch welche als ihre Wirkung in der Erscheinung sich jene offenbaren. Die Normalidee muß ihre Elemente zur Gestalt eines Thiers von besonderer Gattung aus der Erfahrung nehmen; aber die größte Zweckmäßigkeit in der Construction der Gestalt, die zum allgemeinen Richtmaß der ästhetischen Beurtheilung jedes Einzelnen dieser Species tauglich wäre, das Bild, was gleichsam absichtlich der Technik der Natur zum Grunde gelegen hat, dem nur die Gattung im Ganzen, aber kein Einzelnes abgesondert adäquat ist, liegt doch bloß in der Idee des Beurtheilenden, welche aber mit ihren Proportionen als ästhetische Idee in einem Musterbilde völlig in concreto dargestellt werden kann. Um, wie dieses zugehe, einigermaßen begreiflich zu A 57 machen (denn wer kann der Natur ihr Geheimniß gänzlich ablocken?), wollen wir eine psychologische Erklärung versuchen.

Es ist anzumerken: daß auf eine uns gänzlich unbegreifliche Art die 234 Einbildungskraft nicht allein die Zeichen für Begriffe gelegentlich, selbst von langer Zeit her, zurückzurufen; sondern auch das Bild und die Gestalt des Gegenstandes aus einer unaussprechlichen Zahl von Gegenständen verschiedener Arten oder auch einer und derselben Art zu reproduciren; ja auch, wenn das Gemüth es auf Vergleichungen anlegt, allem Vermuthen nach wirklich, wenn gleich nicht hinreichend zum Bewußtsein, ein Bild gleichsam auf das andere fallen zu lassen und durch die Congruenz der mehrern von derselben Art ein Mittleres herauszubekommen wisse, welches allen zum gemeinschaftlichen Maße dient. Jemand hat tausend erwachsene Mannspersonen gesehen. Will er nun über die vergleichungsweise zu schätzende Normalgröße urtheilen, so läßt (meiner Meinung nach) die Einbildungskraft eine große Zahl der Bilder (vielleicht alle jene tausend) auf einander fallen; und wenn es mir erlaubt ist, hiebei die Analogie der optischen Darstellung anzuwenden, in dem Raum, wo die meisten sich vereinigen, und innerhalb dem Umrisse, wo der Platz mit der am stärksten aufgetragenen Farbe illuminirt ist, da wird die mittlere Größe kenntlich, die sowohl der Höhe als Breite nach von den äußersten Gränzen der größten und kleinsten Staturen gleich weit entfernt ist; und dies ist die A 58 Statur für einen schönen Mann. (Man könnte ebendasselbe mechanisch heraus bekommen, wenn man alle tausend mäße, ihre Höhen unter sich und Breiten (und Dicken) für sich zusammen addirte und die Summe durch tausend dividirte. Allein die Einbildungskraft thut eben dieses durch einen dynamischen Effect, der aus der vielfältigen Auffassung solcher Gestalten auf das Organ des innern Sinnes entspringt.) Wenn nun auf ähnliche Art für diesen mittlern Mann der mittlere Kopf, für diesen die mittlere Nase u. s. w. gesucht wird, so liegt diese Gestalt der Normalidee des schönen Mannes in dem Lande, wo diese Vergleichung angestellt wird, zum Grunde; daher ein Neger nothwendig unter diesen empirischen Bedingungen eine andere Normalidee der Schönheit der Gestalt haben muß, als ein Weißer, der Chinese eine andere, als der Europäer. Mit dem Muster eines schönen Pferdes oder Hundes (von gewisser Race) würde es eben so gehen. — Diese Normalidee ist nicht aus von der Erfahrung hergenommenen Proportionen, als bestimmten Regeln, abgeleitet; sondern nach ihr werden allererst Regeln der Beurtheilung möglich. Sie ist das zwischen allen einzelnen, auf mancherlei Weise verschiedenen Anschauungen der Individuen schwebende Bild für die ganze Gattung, welches die Natur zum Urbilde ihren Erzeugungen in derselben Species unterlegte, 235 aber in keinem Einzelnen völlig erreicht zu haben scheint. Sie ist keinesweges A 59 das ganze Urbild der Schönheit in dieser Gattung, sondern nur die Form, welche die unnachlaßliche Bedingung aller Schönheit ausmacht, mithin bloß die Richtigkeit in Darstellung der Gattung. Sie ist, wie man Polyklets berühmten Doryphorus nannte, die Regel (eben dazu konnte auch Myrons Kuh in ihrer Gattung gebraucht werden). Sie kann eben darum auch nichts Specifisch-Charakteristisches enthalten; denn sonst wäre sie nicht Normalidee für die Gattung. Ihre Darstellung gefällt auch nicht durch Schönheit, sondern bloß weil sie keiner Bedingung, unter welcher allein ein Ding dieser Gattung schön sein kann, widerspricht. Die Darstellung ist bloß schulgerecht.⁸

Von der Normalidee des Schönen ist doch noch das Ideal desselben unterschieden, welches man lediglich an der menschlichen Gestalt aus schon angeführten Gründen erwarten darf. An dieser nun besteht das Ideal in dem Ausdrucke des Sittlichen, ohne welches der Gegenstand A 60 nicht allgemein und dazu positiv (nicht bloß negativ in einer schulgerechten Darstellung) gefallen würde. Der sichtbare Ausdruck sittlicher Ideen, die den Menschen innerlich beherrschen, kann zwar nur aus der Erfahrung genommen werden; aber ihre Verbindung mit allem dem, was unsere Vernunft mit dem Sittlich-Guten in der Idee der höchsten Zweckmäßigkeit verknüpft, die Seelengüte, oder Reinigkeit, oder Stärke oder Ruhe u. s. w. in körperlicher Äußerung (als Wirkung des Innern) gleichsam sichtbar zu machen: dazu gehören reine Ideen der Vernunft und große Macht der Einbildungskraft in demjenigen vereinigt, welcher sie nur beurtheilen, vielmehr noch wer sie darstellen will. Die Richtigkeit eines solchen Ideals 236 der Schönheit beweiset sich darin: daß es keinem Sinnenreiz sich in das Wohlgefallen an seinem Objecte zu mischen erlaubt und dennoch ein großes Interesse daran nehmen läßt; welches dann beweiset, daß die Beurtheilung nach einem solchen Maßstabe niemals rein ästhetisch sein könne, und die Beurtheilung nach einem Ideale der Schönheit kein bloßes Urtheil des A 61 Geschmacks sei.

Aus diesem dritten Momente geschlossene Erklärung des Schönen.

Schönheit ist Form der Zweckmäßigkeit eines Gegenstandes, sofern sie ohne Vorstellung eines Zwecks an ihm wahrgenommen wird.⁹

Viertes Moment A 62 des Geschmacksurtheils nach der Modalität des Wohlgefallens an dem Gegenstande.

18 Was die Modalität eines Geschmacksurtheils sei.

Von einer jeden Vorstellung kann ich sagen: wenigstens es sei möglich, daß sie (als Erkenntniß) mit einer Lust verbunden sei. Von dem, was ich angenehm nenne, sage ich, daß es in mir wirklich Lust bewirke. Vom Schönen aber denkt man sich, daß es eine nothwendige Beziehung auf das Wohlgefallen habe. Diese Nothwendigkeit nun ist von besonderer Art: nicht eine theoretische objective Nothwendigkeit, wo a priori 237 erkannt werden kann, daß jedermann dieses Wohlgefallen an dem von mir schön genannten Gegenstande fühlen werde; auch nicht eine praktische, wo durch Begriffe eines reinen Vernunftwillens, welcher freihandelnden Wesen zur Regel dient, dieses Wohlgefallen die nothwendige Folge eines objectiven Gesetzes ist und nichts anders bedeutet, als daß man schlechterdings (ohne weitere Absicht) auf gewisse Art handeln solle. Sondern sie kann als Nothwendigkeit, die in einem ästhetischen Urtheile gedacht wird, nur exemplarisch genannt werden, d. i. eine Nothwendigkeit der Beistimmung aller zu einem Urtheil, was als Beispiel einer allgemeinen A 63 Regel, die man nicht angeben kann, angesehen wird. Da ein ästhetisches Urtheil kein objectives und Erkenntnißurtheil ist, so kann diese Nothwendigkeit nicht aus bestimmten Begriffen abgeleitet werden und ist also nicht apodiktisch. Viel weniger kann sie aus der Allgemeinheit der Erfahrung (von einer durchgängigen Einhelligkeit der Urtheile über die Schönheit eines gewissen Gegenstandes) geschlossen werden. Denn nicht allein daß die Erfahrung hiezu schwerlich hinreichend viele Beläge schaffen würde, so läßt sich auf empirische Urtheile kein Begriff der Nothwendigkeit dieser Urtheile gründen.

19 Die subjective Nothwendigkeit, die wir dem Geschmacksurtheile beilegen, ist bedingt.

Das Geschmacksurtheil sinnt jedermann Beistimmung an; und wer etwas für schön erklärt, will, daß jedermann dem vorliegenden Gegenstande Beifall geben und ihn gleichfalls für schön erklären solle. Das Sollen im ästhetischen Urtheile wird also selbst nach allen Datis, die zur Beurtheilung erfordert werden, doch nur bedingt ausgesprochen. Man wirbt um jedes andern Beistimmung, weil man dazu einen Grund hat, der allen gemein ist; auf welche Beistimmung man auch rechnen könnte, wenn man nur immer sicher wäre, daß der Fall unter jenem Grunde als A 64 Regel des Beifalls richtig subsumirt wäre.

20 Die Bedingung der Nothwendigkeit, die ein Geschmacksurtheil vorgiebt, ist die Idee eines Gemeinsinnes.

Wenn Geschmacksurtheile (gleich den Erkenntnißurtheilen) ein bestimmtes objectives Princip hätten, so würde der, welcher sie nach dem 238 letztern fällt, auf unbedingte Nothwendigkeit seines Urtheils Anspruch machen. Wären sie ohne alles Princip, wie die des bloßen Sinnengeschmacks, so würde man sich gar keine Nothwendigkeit derselben in die Gedanken kommen lassen. Also müssen sie ein subjectives Princip haben, welches nur durch Gefühl und nicht durch Begriffe, doch aber allgemeingültig bestimme, was gefalle oder mißfalle. Ein solches Princip aber könnte nur als ein Gemeinsinn angesehen werden, welcher vom gemeinen Verstande, den man bisweilen auch Gemeinsinn (sensus communis) nennt, wesentlich unterschieden ist: indem letzterer nicht nach Gefühl, sondern jederzeit nach Begriffen, wiewohl gemeiniglich nur als nach dunkel vorgestellten Principien, urtheilt.

Also nur unter der Voraussetzung, daß es einen Gemeinsinn gebe (wodurch wir aber keinen äußern Sinn, sondern die Wirkung aus dem freien Spiel unserer Erkenntnißkräfte verstehen), nur unter Voraussetzung, A 65 sage ich, eines solchen Gemeinsinns kann das Geschmacksurtheil gefällt werden.

21 Ob man mit Grunde einen Gemeinsinn voraussetzen könne.

Erkenntnisse und Urtheile müssen sich sammt der Überzeugung, die sie begleitet, allgemein mittheilen lassen; denn sonst käme ihnen keine Übereinstimmung mit dem Object zu: sie wären insgesammt ein bloß subjectives Spiel der Vorstellungskräfte, gerade so wie es der Skepticism verlangt. Sollen sich aber Erkenntnisse mittheilen lassen, so muß sich auch der Gemüthszustand, d. i. die Stimmung der Erkenntnißkräfte zu einer Erkenntniß überhaupt, und zwar diejenige Proportion, welche sich für eine Vorstellung (wodurch uns ein Gegenstand gegeben wird) gebührt, um daraus Erkenntniß zu machen, allgemein mittheilen lassen: weil ohne diese als subjective Bedingung des Erkennens das Erkenntniß als Wirkung nicht entspringen könnte. Dieses geschieht auch wirklich jederzeit, wenn ein gegebener Gegenstand vermittelst der Sinne die Einbildungskraft zur Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen, diese aber den Verstand zur Einheit desselben in Begriffen in Thätigkeit bringt. Aber diese Stimmung der Erkenntnißkräfte hat nach Verschiedenheit der Objecte, die gegeben werden, eine verschiedene Proportion. Gleichwohl aber muß es eine geben, A 66 in welcher dieses innere Verhältniß zur Belebung (einer durch die andere) die zuträglichste für beide Gemüthskräfte in Absicht auf Erkenntniß (gegebener 239 Gegenstände) überhaupt ist; und diese Stimmung kann nicht anders als durch das Gefühl (nicht nach Begriffen) bestimmt werden. Da sich nun diese Stimmung selbst muß allgemein mittheilen lassen, mithin auch das Gefühl derselben (bei einer gegebenen Vorstellung); die allgemeine Mittheilbarkeit eines Gefühls aber einen Gemeinsinn voraussetzt: so wird dieser mit Grunde angenommen werden können, und zwar ohne sich desfalls auf psychologische Beobachtungen zu fußen, sondern als die nothwendige Bedingung der allgemeinen Mittheilbarkeit unserer Erkenntniß, welche in jeder Logik und jedem Princip der Erkenntnisse, das nicht skeptisch ist, vorausgesetzt werden muß.

22 Die Nothwendigkeit der allgemeinen Beistimmung, die in einem Geschmacksurtheil gedacht wird, ist eine subjective Nothwendigkeit, die unter der Voraussetzung eines Gemeinsinns als objectiv vorgestellt wird.

In allen Urtheilen, wodurch wir etwas für schön erklären, verstatten wir keinem anderer Meinung zu sein; ohne gleichwohl unser Urtheil auf A 67 Begriffe, sondern nur auf unser Gefühl zu gründen: welches wir also nicht als Privatgefühl, sondern als ein gemeinschaftliches zum Grunde legen. Nun kann dieser Gemeinsinn zu diesem Behuf nicht auf der Erfahrung gegründet werden; denn er will zu Urtheilen berechtigen, die ein Sollen enthalten: er sagt nicht, daß jedermann mit unserm Urtheile übereinstimmen werde, sondern damit zusammenstimmen solle. Also ist der Gemeinsinn, von dessen Urtheil ich mein Geschmacksurtheil hier als ein Beispiel angebe und weswegen ich ihm exemplarische Gültigkeit beilege, eine bloße idealische Norm, unter deren Voraussetzung man ein Urtheil, welches mit ihr zusammenstimmte, und das in demselben ausgedrückte Wohlgefallen an einem Object für jedermann mit Recht zur Regel machen könnte: weil das Princip, zwar nur subjectiv, dennoch aber, für subjectiv-allgemein (eine jedermann nothwendige Idee) angenommen, was die Einhelligkeit verschiedener Urtheilenden betrifft, gleich einem objectiven allgemeine Beistimmung fordern könnte; wenn man nur sicher wäre, darunter richtig subsumirt zu haben.

Diese unbestimmte Norm eines Gemeinsinns wird von uns wirklich vorausgesetzt: das beweiset unsere Anmaßung Geschmacksurtheile zu fällen. 240 Ob es in der That einen solchen Gemeinsinn als constitutives Princip der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung gebe, oder ein noch höheres Princip der Vernunft es uns nur zum regulativen Princip mache, allererst einen Gemeinsinn A 68 zu höhern Zwecken in uns hervorzubringen; ob also Geschmack ein ursprüngliches und natürliches, oder nur die Idee von einem noch zu erwerbenden und künstlichen Vermögen sei, so daß ein Geschmacksurtheil mit seiner Zumuthung einer allgemeinen Beistimmung in der That nur eine Vernunftforderung sei, eine solche Einhelligkeit der Sinnesart hervorzubringen, und das Sollen, d. i. die objective Nothwendigkeit des Zusammenfließens des Gefühls von jedermann mit jedes seinem besondern, nur die Möglichkeit hierin einträchtig zu werden bedeute, und das Geschmacksurtheil nur von Anwendung dieses Princips ein Beispiel aufstelle: das wollen und können wir hier noch nicht untersuchen, sondern haben für jetzt nur das Geschmacksvermögen in seine Elemente aufzulösen und sie zuletzt in der Idee eines Gemeinsinns zu vereinigen.

Aus dem vierten Moment gefolgerte Erklärung vom Schönen.

Schön ist, was ohne Begriff als Gegenstand eines nothwendigen Wohlgefallens erkannt wird.

Allgemeine Anmerkung zum ersten Abschnitte der Analytik.

Wenn man das Resultat aus den obigen Zergliederungen zieht, so findet sich, daß alles auf den Begriff des Geschmacks herauslaufe: daß er ein Beurtheilungsvermögen eines Gegenstandes in Beziehung auf die A 69 freie Gesetzmäßigkeit der Einbildungskraft sei. Wenn nun im Geschmacksurtheile die Einbildungskraft in ihrer Freiheit betrachtet werden muß, so wird sie erstlich nicht reproductiv, wie sie den Associationsgesetzen unterworfen ist, sondern als productiv und selbstthätig (als Urheberin willkürlicher Formen möglicher Anschauungen) angenommen; und ob sie zwar bei der Auffassung eines gegebenen Gegenstandes der Sinne an eine bestimmte Form dieses Objects gebunden ist und sofern kein freies Spiel (wie im Dichten) hat, so läßt sich doch noch wohl begreifen: daß der Gegenstand ihr gerade eine solche Form an die Hand geben könne, die eine 241 Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen enthält, wie sie die Einbildungskraft, wenn sie sich selbst frei überlassen wäre, in Einstimmung mit der Verstandesgesetzmäßigkeit überhaupt entwerfen würde. Allein daß die Einbildungskraft frei und doch von selbst gesetzmäßig sei, d. i. daß sie eine Autonomie bei sich führe, ist ein Widerspruch. Der Verstand allein giebt das Gesetz. Wenn aber die Einbildungskraft nach einem bestimmten Gesetze zu verfahren genöthigt wird, so wird ihr Product der Form nach durch Begriffe bestimmt, wie es sein soll; aber alsdann ist das Wohlgefallen, wie oben gezeigt, nicht das am Schönen, sondern am Guten (der Vollkommenheit, allenfalls bloß der formalen), und das Urtheil ist kein Urtheil durch Geschmack. Es wird also eine Gesetzmäßigkeit ohne Gesetz und eine subjective Übereinstimmung der Einbildungskraft zum Verstande ohne eine objective, da die Vorstellung auf einen bestimmten Begriff von einem Gegenstande bezogen wird, mit der freien Gesetzmäßigkeit des Verstandes (welche auch Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck genannt worden) und mit der Eigenthümlichkeit eines Geschmacksurtheils allein zusammen bestehen können.

Nun werden geometrisch-regelmäßige Gestalten, eine Cirkelfigur, ein A 70 Quadrat, ein Würfel u. s. w., von Kritikern des Geschmacks gemeiniglich als die einfachsten und unzweifelhaftesten Beispiele der Schönheit angeführt; und dennoch werden sie eben darum regelmäßig genannt, weil man sie nicht anders vorstellen kann als so, daß sie für bloße Darstellungen eines bestimmten Begriffs, der jener Gestalt die Regel vorschreibt (nach der sie allein möglich ist), angesehen werden. Eines von beiden muß also irrig sein: entweder jenes Urtheil der Kritiker, gedachten Gestalten Schönheit beizulegen; oder das unsrige, welches Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Begriff zur Schönheit nöthig findet.

