Section 69
Original German
69 Indem der Erwerber eines solches Products an dem Exemplar als Einzelnem den vollen Gebrauch und Werth desselben besitzt, so ist er vollkommner und freyer Eigenthümer desselben als eines Einzelnen, obgleich der Verfasser der Schrift oder der Erfinder der technischen Vorrichtung Eigenthümer der allgemeinen Art und Weise bleibt, dergleichen Producte und Sachen zu vervielfältigen, als welche allgemeine Art und Weise er nicht unmittelbar veräußert hat, sondern sich dieselbe als eigenthümliche Aeußerung vorbehalten kann.
Das Substantielle des Rechts des Schriftstellers und Erfinders ist zunächst nicht darin zu suchen, daß er bey der Entäußerung des einzelnen Exemplars es willkührlich zur Bedingung macht, daß die damit in den Besitz des Andern kommende Möglichkeit, solche Producte nunmehr als Sachen gleichfalls hervorzubringen, nicht Eigenthum des Andern werde, sondern Eigenthum des Erfinders bleibe. Die erste Frage ist, ob eine solche Trennung des Eigenthums der Sache von der mit ihr gegebenen Möglichkeit, sie gleichfalls zu produciren, im Begriffe zulässig ist und das volle, freye Eigenthum (§. 62.) nicht aufhebt, — worauf es erst in die Willkühr des ersten geistigen Producenten kommt, diese Möglichkeit für sich zu behalten, oder als einen Werth zu veräußern oder für sich keinen Werth darauf zu legen und mit der einzelnen Sache auch sie preis zu geben. Diese Möglichkeit hat nemlich das Eigne, an der Sache die Seite zu seyn, wornach diese nicht nur eine Besitzung, sondern ein Vermögen ist (s. unten §. 170. ff.) so daß dieß in der besondern Art und Weise des äußern Gebrauchs liegt, der von der Sache gemacht wird, und von dem Gebrauche, zu welchem die Sache unmittelbar bestimmt ist, verschieden und trennbar ist (er ist nicht, wie man es heißt, eine solche accessio naturalis, wie die foetura). Da nun der Unterschied in das seiner Natur nach Theilbare, in den äußerlichen Gebrauch fällt, so ist die Zurückbehaltung des einen Theils bey Veräußerung des andern Theils des Gebrauchs nicht der Vorbehalt einer Herrenschaft ohne Utile. — Die bloß negative, aber allererste Beförderung der Wissenschaften und Künste ist, diejenigen, die darin arbeiten, gegen Diebstahl zu sichern und ihnen den Schutz ihres Eigenthums angedeihen zu lassen; wie die allererste und wichtigste Beförderung des Handels und der Industrie war, sie gegen die Räuberey auf den Landstraßen sicher zu stellen. — Indem übrigens das Geistesprodukt die Bestimmung hat, von andern Individuen aufgefaßt und ihrer Vorstellung, Gedächtniß, Denken u. s. f. zu eigen gemacht zu werden und ihre Aeußerung, wodurch sie das Gelernte (denn Lernen heißt nicht nur, mit dem Gedächtniß die Worte auswendig lernen — die Gedanken anderer können nur durch Denken aufgefaßt werden, und dieß Nachdenken ist auch Lernen) gleichfalls zu einer veräußerbaren Sache machen, hat immer leicht irgend eine eigenthümliche Form, so daß sie das daraus erwachsende Vermögen als ihr Eigenthum betrachten und für sich das Recht solcher Production daraus behaupten können. Die Fortpflanzung der Wissenschaften überhaupt, und das bestimmte Lehrgeschäft insbesondere ist, seiner Bestimmung und Pflicht nach, am bestimmtesten bey positiven Wissenschaften, der Lehre einer Kirche, der Jurisprudenz u. s. f. die Repetition festgesetzter, überhaupt schon geäußerter und von Außen aufgenommener Gedanken, somit auch in Schriften, welche dieß Lehrgeschäft und die Fortpflanzung und Verbreitung der Wissenschaften zum Zweck haben. In wie fern nun die in der wiederholenden Aeußerung sich ergebende Form den vorhandenen wissenschaftlichen Schatz und insbesondere die Gedanken solcher Anderer, die noch im äußerlichen Eigenthum ihrer Geistesprodukte sind, in ein specielles geistiges Eigenthum des reproducirenden Individuums verwandle, und ihm hiemit das Recht, sie auch zu seinem äußerlichen Eigenthum zu machen, gebe oder in wie fern nicht, — in wie fern solche Wiederholung in einem schriftstellerischen Werke ein Plagiat werde, läßt sich nicht durch eine genaue Bestimmung angeben und hiemit nicht rechtlich und gesetzlich festsetzen. Das Plagiat müßte daher eine Sache der Ehre seyn und von dieser zurückgehalten werden. — Gesetze gegen den Nachdruck erfüllen daher ihren Zweck, das Eigenthum der Schriftsteller und der Verleger rechtlich zu sichern, zwar in dem bestimmten, aber sehr beschränkten Umfange. Die Leichtigkeit, absichtlich an der Form etwas zu ändern oder ein Modificatiönchen an einer großen Wissenschaft, an einer umfassenden Theorie, welche das Werk eines Andern ist, zu erfinden, oder schon die Unmöglichkeit, im Vortrage des Aufgefaßten bey den Worten des Urhebers zu bleiben, führen für sich außer den besondern Zwecken, für welche eine solche Wiederholung nöthig wird, die unendliche Vielfachheit von Veränderungen herbey, die dem fremden Eigenthum den mehr oder weniger oberflächlichen Stempel des Seinigen aufdrücken; wie die hundert und aber hundert Compendien, Auszüge, Sammlungen u. s. f. Rechenbücher, Geometrieen, Erbauungsschriften u. s. f. zeigen, wie jeder Einfall einer kritischen Zeitschrift, Musenalmanachs, Conversationslexicons u. s. f. sogleich ebenfalls unter demselben oder einem veränderten Titel wiederholt, aber als etwas Eigenthümliches behauptet werden kann; — wodurch denn leicht dem Schriftsteller oder erfindenden Unternehmer der Gewinn, den ihm sein Werk oder Einfall versprach, zu Nichte gemacht oder gegenseitig heruntergebracht oder allen ruinirt wird. — Was aber die Wirkung der Ehre gegen das Plagiat betrifft, so ist dabey dieß auffallend, daß der Ausdruck Plagiat oder gar gelehrter Diebstahl nicht mehr gehört wird — es sey, entweder daß die Ehre ihre Wirkung gethan, das Plagiat zu verdrängen, oder daß es aufgehört hat, gegen die Ehre zu seyn und das Gefühl hierüber verschwunden ist, oder daß ein Einfällchen und Veränderung einer äußern Form sich als Originalität und selbstdenkendes Produciren so hoch anschlägt, um den Gedanken an ein Plagiat gar nicht in sich aufkommen zu lassen.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
