Section 62
Original German
62 Nur ein theilweiser oder temporärer Gebrauch, so wie ein theilweiser oder temporärer Besitz (als die selbst theilweise oder temporäre Möglichkeit, die Sache zu gebrauchen) der mir zusteht, ist daher vom Eigenthume der Sache selbst unterschieden. Wenn der ganze Umfang des Gebrauchs Mein wäre, das abstracte Eigenthum aber eines Andern seyn sollte, so wäre die Sache als die Meinige von meinem Willen gänzlich durchdrungen (vorh. §. und §. 52.), und zugleich darin ein für mich undurchdringliches, der und zwar leere Wille eines andern, — Ich mir in der Sache als positiver Wille objectiv und zugleich nicht objectiv, — das Verhältniß eines absoluten Widerspruchs. — Das Eigenthum ist daher wesentlich freyes, volles Eigenthum.
Die Unterscheidung unter dem Rechte auf den ganzen Umfang des Gebrauchs und unter abstractem Eigenthum gehört dem leeren Verstande, dem die Idee, hier als Einheit des Eigenthums oder auch des persönlichen Willens überhaupt, und der Realität desselben, nicht das Wahre ist, sondern dem diese beyden Momente in ihrer Absonderung von einander für etwas Wahres gelten. Diese Unterscheidung ist daher als wirkliches Verhältniß das einer leeren Herrenschaft, das (wenn die Verrücktheit nicht nur von der bloßen Vorstellung des Subjects und seiner Wirklichkeit, die in unmittelbarem Widerspruche in Einem sind, gesagt würde) eine Verrücktheit der Persönlichkeit genannt werden könnte, weil das Mein in Einem Objecte unvermittelt mein einzelner ausschließender Wille und ein anderer einzelner ausschließender Wille seyn sollte. — In den Institut. lib. II. tit. IV. ist gesagt: ususfructus est jus alienis rebus utendi, fruendi salva rerum substantia. Weiterhin heißt es ebendaselbst: ne tamen in universum inutiles essent proprietates, semper abscedente usufructu: placuit certis modis extingui usumfructum et ad proprietatem reverti. — Placuit — als ob es erst ein Belieben oder Beschluß wäre, jener leeren Unterscheidung durch diese Bestimmung einen Sinn zu geben. Eine proprietas semper abscedente usufructu wäre nicht nur inutilis, sondern keine proprietas mehr. — Andere Unterscheidungen des Eigenthums selbst, wie in res mancipi und nec mancipi, das dominium Quiritarium und Bonitarium und dergleichen zu erörtern, gehört nicht hieher, da sie sich auf keine Begriffsbestimmung des Eigenthums beziehen, und blos historische Delikatessen dieses Rechts sind. — Aber die Verhältnisse des dominii directi und des dominii utilis, der emphyteutische Vertrag und die weitern Verhältnisse von Lehngütern mit ihren Erb- und andern Zinsen, Gilten, Handlohn u. s. f. in ihren mancherley Bestimmungen, wenn solche Lasten unablösbar sind, enthalten einerseits die obige Unterscheidung, andererseits auch nicht, eben in so fern mit dem dominio utili Lasten verbunden sind, wodurch das dominium directum zugleich ein dominium utile wird. Enthielten solche Verhältnisse nichts, als nur jene Unterscheidung in ihrer strengen Abstraction, so stünden darin eigentlich nicht zwey Herren (domini), sondern ein Eigenthümer und ein leerer Herr gegeneinander über. Um der Lasten willen aber sind es zwey Eigenthümer, welche im Verhältnisse stehen. Jedoch sind sie nicht im Verhältnisse eines gemeinschaftlichen Eigenthums. Zu solchem Verhältnisse liegt der Uebergang von jenem am nächsten; — ein Uebergang, der dann darin schon begonnen hat, wenn an dem dominium directum der Ertrag berechnet und als das Wesentliche angesehen, somit das Unberechenbare der Herrenschaft über ein Eigenthum, welche etwa für das Edle gehalten worden, dem Utile, welches hier das Vernünftige ist, nachgesetzt wird.
Es ist wohl an die anderthalb tausend Jahre, daß die Freiheit der Person durch das Christenthum zu erblühen angefangen hat und unter einem übrigens kleinen Theile des Menschengeschlechts allgemeines Princip geworden ist. Die Freiheit des Eigenthums aber ist seit gestern, kann man sagen, hier und da als Princip anerkannt worden. — Ein Beyspiel aus der Weltgeschichte über die Länge der Zeit, die der Geist braucht, in seinem Selbstbewußtseyn fortzuschreiten — und gegen die Ungeduld des Meynens.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
62 Only a partial or temporary use that belongs to me, then, or a partial or temporary possession—the possibility, itself partial or temporary, of using the thing—is distinct from ownership of the thing itself. If the entire extent of the use were mine, but abstract ownership were supposed to belong to another, the thing, as mine, would be wholly permeated by my will (the preceding section. and § 52.), yet would at the same time contain something impenetrable to me: another's will, and an empty will at that. In the thing I would be objective to myself as a positive will, and at the same time not objective—a relation of absolute contradiction.—Ownership is therefore essentially free, full ownership.