Niemand wird leichtlich einen Menschen von Geschmack dazu nöthig finden, um an einer Cirkelgestalt mehr Wohlgefallen, als an einem kritzlichen Umrisse, an einem gleichseitigen und gleicheckigen Viereck mehr, als an einem schiefen, ungleichseitigen, gleichsam verkrüppelten zu finden; denn dazu gehört nur gemeiner Verstand und gar kein Geschmack. Wo eine Absicht, z. B. die Größe eines Platzes zu beurtheilen, oder das Verhältniß der Theile zu einander und zum Ganzen in einer Eintheilung faßlich zu machen, wahrgenommen wird: da sind regelmäßige Gestalten und zwar die von der einfachsten Art nöthig; und das Wohlgefallen ruht nicht unmittelbar auf dem Anblicke der Gestalt, sondern der Brauchbarkeit derselben 242 zu allerlei möglicher Absicht. Ein Zimmer, dessen Wände schiefe Winkel machen, ein Gartenplatz von solcher Art, selbst alle Verletzung der Symmetrie sowohl in der Gestalt der Thiere (z. B. einäugig zu sein), als der Gebäude oder der Blumenstücke mißfällt, weil es zweckwidrig ist, nicht allein praktisch in Ansehung eines bestimmten Gebrauchs dieser Dinge, sondern auch für die Beurtheilung in allerlei möglicher Absicht; welches der Fall im Geschmacksurtheile nicht ist, welches, wenn es rein ist, Wohlgefallen A 71 oder Mißfallen ohne Rücksicht auf den Gebrauch oder einen Zweck mit der bloßen Betrachtung des Gegenstandes unmittelbar verbindet.

Die Regelmäßigkeit, die zum Begriffe von einem Gegenstande führt, ist zwar die unentbehrliche Bedingung (conditio sine qua non), den Gegenstand in eine einzige Vorstellung zu fassen und das Mannigfaltige in der Form desselben zu bestimmen. Diese Bestimmung ist ein Zweck in Ansehung der Erkenntniß; und in Beziehung auf diese ist sie auch jederzeit mit Wohlgefallen (welches die Bewirkung einer jeden auch bloß problematischen Absicht begleitet) verbunden. Es ist aber alsdann bloß die Billigung der Auflösung, die einer Aufgabe Gnüge thut, und nicht eine freie und unbestimmt-zweckmäßige Unterhaltung der Gemüthskräfte mit dem, was wir schön nennen, und wobei der Verstand der Einbildungskraft und nicht diese jenem zu Diensten ist.

An einem Dinge, das nur durch eine Absicht möglich ist, einem Gebäude, selbst einem Thier muß die Regelmäßigkeit, die in der Symmetrie besteht, die Einheit der Anschauung ausdrücken, welche den Begriff des Zwecks begleitet, und gehört mit zum Erkenntnisse. Aber wo nur ein freies Spiel der Vorstellungskräfte (doch unter der Bedingung, daß der Verstand dabei keinen Anstoß leide) unterhalten werden soll, in Lustgärten, Stubenverzierung, allerlei geschmackvollem Geräthe u. d. gl., wird die Regelmäßigkeit, die sich als Zwang ankündigt, so viel möglich vermieden; daher der englische Geschmack in Gärten, der Barockgeschmack an Möbeln die Freiheit der Einbildungskraft wohl eher bis zur Annäherung zum Grotesken treibt und in dieser Absonderung von allem Zwange der Regel eben den Fall setzt, wo der Geschmack in Entwürfen der Einbildungskraft seine A 72 größte Vollkommenheit zeigen kann.

Alles Steif-Regelmäßige (was der mathematischen Regelmäßigkeit nahe kommt) hat das Geschmackwidrige an sich: daß es keine lange Unterhaltung mit der Betrachtung desselben gewährt, sondern, sofern es nicht 243 ausdrücklich das Erkenntniß, oder einen bestimmten praktischen Zweck zur Absicht hat, lange Weile macht. Dagegen ist das, womit Einbildungskraft ungesucht und zweckmäßig spielen kann, uns jederzeit neu, und man wird seines Anblicks nicht überdrüssig. Marsden in seiner Beschreibung von Sumatra macht die Anmerkung, daß die freien Schönheiten der Natur den Zuschauer daselbst überall umgeben und daher wenig Anziehendes mehr für ihn haben: dagegen ein Pfeffergarten, wo die Stangen, an denen sich dieses Gewächs rankt, in Parallellinien Alleen zwischen sich bilden, wenn er ihn mitten in einem Walde antraf, für ihn viel Reiz hatte; und schließt daraus, daß wilde, dem Anscheine nach regellose Schönheit nur dem zur Abwechselung gefalle, der sich an der regelmäßigen satt gesehen hat. Allein er durfte nur den Versuch machen, sich einen Tag bei seinem Pfeffergarten aufzuhalten, um inne zu werden, daß, wenn der Verstand durch die Regelmäßigkeit sich in die Stimmung zur Ordnung, die er allerwärts bedarf, versetzt hat, ihn der Gegenstand nicht länger unterhalte, vielmehr der Einbildungskraft einen lästigen Zwang anthue: wogegen die dort an Mannigfaltigkeiten bis zur Üppigkeit verschwenderische Natur, die keinem Zwange künstlicher Regeln unterworfen ist, seinem Geschmacke für beständig Nahrung geben könne. — Selbst der Gesang der Vögel, den wir unter keine musikalische Regel bringen können, scheint mehr Freiheit und darum mehr für den Geschmack zu enthalten, als selbst ein menschlicher Gesang, der nach allen Regeln der Tonkunst geführt wird: weil man A 73 des letztern, wenn er oft und lange Zeit wiederholt wird, weit eher überdrüssig wird. Allein hier vertauschen wir vermuthlich unsere Theilnehmung an der Lustigkeit eines kleinen beliebten Thierchens mit der Schönheit seines Gesanges, der, wenn er vom Menschen (wie dies mit dem Schlagen der Nachtigall bisweilen geschieht) ganz genau nachgeahmt wird, unserm Ohre ganz geschmacklos zu sein dünkt.

Noch sind schöne Gegenstände von schönen Aussichten auf Gegenstände (die öfter der Entfernung wegen nicht mehr deutlich erkannt werden können) zu unterscheiden. In den letztern scheint der Geschmack nicht sowohl an dem, was die Einbildungskraft in diesem Felde auffaßt, als vielmehr an dem, was sie hiebei zu dichten Anlaß bekommt, d. i. an den eigentlichen Phantasieen, womit sich das Gemüth unterhält, indessen daß es durch die Mannigfaltigkeit, auf die das Auge stößt, continuirlich erweckt wird, zu haften; so wie etwa bei dem Anblick der veränderlichen Gestalten eines Kaminfeuers oder eines rieselnden Baches, welche beide keine 244 Schönheiten sind, aber doch für die Einbildungskraft einen Reiz bei sich führen, weil sie ihr freies Spiel unterhalten.

4 Die Definition des Geschmacks, welche hier zum Grunde gelegt wird, ist: daß er das Vermögen der Beurtheilung des Schönen sei. Was aber dazu erfordert wird, um einen Gegenstand schön zu nennen, das muß die Analyse der Urtheile des Geschmacks entdecken. Die Momente, worauf diese Urtheilskraft in ihrer Reflexion Acht hat, habe ich nach Anleitung der logischen Functionen zu urtheilen aufgesucht (denn im Geschmacksurtheile ist immer noch eine Beziehung auf den Verstand enthalten). Die der Qualität habe ich zuerst in Betrachtung gezogen, weil das ästhetische Urtheil über das Schöne auf diese zuerst Rücksicht nimmt.

5 Ein Urtheil über einen Gegenstand des Wohlgefallens kann ganz uninteressirt, aber doch sehr interessant sein, d. i. es gründet sich auf keinem Interesse, aber es bringt ein Interesse hervor; dergleichen sind alle reine moralische Urtheile. Aber die Geschmacksurtheile begründen an sich auch gar kein Interesse. Nur in der Gesellschaft wird es interessant, Geschmack zu haben, wovon der Grund in der Folge angezeigt werden wird.

6 Eine Verbindlichkeit zum Genießen ist eine offenbare Ungereimtheit. Eben das muß also auch eine vorgegebene Verbindlichkeit zu allen Handlungen sein, die zu ihrem Ziele blos das Genießen haben: dieses mag nun so geistig ausgedacht (oder verbrämt) sein, wie es wolle, und wenn es auch ein mystischer, sogenannter himmlischer Genuß wäre.

7 Muster des Geschmacks in Ansehung der redenden Künste müssen in einer todten und gelehrten Sprache abgefaßt sein: das erste, um nicht die Veränderung erdulden zu müssen, welche die lebenden unvermeidlicher Weise trifft, daß edle Ausdrücke platt, gewöhnliche veraltet und neugeschaffene in einen nur kurz daurenden Umlauf gebracht werden; das zweite, damit sie eine Grammatik habe, welche keinem muthwilligen Wechsel der Mode unterworfen sei, sondern ihre unveränderliche Regel hat.

8 Man wird finden, daß ein vollkommen regelmäßiges Gesicht, welches der Maler ihm zum Modell zu sitzen bitten möchte, gemeiniglich nichts sagt: weil es nichts Charakteristisches enthält, also mehr die Idee der Gattung, als das Specifische einer Person ausdrückt. Das Charakteristische von dieser Art, was übertrieben ist, d. i. welches der Normalidee (der Zweckmäßigkeit der Gattung) selbst Abbruch thut, heißt Caricatur. Auch zeigt die Erfahrung, daß jene ganz regelmäßigen Gesichter im Innern gemeiniglich auch nur einen mittelmäßigen Menschen verrathen; vermuthlich (wenn angenommen werden darf, daß die Natur im Äußeren die Proportionen des Inneren ausdrücke) deswegen: weil, wenn keine von den Gemüthsanlagen über diejenige Proportion hervorstechend ist, die erfordert wird, bloß einen fehlerfreien Menschen auszumachen, nichts von dem, was man Genie nennt, erwartet werden darf, in welchem die Natur von ihren gewöhnlichen Verhältnissen der Gemüthskräfte zum Vortheil einer einzigen abzugehen scheint.

9 Man könnte wider diese Erklärung als Instanz anführen: daß es Dinge giebt, an denen man eine zweckmäßige Form sieht, ohne an ihnen einen Zweck zu erkennen; z. B. die öfter aus alten Grabhügeln gezogenen, mit einem Loche als zu einem Hefte versehenen steinernen Geräthe, die, ob sie zwar in ihrer Gestalt eine Zweckmäßigkeit deutlich verrathen, für die man den Zweck nicht kennt, darum gleichwohl nicht für schön erklärt werden. Allein, daß man sie für ein Kunstwerk ansieht, ist schon genug, um gestehen zu müssen, daß man ihre Figur auf irgend eine Absicht und einen bestimmten Zweck bezieht. Daher auch gar kein unmittelbares Wohlgefallen an ihrer Anschauung. Eine Blume hingegen, z. B. eine Tulpe, wird für schön gehalten, weil eine gewisse Zweckmäßigkeit, die so, wie wir sie beurtheilen, auf gar keinen Zweck bezogen wird, in ihrer Wahrnehmung angetroffen wird.

Musean translation

A complete machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.

First Part. Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.

First Section. 203 Analytic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment.

First Book. Analytic of the Beautiful.

First Moment of the Judgment of Taste⁴, According to Quality.

1 The Judgment of Taste Is Aesthetic.

To distinguish whether something is beautiful or not, we refer the representation not through the understanding to the object for cognition, but through the imagination (perhaps combined with the understanding) A 4 to the subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The judgment of taste is therefore no cognitive judgment, hence not logical but aesthetic, by which we understand a judgment whose determining ground can be nothing other than subjective. Any relation of representations, even of sensations, can be objective (and then it signifies the real element of an empirical representation); only the relation to 204 the feeling of pleasure and displeasure cannot, for through it nothing at all is designated in the object. Rather, in it the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation.

To comprehend a regular, purposive building with one's faculty of cognition (whether in a distinct or a confused mode of representation) is something quite different from being conscious of this representation with a sensation of satisfaction. Here the representation is referred entirely to the subject, and indeed to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This grounds a quite special faculty of distinguishing and judging that contributes nothing to cognition, but only holds the given representation in the subject A 5 against the entire faculty of representations, of which the mind becomes conscious in feeling its state. Given representations in a judgment can be empirical (hence aesthetic); but the judgment made through them is logical if in that judgment they are referred only to the object. Conversely, even if the given representations were rational, but in a judgment were referred solely to the subject (its feeling), they are to that extent always aesthetic.

2 The Satisfaction That Determines the Judgment of Taste Is Without Any Interest.

Interest is the name given to the satisfaction we connect with the representation of an object's existence. Such satisfaction therefore always also has a relation to the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground or as necessarily connected with that ground. But when the question is whether something is beautiful, we do not want to know whether we or anyone else have, or could even have, any concern for the thing's existence; rather, we want to know how we judge it in mere contemplation (intuition or reflection). If someone asks whether I find the palace I see before me A 6 beautiful, I may indeed say that I dislike things made merely to be gaped at; or, like that Iroquois sachem, that nothing in Paris pleases me more than the eating houses. I may even rail, in true Rousseauian fashion, against the vanity of the great who spend the people's sweat on such dispensable things. I can 205 finally quite easily convince myself that if I were on an uninhabited island, with no hope of ever returning to human society, and could conjure up such a splendid building by a mere wish, I would not even take that trouble if I already had a hut comfortable enough for me. All this may be conceded and approved; only it is not what is at issue now. We want to know only whether the mere representation of the object is accompanied in me by satisfaction, however indifferent I may be to the existence of the object of this representation. It is easy to see that, to say it is beautiful and to prove that I have taste, what matters is what I make of this representation within myself, not how I depend on the object's existence. Everyone must admit that a judgment of beauty into which the slightest interest enters is very partial and no pure judgment of taste. To play the judge in matters of taste, one must not be in the least partial to the thing's existence, but entirely indifferent A 7 in this respect.

We can best elucidate this proposition, which is of particular importance, by contrasting the pure, disinterested⁵ satisfaction in a judgment of taste with satisfaction connected with interest—especially if at the same time we can be certain that there are no more kinds of interest than those about to be named.

3 Satisfaction in the Agreeable Is Connected with Interest.

Agreeable is what pleases the senses in sensation. Here at once an opportunity arises to point out and criticize a very common confusion between the two meanings the word sensation can have. All satisfaction, people say or think, is itself sensation (of a pleasure). Consequently 206 everything that pleases is agreeable precisely in pleasing (and according to its A 8 different degrees or its relations to other agreeable sensations, it is charming, delightful, gratifying, joyful, and so forth). But if this is conceded, then impressions of the senses that determine inclination, principles of reason that determine the will, and mere reflected forms of intuition that determine judgment are entirely alike as regards their effect on the feeling of pleasure. For this effect would be agreeableness in the sensation of one's state; and since all cultivation of our faculties must ultimately aim at the practical and unite in it as their goal, we could expect of them no other assessment of things and their worth than one consisting in the enjoyment they promise. How they attain this would in the end not matter at all; and since only the choice of means could make a difference here, people could certainly accuse one another of folly and lack of understanding, but never of baseness and malice. For all, each according to his way of seeing things, would be pursuing one goal, which for everyone is enjoyment.

When a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation, this expression means something quite different from what it means when I call the representation of a thing (through the senses, as a receptivity belonging to the faculty of cognition) sensation. For in the latter A 9 case the representation is referred to the object, but in the former solely to the subject, and serves no cognition at all, not even that by which the subject cognizes itself.

In the definition above, however, by sensation we mean an objective representation of the senses; and to avoid the constant risk of being misunderstood, we shall call what must always remain merely subjective and can never constitute a representation of an object by the otherwise customary name of feeling. The green color of meadows belongs to objective sensation, as the perception of an object of sense; its agreeableness, however, belongs to subjective sensation, through which no object is represented—that is, to feeling, through which the object is considered as an object of satisfaction (which is no cognition of it).

That my judgment of an object by which I declare it 207 agreeable expresses an interest in it is already clear from the fact that, through sensation, it arouses a desire for objects of that kind. Hence the satisfaction presupposes not merely the judgment about the object, but the relation of its existence to my state insofar as that state is affected by such an object. Thus we say of the agreeable not merely that it pleases, but that it gratifies. It is not A 10 mere approval that I give it; rather, inclination is produced through it. And what is agreeable in the liveliest way is so far from requiring any judgment about the character of the object that those who aim only at enjoyment (for this is the word that designates the inwardness of gratification) gladly spare themselves all judging.

4 Satisfaction in the Good Is Connected with Interest.

Good is what pleases through reason by means of the mere concept. We call some things good for something (the useful), which please only as means; others we call good in themselves, which please for their own sake. Both always contain the concept of an end, hence the relation of reason to willing (at least possible willing), and consequently a satisfaction in the existence of an object or an action—that is, some interest.

To find something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is supposed to be, that is, have a concept of it. To find beauty in something, I do not need this. Flowers, free designs, lines aimlessly interwoven under the A 11 name of foliage, signify nothing, depend on no determinate concept, and yet please. Satisfaction in the beautiful must depend on reflection upon an object leading to some concept (undetermined which), and is thereby also distinguished from the agreeable, which rests entirely on sensation.

To be sure, the agreeable seems in many cases identical with the good. Thus people commonly say: all enjoyment (especially lasting enjoyment) is good in itself—which amounts roughly to saying that being lastingly agreeable and being good are the same. But one soon notices that this is only a mistaken substitution of words, since the concepts peculiar to these expressions can by no means 208 be exchanged for one another. The agreeable, which as such represents the object solely in relation to sense, must first be brought under principles of reason through the concept of an end in order to be called good as an object of the will. But that this is an entirely different relation to satisfaction when I call what gratifies me good as well can be seen from this: with the good the question is always whether it is merely mediately good or immediately good (useful or good in itself); whereas with the agreeable this question cannot arise at all, since the word always means something that pleases immediately. (The same holds also for what A 12 I call beautiful.)

Even in the most ordinary speech we distinguish the agreeable from the good. Of a dish whose flavor is heightened by spices and other additions, we say without hesitation that it is agreeable, while admitting that it is not good: for although it immediately gratifies the senses, it displeases when considered mediately, that is, through reason, which looks to the consequences. Even in judging health we can still observe this distinction. Health is immediately agreeable to everyone who possesses it (at least negatively, as the absence of all bodily pain). But to say that it is good, we must also direct it through reason toward ends: namely, that it is a state that makes us ready for all our occupations. Finally, with regard to happiness, everyone believes he can call the greatest sum (in both quantity and duration) of life's agreeable things a true good, indeed the highest good. But reason resists this as well. Agreeableness is enjoyment. If enjoyment alone were the aim, it would be foolish to be scrupulous about the means that procure it, whether it were attained passively through nature's generosity or through our own activity and action. But reason will never be persuaded that the existence of a human being who lives merely (and A 13 is ever so busy toward this end) to enjoy has a value in itself—even if, as a means to enjoyment, he were as helpful as possible to others, all of whom likewise aim only at enjoyment, precisely because through sympathy he shared in every enjoyment. Only through what he does without regard to enjoyment, in full freedom and independently of what nature could also provide him passively, does he give his existence as the existence of a person 209 an absolute worth; and happiness, with all its fullness of agreeableness, is far from being an unconditional good⁶.

But despite all these differences between the agreeable and the good, both agree in always being connected with an interest in their object—not only the agreeable, § 3, and the mediately good (the useful), which pleases as a means to some agreeableness, but also what is good absolutely and in every respect, namely the morally good, which carries the highest interest with it. For the good is the object of the will (that is, A 14 of a faculty of desire determined by reason). But to will something and to take satisfaction in its existence—that is, to take an interest in it—are identical.

