Section 93
Original German
93 Der Zwang hat davon, daß er sich in seinem Begriffe zerstört, die reelle Darstellung darin, daß Zwang durch Zwang aufgehoben wird; er ist daher nicht nur bedingt rechtlich, sondern nothwendig, — nemlich als zweyter Zwang, der ein Aufheben eines ersten Zwanges ist.
Verletzung eines Vertrags durch Nichtleistung des Stipulirten, oder der Rechts-Pflichten gegen die Familie, Staat, durch Thun oder Unterlassen, ist insofern erster Zwang oder wenigstens Gewalt, als ich ein Eigenthum, das eines andern ist, oder eine schuldige Leistung demselben vorenthalte oder entziehe. — Pädagogischer Zwang, oder Zwang gegen Wildheit und Rohheit ausgeübt, erscheint zwar als erster nicht auf Vorangehung eines ersten erfolgend. Aber der nur natürliche Wille ist an sich Gewalt gegen die an sich seyende Idee der Freyheit, welche gegen solchen ungebildeten Willen in Schutz zu nehmen und in ihm zur Geltung zu bringen ist. Entweder ist ein sittliches Daseyn in Familie oder Staat schon gesetzt, gegen welche jene Natürlichkeit eine Gewaltthätigkeit ist, oder es ist nur ein Naturzustand, — Zustand der Gewalt überhaupt vorhanden, so begründet die Idee gegen diesen ein Herrenrecht.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
93 That compulsion destroys itself in its concept finds its real presentation in this, that compulsion is canceled by compulsion. It is therefore not merely conditionally in accordance with right but necessary—namely as a second compulsion, which is the cancelation of a first.
The violation of a contract by failing to perform what was stipulated, or of the duties of right toward family or state, whether by doing or by omitting, is a first compulsion, or at least a force, insofar as I withhold or withdraw property that belongs to another, or a performance owed to him.—Pedagogical compulsion, or compulsion exercised against wildness and crudeness, does indeed appear not to follow upon a preceding first compulsion. But the merely natural will is in itself force against the Idea of freedom, which exists in itself, and which must be taken under protection against such an uncultivated will and brought to validity in it. Either an ethical existence in family or state is already posited, against which that naturalness is an act of violence, or there is only a state of nature, a state of force in general; and against this the Idea establishes a right of lordship.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
93 Coercion destroys itself in its own concept. This is actually shown in the fact that coercion is canceled by coercion. Coercion is therefore not merely rightful under certain conditions, but necessary—namely as a second coercion that cancels a first.
A contract can be broken by failing to deliver what was agreed, and legal duties toward the family or the state can be violated by doing something or by leaving something undone. Such a violation is a first coercion, or at least an act of force, insofar as I withhold or take away someone else's property or a service I owe them. Coercion used in education, or against savagery and uncultivated behavior, does admittedly appear to be a first coercion, not a response to an earlier one. But the merely natural will is in itself force directed against the Idea of freedom as it is in itself. That Idea must be protected against such an uneducated will and made effective within it. Either an ethical existence in the family or the state is already established, in which case this natural condition is an act of violence against it; or there is only a state of nature—a condition of force in general. In the latter case, the Idea establishes a right of mastery over that condition.
About this section
Section 93 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 95 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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