The distinction between the right to the entire extent of use and abstract ownership belongs to the empty understanding, for which the Idea—here as the unity of ownership, or of the personal will in general, and its reality—is not the truth; instead, these two moments in their separation from each other count for it as something true. As an actual relation, this distinction is therefore that of an empty lordship, which might be called a madness of personality—if madness were not a term used only where the subject's mere representation and actuality stand in immediate contradiction within one and the same subject. For what is mine in one object is supposed to be, without mediation, both my individual, exclusive will and another individual, exclusive will.—In the Institut. lib. II. tit. IV. it is said: “Usufruct is the right to use and enjoy another's things while preserving the substance of those things.” Further on, the same text says: “Yet, so that ownership should not become altogether useless through usufruct being permanently detached from it, it was decided that usufruct should be extinguished in certain ways and revert to ownership.”—It was decided—as though giving that empty distinction a meaning through this provision were merely a matter of preference or decree. Ownership with usufruct permanently detached would not merely be useless: it would no longer be ownership.—Other distinctions within ownership itself, such as that between things requiring and not requiring formal conveyance, Quiritary and bonitary ownership, and the like, do not belong here. They concern no conceptual determination of property and are merely historical delicacies of this law.—But the relations of superior ownership and beneficial ownership, the emphyteutic contract, and the further relations of feudal estates with their hereditary and other rents, dues, transfer fees, and so forth, in their manifold determinations, where such burdens are irredeemable, both contain the distinction above and do not contain it: the latter precisely insofar as burdens are attached to beneficial ownership, through which superior ownership becomes beneficial ownership as well. If such relations contained nothing but that distinction in its strict abstraction, what confronted one another would not properly be two lords (domini), but an owner and an empty lord. Because of the burdens, however, it is two owners who stand in relation. Yet theirs is not a relation of common ownership. The transition from that relation to common ownership lies nearest at hand—a transition already begun when the yield of superior ownership is calculated and regarded as what is essential, so that the incalculable element in lordship over a property, which may have been held to be the noble element, is subordinated to utility, which here is the rational element.
It is close to fifteen hundred years since freedom of the person began to flourish through Christianity and became a universal principle among what is, after all, a small part of the human race. But freedom of property has been recognized as a principle here and there only since yesterday, one might say.—An example from world history of the length of time spirit needs to advance in its self-consciousness—and a rebuke to the impatience of mere opinion.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
62 Only partial or temporary use, or partial or temporary possession—itself a partial or temporary possibility of using the thing—that belongs to me is therefore distinct from ownership of the thing itself. If the full extent of its use were mine, but abstract ownership were supposed to belong to someone else, then the thing, as mine, would be completely permeated by my will (the preceding § and § 52). At the same time, it would contain another person's will, impenetrable to me and indeed empty. I would be objective in the thing as a positive will, and at the same time not objective: an absolute contradiction.—Property is therefore essentially free, full ownership.
The distinction between the right to the full extent of use and abstract ownership belongs to the empty understanding. For it, the Idea—here, the unity of ownership, or of the personal will in general, with its reality—is not the truth. Instead, it treats these two moments, separated from one another, as something true. As an actual relationship, this distinction is therefore one of empty mastery. It could be called a derangement of personality, if derangement were not a term used only of a subject's mere representation and its actual reality, united in direct contradiction. For my possession of one object would have to consist, without mediation, in both my individual, exclusive will and another individual, exclusive will.—The Institut. lib. II. tit. IV. says: “Usufruct is the right to use and enjoy things belonging to others while preserving their substance.” It goes on: “But so that ownership should not be entirely useless, with usufruct forever separated from it, it was decided that usufruct should end in certain ways and return to ownership.”—“It was decided”—as though giving that empty distinction a meaning through this provision were merely a preference or a decision. Ownership with usufruct forever separated from it would be not only useless, but no ownership at all.—Other distinctions within ownership itself, such as between things transferred by formal conveyance and things not so transferred, or between Quiritary and Bonitary ownership, and the like, do not belong here. They do not concern any determination of the concept of property, and are merely historical niceties of this law.—But the relationships of direct ownership and beneficial ownership, the emphyteutic contract, and the further relationships of feudal estates with their hereditary and other rents, dues, transfer fees, and so forth, in their many forms, both contain and do not contain the above distinction when such burdens cannot be redeemed. They do not contain it insofar as burdens are attached to beneficial ownership, making direct ownership also a beneficial ownership. If such relationships contained nothing but that distinction in its strict abstraction, there would not really be two masters (domini) facing one another, but an owner and an empty master. Because of the burdens, however, there are two owners in the relationship. Yet their relationship is not one of common ownership. The transition to such a relationship is the nearest step from the former one. This transition has already begun when the income from direct ownership is calculated and treated as essential. The incalculable aspect of mastery over property, which may have been regarded as noble, is then subordinated to utility, which here is what is rational.
It is close to fifteen hundred years since personal freedom began to flourish through Christianity and became a universal principle among a part of the human race that was, after all, small. But freedom of property has, one might say, been recognized here and there as a principle only since yesterday.—An example from world history of how long spirit needs to advance in its self-consciousness—and a counter to the impatience of mere opinion.
About this section
Section 62 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 64 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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