5 Comparison of the Three Specifically Different Kinds of Satisfaction.

The agreeable and the good both have a relation to the faculty of desire and to that extent carry with them, the former a pathologically conditioned satisfaction (through incitements, stimuli), the latter a pure practical satisfaction. This satisfaction is determined not merely through the representation of the object, but also through the represented connection of the subject with its existence. Not merely the object, but its existence too, pleases. By contrast, the judgment of taste is merely contemplative: a judgment that, indifferent to the existence of an object, only compares its character with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. But this contemplation itself is not directed toward concepts either; for the judgment of taste is no cognitive judgment (neither theoretical nor practical), and hence is neither grounded on concepts nor aimed at them.

The agreeable, the beautiful, and the good thus designate three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, in A 15 210 reference to which we distinguish objects or modes of representation from one another. Nor are the expressions appropriate to each, by which we designate satisfaction in them, the same. Someone calls agreeable what gratifies him; beautiful, what merely pleases him; good, what is esteemed, approved—that is, in which he places an objective worth. Agreeableness holds also for nonrational animals; beauty only for human beings, that is, animal yet rational beings, and not merely as rational beings (for example, spirits), but at the same time as animal beings; the good, however, holds for every rational being in general. This proposition can receive its full justification and explanation only later. We may say that among all these three kinds of satisfaction, that of taste in the beautiful alone is a disinterested and free satisfaction; for no interest, neither of sense nor of reason, compels approval. Thus we could say that satisfaction in the three cases mentioned relates to inclination, favor, or respect. For favor is the only free satisfaction. An object of inclination, and one that a law of reason enjoins us to desire, leave us no freedom to make something into an object of pleasure for ourselves. Every interest presupposes a need or produces one A 16; and as a determining ground of approval, it no longer leaves the judgment about the object free.

As regards the interest of inclination in the agreeable, everyone says that hunger is the best cook, and people with a healthy appetite relish anything edible; hence such satisfaction proves no choice according to taste. Only when the need has been satisfied can one distinguish who among many has taste and who does not. Similarly there are manners (conduct) without virtue, politeness without goodwill, propriety without integrity, and so forth. For where the moral law speaks, there is objectively no longer any free choice concerning what is to be done; and to show taste in one's conduct (or in judging that of others) is something quite different from expressing one's moral way of thinking. The latter contains a command and produces a need, whereas moral taste merely plays with the objects of satisfaction without attaching itself to any one of them.

Definition of the Beautiful Derived from the First Moment. 211

Taste is the faculty for judging an object or a mode of representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest. The object of such a satisfaction is called beautiful.

Second Moment A 17 of the Judgment of Taste, Namely According to Its Quantity.

6 The Beautiful Is What, Without Concepts, Is Represented as the Object of a Universal Satisfaction.

This definition of the beautiful can be derived from the preceding definition of it as an object of satisfaction without any interest. For what someone is conscious of taking satisfaction in without any interest he cannot judge otherwise than as having to contain a ground of satisfaction for everyone. For since it is not grounded on any inclination of the subject (or on any other considered interest), but the person judging feels himself entirely free with regard to the satisfaction he accords the object, he can discover no private conditions as grounds of satisfaction to which his subject alone would be attached. He must therefore regard it as grounded in what he can also presuppose in everyone else; consequently, he must believe he has reason to expect a similar satisfaction from everyone. He will therefore speak of the beautiful as though beauty A 18 were a property of the object and the judgment logical (constituting cognition of the object through concepts of it), although the judgment is only aesthetic and contains merely a relation of the object's representation to the subject. This is because it nevertheless resembles a logical judgment in allowing us to presuppose its validity for everyone. But this universality cannot spring from concepts either. For there is no passage from concepts to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure (except in pure practical laws, which, however, carry an interest with them, such as is not connected with a pure judgment of taste 212). Consequently a judgment of taste, with the consciousness that all interest has been set aside in it, must carry a claim to validity for everyone without a universality directed toward objects; that is, a claim to subjective universality must be connected with it.

7 Comparison of the Beautiful with the Agreeable and the Good through the Above Characteristic.

With regard to the agreeable, everyone acknowledges that his judgment, which he grounds on a private feeling and through which he says of an object that it pleases him, is also restricted to his own person alone. Thus he is quite content if, when he says that Canary wine A 19 is agreeable, someone else corrects his expression and reminds him that he should say: it is agreeable to me. This holds not only for the taste of the tongue, palate, and throat, but also for whatever may be agreeable to each person's eyes and ears. To one person violet is gentle and lovely, to another dead and lifeless. One loves the sound of wind instruments, another that of strings. To argue about this with the intention of condemning another's judgment, which differs from our own, as incorrect—as though it were logically opposed to ours—would be folly. With regard to the agreeable, therefore, the principle holds: everyone has his own taste (of the senses).

With the beautiful it is quite otherwise. It would, on the contrary, be ridiculous if someone who prided himself on his taste thought to justify himself by saying: this object (the building we see, the clothes that person wears, the concert we hear, the poem submitted for judgment) is beautiful for me. For he must not call it beautiful if it pleases only him. Many things may have charm and agreeableness for him; no one concerns himself with that. But when he declares something beautiful, he expects the very same satisfaction from others: he judges not merely for himself, but for A 20 everyone, and then speaks of beauty as though it were a property of things. Thus he says: the thing is beautiful. He does not count on others agreeing with his judgment of satisfaction 213 because he has repeatedly found them in agreement with his own; rather, he demands it of them. He censures them if they judge otherwise, and denies them the taste he nevertheless requires them to have. To this extent we cannot say that everyone has his particular taste. That would amount to saying that there is no taste at all—that is, no aesthetic judgment that could rightfully claim everyone's assent.

Nevertheless, even with regard to the agreeable we find that people can be unanimous in judging it, and that in view of this unanimity some are denied taste and others granted it—not in the sense of an organic sense, but as a faculty of judging the agreeable in general. Thus we say that someone who knows how to entertain his guests with agreeable things (enjoyment through all the senses) in such a way that all are pleased has taste. But here universality is taken only comparatively; there are only general rules (as all empirical rules are), not universal rules, which the judgment of taste about the beautiful undertakes or claims to provide. It A 21 is a judgment in relation to sociability, insofar as sociability rests on empirical rules. With regard to the good, judgments likewise rightly claim validity for everyone; but the good is represented as an object of universal satisfaction only through a concept, which is the case neither with the agreeable nor with the beautiful.

8 The Universality of Satisfaction Is Represented in a Judgment of Taste Only as Subjective.

This particular determination of the universality of an aesthetic judgment, found in a judgment of taste, is a remarkable feature—not indeed for the logician, but for the transcendental philosopher. It calls for no small effort on his part to discover its origin, but in return reveals a property of our faculty of cognition that would have remained unknown without this analysis.

First we must become fully convinced that through the 214 judgment of taste (about the beautiful) we expect everyone to take satisfaction in an object, yet without grounding ourselves on a concept (for then it would be the good); and that this claim to universal validity A 22 belongs so essentially to a judgment by which we declare something beautiful that, without thinking such validity in it, no one would ever think of using this expression. Instead, everything that pleases without a concept would be counted among the agreeable, concerning which everyone is allowed his own opinion and no one expects another to agree with his judgment of taste—something that nevertheless always happens in judgments of taste about beauty. I can call the first the taste of sense, the second the taste of reflection: the former makes merely private judgments, the latter supposedly generally valid (public) judgments; but both make aesthetic (not practical) judgments about an object merely with regard to the relation of its representation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Now it is indeed strange that, whereas experience not only shows that the judgment of the taste of sense (of pleasure or displeasure in something) does not hold universally, but everyone is also of his own accord modest enough not to expect this agreement of others (although a very extensive unanimity is in fact often found even in these judgments), the taste of reflection, although experience teaches that it too is often enough rebuffed in its claim to the universal validity of its judgment (about the beautiful) for everyone, can nevertheless find it possible—as it A 23 actually does—to represent judgments that could universally demand this agreement. It actually expects such agreement of everyone for each of its judgments of taste, without those judging disputing the possibility of such a claim, but merely failing to agree in particular cases about the correct application of this faculty.

Here we must first observe that a universality not resting on concepts of the object (even if only empirical ones) is not logical at all, but aesthetic: that is, it contains no objective quantity of the judgment, but only a subjective one. For this I also use the expression common validity, which designates the validity for every subject of the relation of a representation not to the faculty of cognition, but to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. (The same expression can also be used for the logical quantity of a judgment, 215 provided one adds objective universal validity, to distinguish it from merely subjective validity, which is always aesthetic.)

Now an objectively universally valid judgment is always subjectively valid as well: if the judgment holds for everything contained under a given concept, it also holds for everyone who represents an object through that concept. But from subjective universal validity—that is, aesthetic validity, which rests on no concept A 24—we cannot infer logical validity, because judgments of that kind do not concern the object at all. For precisely this reason, however, the aesthetic universality attributed to a judgment must also be of a special kind: it does not connect the predicate of beauty with the concept of the object, considered in its whole logical sphere, yet it extends that predicate over the whole sphere of those who judge.

With regard to logical quantity, all judgments of taste are singular judgments. For since I must compare the object immediately with my feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and not through concepts, these judgments cannot have the quantity of objectively universally valid judgments. Yet if, according to the conditions determining the judgment of taste, the singular representation of its object is transformed through comparison into a concept, a logically universal judgment can arise from it. For example, through a judgment of taste I declare the rose I am looking at beautiful. By contrast, the judgment arising from the comparison of many singular judgments—roses in general are beautiful—is now stated not merely as an aesthetic judgment, but as a logical judgment grounded on an aesthetic one. Now the judgment that the rose is agreeable (in its scent) is also aesthetic and singular, but it is not a judgment of taste: it is a judgment of sense. It differs from the former in this: the judgment of taste carries with it an aesthetic A 25 quantity of universality, that is, validity for everyone, which cannot be found in a judgment about the agreeable. Only judgments about the good, although they too determine satisfaction in an object, have logical and not merely aesthetic universality; for they hold of the object as cognitions of it, and therefore for everyone.

If objects are judged merely according to concepts, all representation of beauty is lost. Thus there can also be no rule according to which someone should be compelled to acknowledge something as beautiful. Whether 216 a garment, a house, or a flower is beautiful is not a judgment one allows reasons or principles to talk one into. One wants to submit the object to one's own eyes, as though one's satisfaction depended on sensation; and yet, when one then calls the object beautiful, one believes one has a universal voice on one's side and claims everyone's agreement, whereas every private sensation would decide only for the observer alone and his satisfaction.

Here, then, we see that in the judgment of taste nothing is postulated but such a universal voice concerning satisfaction without the mediation of concepts; hence the possibility of an A 26 aesthetic judgment that can at the same time be considered valid for everyone. The judgment of taste itself does not postulate everyone's agreement (for only a logically universal judgment can do this, because it can adduce grounds); it only expects this agreement of everyone, as a case of the rule concerning which it awaits confirmation not from concepts but from the concurrence of others. The universal voice is therefore only an idea (what it rests on is not yet being investigated here). Whether someone who believes he is making a judgment of taste actually judges in accordance with this idea may be uncertain; but that he refers his judgment to it, and hence intends it to be a judgment of taste, he announces through the expression beauty. For himself, however, he can become certain of this through the mere consciousness of having separated everything belonging to the agreeable and the good from the satisfaction that remains to him; and this is all for which he promises himself everyone's assent—a claim to which, under these conditions, he would also be entitled, if only he did not so often fail to meet them and thereby make an erroneous judgment of taste.

9 A 27 Investigation of the Question Whether, in a Judgment of Taste, the Feeling of Pleasure Precedes the Judging of the Object, or the Judging Precedes the Feeling.

The solution of this problem is the key to the critique of taste and therefore deserves all our attention.

If pleasure in the given object came first, and only its 217 universal communicability were to be attributed in the judgment of taste to the representation of the object, such a procedure would contradict itself. For such pleasure would be nothing but mere agreeableness in the sensation of sense, and hence by its nature could have only private validity, since it would depend immediately on the representation through which the object is given.

Thus it is the universal communicability of the state of mind in the given representation that must, as the subjective condition of the judgment of taste, underlie that judgment and have pleasure in the object as its consequence. But nothing can be universally communicated except cognition and representation insofar as it belongs to cognition. For only to this extent is the latter objective, and only thereby does it have a universal point of reference with which everyone's power of representation is compelled to agree A 28. Now if the determining ground of the judgment about this universal communicability of the representation is to be thought as merely subjective, namely without a concept of the object, it can be nothing other than the state of mind found in the relation of the powers of representation to one another, insofar as they refer a given representation to cognition in general.

The cognitive powers brought into play through this representation are here in free play, because no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. Thus the state of mind in this representation must be that of a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation with a given representation for cognition in general. Now for a representation through which an object is given to become cognition at all, imagination is required to combine the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of the concept that unites the representations. This state of a free play of the cognitive faculties in a representation through which an object is given must be universally communicable, because cognition, as a determination of the object with which given representations (in whatever subject) ought to agree A 29, is the only mode of representation valid for everyone.

The subjective universal communicability of the mode of representation in a judgment of taste, since it is to occur without presupposing a determinate concept, can be nothing other than the state of mind in the 218 free play of imagination and understanding (insofar as they harmonize with each other as is required for cognition in general). For we are conscious that this subjective relation, suited to cognition in general, must be valid for everyone and hence universally communicable, just as every determinate cognition is, which nevertheless always rests on that relation as its subjective condition.

This merely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the object, or of the representation through which it is given, now precedes the pleasure in it and is the ground of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties. But it is solely on that universality of the subjective conditions of judging objects that this universal subjective validity of the satisfaction rests, which we connect with the representation of the object we call beautiful.

That being able to communicate one's state of mind, even only with regard to the cognitive faculties, carries pleasure with it could easily be demonstrated from the human being's natural propensity to sociability (empirically A 30 and psychologically). But that is not enough for our purpose. In a judgment of taste we expect the pleasure we feel of everyone else as necessary, as though, when we call something beautiful, it were to be regarded as a property of the object determined in it according to concepts—although beauty, without relation to the subject's feeling, is nothing in itself. But we must reserve the discussion of this question until we answer the question whether and how aesthetic judgments are possible a priori.

For now we are still occupied with the lesser question: in what way do we become conscious in a judgment of taste of a reciprocal subjective agreement of the cognitive powers with one another—aesthetically, through mere inner sense and sensation, or intellectually, through consciousness of our intentional activity in setting them into play?

If the given representation occasioning the judgment of taste were a concept that united understanding and imagination in judging the object into a cognition of it, then consciousness of this relation would be intellectual (as in the objective schematism of judgment treated in the Critique). But then the judgment would not be made in relation to pleasure and displeasure 219, and hence would not be a judgment of taste. Now, however, the judgment of taste A 31 determines the object independently of concepts with regard to satisfaction and the predicate of beauty. Thus that subjective unity of the relation can make itself known only through sensation. The enlivening of both faculties (imagination and understanding) to an activity that is indeterminate, yet, through the occasion of the given representation, harmonious—namely the activity belonging to cognition in general—is the sensation whose universal communicability the judgment of taste postulates. An objective relation can indeed only be thought; yet insofar as it is subjective in its conditions, it can nevertheless be sensed in its effect on the mind. And in a relation grounded on no concept (such as that of the powers of representation to a faculty of cognition in general), no consciousness of it is possible other than through the sensation of its effect: the facilitated play of the two mental powers (imagination and understanding), enlivened through mutual harmony. A representation that, as singular and without comparison with others, nevertheless agrees with the conditions of universality, which constitutes the task of the understanding in general, brings the cognitive faculties into the proportionate attunement that we require for all cognition and therefore also regard as valid for everyone destined to judge through understanding and A 32 senses in combination (for every human being).

Definition of the Beautiful Derived from the Second Moment.

Beautiful is what pleases universally without a concept.

Third Moment of Judgments of Taste According to the Relation of the Ends Taken into Consideration in Them.

10 On Purposiveness in General.

If we wish to explain what an end is according to its transcendental determinations (without presupposing anything empirical, such as the feeling of pleasure 220), then an end is the object of a concept insofar as the concept is regarded as the cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility); and the causality of a concept with regard to its object is purposiveness (final form). Thus where not merely the cognition of an object, but the object itself (its form or existence), as an effect, is thought as possible only through a concept of that effect, we think an end. The representation of the effect is here the determining ground of its cause A 33 and precedes it. Consciousness of a representation's causality with a view to the subject's state, so as to maintain the subject in that state, can here designate in general what is called pleasure; whereas displeasure is that representation which contains the ground for determining the state of representations into its own opposite (for restraining or removing them).

The faculty of desire, insofar as it can be determined only through concepts—that is, to act in conformity with the representation of an end—would be the will. Yet an object, a state of mind, or an action is also called purposive even when its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, merely because its possibility can be explained and comprehended by us only insofar as we assume as its ground a causality according to ends: that is, a will that would have arranged it so according to the representation of a certain rule. Purposiveness can therefore be without an end insofar as we do not place the causes of this form in a will, yet can make the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving it from a will. Now we do not always need to understand through reason the possibility of what we observe. Thus we can at least observe a purposiveness as regards form, even without laying an end A 34 beneath it (as the matter of the connection of ends), and discern it in objects, though only through reflection.

11 221 The Judgment of Taste Has Nothing but the Form of Purposiveness of an Object (or of Its Mode of Representation) as Its Ground.

Every end, when regarded as a ground of satisfaction, always carries with it an interest as the determining ground of the judgment about the object of pleasure. Thus no subjective end can underlie a judgment of taste. But neither can any representation of an objective end—that is, of the possibility of the object itself according to principles of a connection of ends—and hence no concept of the good, determine the judgment of taste. For it is an aesthetic judgment and no cognitive judgment, and thus concerns no concept of the character and inner or outer possibility of the object through this or that cause, but merely the mutual relation of the powers of representation insofar as they are determined through a representation.

Now in determining an object A 35 as beautiful, this relation is connected with the feeling of a pleasure that the judgment of taste at the same time declares valid for everyone. Consequently, neither an agreeableness accompanying the representation nor the representation of the object's perfection and the concept of the good can contain its determining ground. Thus nothing but subjective purposiveness in the representation of an object without any end (either objective or subjective)—hence the mere form of purposiveness in the representation through which an object is given to us, insofar as we are conscious of it—can constitute the satisfaction that we judge, without a concept, to be universally communicable, and hence the determining ground of the judgment of taste.

12 The Judgment of Taste Rests on Grounds a priori.

To establish a priori the connection of the feeling of a pleasure or displeasure, as an effect, with any representation (sensation or concept), as its cause, is absolutely impossible. For that would be a causal relation, which (among objects of experience) can always be cognized only 222 a posteriori and through experience itself A 36. In the Critique of Practical Reason, to be sure, we actually derived the feeling of respect (as a special and peculiar modification of this feeling, which does not quite coincide with either the pleasure or displeasure we receive from empirical objects) from universal moral concepts a priori. But there we could also pass beyond the limits of experience and call upon a causality resting on a supersensible constitution of the subject, namely that of freedom. Yet even there we did not, properly speaking, derive this feeling from the idea of morality as its cause; only the determination of the will was derived from it. But the state of mind of a will determined by anything is already in itself a feeling of pleasure and identical with it; it therefore does not follow from it as an effect. The latter would have to be assumed only if the concept of morality as a good preceded the determination of the will by the law; for then one would vainly seek to derive the pleasure connected with that concept from it as a mere cognition.