69 Since the purchaser of such a product possesses the full use and value of the copy as an individual thing, he is its complete and free owner as an individual thing, even though the author of the writing or the inventor of the technical device remains owner of the universal manner of multiplying such products and things. This universal manner has not been immediately alienated by him; he can reserve it to himself as his distinctive expression.
The substantial basis of the author's and inventor's right is not, in the first instance, to be sought in his arbitrarily making it a condition of alienating the individual copy that the possibility, which thereby comes into the other's possession, of likewise producing such products as things should not become the other's property but remain the inventor's. The first question is whether such a separation of ownership of the thing from the possibility, given with it, of likewise producing it is admissible in the concept, and does not sublate full, free ownership (§ 62.). Only then is it a matter of choice for the original intellectual producer to retain this possibility for himself, to alienate it as something of value, or to place no value on it for himself and surrender it along with the individual thing. This possibility has the peculiarity of being the aspect of the thing by which it is not merely a possession but an asset (see below § 170. ff.). This lies in the particular manner of the external use made of the thing, which differs from, and is separable from, the use for which the thing is immediately intended. It is not what is called a natural accession, such as the offspring of an animal. Since the distinction thus falls within external use, which is by nature divisible, retaining one part while alienating another part of the use is not the reservation of a lordship without utility.—The merely negative, but very first, encouragement of the sciences and arts is to secure those who work in them against theft and grant them protection of their property, just as the very first and most important encouragement of commerce and industry was to secure them against robbery on the highways.—Further, an intellectual product is intended to be grasped by other individuals and made their own in representation, memory, thinking, and so forth. Their expression, through which they likewise make what they have learned into an alienable thing, always readily takes on some distinctive form. For learning does not mean merely learning words by heart through memory: the thoughts of others can be grasped only through thinking, and this thinking them over is also learning. They can thus regard the asset arising from this as their property and claim for themselves the right to such production. The transmission of the sciences in general, and the specific business of teaching in particular, is, by its purpose and duty—and most decidedly in the positive sciences, the doctrine of a church, jurisprudence, and so forth—the repetition of established thoughts, thoughts already expressed in general and received from outside. This holds also for writings whose purpose is this business of teaching and the transmission and dissemination of the sciences. To what extent the form arising in this repeated expression transforms the existing treasury of knowledge, and in particular the thoughts of others who still hold external ownership of their intellectual products, into a specific intellectual property of the reproducing individual, thereby giving him the right to make it his external property as well, or to what extent it does not—to what extent such repetition in a literary work becomes plagiarism—cannot be stated by an exact determination, and thus cannot be settled legally or by statute. Plagiarism ought therefore to be a matter of honor, and honor ought to restrain it.—Laws against unauthorized reprinting therefore fulfill their purpose of legally securing the property of writers and publishers within a definite, but very restricted, compass. The ease of deliberately changing something in the form, or of inventing some tiny modification in a great science or a comprehensive theory that is another's work, or simply the impossibility of keeping to the originator's words when presenting what one has grasped, brings about, of itself and apart from the particular purposes for which such repetition becomes necessary, an infinite variety of alterations that stamp another's property, more or less superficially, as one's own. Witness the hundreds upon hundreds of compendiums, extracts, collections, and so forth, books of arithmetic, geometries, devotional writings, and so forth; or the way any idea for a critical journal, poetry almanac, encyclopedia, and so forth can immediately be repeated under the same or an altered title, yet claimed as something distinctive. Through this, the profit that an author's work, or an inventive entrepreneur's idea, promised him can readily be wiped out, mutually diminished, or ruined for everyone.—As for the effect of honor against plagiarism, however, it is striking that the expression plagiarism, or indeed scholarly theft, is no longer heard. Either honor has done its work in displacing plagiarism, or plagiarism has ceased to be contrary to honor and the feeling about it has vanished, or some little idea and alteration of external form rates itself so highly as originality and independent intellectual production that it never even allows the thought of plagiarism to arise within it.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
69 Someone who acquires such a product possesses its full use and value in the copy as an individual thing, and so is its complete and free owner as an individual thing. Yet the author of the text or inventor of the technical device remains the owner of the general way of reproducing such products and things. They have not directly transferred this general way, but can reserve it for themselves as their own expression.
