Section 86
Original German
86 In den Partheyen ist die Anerkennung des Rechts mit dem entgegengesetzten besondern Interesse und eben solcher Ansicht verbunden. Gegen diesen Schein tritt zugleich in ihm selbst (vorherg. §.) das Recht an sich als vorgestellt und gefodert hervor. Es ist aber zunächst nur als ein Sollen, weil der Wille noch nicht als ein solcher vorhanden ist, der sich von der Unmittelbarkeit des Interesses befreyt, als besonderer den allgemeinen Willen zum Zwecke hätte; noch ist er hier als eine solche anerkannte Wirklichkeit bestimmt, gegen welche die Partheyen auf ihre besondere Ansicht und Interesse Verzicht zu thun hätten.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
86 In the parties, recognition of right is bound up with opposed particular interests and correspondingly opposed views. Against this semblance, right in itself also emerges within the semblance itself (preceding section.) as something represented and demanded. Yet initially it is only an ought, because the will is not yet present as a will that, freed from the immediacy of interest, would, as a particular will, have the universal will as its end. Nor is this will yet determined here as such an acknowledged actuality that the parties would have to renounce their particular views and interests before it.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
86 In the parties to a dispute, recognition of right is joined to opposing particular interests and equally opposing views. Against this semblance, and within it itself, right in itself also emerges as something represented and demanded (preceding section). But at first it is only an ought. There is not yet a will that, freed from the immediacy of its interest, would take the universal will as its purpose while remaining a particular will. Nor is the will here yet determined as an acknowledged actual reality before which the parties would have to give up their particular views and interests.
About this section
Section 86 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 88 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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