Now pleasure in aesthetic judgment is similar, except that here it is merely contemplative and produces no interest in the object, whereas in moral judgment it is practical. Consciousness of the merely formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive powers A 37 in a representation through which an object is given is the pleasure itself. For it contains a determining ground of the subject's activity in enlivening its cognitive powers, hence an inner causality (which is purposive) with regard to cognition in general, but without restriction to a determinate cognition—and thus a mere form of the subjective purposiveness of a representation in an aesthetic judgment. This pleasure is also in no way practical, neither like pleasure arising from the pathological ground of agreeableness nor like pleasure arising from the intellectual ground of the represented good. Yet it does contain causality: namely, to maintain the state of the representation itself and the occupation of the cognitive powers without further intention. We linger over the contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself. This is analogous to (but not identical with) the lingering in which a charm in the representation of an object repeatedly arouses attention, while the mind is passive.

13 223 The Pure Judgment of Taste Is Independent of Charm and Emotion.

Every interest corrupts the judgment of taste and deprives it of impartiality, especially when it does not, like the interest of reason, A 38 place purposiveness before the feeling of pleasure, but grounds purposiveness on that feeling. The latter always happens in an aesthetic judgment about something insofar as it gratifies or pains us. Thus judgments affected in this way can lay no claim to universally valid satisfaction, or so much less a claim the more sensations of the kind mentioned are found among the determining grounds of taste. Taste is always still barbarous where it needs an admixture of charms and emotions for its satisfaction, or even makes these the measure of its approval.

Yet charms are often not merely counted as contributing to beauty (which should properly concern only form) as a contribution to aesthetic universal satisfaction; they are even passed off in themselves as beauties, and thus the matter of satisfaction as its form. This misunderstanding, like many others that nevertheless always have some truth at their foundation, can be removed through careful determination of these concepts.

A judgment of taste on which charm and emotion have no influence (although they may be combined with satisfaction in the beautiful), and which therefore has solely the purposiveness of form as its determining ground, is a pure judgment of taste.

14 A 39 Elucidation through Examples.

Aesthetic judgments, like theoretical (logical) judgments, can be divided into empirical and pure. The first are those that assert agreeableness or disagreeableness of an object or of its mode of representation; the second, those that assert beauty. The former are judgments of sense (material aesthetic judgments); the latter alone, as formal judgments, are judgments of taste in the proper sense.

224 Thus a judgment of taste is pure only insofar as no merely empirical satisfaction is mingled with its determining ground. But this always happens when charm or emotion has a share in the judgment by which something is to be declared beautiful.

Now various objections arise again, which ultimately present charm not merely as a necessary ingredient of beauty, but even as sufficient by itself to be called beautiful. A mere color, for example the green of a lawn, a mere tone (as distinct from sound and noise), such as that of a violin, is declared by most people to be beautiful in itself, although both seem to have as their ground merely the matter of representations, namely sensation alone, and therefore to deserve only to be called agreeable A 40. But we shall also observe that sensations of color as well as tone consider themselves entitled to count as beautiful only insofar as both are pure. This is a determination that already concerns form, and also the only thing about these representations that can be universally communicated with certainty. For the quality of sensations themselves can hardly be assumed to agree in all subjects, or the agreeableness of one color over another, or of the tone of one musical instrument over another, to be judged in the same way by everyone.

If, with Euler, we assume that colors are successive, evenly timed pulses (pulsus) of the ether, just as tones are of the air shaken in sound, and, most importantly, that the mind perceives not merely through sense their effect on the enlivening of the organ, but also through reflection the regular play of the impressions (hence the form in the combination of different representations)—of which I have no doubt—then color and tone would not be mere sensations, but already a formal determination of the unity of their manifold, and could then also be counted as beauties in themselves.

But the purity of a simple kind of sensation means that its uniformity is disturbed A 41 and interrupted by no sensation of another kind, and belongs merely to form, because in this we can abstract from the quality of that kind of sensation (whether it represents a color, and which color, or a tone, and which tone). Thus all simple colors, insofar as they are pure, are considered beautiful; mixed colors do not have this 225 advantage, precisely because, since they are not simple, we have no standard for judging whether to call them pure or impure.

But as for the beauty attributed to an object on account of its form, insofar as it is thought capable of being heightened by charm, this is a common error, very detrimental to genuine, unbribed, sound taste. Certainly charms may be added alongside beauty in order, beyond dry satisfaction, to interest the mind through the representation of the object, and thus serve to recommend taste and its cultivation, especially when it is still crude and unpracticed. But they actually impair the judgment of taste when they draw attention to themselves as grounds for judging beauty. For far from contributing to it, they must rather, as strangers, be admitted indulgently when taste is still weak and unpracticed, and only insofar as they do not disturb that beautiful form.

In painting, sculpture, indeed all the formative arts, in A 42 architecture and the art of gardens insofar as they are fine arts, design is essential: in it, not what gratifies in sensation, but merely what pleases through its form, constitutes the ground of every arrangement for taste. The colors that illuminate the outline belong to charm; they can indeed enliven the object in itself for sensation, but cannot make it worthy of contemplation and beautiful. Rather, they are for the most part greatly restricted by what beautiful form requires, and even where charm is admitted, are ennobled by that form alone.

All form in objects of the senses (of the outer senses and, indirectly, of inner sense as well) is either shape or play; in the latter case, either a play of shapes (in space: mime and dance) or a mere play of sensations (in time). The charm of colors or agreeable instrumental tones may be added, but design in the former and composition in the latter constitute the proper object of a pure judgment of taste. That the purity of colors as well as tones, or their variety and contrast, seems to contribute to beauty does not mean that, because they are agreeable in themselves, they provide, as it were, an addition of the same kind to satisfaction in form A 43; rather, they merely make that form more precisely, determinately, and completely 226 intuitable, and also enliven the representation through their charm by arousing and sustaining attention to the object itself.

Even what are called ornaments (parerga)—what belongs to the whole representation of the object not inwardly as a constituent, but only outwardly as an addition, and increases the satisfaction of taste—do so only through their form: for example, the frames of paintings, draperies on statues, or colonnades around magnificent buildings. But if the ornament does not itself consist in beautiful form, and is attached, like a gold frame, merely to recommend the painting to approval through its charm, it is then called finery and detracts from genuine beauty.

Emotion, a sensation in which agreeableness is produced only through a momentary inhibition followed by a stronger outpouring of the vital force, does not belong to beauty at all. Sublimity (with which the feeling of emotion is connected), however, requires a different standard of judgment from the one taste takes as its foundation. Thus a pure judgment of taste has neither charm nor emotion—in a word, no sensation as the matter of aesthetic judgment—as its determining ground.

15 A 44 The Judgment of Taste Is Entirely Independent of the Concept of Perfection.

Objective purposiveness can be cognized only by referring the manifold to a determinate end, thus only through a concept. This alone already makes clear that the beautiful, whose judging has as its ground a merely formal purposiveness—that is, purposiveness without an end—is entirely independent of the representation of the good, since the latter presupposes an objective purposiveness, that is, the relation of the object to a determinate end.

Objective purposiveness is either external, that is, the utility, or internal, that is, the perfection, of the object. That the satisfaction in an object on account of which we call it beautiful cannot rest on the representation of its utility is sufficiently evident from the two preceding main sections: for then it would not 227 be an immediate satisfaction in the object, which is the essential condition of a judgment about beauty. But an objective internal purposiveness, that is, perfection, comes closer to the predicate of beauty, and has therefore been held identical with beauty by eminent philosophers, though with the qualification, when it is thought confusedly A 45. In a critique of taste it is of the utmost importance to decide whether beauty can actually be resolved into the concept of perfection.

To judge objective purposiveness we always need the concept of an end and (if that purposiveness is to be internal rather than external [utility]) the concept of an internal end containing the ground of the object's inner possibility. Now just as an end in general is that whose concept can be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself, so, in order to represent an objective purposiveness in a thing, the concept of that thing—what sort of thing it is supposed to be—will come first; and the agreement of the manifold in it with this concept (which gives the rule for its combination in the thing) is the qualitative perfection of a thing. Entirely distinct from this is quantitative perfection, as the completeness of any thing in its kind: a mere concept of magnitude (of totality), in which what the thing is supposed to be is already thought as determined in advance, and the only question is whether everything required for it is present. The formal element in the representation of a thing—that is, the agreement of the manifold into one (with what it is supposed to be left undetermined)—provides A 46 in itself no cognition of objective purposiveness whatsoever. For since we abstract from this one thing as an end (what the thing is supposed to be), nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of the representations in the mind of the one intuiting. This does indeed indicate a certain purposiveness of the state of representation in the subject, and in the subject a comfort in apprehending a given form in the imagination; but it indicates no perfection of any object, which here is thought through no concept of an end. For example, if I come upon a grassy clearing in the woods around which trees stand in a circle, and do not represent an end to myself—say, that it is to serve for a country dance—not the slightest concept of 228 perfection is given through the mere form. But to represent a formal objective purposiveness without an end, that is, the mere form of a perfection (without any matter or concept of that with which there is agreement, even if it were only the idea of lawfulness in general), is a true contradiction.

Now the judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, that is, one resting on subjective grounds, whose determining ground cannot be a concept, and hence cannot be the concept of a determinate end either. Thus beauty, as a formal subjective purposiveness, by no means involves thinking a perfection of the object as a supposedly A 47 formal yet nevertheless objective purposiveness. And the distinction between the concepts of the beautiful and the good—as though they differed only in logical form, the first being merely a confused and the second a distinct concept of perfection, but otherwise identical in content and origin—is null. For then there would be no specific difference between them, and a judgment of taste would be as much a cognitive judgment as the judgment declaring something good; just as, for instance, an ordinary person who says that fraud is wrong grounds his judgment on confused principles of reason, and the philosopher on distinct ones, but both fundamentally on the same principles. Yet I have already stated that an aesthetic judgment is unique in its kind and gives absolutely no cognition (not even a confused one) of the object. Such cognition occurs only through a logical judgment; the aesthetic judgment, by contrast, refers the representation through which an object is given solely to the subject, and makes discernible no property of the object, but only the purposive form in the determination of the powers of representation occupied with it. The judgment is called aesthetic precisely because its determining ground is no concept, but the feeling (of inner sense) of that harmony in the play of the mental powers, insofar as it can only be felt. By contrast, if we wished to call confused concepts and the objective A 48 judgment grounded on them aesthetic, we would have an understanding that judges sensibly, or a sense that represents its objects through concepts, both of which are contradictory. The faculty of concepts, whether confused or distinct, is the understanding; and although the judgment of taste, as an aesthetic judgment, also requires understanding (as do all judgments), it requires it 229 not as a faculty of cognizing an object, but as a faculty of determining the judgment and its representation (without a concept) according to their relation to the subject and its inner feeling, insofar as this judgment is possible according to a universal rule.

16 A Judgment of Taste by Which an Object Is Declared Beautiful under the Condition of a Determinate Concept Is Not Pure.

There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (unattached beauty), or merely adherent beauty (attached beauty). The first presupposes no concept of what the object is supposed to be; the second presupposes such a concept and the object's perfection according to it. The kinds of the first are called (self-subsisting) beauties of this or that thing; the other, as adhering to a concept A 49 (conditioned beauty), is attributed to objects standing under the concept of a particular end.

Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly anyone but the botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is supposed to be; and even he, who recognizes in it the plant's organ of fertilization, pays no regard to this natural end when judging it through taste. Thus no perfection of any kind, no inner purposiveness to which the combination of the manifold refers, is laid at the foundation of this judgment. Many birds (the parrot, the hummingbird, the bird of paradise), and a host of sea creatures in shells, are beauties in themselves, belonging to no object determined through concepts with regard to its end, but pleasing freely and for themselves. Thus designs in the Greek manner, foliage for borders or on wallpaper, and so forth, signify nothing in themselves: they represent nothing, no object under a determinate concept, and are free beauties. We can also count what are called fantasias (without a theme) in music, indeed all music without a text, as belonging to the same kind.

In judging a free beauty (according to mere form), the judgment of taste is pure. No concept is presupposed of any end that the manifold is to serve in the given object, and hence of what 230 the object is to represent; such a concept would only restrict the freedom of the imagination A 50, which, as it were, plays in observing the shape.

But the beauty of a human being (and within this kind, of a man, woman, or child), the beauty of a horse or a building (as a church, palace, arsenal, or summerhouse), presupposes a concept of the end determining what the thing is supposed to be, and hence a concept of its perfection; it is therefore merely adherent beauty. Now just as the combination of the agreeable (in sensation) with beauty, which properly concerns only form, prevented the purity of the judgment of taste, so the combination of the good (namely, what the manifold is good for in the thing itself according to its end) with beauty impairs its purity.

Many things that please immediately in intuition could be added to a building, if only it were not to be a church; a figure could be embellished with all sorts of flourishes and light yet regular lines, as the New Zealanders do with their tattooing, if only it were not a human being; and this human being could have much finer features and a more pleasing, gentler facial outline, if only he were not to represent a man, or indeed a warrior.

Now satisfaction in the manifold in a thing A 51 in relation to the internal end determining its possibility is a satisfaction grounded on a concept; but satisfaction in beauty presupposes no concept and is immediately connected with the representation through which the object is given (not through which it is thought). If the judgment of taste concerning the latter is made dependent on the end in the former, as a judgment of reason, and is thereby restricted, it is no longer a free and pure judgment of taste.

Taste does indeed gain from this combination of aesthetic with intellectual satisfaction in that it becomes fixed: although not universally, rules can nevertheless be prescribed to it with regard to certain objects determined according to ends. But these are then no rules of taste, only rules for reconciling taste with reason—that is, the beautiful with the good—through which the former becomes usable as an instrument of the intention regarding the latter. Thus the state of mind that maintains itself and has 231 subjective universal validity can be placed beneath the way of thinking that can be maintained only through strenuous resolve, but is objectively universally valid. Properly speaking, however, neither perfection gains through beauty nor beauty through perfection A 52. Rather, because, when we compare through a concept the representation through which an object is given to us with the object (with regard to what it is supposed to be), we cannot avoid at the same time comparing it with the sensation in the subject, the entire faculty of representation gains when both states of mind agree.

A judgment of taste concerning an object with a determinate internal end would be pure only if the person judging either had no concept of this end or abstracted from it in his judgment. But then, although he made a correct judgment of taste by judging the object as a free beauty, he would nevertheless be censured and accused of false taste by someone else who considered its beauty only as an adherent property (who looked to the object's end), although both judged correctly in their way: one according to what he had before his senses, the other according to what he had in thought. Through this distinction many a dispute among judges of taste about beauty can be settled, by showing that one is concerned with free and the other with adherent beauty, the former making a pure and the latter an applied judgment of taste.

17 A 53 On the Ideal of Beauty.

There can be no objective rule of taste determining through concepts what is beautiful. For every judgment from this source is aesthetic: the subject's feeling, and no concept of an object, is its determining ground. To seek a principle of taste giving the universal criterion of the beautiful through determinate concepts is a fruitless effort, because what is sought is impossible and self-contradictory. The universal communicability of sensation (of satisfaction or dissatisfaction), and indeed a communicability occurring without a concept—the greatest possible unanimity of all ages and 232 peoples concerning this feeling in the representation of certain objects—is the empirical criterion, though a weak one scarcely sufficient for conjecture, that a taste thus confirmed by examples descends from the deeply hidden ground, common to all human beings, of unanimity in judging the forms under which objects are given to them.

Hence some products of taste are regarded as exemplary, not as though taste could be acquired by imitating others. For taste must be a faculty of one's own; someone who imitates a model shows skill insofar as he succeeds, A 54 but taste only insofar as he can judge this model himself.⁷ From this it follows that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea that everyone must produce within himself, and according to which he must judge everything that is an object of taste or an example of judging through taste, and even everyone's taste itself. An idea properly means a concept of reason, and an ideal the representation of an individual being as adequate to an idea. Thus that archetype of taste, which admittedly rests on reason's indeterminate idea of a maximum, yet can be represented not through concepts but only in an individual presentation, is better called the ideal of the beautiful. Although we are not in possession of such an ideal, we nevertheless strive to produce it within ourselves. But it will be merely an ideal of the imagination, precisely because it rests not on concepts but on presentation; and the faculty A 55 of presentation is the imagination.—How, then, do we arrive at such an ideal of beauty? A priori, or empirically? And likewise, what kind of beautiful thing is capable of an ideal?

First we must observe that the beauty for which an ideal is to be sought must not be unattached beauty, but beauty fixed through a concept of objective purposiveness. It must therefore belong not to the object of a wholly pure judgment of taste, but to one of a partly intellectualized judgment of taste 233. That is, wherever an ideal is to occur among grounds of judging, some idea of reason according to determinate concepts must underlie it, determining a priori the end on which the object's inner possibility rests. An ideal of beautiful flowers, beautiful furnishings, or a beautiful view cannot be thought. But neither can an ideal be represented of a beauty adhering to determinate ends, for example a beautiful house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, and so forth—presumably because the ends are not sufficiently determined and fixed by their concept, and hence the purposiveness is almost as free as in unattached beauty. Only what has the end of its existence within itself—the human being, who through reason can determine his own ends, or, where he must draw them from outer perception, can nevertheless compare them with essential and universal ends and then A 56 judge their agreement with those ends aesthetically as well—only this human being, among all objects in the world, is therefore capable of an ideal of beauty, just as humanity in his person, as intelligence, is capable of the ideal of perfection.

But two elements belong to this: first, the aesthetic normal idea, which is an individual intuition (of the imagination) representing the standard for judging him as a thing belonging to a particular animal species; second, the idea of reason, which makes the ends of humanity, insofar as they cannot be represented sensibly, the principle for judging his shape, through which, as their effect in appearance, those ends reveal themselves. The normal idea must take from experience its elements for the shape of an animal of a particular kind; yet the greatest purposiveness in the construction of that shape, which would be fit to serve as the universal standard for aesthetically judging each individual of this species—the image that seems to have intentionally underlain nature's technique, to which only the species as a whole, but no separate individual, is adequate—lies solely in the idea of the person judging. But this idea, with its proportions, can as an aesthetic idea be presented fully in a concrete instance in a model image. To make it somewhat comprehensible how this happens A 57 (for who can wholly draw nature's secret from it?), we shall attempt a psychological explanation.