The substantial basis of the author's and inventor's right should not be sought first in their making an arbitrary condition when giving up an individual copy: namely, that the possibility of likewise producing such products as things, which thereby comes into the other person's possession, should not become that person's property, but remain the inventor's. The first question is whether the concept allows ownership of the thing to be separated from the possibility it brings of producing the same thing, without canceling full, free ownership (§ 62). Only then is it up to the original intellectual producer to keep this possibility, transfer it as something of value, or attach no value to it and give it up along with the individual thing. The distinctive feature of this possibility is that it is the side of the thing that makes it not just a possession, but an asset (s. unten § 170. ff.). It lies in the particular way the thing is used externally, and differs from and can be separated from the use for which the thing is directly intended. It is not what is called a natural accession, such as offspring. Since the distinction falls within external use, which is divisible by its nature, retaining one part while transferring the other part of the use does not reserve a mastery without benefit.—The merely negative, but very first way to promote the sciences and arts is to protect those who work in them against theft and give them the protection of their property. Similarly, the very first and most important promotion of trade and industry was to make them safe from robbery on the highways.—An intellectual product, however, is intended to be understood by other individuals and made their own in their ideas, memory, thought, and so forth. Their expression, by which they likewise make what they have learned into a transferable thing, readily takes on some distinctive form. Learning does not mean only memorizing words: other people's thoughts can be grasped only through thinking, and this thinking them through is also learning. Thus they can regard the asset arising from what they have learned as their property and claim for themselves the right to produce from it. The propagation of the sciences in general, and the specific work of teaching in particular, are, by their purpose and duty, the repetition of established thoughts—thoughts already expressed and taken in from outside. This is most definite in the positive sciences, a church's doctrine, jurisprudence, and so forth. The same applies to writings intended for this teaching and for propagating and spreading the sciences. No precise determination can state how far the form arising in repeated expression transforms the existing stock of scientific knowledge into a special intellectual property of the individual reproducing it, and thereby gives that individual the right to make it their external property too. This applies particularly to the thoughts of others who still own their intellectual products externally. Nor can it state how far no such transformation takes place—how far such repetition in a literary work becomes plagiarism. These matters therefore cannot be settled in law and legislation. Plagiarism would consequently have to be a matter of honor, and honor would have to restrain it.—Laws against unauthorized reprinting therefore fulfill their purpose of legally securing the property of authors and publishers within a definite but very limited scope. It is easy deliberately to change something in the form, or to invent some tiny modification of a great science or comprehensive theory that is someone else's work. Indeed, it is impossible, when presenting what one has understood, to keep to the originator's words. Quite apart from the particular purposes that make such repetition necessary, these circumstances produce an infinite variety of changes that stamp someone else's property, more or less superficially, as one's own. Hundreds upon hundreds of compendiums, extracts, collections, arithmetic books, geometries, devotional writings, and so forth show this. So does the way every idea in a critical journal, literary almanac, encyclopedia, and so forth can immediately be repeated, under the same or a different title, yet claimed as something original. In this way, the profit that a work or idea promised its author or inventive entrepreneur can easily be wiped out, mutually reduced, or ruined for everyone.—As for the effect of honor against plagiarism, it is striking that the expression plagiarism, or even scholarly theft, is no longer heard. Either honor has done its work and driven plagiarism out, or plagiarism has stopped being dishonorable and the feeling against it has disappeared, or some little idea and change of external form rate themselves so highly as originality and independent intellectual production that they never even allow the thought of plagiarism to arise.
About this section
Section 69 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 71 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.