Section 77
Original German
77 Indem jeder im reellen Vertrage dasselbe Eigenthum behält, mit welchem er eintritt und welches er zugleich aufgibt, so unterscheidet sich jenes identisch bleibende als das im Vertrage an sich seyende Eigenthum, von den äußerlichen Sachen, welche im Tausche ihren Eigenthümer verändern. Jenes ist der Werth, in welchem die Vertragsgegenstände bey aller qualitativen äußern Verschiedenheit der Sachen einander gleich sind, das Allgemeine derselben. (§. 63.)
Die Bestimmung, daß eine laesio enormis die im Vertrag eingegangene Verpflichtung aufhebe, hat somit ihre Quelle im Begriffe des Vertrags und näher in dem Momente, daß der contrahirende durch die Entäußerung seines Eigenthums, Eigenthümer und in näherer Bestimmung, quantitativ derselbe bleibt. Die Verletzung aber ist nicht nur enorm (als eine solche wird sie angenommen, wenn sie die Hälfte des Werths übersteigt) sondern unendlich, wenn über ein unveräußerliches Gut (§. 66.) ein Vertrag oder Stipulation überhaupt zu ihrer Veräußerung eingegangen wäre. — Eine Stipulation übrigens ist zunächst ihrem Inhalte nach vom Vertrage unterschieden, daß sie irgend einen einzelnen Theil oder Moment des ganzen Vertrags bedeutet, dann auch daß sie die förmliche Festsetzung desselben ist, wovon nachher. Sie enthält nach jener Seite nur die formelle Bestimmung des Vertrags, die Einwilligung des einen, etwas zu leisten und die Einwilligung des andern zu seyn, es anzunehmen; sie ist darum zu den sogenannten einseitigen Verträgen gezählt worden. Die Unterscheidung der Verträge in einseitige und zweyseitige, so wie andere Eintheilungen derselben im römischen Rechte sind theils oberflächliche Zusammenstellungen nach einer einzelnen oft äußerlichen Rücksicht, wie der Art und Weise ihrer Förmlichkeit, theils vermischen sie unter andern auch Bestimmungen, welche die Natur des Vertrags selbst betreffen und solche, welche sich erst auf die Rechtspflege (actiones) und die rechtlichen Wirkungen nach dem positiven Gesetze beziehen, oft aus ganz äußerlichen Umständen herstammen und den Begriff des Rechts verletzen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
77 Since, in a real contract, each party retains the same property with which he enters it and which he at the same time relinquishes, this property, which remains identical as the property that is in itself present in the contract, is distinguished from the external things that change owners in the exchange. It is the value in which the objects of the contract are equal to one another despite all the qualitative, external differences between the things: their universal aspect. (§ 63.)
The provision that gross injury annuls an obligation undertaken in a contract thus has its source in the concept of contract, and more precisely in the moment whereby the contracting party, in alienating his property, remains an owner and, more precisely, remains quantitatively the same owner. The injury, however, is not merely gross—as it is deemed to be when it exceeds half the value—but infinite if a contract, or any stipulation at all, has been entered into for the alienation of an inalienable good (§ 66.). A stipulation, incidentally, is distinguished from a contract first by its content: it signifies some individual part or moment of the whole contract; and then also in that it is the formal establishment of the contract, of which more below. In the former respect it contains only the formal determination of contract: one party's consent to perform something and the other's consent to accept it. It has therefore been counted among the so-called unilateral contracts. The distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts, like other classifications of contracts in Roman law, consists in part of superficial groupings based on a single, often external consideration, such as the manner and form of their formalities. In part, among other things, these classifications also mix determinations that concern the nature of contract itself with those that relate only to the administration of justice (legal actions) and to legal effects under positive law, often arising from entirely external circumstances and violating the concept of right.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
77 In a real contract, each person keeps the same property with which they entered it and which they also give up. What stays identical, as the property that exists in itself within the contract, is therefore distinct from the external things that change owners in the exchange. It is their value. In value, the objects of the contract are equal despite all their outward qualitative differences. It is what is universal in them (§ 63).
The rule that laesio enormis (enormous injury) cancels an obligation entered into by contract therefore comes from the concept of contract. More specifically, it comes from the fact that, by giving up property, a contracting party remains an owner and, more precisely, remains the owner of the same quantity. But the injury is not merely enormous—this is taken to mean that it exceeds half the value—but infinite if a contract, or any stipulation for transfer, concerns an inalienable good (§ 66). A stipulation, incidentally, is initially distinguished from a contract by its content: it means some particular part or element of the whole contract. It also means the formal establishment of the contract, which will be discussed later. In the first sense it contains only the formal determination of a contract: one person's consent to provide something and the other's consent to accept it. It has therefore been counted among the so-called unilateral contracts. The division of contracts into unilateral and bilateral, like other classifications in Roman law, partly consists of superficial groupings based on a single, often external consideration, such as the manner of their formalities. These classifications also partly mix determinations concerning the nature of the contract itself with those concerning only the administration of justice (actiones, legal actions) and legal effects under positive law. The latter often arise from entirely external circumstances and violate the concept of right.
About this section
Section 77 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 79 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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