It should be noted that, in a manner wholly incomprehensible to us, the 234 imagination knows not only how, on occasion, to recall signs for concepts even from long ago, but also how to reproduce the image and shape of an object from an unspeakable number of objects of different kinds, or of one and the same kind. Indeed, when the mind undertakes comparisons, it very probably actually knows how, though not sufficiently for consciousness, to let one image fall upon another, as it were, and through the congruence of several of the same kind to arrive at a mean serving as a common measure for them all. Someone has seen a thousand adult men. If he now wishes to judge the normal stature to be estimated comparatively, the imagination (in my opinion) lets a great number of the images—perhaps all thousand—fall upon one another. And if I may apply the analogy of optical presentation here, in the space where most of them converge, and within the outline where the area is illuminated by the most heavily applied color, the average stature becomes discernible, equally distant in both height and breadth from the outermost limits of the largest and smallest figures; and this is the A 58 stature for a beautiful man. (The same result could be obtained mechanically by measuring all thousand, adding their heights together, and their widths (and thicknesses) separately, and dividing the sums by a thousand. But the imagination does precisely this through a dynamic effect arising from the manifold apprehension of such shapes upon the organ of inner sense.) If in a similar way the average head is sought for this average man, the average nose for that head, and so forth, this shape underlies the normal idea of a beautiful man in the country where the comparison is made. Thus under these empirical conditions a Black person must necessarily have a different normal idea of beauty of shape from a white person, a Chinese person a different one from a European. The same would hold for the model of a beautiful horse or dog (of a certain breed).—This normal idea is not derived from proportions taken from experience as determinate rules; rather, only in accordance with it do rules of judging first become possible. It is the image for the whole genus hovering among all the individual intuitions of individuals differing in many ways, which nature placed as an archetype beneath its productions of the same species, 235 yet seems not to have fully attained in any individual. It is by no means A 59 the entire archetype of beauty in this genus, but only the form constituting the indispensable condition of all beauty, hence merely correctness in presenting the genus. It is, as Polykleitos's famous Doryphoros was called, the rule (Myron's cow could likewise have served this purpose within its genus). For precisely this reason it can contain nothing specifically characteristic; otherwise it would not be the normal idea for the genus. Its presentation also pleases not through beauty, but merely because it contradicts none of the conditions under which alone a thing of this genus can be beautiful. The presentation is merely academically correct.⁸

Still distinct from the normal idea of the beautiful is its ideal, which, for the reasons already given, we may expect only in the human figure. Here the ideal consists in the expression of the moral, without which the object A 60 would not please universally and also positively (not merely negatively in an academically correct presentation). The visible expression of moral ideas that inwardly govern a human being can indeed be taken only from experience. But to unite these with everything our reason connects with the morally good in the idea of the highest purposiveness—to make goodness, purity, strength, or serenity of soul, and so forth, as it were visible in bodily expression (as the effect of what is inward)—requires pure ideas of reason and great power of imagination united in someone who would merely judge them, and still more in someone who would present them. The correctness of such an ideal 236 of beauty proves itself in this: it allows no sensory charm to mingle with satisfaction in its object, yet permits a great interest to be taken in it. This then proves that judging by such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, and judging according to an ideal of beauty is no mere judgment of A 61 taste.

Definition of the Beautiful Concluded from This Third Moment.

Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object insofar as it is perceived in it without the representation of an end.⁹

Fourth Moment A 62 of the Judgment of Taste According to the Modality of Satisfaction in the Object.

18 What the Modality of a Judgment of Taste Is.

Of every representation I can say that it is at least possible for it (as cognition) to be connected with a pleasure. Of what I call agreeable, I say that it actually produces pleasure in me. But the beautiful is thought to have a necessary relation to satisfaction. Now this necessity is of a special kind: not a theoretical objective necessity through which one can cognize a priori 237 that everyone will feel this satisfaction in the object I call beautiful; nor a practical necessity in which, through concepts of a pure rational will serving as a rule for freely acting beings, this satisfaction is the necessary consequence of an objective law and means nothing other than that one ought unconditionally (without further intention) to act in a certain way. Rather, as a necessity thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be called exemplary: a necessity of the assent of all to a judgment regarded as an example of a universal A 63 rule that cannot be stated. Since an aesthetic judgment is no objective cognitive judgment, this necessity cannot be derived from determinate concepts, and is therefore not apodictic. Still less can it be inferred from the universality of experience (of a thoroughgoing unanimity of judgments about the beauty of a certain object). For not only would experience scarcely provide enough evidence for this; no concept of the necessity of these judgments can be grounded on empirical judgments.

19 The Subjective Necessity We Attribute to a Judgment of Taste Is Conditioned.

The judgment of taste expects everyone's assent; and whoever declares something beautiful wants everyone to approve of the object before them and likewise to declare it beautiful, as they ought. Thus the ought in an aesthetic judgment is itself pronounced only conditionally, even after all the data required for judging have been supplied. We seek everyone else's assent because we have a ground for it common to all; and we could also count on such assent if only we were always certain that the case had been correctly subsumed under that ground as A 64 the rule of approval.

20 The Condition of the Necessity Claimed by a Judgment of Taste Is the Idea of a Common Sense.

If judgments of taste (like cognitive judgments) had a determinate objective principle, someone making them according to that 238 principle would claim unconditional necessity for his judgment. If they were without any principle, like judgments of mere sensory taste, no necessity in them would ever enter one's thoughts. Thus they must have a subjective principle that determines what pleases or displeases only through feeling, not through concepts, yet with universal validity. Such a principle, however, could be regarded only as a common sense, essentially distinct from the common understanding, which is sometimes also called common sense (shared sense). For the latter judges not by feeling but always according to concepts, although usually only as principles obscurely represented.

Thus only on the presupposition that there is a common sense—by which we understand no outer sense, but the effect arising from the free play of our cognitive powers—only on the presupposition, A 65 I say, of such a common sense can the judgment of taste be made.

21 Whether We Can with Reason Presuppose a Common Sense.

Cognitions and judgments, together with the conviction accompanying them, must be universally communicable; otherwise they would have no agreement with the object. They would all be a merely subjective play of the powers of representation, just as skepticism would have it. But if cognitions are to be communicable, then the state of mind—that is, the attunement of the cognitive powers for cognition in general, and indeed the proportion appropriate to a representation (through which an object is given to us) in order to make cognition out of it—must also be universally communicable. For without this, as the subjective condition of cognizing, cognition could not arise as an effect. This also actually happens whenever a given object, through the senses, sets the imagination into activity to combine the manifold, and the imagination in turn sets the understanding into activity to unite it in concepts. But this attunement of the cognitive powers has a different proportion according to the difference of the objects given. Nevertheless there must be one A 66 in which this inner relation for enlivening one power through the other is the most beneficial for both mental powers with a view to cognition (of given 239 objects) in general; and this attunement can be determined only through feeling (not according to concepts). Now since this attunement itself must be universally communicable, and hence also the feeling of it (in a given representation), while the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense, this common sense can reasonably be assumed. We need not ground ourselves for this purpose on psychological observations, but may assume it as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which must be presupposed in every logic and every principle of cognition that is not skeptical.

22 The Necessity of Universal Assent Thought in a Judgment of Taste Is a Subjective Necessity Represented as Objective under the Presupposition of a Common Sense.

In all judgments by which we declare something beautiful, we allow no one to be of another opinion, although we ground our judgment not on A 67 concepts but only on our feeling—which we thus lay at its foundation not as a private feeling, but as a shared one. Now for this purpose this common sense cannot be grounded on experience; for it seeks to authorize judgments containing an ought. It does not say that everyone will agree with our judgment, but that everyone ought to agree with it. Thus common sense, of whose judgment I here give my judgment of taste as an example, and on account of which I attribute exemplary validity to it, is a mere ideal norm. Under its presupposition we could rightly make a judgment agreeing with it, and the satisfaction in an object expressed in that judgment, a rule for everyone. For although the principle is merely subjective, yet, assumed as subjectively universal (an idea necessary for everyone), it could, with regard to the unanimity of different people judging, demand universal assent like an objective principle—if only we were certain of having subsumed correctly under it.

We do actually presuppose this indeterminate norm of a common sense: our presumption in making judgments of taste proves it. 240 Whether there is in fact such a common sense as a constitutive principle of the possibility of experience, or whether a still higher principle of reason makes it merely a regulative principle for us, requiring us first to produce within ourselves a common sense A 68 for higher ends; whether, therefore, taste is an original and natural faculty, or only the idea of an artificial faculty still to be acquired, so that a judgment of taste, with its expectation of universal assent, is in fact only a demand of reason to bring about such unanimity in our manner of sensing, and the ought—that is, the objective necessity that everyone's feeling should converge with each person's particular feeling—means only the possibility of becoming of one mind in this, while the judgment of taste merely supplies an example of the application of this principle: these are questions we neither wish nor are able to investigate here as yet. For now we have only to resolve the faculty of taste into its elements and finally unite them in the idea of a common sense.

Definition of the Beautiful Derived from the Fourth Moment.

Beautiful is what, without a concept, is cognized as the object of a necessary satisfaction.

General Remark on the First Section of the Analytic.

If we draw the result from the analyses above, we find that everything comes down to this concept of taste: that it is a faculty for judging an object in relation to the A 69 free lawfulness of the imagination. Now if in a judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom, it is assumed, first, not as reproductive, as subject to the laws of association, but as productive and self-active (as the author of freely chosen forms of possible intuitions). And although in apprehending a given object of the senses it is bound to a determinate form of this object, and to that extent has no free play (as in poetic invention), we can nevertheless readily conceive that the object might offer it precisely such a form, containing a 241 combination of the manifold such as the imagination, if left freely to itself, would devise in harmony with the lawfulness of the understanding in general. But that the imagination should be free and yet lawful of itself—that is, should carry an autonomy within it—is a contradiction. The understanding alone gives the law. If, however, the imagination is compelled to proceed according to a determinate law, then the form of its product is determined by concepts as to what it should be; but then, as shown above, the satisfaction is not in the beautiful but in the good (in perfection, perhaps merely formal perfection), and the judgment is no judgment through taste. Thus only a lawfulness without a law, and a subjective agreement of the imagination with the understanding without an objective agreement—in which the representation is referred to a determinate concept of an object—can coexist with the free lawfulness of the understanding (which has also been called purposiveness without an end) and with the distinctive character of a judgment of taste.

Now geometrically regular shapes—a circle, a A 70 square, a cube, and so forth—are commonly cited by critics of taste as the simplest and most indubitable examples of beauty. Yet they are called regular precisely because we cannot represent them otherwise than as mere presentations of a determinate concept prescribing the rule for that shape (according to which alone it is possible). Thus one of the two must be mistaken: either the critics' judgment attributing beauty to these shapes, or ours, which finds purposiveness without a concept necessary for beauty.

Hardly anyone will think that a person of taste is needed to find more satisfaction in a circular shape than in a scribbled outline, or in a quadrilateral with equal sides and angles than in a slanting, unequal, as it were deformed one; for this requires only common understanding and no taste at all. Where an intention is perceived—for example, to judge the size of a space, or to make the relation of the parts to one another and to the whole comprehensible in a division—regular shapes, and indeed the simplest kinds, are necessary. Satisfaction rests not immediately on the sight of the shape, but on its usefulness 242 for all sorts of possible intentions. A room whose walls meet at oblique angles, a garden plot of that kind, indeed every violation of symmetry in the shape of animals (for example, being one-eyed), buildings, or flower beds, displeases because it is counterpurposive—not only practically, with regard to a determinate use of these things, but also for judging them with all sorts of possible intentions. This is not the case in a judgment of taste, which, when pure, immediately connects satisfaction A 71 or dissatisfaction with the mere contemplation of the object, without regard to use or an end.

Regularity leading to the concept of an object is indeed the indispensable condition (a condition without which it cannot be) for grasping the object in a single representation and determining the manifold in its form. This determination is an end with regard to cognition; and in relation to cognition it is also always connected with satisfaction (which accompanies the realization of every intention, even a merely problematic one). But then it is merely the approval of a solution that satisfies a problem, not a free and indeterminately purposive occupation of the mental powers with what we call beautiful, in which the understanding serves the imagination, and not the imagination the understanding.

In a thing possible only through an intention—a building, even an animal—the regularity consisting in symmetry must express the unity of intuition accompanying the concept of the end, and belongs to cognition. But where only a free play of the powers of representation is to be sustained (yet on condition that the understanding suffers no affront), in pleasure gardens, interior decoration, all kinds of tasteful furnishings, and the like, regularity, which announces itself as constraint, is avoided as far as possible. Thus the English taste in gardens and the Baroque taste in furniture readily push the freedom of the imagination almost to the grotesque, and locate precisely in this separation from every constraint of rule the case in which taste can show its A 72 greatest perfection in the imagination's designs.

Everything stiffly regular (approaching mathematical regularity) has this about it that is contrary to taste: it affords no lasting occupation in its contemplation, but, unless it 243 expressly aims at cognition or a determinate practical end, causes boredom. By contrast, what the imagination can play with uncontrivedly and purposively is always new to us, and we do not tire of looking at it. Marsden, in his description of Sumatra, remarks that the free beauties of nature surround the spectator everywhere there, and thus have little attraction left for him; by contrast, a pepper garden, where the poles up which the plant climbs form avenues between them in parallel lines, had much charm for him when he encountered it in the middle of a forest. From this he concludes that wild, apparently unregulated beauty pleases only as a change for someone who has had his fill of looking at regular beauty. But he need only have tried spending a day in his pepper garden to realize that, once the understanding had been attuned by regularity to the order it needs everywhere, the object would no longer occupy him, but would instead impose a burdensome constraint on the imagination. By contrast, nature there, lavish to the point of luxuriance in its manifoldness and subject to no constraint of artificial rules, could provide lasting nourishment for his taste.—Even birdsong, which we cannot bring under any musical rule, seems to contain more freedom, and therefore more for taste, than even a human song performed according to all the rules of music, because A 73 we tire much sooner of the latter when it is repeated often and for a long time. Yet here we probably confuse our sympathy with the merriment of a little creature we love with the beauty of its song, which, when imitated quite precisely by a human being (as sometimes happens with the nightingale's song), seems wholly tasteless to our ear.

Beautiful objects must also be distinguished from beautiful views of objects (which often, because of their distance, can no longer be distinctly recognized). In the latter, taste seems to attach not so much to what the imagination apprehends in this field as to what it finds occasion to invent there—that is, to the actual fantasies with which the mind entertains itself while continually being aroused by the manifoldness the eye encounters. This is much as in watching the changing shapes of a hearth fire or a rippling brook, neither of which is a 244 beauty, yet both carry a charm for the imagination because they sustain its free play.

4 The definition of taste laid at the foundation here is that it is the faculty for judging the beautiful. But what is required in order to call an object beautiful must be discovered by analyzing judgments of taste. I have sought the moments to which this power of judgment attends in its reflection by following the logical functions of judging (for a judgment of taste always still contains a relation to the understanding). I have considered those of quality first, because aesthetic judgment about the beautiful attends to these first.

5 A judgment about an object of satisfaction can be entirely disinterested and yet very interesting: that is, it is grounded on no interest, but produces an interest. All pure moral judgments are of this kind. But judgments of taste in themselves ground no interest at all. Only in society does it become interesting to have taste; the ground of this will be indicated later.

6 An obligation to enjoy is an obvious absurdity. Thus a supposed obligation to perform all actions whose goal is merely enjoyment must be the same, however spiritual that enjoyment may be conceived (or embellished) to be, even if it were a mystical, so-called heavenly enjoyment.

7 Models of taste in the verbal arts must be composed in a dead and learned language: the first, so as not to have to endure the change that inevitably befalls living languages, in which noble expressions become commonplace, ordinary ones obsolete, and newly created ones enter a circulation that lasts only briefly; the second, so that the language has a grammar subject to no willful changes of fashion, but possessing its unchanging rule.

8 We shall find that a perfectly regular face, which a painter might ask to sit as his model, generally says nothing, because it contains nothing characteristic, and thus expresses the idea of the genus more than the specific character of a person. What is exaggerated in characteristic features of this kind—that is, what impairs the normal idea itself (the purposiveness of the genus)—is called caricature. Experience also shows that those wholly regular faces generally betray only an average human being within; presumably (if we may assume that nature expresses inward proportions in outward ones) because, when none of the mind's predispositions stands out beyond the proportion required to constitute a merely faultless human being, nothing of what is called genius can be expected, in which nature seems to depart from its usual relations among the mental powers in favor of a single one.

9 An objection to this definition might cite things in which we see a purposive form without recognizing an end: for example, the stone implements often dug out of ancient burial mounds, furnished with a hole as if for a handle. Although their shape clearly reveals a purposiveness whose end is unknown, they are nevertheless not on that account declared beautiful. But the fact that we regard them as artifacts is already enough to require us to admit that we refer their shape to some intention and a determinate end. Hence there is also no immediate satisfaction in intuiting them. A flower, by contrast—for example, a tulip—is considered beautiful because a certain purposiveness is encountered in its perception which, as we judge it, is referred to no end at all.

Plain English translation

A complete, independent machine-assisted translation from the German text of the 1793 edition in the 1913 Academy printing, including Kant’s notes. The faculty table is given as lines.

First Part. Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.

First Section. 203 Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment.

First Book. Analytic of the Beautiful.

First Moment of the Judgment of Taste⁴, according to Quality.

1 A judgment of taste is aesthetic.

To distinguish whether something is beautiful or not, we do not relate its representation through the understanding to the object for cognition. Instead, through imagination, perhaps combined with understanding, A 4 we relate it to the subject and the subject's feeling of pleasure or displeasure. A judgment of taste is therefore not a cognitive judgment, and so is not logical but aesthetic. By this we mean a judgment whose determining ground can be nothing but subjective. Every relation of representations, even of sensations, can be objective, in which case it signifies the real element of an empirical representation. The exception is their relation to 204 the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. This indicates nothing at all in the object. Instead, in this relation the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation.

Grasping a regular, purposive building with one's cognitive faculty, whether in a clear or a confused way of representing it, is quite different from being aware of this representation with a sensation of satisfaction. Here the representation is related entirely to the subject, specifically to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This grounds a quite distinct ability to discriminate and judge, which contributes nothing to cognition. It only compares the given representation in the subject A 5 with the entire faculty of representations of which the mind becomes aware in feeling its own state. The representations given in a judgment may be empirical, and thus aesthetic. Yet the judgment made through them is logical if in that judgment they are related only to the object. Conversely, even if the given representations were rational, but in a judgment were related solely to the subject and its feeling, they are to that extent always aesthetic.

2 The satisfaction that determines a judgment of taste is free of all interest.

Interest is the name for the satisfaction we connect with the representation of an object's existence. Such satisfaction therefore always also relates to the faculty of desire, either as its determining ground or at least as necessarily connected with that ground. But when the question is whether something is beautiful, we do not want to know whether we or anyone else care, or even could care, about the thing's existence. We want to know how we judge it in mere contemplation, in intuition or reflection. If someone asks whether I find the palace I see before me A 6 beautiful, I may say that I do not like things made merely to be stared at. Or, like that Iroquois chief, I may say that nothing in Paris pleases me more than the cookshops. I may even denounce, in true Rousseau style, the vanity of the great, who spend the people's sweat on such dispensable things. Finally, I can 205 easily convince myself that if I were on an uninhabited island with no hope of ever returning to human company, and could conjure up such a magnificent building by merely wishing for it, I would not even take that trouble if I already had a comfortable enough hut. All this can be granted and approved. But that is not what is being discussed now. The question is only whether the mere representation of the object is accompanied by satisfaction in me, however indifferent I may be to the existence of the object of that representation. It is easy to see that to say it is beautiful, and to show that I have taste, what matters is what I make of this representation within myself, not how I depend on the object's existence. Everyone must admit that a judgment about beauty mixed with even the slightest interest is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste. To act as judge in matters of taste, we must not be biased in the least toward the thing's existence, but must be entirely indifferent A 7 in that respect.

We can best explain this especially important proposition by contrasting pure, disinterested⁵ satisfaction in a judgment of taste with satisfaction connected with interest. This is especially so if we can also be certain that there are no kinds of interest beyond those we are about to name.

3 Satisfaction in the agreeable is connected with interest.

The agreeable is what pleases the senses in sensation. Here we immediately have an opportunity to point out and challenge a very common confusion between the two meanings the word sensation can have. People say or think that all satisfaction is itself a sensation of pleasure. Consequently 206, everything that pleases is agreeable precisely because it pleases, and, according to A 8 its different degrees or its relations to other agreeable sensations, is delightful, charming, entertaining, gratifying, and so on. But if we grant this, sensory impressions that determine inclination, principles of reason that determine the will, and merely reflected forms of intuition that determine judgment are all exactly the same in their effect on the feeling of pleasure. For this effect would be agreeableness in the sensation of one's state. Ultimately all cultivation of our faculties must aim at the practical and unite in it as their goal. We could therefore expect from them no assessment of things and their worth except one based on the enjoyment they promise. How they achieve this would not matter in the end. Since only the choice of means could make any difference, people could accuse one another of folly and lack of understanding, but never of baseness and malice. For all of them, each according to their own way of seeing things, would be pursuing a goal that for everyone is enjoyment.

When a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation, this expression means something quite different from what it means when I call the representation of a thing sensation, through the senses as a receptivity belonging to the faculty of cognition. In the latter A 9 case, the representation is related to the object. In the former, it is related solely to the subject and serves no cognition at all, not even the cognition through which the subject knows itself.

In the definition above, however, by sensation we mean an objective representation of the senses. To avoid the constant risk of being misunderstood, we will use the otherwise customary name feeling for what must always remain merely subjective and can never constitute a representation of an object. The green color of meadows belongs to objective sensation, as perception of an object of sense. Its agreeableness, however, belongs to subjective sensation, through which no object is represented: that is, to feeling, through which the object is considered as an object of satisfaction, which is not knowledge of it.

My judgment declaring an object 207 agreeable clearly expresses an interest in it. This is already evident from the fact that, through sensation, it arouses desire for an object of that kind. The satisfaction therefore presupposes not merely a judgment about the object, but a relation of its existence to my state insofar as such an object affects it. That is why we say of the agreeable not merely that it pleases, but that it gratifies. What I give it is not A 10 mere approval: it produces inclination. And what is agreeable in the liveliest way requires so little judgment about the object's character that people who aim only at enjoyment—the word for the intimate character of gratification—gladly spare themselves all judging.

4 Satisfaction in the good is connected with interest.

Good is what pleases through reason by means of the mere concept. We call something good for something, or useful, when it pleases only as a means. We call something else good in itself when it pleases for its own sake. Both always contain the concept of an end, and thus a relation of reason to willing, at least possible willing. Consequently, they contain satisfaction in the existence of an object or an action: that is, some interest.

To find something good, I must always know what sort of thing the object is supposed to be, that is, have a concept of it. I do not need this to find beauty in something. Flowers, free designs, and lines intertwined without an aim under the A 11 name of foliage patterns signify nothing and depend on no definite concept, yet they please. Satisfaction in the beautiful must depend on reflection on an object that leads to some concept, though which concept remains undetermined. This also distinguishes it from the agreeable, which rests entirely on sensation.

The agreeable and the good do seem to be the same in many cases. People commonly say that all enjoyment, especially lasting enjoyment, is good in itself. This amounts more or less to saying that being lastingly agreeable and being good are the same. But we soon see that this is merely a mistaken substitution of words. The concepts peculiar to these expressions can by no means 208 be exchanged. The agreeable as such represents the object solely in relation to sense. It must first be brought under principles of reason through the concept of an end before it can be called good as an object of the will. Calling what gratifies good as well places it in an entirely different relation to satisfaction. We can see this because, with the good, the question always arises whether it is merely indirectly good or directly good, useful or good in itself. With the agreeable, however, this question cannot arise at all, since the word always means something that pleases directly. The same applies to what A 12 I call beautiful.

Even in the most ordinary speech, people distinguish the agreeable from the good. We readily say that a dish whose flavor is enhanced by spices and other additions is agreeable, while admitting that it is not good. It directly pleases the senses, but indirectly displeases when considered through reason, which looks ahead to the consequences. We can notice this distinction even in judging health. Health is directly agreeable to everyone who has it, at least negatively, as the absence of all bodily pain. But to say it is good, we must also use reason to relate it to ends: it is a state that makes us fit for all our activities. Finally, regarding happiness, everyone believes they can call the greatest sum of life's agreeable experiences, in both amount and duration, a true good, indeed the highest good. But reason resists this too. Agreeableness is enjoyment. If enjoyment alone were the aim, it would be foolish to be scrupulous about the means that procure it, whether it were passively received through nature's generosity or acquired through our own activity and effort. But reason will never be persuaded that the existence of someone who lives merely A 13 to enjoy has worth in itself, however busy that person may be in pursuing this aim. This remains true even if, as a means to enjoyment, that person greatly benefits others who likewise seek only enjoyment, and does so because sympathy allows them to share every pleasure. Only through what a person does without regard to enjoyment, in complete freedom and independently of what nature might provide even without their activity, do they give their existence as a person 209 absolute worth. Happiness, with all its abundance of agreeableness, is far from being an unconditional good⁶.

Despite all these differences between the agreeable and the good, both agree in always being connected with an interest in their object. This applies not just to the agreeable, § 3, and to the indirectly good, the useful, which pleases as a means to some agreeableness. It also applies to what is good absolutely and in every respect: the morally good, which carries the highest interest with it. For the good is the object of the will, that is, A 14 a faculty of desire determined by reason. Willing something and taking satisfaction in its existence, that is, taking an interest in it, are identical.

5 Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of satisfaction.

The agreeable and the good both relate to the faculty of desire. In this respect, the former carries with it a pathologically conditioned satisfaction, conditioned by attractions or stimuli; the latter carries a pure practical satisfaction. This satisfaction is determined not merely by the representation of the object, but also by the represented connection of the subject with its existence. Not merely the object, but its existence too, pleases. A judgment of taste, by contrast, is merely contemplative: indifferent to an object's existence, it only compares the object's character with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. But this contemplation itself is not directed toward concepts either. For a judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment, whether theoretical or practical. It is therefore neither grounded on concepts nor aimed at them.

The agreeable, the beautiful, and the good thus designate three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. In A 15 210 relation to this feeling we distinguish objects or ways of representing them from one another. The appropriate expressions used to designate satisfaction in each are also different. A person calls agreeable what gratifies them, beautiful what merely pleases them, and good what they esteem or approve, that is, what they assign an objective worth. Agreeableness holds even for animals without reason. Beauty holds only for human beings: beings that are animal yet rational, and not merely rational, as spirits might be, but animal as well. The good, however, holds for every rational being in general. This proposition can receive its full justification and explanation only later. We can say that, of these three kinds of satisfaction, taste's satisfaction in the beautiful alone is disinterested and free. No interest, whether of the senses or of reason, compels approval. We could therefore say that satisfaction in the three cases relates to inclination, favor, or respect. For favor is the only free satisfaction. An object of inclination, and one that a law of reason requires us to desire, leave us no freedom to make something into an object of pleasure for ourselves. Every interest presupposes a need or produces A 16 one. As a ground determining approval, it no longer allows judgment about the object to be free.

Regarding inclination's interest in the agreeable, everyone says that hunger is the best cook, and that people with a healthy appetite like anything edible. Such satisfaction therefore shows no choice according to taste. Only when the need is satisfied can we distinguish who among many people has taste and who does not. Similarly, there are manners or conduct without virtue, politeness without goodwill, propriety without integrity, and so on. Where the moral law speaks, objectively there is no longer any free choice about what to do. Showing taste in one's conduct, or in judging that of others, is quite different from expressing one's moral way of thinking. The latter contains a command and produces a need. Moral taste, by contrast, merely plays with objects of satisfaction without attaching itself to any one of them.

Definition of the beautiful derived from the first moment. 211

Taste is the ability to judge an object or a way of representing it through satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest. The object of such satisfaction is called beautiful.

Second Moment A 17 of the judgment of taste, according to its quantity.

6 The beautiful is what, without concepts, is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction.

This definition of the beautiful can be derived from its previous definition as an object of satisfaction without any interest. If someone is aware that their satisfaction in something involves no interest at all, they cannot help judging that it must contain a ground of satisfaction for everyone. Their satisfaction is not based on any inclination of the subject, or on any other deliberate interest. The person judging feels completely free regarding the satisfaction they take in the object. They therefore cannot discover, as grounds for that satisfaction, any private conditions on which their subject alone depends. They must regard it as grounded in what they can also presuppose in everyone else. Consequently, they must believe they have grounds to expect a similar satisfaction from everyone. They will therefore speak of the beautiful as though beauty A 18 were a feature of the object and the judgment were logical, constituting knowledge of the object through concepts of it. Yet the judgment is only aesthetic and contains merely a relation of the object's representation to the subject. It does, however, resemble a logical judgment in allowing its validity for everyone to be presupposed. But this universality cannot arise from concepts either. There is no passage from concepts to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, except in pure practical laws. These, however, carry an interest of a kind not connected with a pure judgment of taste 212. Consequently, a judgment of taste, together with awareness that it is separated from all interest, must carry a claim to validity for everyone without a universality directed at objects. That is, it must be connected with a claim to subjective universality.

7 Comparison of the beautiful with the agreeable and the good through the characteristic given above.

Regarding the agreeable, everyone accepts that their judgment, which they base on a private feeling and through which they say an object pleases them, is confined to their own person. They are therefore quite content if, on saying "Canary wine A 19 is agreeable," someone else corrects the expression and reminds them to say, "It is agreeable to me." This applies not only to the taste of the tongue, palate, and throat, but also to whatever may be agreeable to each person's eyes and ears. One person finds violet gentle and lovely, another finds it dead and lifeless. One loves the sound of wind instruments, another that of string instruments. It would be foolish to argue over this in order to condemn another person's different judgment as incorrect, as though it logically contradicted our own. Regarding the agreeable, therefore, the principle holds: everyone has their own taste, the taste of sense.

The beautiful is quite different. Here, on the contrary, it would be ridiculous if someone who prided themselves on their taste tried to justify it by saying, "This object is beautiful for me"—whether the building we see, the clothes someone is wearing, the concert we hear, or the poem submitted for judgment. They must not call it beautiful if it merely pleases them. Many things may be attractive and agreeable to them; no one cares about that. But in declaring something beautiful, they expect the same satisfaction from others. They judge not merely for themselves but for A 20 everyone, and speak of beauty as though it were a property of things. They therefore say, "The thing is beautiful." They do not count on others' agreement with their judgment of satisfaction 213 merely because they have repeatedly found others agreeing with them. They demand it. They criticize others who judge differently and deny them taste, while still requiring them to have it. In this respect we cannot say that everyone has their own particular taste. That would mean there is no taste at all, that is, no aesthetic judgment that could rightfully claim everyone's agreement.

Yet even regarding the agreeable, we find agreement among people in judging it. With reference to this agreement, we deny taste to some and grant it to others, not as a bodily sense but as an ability to judge the agreeable in general. Thus we say that someone has taste if they know how to entertain their guests with agreeable experiences, with enjoyment through all the senses, in a way that pleases them all. But here universality is taken only comparatively. There are only general rules, as all empirical rules are, not universal rules of the kind a judgment of taste about the beautiful undertakes to establish or claims to follow. It A 21 is a judgment relating to sociability insofar as that rests on empirical rules. Judgments about the good also rightly claim validity for everyone. But the good is represented as an object of universal satisfaction only through a concept, which is not the case with either the agreeable or the beautiful.

8 In a judgment of taste, the universality of satisfaction is represented only as subjective.

This particular determination of the universality of an aesthetic judgment, found in a judgment of taste, is remarkable. Not for the logician, but for the transcendental philosopher, it calls for considerable effort to discover its origin. In return, it reveals a property of our faculty of cognition that would have remained unknown without this analysis.

First, we must be completely convinced that through a 214 judgment of taste about the beautiful we expect everyone to take satisfaction in an object, without basing this on a concept, for then it would be the good. This claim to universal validity A 22 is so essential to a judgment declaring something beautiful that without thinking of it, no one would think to use that expression. Everything that pleases without a concept would instead be counted as agreeable. In that case everyone is allowed their own opinion, and no one expects another to agree with their judgment of taste, as always happens in a judgment of taste about beauty. I can call the first the taste of sense, the second the taste of reflection. The former makes merely private judgments; the latter makes supposedly universally valid, public judgments. Both, however, make aesthetic, not practical, judgments about an object solely in regard to the relation of its representation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Now experience shows not only that the judgment of the taste of sense, its pleasure or displeasure in something, does not hold universally. Everyone is also modest enough on their own not to expect this agreement from others, although very widespread agreement is often actually found even in these judgments. Yet the taste of reflection, whose claim to the universal validity of its judgment about the beautiful for everyone is also often rejected, as experience teaches, still finds it possible A 23—and actually does so—to represent judgments that could demand this agreement universally. Indeed, it expects this agreement from everyone for each of its judgments of taste. This is strange. Those judging do not dispute the possibility of such a claim. They disagree only, in particular cases, about the correct use of this faculty.

Here we must first note that a universality not resting on concepts of the object, even merely empirical ones, is not logical but aesthetic. It contains no objective quantity of the judgment, only a subjective one. For this I also use the expression common validity. It designates the validity for every subject of a representation's relation not to the faculty of cognition but to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. The same expression can also be used for the logical quantity of a judgment, 215 provided we add objective universal validity, to distinguish it from merely subjective universal validity, which is always aesthetic.

An objectively universally valid judgment is also always subjectively valid. That is, if the judgment holds for everything contained under a given concept, it also holds for everyone who represents an object through that concept. But from subjective universal validity, that is, aesthetic validity, which rests on no concept A 24, we cannot infer logical validity, because judgments of this kind do not concern the object at all. For that very reason, the aesthetic universality attributed to a judgment must be of a special kind. It does not connect the predicate of beauty with the concept of the object considered throughout its entire logical sphere, yet it extends that same predicate over the whole sphere of those judging.

As regards logical quantity, all judgments of taste are singular judgments. I must compare the object directly with my feeling of pleasure and displeasure, not through concepts. Such judgments therefore cannot have the quantity of objectively universally valid judgments. Yet a logically universal judgment can result if the singular representation of the object of a judgment of taste is transformed by comparison into a concept, according to the conditions determining that judgment. For example, through a judgment of taste I declare the rose I am looking at beautiful. By contrast, the judgment arising from comparing many singular judgments, "Roses in general are beautiful," is now expressed not merely as an aesthetic judgment, but as a logical judgment grounded on an aesthetic one. Now the judgment "The rose is agreeable in its smell" is also aesthetic and singular, but is a judgment of sense, not of taste. It differs from the latter in this: a judgment of taste carries an aesthetic A 25 quantity of universality, of validity for everyone, that cannot be found in a judgment about the agreeable. Only judgments about the good have logical, not merely aesthetic, universality, although they too determine satisfaction in an object. For they hold of the object as knowledge of it, and therefore hold for everyone.

If we judge objects merely according to concepts, all representation of beauty is lost. There can therefore be no rule by which someone should be forced to acknowledge something as beautiful. Whether 216 clothes, a house, or a flower are beautiful is not a judgment we let anyone talk us into through reasons or principles. We want to put the object before our own eyes, as though our satisfaction depended on sensation. Yet when we then call the object beautiful, we believe we have a universal voice on our side and claim everyone's agreement. A private sensation, by contrast, would decide only for the observer and their own satisfaction.

Here we can see that in a judgment of taste nothing is postulated but such a universal voice regarding satisfaction without concepts acting as intermediaries. Thus what is postulated is the possibility of an A 26 aesthetic judgment that could also be considered valid for everyone. The judgment of taste itself does not postulate everyone's agreement; only a logically universal judgment can do that, because it can give reasons. It only expects this agreement from everyone, as a case of the rule, for which it expects confirmation not from concepts but from the agreement of others. The universal voice is therefore only an idea. What it rests on is not yet investigated here. It may be uncertain whether someone who believes they are making a judgment of taste actually judges in accordance with this idea. But by using the expression beauty they announce that they do relate the judgment to it, and thus that it is meant to be a judgment of taste. For themselves, they can become certain of this simply by being aware that they have separated everything belonging to the agreeable and the good from the satisfaction that remains. This is all for which they expect everyone's agreement. Under these conditions their claim would also be justified, if only they did not so often violate them and therefore make an erroneous judgment of taste.

9 A 27 Investigation of the question: in a judgment of taste, does the feeling of pleasure precede judging the object, or does judging precede pleasure?

Solving this problem is the key to the critique of taste and therefore deserves our full attention.

Suppose pleasure in the given object came first, and a judgment of taste were only to attribute the 217 universal communicability of this pleasure to the representation of the object. Such a procedure would contradict itself. For this pleasure would be nothing but mere agreeableness in sensory sensation. By its nature it could therefore have only private validity, since it would depend directly on the representation through which the object is given.

It must therefore be the universal communicability of the mental state in the given representation that underlies the judgment of taste as its subjective condition, and has pleasure in the object as its consequence. But nothing can be universally communicated except cognition and representation insofar as it belongs to cognition. Only to that extent is a representation objective, and only through this does it have a universal point of reference with which everyone's power of representation is compelled A 28 to agree. Now if the determining ground of the judgment about this universal communicability of the representation is to be thought as merely subjective, without a concept of the object, it can only be the mental state found in the relation of the powers of representation to one another, insofar as they relate a given representation to cognition in general.

The cognitive powers brought into play by this representation are here in free play, because no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. The mental state in this representation must therefore be a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation in a given representation for cognition in general. For a representation through which an object is given to become cognition at all, it requires imagination to combine the manifold of intuition, and understanding for the unity of the concept that unites the representations. This state of free play of the cognitive faculties in a representation through which an object is given must be universally communicable. For cognition, as the determination of the object with which given representations, in whatever subject, ought to agree A 29, is the only kind of representation that holds for everyone.

The subjective universal communicability of the way of representing in a judgment of taste is supposed to occur without presupposing a definite concept. It can therefore be nothing other than the mental state in the 218 free play of imagination and understanding, insofar as they agree with each other as is required for cognition in general. We are aware that this subjective relation suited to cognition in general must hold for everyone and therefore be universally communicable, just as every definite cognition is. Such cognition always rests on that relation as its subjective condition.

This merely subjective, aesthetic judging of the object, or of the representation through which it is given, thus precedes pleasure in it and grounds this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties. The universal subjective validity of the satisfaction we connect with the representation of an object we call beautiful rests solely on that universality of the subjective conditions for judging objects.

Being able to communicate one's mental state, even just regarding the cognitive faculties, carries pleasure with it. This could easily be shown from the human being's natural tendency toward sociability, empirically A 30 and psychologically. But that is not enough for our purpose. In a judgment of taste we expect everyone else necessarily to have the pleasure we feel. When we call something beautiful, we speak as though beauty were a feature of the object determined in it according to concepts. Yet beauty in itself is nothing without a relation to the subject's feeling. We must reserve discussion of this question until we answer whether and how aesthetic judgments are possible a priori.

For now, we are still concerned with the smaller question: how do we become aware, in a judgment of taste, of a mutual subjective agreement of the cognitive powers? Is it aesthetically, through mere inner sense and sensation, or intellectually, through awareness of the intentional activity by which we bring them into play?

If the given representation occasioning the judgment of taste were a concept that united understanding and imagination in judging the object so as to know it, awareness of this relation would be intellectual, as in the objective schematism of judgment discussed in the critique. But the judgment would then not be made in relation to pleasure and displeasure, 219 and would therefore not be a judgment of taste. Now a judgment of taste A 31 determines the object independently of concepts in regard to satisfaction and the predicate of beauty. That subjective unity of the relation can therefore make itself known only through sensation. The sensation whose universal communicability the judgment of taste postulates is the enlivening of both faculties, imagination and understanding, into an activity that is undetermined yet harmonious on the occasion of the given representation: the activity belonging to cognition in general. An objective relation can indeed only be thought. Yet insofar as it is subjective in its conditions, it can be sensed in its effect on the mind. Where a relation has no concept as its basis, as with the relation of the powers of representation to a faculty of cognition in general, no awareness of it is possible except through the sensation of its effect. This effect consists in the easier play of the two mental powers, imagination and understanding, enlivened by their mutual agreement. A representation that, though singular and not compared with others, nevertheless agrees with the conditions of universality, which constitutes the understanding's task in general, brings the cognitive faculties into the proportionate attunement we require for all cognition. We therefore also consider it valid for everyone whose task is to judge through understanding and A 32 senses in combination: for every human being.

Definition of the beautiful derived from the second moment.

Beautiful is what pleases universally without a concept.

Third Moment of judgments of taste, according to the relation of ends considered in them.

10 On purposiveness in general.

If we want to explain what an end is according to its transcendental determinations, without presupposing anything empirical such as the feeling of pleasure, 220 then an end is the object of a concept insofar as that concept is regarded as the object's cause, the real ground of its possibility. The causality of a concept with regard to its object is purposiveness (final form). Thus we think of an end wherever not merely knowledge of an object, but the object itself, its form or existence, is thought as an effect possible only through a concept of that effect. The representation of the effect here determines its cause A 33 and precedes it. Awareness of a representation's causality with regard to the subject's state, toward keeping the subject in that state, can here designate in general what we call pleasure. Displeasure, by contrast, is that representation which contains the ground for determining the state of representations toward its own opposite, for holding them off or removing them.

The faculty of desire, insofar as it can be determined only through concepts, that is, to act in accordance with the representation of an end, would be the will. But an object, a mental state, or an action is also called purposive even if its possibility does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end. This is simply because we can explain and understand its possibility only insofar as we assume as its basis a causality according to ends: a will that would have arranged it in this way according to the representation of a certain rule. Purposiveness can therefore exist without an end, insofar as we do not locate the causes of this form in a will, yet can make the explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving it from a will. Now we do not always need to understand through reason the possibility of what we observe. So we can at least observe a purposiveness of form without placing an end A 34 beneath it as the matter of the connection of ends. We can notice it in objects, although only through reflection.

11 221 A judgment of taste is grounded on nothing but the form of purposiveness of an object or of the way of representing it.

Every end, when regarded as the ground of satisfaction, always carries an interest as the determining ground of the judgment about the object of pleasure. Thus no subjective end can underlie a judgment of taste. But neither can any representation of an objective end—that is, of the possibility of the object itself according to principles of a connection of ends—and hence no concept of the good determine a judgment of taste. For it is an aesthetic judgment, not a cognitive one. It therefore concerns no concept of the object's character and its inner or outer possibility through this or that cause. It concerns only the relation of the powers of representation to one another insofar as they are determined by a representation.

Now when an object is determined A 35 as beautiful, this relation is connected with a feeling of pleasure that the judgment of taste also declares valid for everyone. Consequently, neither an agreeableness accompanying the representation, nor a representation of the object's perfection and the concept of the good, can contain the determining ground. Nothing, then, can constitute the satisfaction we judge universally communicable without a concept, and thus the determining ground of a judgment of taste, except subjective purposiveness in the representation of an object without any end, objective or subjective. It is therefore the mere form of purposiveness in the representation through which an object is given to us, insofar as we are aware of that form.

12 A judgment of taste rests on a priori grounds.

It is absolutely impossible to establish a priori a connection between a feeling of pleasure or displeasure as an effect and any representation, whether sensation or concept, as its cause. This would be a causal relation, which among objects of experience can 222 always be known only a posteriori, through experience itself. A 36 In the Critique of Practical Reason, we did indeed derive the feeling of respect a priori from universal moral concepts. Respect is a special and distinctive modification of this feeling, which does not quite coincide with either the pleasure or displeasure we receive from empirical objects. But there we could also go beyond the limits of experience and call upon a causality resting on a supersensible character of the subject: the causality of freedom. Yet even there we did not really derive this feeling from the idea of morality as its cause. Only the determination of the will was derived from it. The mental state of a will determined in any way is in itself already a feeling of pleasure and identical with it. It does not follow from that determination as an effect. We would have to assume the latter only if the concept of morality as a good preceded the determination of the will by the law. In that case we would try in vain to derive the pleasure connected with the concept from that concept as a mere cognition.

Pleasure in an aesthetic judgment is similar. The difference is that here pleasure is merely contemplative and produces no interest in the object, whereas in a moral judgment it is practical. Awareness of the merely formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive powers A 37 in a representation through which an object is given is the pleasure itself. For in an aesthetic judgment this awareness contains a ground determining the subject's activity toward enlivening its cognitive powers. It thus contains an inner causality, which is purposive, with regard to cognition in general, but without being restricted to a definite cognition. It therefore contains merely the form of a representation's subjective purposiveness. This pleasure is also in no way practical, neither like pleasure arising from the pathological ground of agreeableness nor like pleasure arising from the intellectual ground of the represented good. Yet it does contain causality: that of maintaining the state of representation itself and the activity of the cognitive powers without any further aim. We linger over contemplating the beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself. This is analogous to, but not identical with, the lingering that occurs when an attraction in the object's representation repeatedly awakens attention, while the mind is passive.

13 223 A pure judgment of taste is independent of sensory attraction and emotion.

Every interest spoils a judgment of taste and deprives it of impartiality. This is especially true when, unlike the interest of reason, A 38 it does not place purposiveness before the feeling of pleasure, but grounds purposiveness on that feeling. The latter always occurs in an aesthetic judgment about something insofar as it gratifies or pains. Judgments affected in this way can therefore make no claim to universally valid satisfaction, or their claim diminishes to the extent that sensations of this kind enter among taste's determining grounds. Taste is still barbaric whenever it needs an admixture of sensory attractions and emotions for satisfaction, and even makes these the standard of its approval.

Yet sensory attractions are often counted not only as contributions to beauty, which strictly should concern form alone, and to universal aesthetic satisfaction. They are even passed off as beauties in themselves, and thus the matter of satisfaction is passed off as its form. Like many other misunderstandings that still have some truth at their basis, this can be removed by carefully defining these concepts.

A judgment of taste on which sensory attraction and emotion have no influence, although they can be combined with satisfaction in the beautiful, and which therefore has only the purposiveness of form as its determining ground, is a pure judgment of taste.

14 A 39 Explanation through examples.

Aesthetic judgments, like theoretical or logical judgments, can be divided into empirical and pure. The former assert agreeableness or disagreeableness of an object or of the way of representing it. The latter assert beauty. The former are judgments of sense, material aesthetic judgments; the latter, as formal judgments, alone are judgments of taste in the proper sense.

224 A judgment of taste is therefore pure only insofar as no merely empirical satisfaction is mixed into its determining ground. But such a mixture always occurs when sensory attraction or emotion has a share in the judgment intended to declare something beautiful.

Here various objections arise again. In the end they make sensory attraction appear not merely a necessary ingredient of beauty, but even sufficient on its own to be called beautiful. Most people declare a mere color, such as the green of a lawn, or a mere tone, as distinct from sound and noise, such as that of a violin, beautiful in itself. Yet both seem based only on the matter of representations, on sensation alone, and therefore seem to deserve only the name agreeable. A 40 But we also notice that sensations of both color and tone are considered entitled to count as beautiful only insofar as both are pure. This determination already concerns form, and is also the only thing about these representations that can with certainty be communicated universally. For we can hardly assume that the quality of the sensations themselves agrees in all subjects, or that everyone judges in the same way the agreeableness of one color over another, or of the tone of one musical instrument over another.

Suppose we assume with Euler that colors are successive pulses (beats) of the ether occurring at equal intervals, just as tones are such pulses of air set vibrating in sound. Suppose, most importantly, that the mind perceives not only, through sense, their effect in enlivening the organ, but also, through reflection, the regular play of the impressions, and thus the form in the combination of different representations. I have no doubt about the latter. Color and tone would then not be mere sensations, but already formal determinations of the unity of a manifold of sensations. They could then also be counted as beauties in themselves.

The purity of a simple kind of sensation means that its uniformity is not disturbed A 41 or interrupted by any sensation of a different kind. It belongs solely to form, because we can abstract here from the quality of that kind of sensation: whether it represents a color and which one, or a tone and which one. All simple colors, insofar as they are pure, are therefore considered beautiful. Mixed colors do not have this 225 advantage, precisely because, since they are not simple, we have no standard for judging whether to call them pure or impure.

As for the beauty attributed to an object because of its form, it is a common error to suppose that sensory attraction can actually heighten it. This error is very harmful to genuine, unbiased, well-grounded taste. Attractions can certainly be added alongside beauty to interest the mind in the object's representation beyond its bare satisfaction. They can thus help recommend taste and its cultivation, especially when it is still rough and unpracticed. But they actually undermine a judgment of taste if they draw attention to themselves as grounds for judging beauty. Far from contributing to it, they must instead be tolerated as foreign elements when taste is still weak and unpracticed, and only insofar as they do not disturb that beautiful form.

In painting, sculpture, indeed all the visual arts, in A 42 architecture and garden design insofar as they are fine arts, drawing is essential. Here the basis of everything arranged for taste is not what gratifies in sensation, but merely what pleases through its form. The colors that illuminate the outline belong to sensory attraction. They can make the object itself lively for sensation, but cannot make it worthy of contemplation and beautiful. Rather, the requirements of beautiful form usually restrict them very greatly. Even where sensory attraction is permitted, it is ennobled by that form alone.

Every form of objects of the senses, both the outer senses and indirectly the inner sense, is either shape or play. In the latter case it is either a play of shapes, as in mime and dance in space, or a mere play of sensations in time. The attraction of colors or of an instrument's agreeable tones may be added. But drawing in the first case and composition in the latter constitute the actual object of a pure judgment of taste. The purity of colors and tones, or their variety and contrast, may seem to contribute to beauty. This does not mean that, because they are agreeable in themselves, they add something of the same kind to satisfaction in form. A 43 It means instead that they make the form more precisely, distinctly, and fully 226 visible, and also enliven the representation through their attraction by arousing and sustaining attention to the object itself.

Even what we call ornaments (accessories)—what belongs to the whole representation of the object not internally as a component but only externally as an addition, and increases the satisfaction of taste—does so only through its form. Examples are picture frames, clothing on statues, or colonnades around magnificent buildings. But if the ornament does not itself consist in beautiful form, and is added merely to recommend the painting to approval through its attraction, like a gold frame, it is then called finery and detracts from genuine beauty.

Emotion is a sensation in which agreeableness is produced only through a momentary check of the vital force followed by a stronger outpouring of it. It has no place in beauty at all. Sublimity, with which the feeling of emotion is connected, requires a different standard of judgment from the one taste takes as its basis. Thus a pure judgment of taste has neither sensory attraction nor emotion—in a word, no sensation as the matter of an aesthetic judgment—as its determining ground.

15 A 44 A judgment of taste is entirely independent of the concept of perfection.

Objective purposiveness can be known only through the relation of the manifold to a definite end, and thus only through a concept. This alone already shows that the beautiful is entirely independent of the representation of the good. For judging the beautiful rests on a merely formal purposiveness, a purposiveness without an end, whereas the good presupposes objective purposiveness, the relation of the object to a definite end.

Objective purposiveness is either external, the object's usefulness, or internal, its perfection. The two preceding main divisions sufficiently show that the satisfaction in an object for which we call it beautiful cannot rest on the representation of its usefulness. It would then not 227 be a direct satisfaction in the object, which is the essential condition of a judgment about beauty. But objective inner purposiveness, perfection, comes closer to the predicate of beauty. Distinguished philosophers have therefore considered it identical with beauty, though with the qualification, when it is thought confusedly. A 45 In a critique of taste, it is of the greatest importance to decide whether beauty can actually be reduced to the concept of perfection.

To judge objective purposiveness, we always need the concept of an end. If that purposiveness is to be internal rather than external [usefulness], we also need the concept of an internal end containing the ground of the object's inner possibility. An end in general is something whose concept can be regarded as the ground of the possibility of the object itself. Thus, to represent objective purposiveness in a thing, a concept of it, of what sort of thing it is supposed to be, will come first. The agreement of the manifold within it with this concept, which gives the rule for combining that manifold in it, is a thing's qualitative perfection. Entirely different from this is quantitative perfection, the completeness of each thing of its kind. This is a mere concept of magnitude, of totality. Here what the thing is supposed to be is already thought as determined in advance. The question is only whether everything required for it is present. The formal element in the representation of a thing, the agreement of the manifold into one, leaving undetermined what that one is supposed to be, gives A 46 no knowledge at all of objective purposiveness on its own. For when we abstract from this one as an end, from what the thing is supposed to be, nothing remains but the subjective purposiveness of representations in the mind of the person intuiting it. This does indicate a certain purposiveness of the subject's state of representation, and a comfort in taking a given form into imagination. But it indicates no perfection of any object, since here the object is not thought through any concept of an end. For example, if I come across a grassy clearing in a wood, with trees standing around it in a circle, and do not represent an end to myself—perhaps that it is meant for a country dance—the mere form gives not the slightest concept of 228 perfection. But to represent a formal objective purposiveness without an end, a mere form of perfection without any matter or concept of what the agreement is directed toward, even if this were only the idea of lawfulness in general, is an outright contradiction.

Now a judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, one resting on subjective grounds. Its determining ground cannot be a concept, and therefore cannot be the concept of a definite end. Thus beauty, as formal subjective purposiveness, in no way means a perfection of the object as an allegedly A 47 formal yet still objective purposiveness. It is therefore invalid to distinguish the concepts of the beautiful and the good as though they differed only in logical form: the first being merely a confused concept of perfection, the second a clear one, while both were otherwise identical in content and origin. There would then be no specific difference between them. A judgment of taste would be just as much a cognitive judgment as the judgment declaring something good. It would be like an ordinary person saying that fraud is wrong and grounding the judgment on confused principles, while a philosopher grounds it on clear principles, though fundamentally both rely on the same rational principles. But I have already stated that an aesthetic judgment is unique in its kind and provides absolutely no knowledge, not even confused knowledge, of the object. Only a logical judgment does that. An aesthetic judgment instead relates the representation through which an object is given solely to the subject. It indicates no feature of the object, but only the purposive form in the determination of the powers of representation occupied with it. The judgment is called aesthetic precisely because its determining ground is not a concept but the feeling, through inner sense, of that harmony in the play of the mental powers, insofar as it can only be felt. By contrast, if we called confused concepts and the objective A 48 judgment based on them aesthetic, we would have an understanding judging sensibly, or a sense representing its objects through concepts. Both are self-contradictory. The understanding is the faculty of concepts, whether confused or clear. Although understanding also belongs to a judgment of taste as an aesthetic judgment, as it does to all judgments, it belongs to it 229 not as a faculty for knowing an object. It belongs as a faculty for determining the judgment and its representation, without a concept, according to their relation to the subject and its inner feeling, insofar as this judgment is possible according to a universal rule.

16 A judgment of taste declaring an object beautiful under the condition of a definite concept is not pure.

There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (unattached beauty) and merely dependent beauty (adhering beauty). The former presupposes no concept of what the object is supposed to be. The latter presupposes such a concept and the object's perfection according to it. Kinds of the former are called self-standing beauties of this or that thing. The latter, as adhering to a concept A 49, as conditioned beauty, is attributed to objects that fall under the concept of a particular end.

Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly anyone but a botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is supposed to be. Even the botanist, who recognizes in it the plant's reproductive organ, takes no account of this natural end when judging it through taste. No perfection of any kind, no internal purposiveness to which the combination of the manifold relates, is therefore placed at the basis of this judgment. Many birds—the parrot, the hummingbird, the bird of paradise—and a great many sea creatures with shells are beauties in themselves. They do not belong to any object determined by concepts with regard to its end, but please freely and on their own. Similarly, designs in the Greek style, foliage patterns on borders or wallpaper, and so forth, mean nothing in themselves. They represent nothing, no object under a definite concept, and are free beauties. We can also count in this kind what are called fantasies in music, without a theme, and indeed all music without words.

In judging a free beauty according to mere form, the judgment of taste is pure. No concept of any end is presupposed, no concept of what the manifold in the given object should serve or what 230 the object should therefore represent. Such a concept would only restrict the freedom of imagination, A 50 which plays, as it were, in observing the shape.

But the beauty of a human being, and within this kind the beauty of a man, woman, or child; the beauty of a horse; or the beauty of a building, whether a church, palace, arsenal, or summerhouse, presupposes a concept of the end determining what the thing is supposed to be. It thus presupposes a concept of its perfection and is merely dependent beauty. Combining the agreeable, sensation, with beauty, which properly concerns form alone, prevented the judgment of taste from being pure. Similarly, combining the good with beauty detracts from its purity: here the good means what the manifold contributes to the thing itself according to its end.

We could add many features to a building that would please directly in intuition, if only it were not supposed to be a church. We could beautify a figure with all kinds of flourishes and light yet regular lines, as the New Zealanders do with their tattooing, if only it were not a human being. And a human being could have much finer features and a more pleasing, gentler facial outline, if only they were not supposed to represent a man, especially a warrior.

Now satisfaction in the manifold in a thing A 51, in relation to the internal end determining its possibility, is satisfaction grounded on a concept. Satisfaction in beauty, however, presupposes no concept. It is directly connected with the representation through which the object is given, not through which it is thought. If the judgment of taste concerning the latter is made dependent on the end in the former, a judgment of reason, and is thereby restricted, it is no longer a free and pure judgment of taste.

Taste does gain something from this combination of aesthetic with intellectual satisfaction: it becomes fixed. Although it does not become universal, rules can still be prescribed for it regarding certain objects determined by ends. But these are not rules of taste. They are merely rules for reconciling taste with reason, the beautiful with the good. Through them the beautiful becomes useful as an instrument for the aim concerning the good. The mental attunement that maintains itself and has 231 subjective universal validity is placed beneath a way of thinking that can be maintained only through strenuous resolve, but is objectively universally valid. Strictly speaking, however, perfection gains nothing through beauty, nor beauty through perfection. A 52 Rather, when we compare the representation through which an object is given to us with the object, as regards what it is supposed to be, through a concept, we cannot avoid also comparing it with sensation in the subject. It is therefore the entire capacity of the power of representation that gains when both mental states agree.

A judgment of taste regarding an object with a definite internal end would be pure only if the person judging either had no concept of that end or abstracted from it in the judgment. In that case, although they made a correct judgment of taste by judging the object as free beauty, they would still be criticized and accused of false taste by someone who considered its beauty only as a dependent feature, looking to the object's end. Yet both would judge correctly in their own way: one according to what they have before their senses, the other according to what they have in mind. This distinction can settle many disputes among judges of beauty. We show them that one is concerned with free beauty, the other with dependent beauty; the former makes a pure judgment of taste, the latter an applied one.

17 A 53 On the ideal of beauty.

There can be no objective rule of taste determining through concepts what is beautiful. Every judgment from this source is aesthetic: the subject's feeling, not a concept of an object, is its determining ground. Seeking a principle of taste that gives the universal criterion of the beautiful through definite concepts is a fruitless effort. What is being sought is impossible and self-contradictory. The universal communicability of sensation, of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, occurring without a concept; the agreement, as far as possible, of all times and 232 peoples regarding this feeling in representing certain objects: this is the empirical criterion that a taste confirmed by such examples descends from the deeply hidden ground, common to all human beings, of agreement in judging the forms under which objects are given to them. Yet this criterion is weak and scarcely enough to support a conjecture.

Some products of taste are therefore regarded as exemplary, not as though taste could be acquired by imitating others. Taste must be a faculty of one's own. Someone who imitates a model shows skill insofar as they reproduce it, A 54 but shows taste only insofar as they can judge the model itself.⁷ It follows that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea that everyone must produce within themselves. By it they must judge everything that is an object of taste or an example of judging through taste, and even everyone's taste itself. Idea, strictly speaking, means a concept of reason; ideal means the representation of an individual being adequate to an idea. This archetype of taste rests on reason's indeterminate idea of a maximum, yet cannot be represented through concepts, only in an individual presentation. It is therefore better called the ideal of the beautiful. Even if we do not possess such an ideal, we still strive to produce it within ourselves. But it will be only an ideal of imagination, precisely because it rests not on concepts but on presentation, and the faculty A 55 of presentation is imagination.—How, then, do we arrive at such an ideal of beauty? A priori or empirically? And what kind of beauty is capable of an ideal?

First, we must note that the beauty for which an ideal is to be sought cannot be unattached beauty. It must be beauty fixed by a concept of objective purposiveness. It must therefore belong not to the object of a wholly pure judgment of taste, but to the object of a partly intellectualized judgment of taste 233. In other words, wherever an ideal can occur among grounds of judgment, some idea of reason according to definite concepts must underlie it, determining a priori the end on which the object's inner possibility rests. We cannot think an ideal of beautiful flowers, beautiful furnishings, or a beautiful view. But we cannot represent an ideal even of beauty dependent on definite ends, such as a beautiful house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden, and so forth. Presumably this is because the ends are not sufficiently determined and fixed by their concept, so that purposiveness is almost as free as in unattached beauty. The human being has the end of its existence within itself and can determine its own ends through reason. Or, where it must take them from external perception, it can still compare them with essential and universal ends, and then A 56 judge their agreement with these aesthetically as well. Thus among all objects in the world, this human being alone is capable of an ideal of beauty, just as humanity in the human person, as intelligence, is capable of the ideal of perfection.

Two elements belong to this. First, the aesthetic normal idea: an individual intuition of imagination representing the standard for judging the human being as a thing belonging to a particular animal species. Second, the idea of reason: this makes the ends of humanity, insofar as they cannot be represented sensibly, the principle for judging the human figure. Through the figure, as their effect in appearance, these ends reveal themselves. The normal idea must take from experience its elements for the figure of an animal of a particular kind. Yet the greatest purposiveness in constructing that figure, suitable as a universal standard for aesthetically judging every individual of the species, lies solely in the idea of the person judging. It is the image that seems to have intentionally underlain nature's technique, an image to which only the species as a whole, but no separate individual, is adequate. Yet this idea, with its proportions, can be fully presented as an aesthetic idea in a model image in a concrete instance. To make it somewhat understandable how this happens A 57—for who can coax nature's secret from it entirely?—we will attempt a psychological explanation.

We should note that in a way wholly beyond our understanding, 234 imagination knows not only how to recall on occasion the signs for concepts, even from long ago. It can also reproduce the image and shape of an object out of an inexpressibly large number of objects of different kinds, or of one and the same kind. Indeed, when the mind sets about making comparisons, imagination in all probability actually lets one image fall upon another, though not sufficiently for us to be aware of it. Through the coincidence of many images of the same kind, it obtains an average that serves as a common measure for them all. Suppose someone has seen a thousand adult men and now wants to judge the normal size to be estimated by comparison. In my view, imagination lets a large number of the images, perhaps all thousand, fall upon one another. If I may use the analogy of optical presentation here, the average size becomes recognizable in the space where most of them unite, within the outline where the area is illuminated with the most heavily applied color. In height and width it is equally distant from the outer limits of the largest and smallest figures. This is the A 58 stature of a beautiful man. We could obtain the same result mechanically by measuring all thousand, adding their heights together, and separately their widths (and thicknesses), and dividing each sum by a thousand. But imagination does this through a dynamic effect arising from repeatedly taking in such figures upon the organ of inner sense. If we similarly seek the average head for this average man, the average nose for that head, and so on, this figure underlies the normal idea of a beautiful man in the country where the comparison is made. Under these empirical conditions, a Black person must therefore have a different normal idea of beauty of figure from a white person, and a Chinese person a different one from a European. The same would apply to the model of a beautiful horse or dog of a particular breed.—This normal idea is not derived from proportions taken from experience as definite rules. Rather, rules of judgment first become possible according to it. It is the image for the whole genus hovering among all the individual intuitions of individuals differing in many ways. Nature placed it beneath its productions in the same species as an archetype, 235 yet seems not to have fully achieved it in any individual. It is by no means A 59 the whole archetype of beauty in this genus. It is only the form constituting the indispensable condition of all beauty, and thus merely correctness in presenting the genus. It is the rule, as Polykleitos's famous Spear-Bearer was called. Myron's cow could also serve the same purpose in its own genus. For this very reason it cannot contain anything specifically characteristic; otherwise it would not be the normal idea for the genus. Nor does its presentation please through beauty, but merely because it contradicts none of the conditions under which alone a thing of this genus can be beautiful. The presentation is merely academically correct.⁸

The ideal of the beautiful remains distinct from its normal idea. For the reasons already given, we can expect this ideal only in the human figure. Here the ideal consists in the expression of the moral, without which the object A 60 would not please universally and also positively, rather than merely negatively in an academically correct presentation. The visible expression of moral ideas that govern human beings inwardly can indeed be taken only from experience. But combining them with everything our reason connects with the morally good in the idea of the highest purposiveness, and making goodness of soul, purity, strength, serenity, and so forth, as it were visible in bodily expression as the effect of the inner state, requires pure ideas of reason united with great imaginative power. This is needed even in someone who merely wants to judge them, and still more in someone who wants to present them. The correctness of such an ideal 236 of beauty is shown in this: it allows no sensory attraction to mix with satisfaction in its object, yet lets us take a great interest in it. This in turn proves that judging according to such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, and judging according to an ideal of beauty is no mere judgment of A 61 taste.

Definition of the beautiful concluded from this third moment.

Beauty is the form of an object's purposiveness, insofar as this is perceived in it without the representation of an end.⁹

Fourth Moment A 62 of the judgment of taste, according to the modality of satisfaction in the object.

18 What the modality of a judgment of taste is.

Of every representation I can at least say that it is possible for it, as cognition, to be connected with pleasure. Of what I call agreeable, I say that it actually produces pleasure in me. But we think of the beautiful as having a necessary relation to satisfaction. This necessity is of a special kind. It is not a theoretical, objective necessity by which we can know a priori 237 that everyone will feel this satisfaction in the object I call beautiful. Nor is it a practical necessity in which, through concepts of a pure rational will serving as a rule for freely acting beings, this satisfaction is the necessary consequence of an objective law. Such a necessity would mean only that we ought absolutely, without any further aim, to act in a certain way. Instead, as a necessity thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can be called only exemplary: the necessity of everyone's agreement with a judgment regarded as an example of a universal A 63 rule we cannot state. An aesthetic judgment is not an objective, cognitive judgment. This necessity therefore cannot be derived from definite concepts and so cannot be demonstrated as necessary. Still less can it be inferred from the universality of experience, from complete agreement in judgments about the beauty of a particular object. Experience could scarcely supply enough evidence for this. Moreover, no concept of the necessity of these judgments can be grounded on empirical judgments.

19 The subjective necessity we attribute to a judgment of taste is conditional.

A judgment of taste expects everyone's agreement. Whoever declares something beautiful wants everyone to approve the object in question and likewise declare it beautiful: everyone ought to do so. The ought in an aesthetic judgment is therefore still expressed only conditionally, even after all the data required for judging are given. We seek everyone else's agreement because we have a ground for it common to all. We could count on this agreement if only we were always certain that the case had been correctly placed under that ground as A 64 a rule of approval.

20 The condition of the necessity claimed by a judgment of taste is the idea of a common sense.

If judgments of taste, like cognitive judgments, had a definite objective principle, someone who made them according to 238 that principle would claim unconditional necessity for their judgment. If they lacked all principle, like judgments of mere sensory taste, we would never think of any necessity in them at all. They must therefore have a subjective principle determining only through feeling, not concepts, yet with universal validity, what pleases or displeases. Such a principle could be regarded only as a common sense. This is essentially different from ordinary understanding, which is sometimes also called common sense (shared sense). The latter judges not according to feeling but always according to concepts, though usually as principles represented only obscurely.

By a common sense, however, we mean not an external sense but the effect of the free play of our cognitive powers. Only if we presuppose that there is such a common sense—only on this presupposition, A 65 I say—can a judgment of taste be made.

21 Whether we can justifiably presuppose a common sense.

Cognitions and judgments, together with the conviction accompanying them, must be universally communicable. Otherwise they would have no agreement with the object. They would all be a merely subjective play of the powers of representation, just as skepticism maintains. But if cognitions are to be communicable, the mental state must also be universally communicable: the attunement of the cognitive powers for cognition in general, specifically the proportion suited to a representation through which an object is given to us, so as to turn it into cognition. Without this as the subjective condition of knowing, cognition could not arise as its effect. This actually happens whenever a given object, through the senses, activates imagination to combine the manifold, and imagination in turn activates understanding to unite it in concepts. But this attunement of the cognitive powers has a different proportion according to the different objects given. Yet there must be one A 66 in which this inner relation for enlivening each through the other is the most beneficial for both mental powers with regard to cognition of given 239 objects in general. This attunement can be determined only through feeling, not according to concepts. Now this attunement itself must be universally communicable, and therefore so must the feeling of it in a given representation. But the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense. We can therefore justifiably assume such a common sense, without basing it on psychological observations. We assume it as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which must be presupposed in every logic and every nonskeptical principle of cognition.

22 The necessity of universal agreement thought in a judgment of taste is a subjective necessity represented as objective on the presupposition of a common sense.

In every judgment declaring something beautiful, we allow no one to hold another opinion. Yet we base our judgment not on A 67 concepts but only on our feeling. We therefore take this as a shared feeling, not a private one. Now common sense cannot for this purpose be grounded on experience. It claims to authorize judgments containing an ought. It does not say that everyone will agree with our judgment, but that everyone ought to agree. Thus common sense, whose judgment I here give my judgment of taste as an example of, and because of which I attribute exemplary validity to it, is a mere ideal norm. On its presupposition, we could rightly make a judgment agreeing with it, and the satisfaction in an object expressed in that judgment, a rule for everyone. For although the principle is only subjective, if accepted as subjectively universal, as an idea necessary for everyone, it could demand universal agreement concerning the harmony of different people judging, just like an objective principle. We would only have to be certain that we had correctly placed the case under it.

We actually presuppose this indeterminate norm of a common sense, as our claim to make judgments of taste proves. 240 Whether such a common sense actually exists as a constitutive principle of the possibility of experience, or whether a still higher principle of reason only makes it a regulative principle for us, requiring us first to produce a common sense A 68 within ourselves for higher ends, is another question. Is taste an original and natural faculty, or only the idea of an artificial faculty still to be acquired? In the latter case, a judgment of taste, with its expectation of universal agreement, would actually be only a demand of reason to produce such agreement in our way of sensing. The ought, the objective necessity of everyone's feeling merging with each person's particular feeling, would mean only the possibility of achieving harmony in this. A judgment of taste would then provide only an example of this principle's application. We do not intend to investigate this here yet, nor can we. For now we have only to analyze the faculty of taste into its elements and finally unite them in the idea of a common sense.

Definition of the beautiful derived from the fourth moment.

Beautiful is what, without a concept, is recognized as the object of a necessary satisfaction.

General remark on the first section of the Analytic.

If we draw the result from the preceding analyses, we find that everything comes down to this concept of taste: it is the ability to judge an object in relation to the A 69 free lawfulness of imagination. Now if imagination must be considered in its freedom in a judgment of taste, it is first taken not as reproductive and subject to laws of association, but as productive and self-active, as the originator of freely chosen forms of possible intuitions. In taking in a given object of the senses, it is admittedly bound to a definite form of this object and has no free play in that respect, as it does in poetic invention. Yet we can still understand that the object might supply it with just such a form, containing a 241 combination of the manifold of the kind imagination would design if left free to itself, in agreement with the understanding's lawfulness in general. But that imagination is free and yet lawful of itself, that is, that it possesses autonomy, is a contradiction. Understanding alone gives the law. If imagination is compelled to proceed according to a definite law, its product's form is determined through concepts as to what it ought to be. But then, as shown above, the satisfaction is not in the beautiful but in the good, in perfection, even if merely formal perfection. The judgment is not a judgment through taste. Thus only a lawfulness without a law, and a subjective agreement of imagination with understanding without an objective agreement in which the representation is related to a definite concept of an object, can coexist with the understanding's free lawfulness, also called purposiveness without an end, and with the distinctive character of a judgment of taste.

Critics of taste commonly cite geometrically regular shapes—a circle, A 70 a square, a cube, and so on—as the simplest and most unquestionable examples of beauty. Yet they are called regular precisely because we can represent them only as mere presentations of a definite concept prescribing the rule for that shape, the rule according to which alone it is possible. One of two judgments must therefore be mistaken: either the critics' judgment attributing beauty to these shapes, or ours, which finds purposiveness without a concept necessary for beauty.

Hardly anyone will think a person of taste is needed to find more satisfaction in a circular shape than in a scribbled outline, or in a quadrilateral with equal sides and angles than in a crooked, unequal, almost deformed one. That requires only ordinary understanding and no taste at all. Where an aim is perceived—for example, judging the size of an area, or making the relation of the parts to one another and to the whole comprehensible in a division—regular shapes, and indeed the simplest kinds, are needed. Satisfaction rests not directly on the sight of the shape but on its usefulness 242 for all kinds of possible aims. A room whose walls meet at oblique angles, a garden plot of this kind, indeed any violation of symmetry in the shape of animals, such as being one-eyed, or of buildings or flower beds, displeases because it is contrary to an end. This is so not only practically, regarding a definite use of these things, but also for judging them with regard to any possible aim. That is not the case in a judgment of taste. When pure, it connects satisfaction A 71 or dissatisfaction directly with mere contemplation of the object, without regard to use or an end.

The regularity leading to a concept of an object is indeed the indispensable condition (a condition without which it is impossible) for grasping the object in a single representation and determining the manifold in its form. This determination is an end regarding cognition. In relation to cognition it is also always connected with satisfaction, which accompanies the achievement of any aim, even a merely possible one. But this is then only approval of a solution that satisfies a problem. It is not a free and indeterminately purposive occupation of the mental powers with what we call beautiful, in which understanding serves imagination, not imagination understanding.

In a thing possible only through an intention—a building, even an animal—the regularity consisting in symmetry must express the unity of intuition accompanying the concept of the end, and belongs to cognition. But where only a free play of the powers of representation is to be maintained, provided the understanding takes no offense, regularity announcing itself as constraint is avoided as far as possible. This applies to pleasure gardens, interior decoration, all kinds of tasteful furnishings, and the like. English taste in gardens and baroque taste in furniture therefore tend to push freedom of imagination almost to the grotesque. In this separation from every constraint of a rule, they place the very case in which taste can show its A 72 greatest perfection in imagination's designs.

Everything stiffly regular, approaching mathematical regularity, has something contrary to taste about it. It provides no lasting occupation in contemplating it, but, unless 243 it expressly aims at cognition or a definite practical end, becomes boring. By contrast, what imagination can play with naturally and purposively is always new to us, and we do not tire of looking at it. In his description of Sumatra, Marsden remarks that the free beauties of nature surround the spectator there on every side and therefore have little attraction left. A pepper garden, by contrast, in which the poles supporting the climbing plants form avenues between parallel lines, greatly attracted him when he came across it in the middle of a forest. He concludes that wild, apparently irregular beauty pleases as a change only someone who has had their fill of regular beauty. But he needed only to try staying at his pepper garden for a day. He would have discovered that once regularity had put his understanding into the mood for the order it needs everywhere, the object would no longer occupy him, but would instead impose a burdensome constraint on imagination. By contrast, nature there, lavish to the point of luxuriance in its variety and subject to no constraint of artificial rules, could constantly nourish his taste.—Even birdsong, which we cannot bring under any musical rule, seems to contain more freedom and therefore more for taste than human singing conducted according to all the rules of music. We A 73 grow tired of the latter much sooner when it is repeated often and for a long time. But here we are probably confusing our sympathy with the cheerfulness of a small, well-loved creature with the beauty of its song. When a human being imitates it exactly, as sometimes happens with the nightingale's song, it seems entirely tasteless to our ear.

We must also distinguish beautiful objects from beautiful views of objects, which often can no longer be clearly recognized because of their distance. In the latter case taste seems to attach not so much to what imagination takes in within this field as to what it is prompted to invent: the actual fantasies with which the mind occupies itself, continually stimulated by the variety encountered by the eye. Something similar happens when we look at the changing shapes of a fire in a fireplace or a rippling brook. Neither is a 244 beauty, yet both attract imagination because they sustain its free play.

4 The definition of taste taken as the basis here is that it is the ability to judge the beautiful. What is required to call an object beautiful must be discovered by analyzing judgments of taste. I have sought the moments to which this power of judgment attends in its reflection by following the logical functions of judging, since a judgment of taste still always contains a relation to understanding. I have considered the moments of quality first, because aesthetic judgment about the beautiful takes account of these first.

5 A judgment about an object of satisfaction can be wholly disinterested yet very interesting. That is, it rests on no interest, but produces an interest. All pure moral judgments are of this kind. But judgments of taste do not in themselves ground any interest at all. Only in society does it become interesting to have taste. The reason for this will be shown later.

6 An obligation to enjoy is an obvious absurdity. So too must be an alleged obligation to all actions whose goal is merely enjoyment, however spiritual this enjoyment may be conceived or dressed up to be, even if it were a mystical, so-called heavenly enjoyment.

7 Models of taste in the arts of speech must be composed in a dead and learned language. The first requirement prevents them from undergoing the change that inevitably affects living languages: noble expressions become commonplace, ordinary ones become obsolete, and newly created ones enter circulation only briefly. The second ensures that the language has a grammar subject to no arbitrary changes of fashion, but possessing its unchanging rule.

8 We find that a perfectly regular face, the kind a painter might ask to sit as a model, usually says nothing. It contains nothing characteristic and therefore expresses the idea of the genus more than what is specific to a person. An exaggeration of the characteristic of this kind, one that impairs the normal idea itself, the purposiveness of the genus, is called caricature. Experience also shows that those entirely regular faces usually reveal only a mediocre person within. Presumably, if we may assume that nature expresses the proportions of the inner person in the outer appearance, this is because none of the mental dispositions stands out beyond the proportion required merely to make a person free of faults. We can then expect nothing of what is called genius, in which nature seems to depart from its usual relations among the mental powers in favor of a single one.

9 Someone might offer this counterexample to the definition: there are things in which we see a purposive form without recognizing an end. For example, stone tools often dug out of ancient burial mounds have a hole as if for a handle. Although their shape clearly reveals a purposiveness whose end we do not know, they are not therefore declared beautiful. But merely regarding them as artifacts is enough to force us to admit that we relate their shape to some intention and a definite end. There is therefore no direct satisfaction in intuiting them. A flower, by contrast, such as a tulip, is considered beautiful because in perceiving it we find a certain purposiveness that, as we judge it, is related to no end at all.

About this section

Part I — Analytic of the Beautiful is part of Critique of Judgment by Immanuel Kant. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is part 13 of 21 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.

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