Section 59
Original German
B. Der Gebrauch der Sache
59 Durch die Besitznahme erhält die Sache das Prädicat die meinige zu seyn, und der Wille hat eine positive Beziehung auf sie. In dieser Identität ist die Sache eben so sehr als ein negatives gesetzt und mein Wille in dieser Bestimmung ein besonderer, Bedürfniß, Belieben u. s. f. Aber mein Bedürfniß als Besonderheit eines Willens ist das Positive, welches sich befriedigt, und die Sache, als das an sich Negative, ist nur für dasselbe und dient ihm. — Der Gebrauch ist diese Realisirung meines Bedürfnisses durch die Veränderung, Vernichtung, Verzehrung der Sache, deren selbstlose Natur dadurch geoffenbart wird und die so ihre Bestimmung erfüllt.
Daß der Gebrauch die reelle Seite und Wirklichkeit des Eigenthums ist, schwebt der Vorstellung vor, wenn sie Eigenthum, von dem kein Gebrauch gemacht wird, für todtes und herrenloses ansieht, und bey unrechtmäßiger Bemächtigung desselben es als Grund, daß es vom Eigenthümer nicht gebraucht worden sey, anführt. — Aber der Wille des Eigenthümers, nach welchem eine Sache die Seinige ist, ist die erste substantielle Grundlage, von der die weitere Bestimmung, der Gebrauch, nur die Erscheinung und besondere Weise ist, die jener allgemeinen Grundlage nachsteht.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
B. The Use of the Thing
59 Through taking possession, the thing acquires the predicate of being mine, and the will has a positive relation to it. In this identity, the thing is equally posited as something negative, and my will in this determination is a particular will: need, preference, and so forth. But my need, as the particularity of one will, is the positive element that satisfies itself; the thing, as what is negative in itself, exists only for that need and serves it.—Use is this realization of my need through the alteration, destruction, or consumption of the thing, whose selfless nature is thereby revealed and which thus fulfills its determination.
That use is the real side and actuality of property is what ordinary conception has in view when it regards property of which no use is made as dead and ownerless, and, when it is unlawfully seized, offers as a justification that the owner had not used it.—But the owner's will, by which a thing is his, is the primary, substantial foundation. The further determination, use, is only the appearance and particular mode of that will, subordinate to this universal foundation.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
B. Using the thing
59 Taking possession gives the thing the predicate of being mine, and the will has a positive relationship to it. Within this identity, the thing is equally established as something negative, and my will in this respect is a particular will: need, preference, and so forth. But my need, as the particularity of one will, is the positive element that satisfies itself. The thing, as something negative in itself, exists only for this need and serves it.—Use is this realization of my need through changing, destroying, or consuming the thing. This reveals the thing's selfless nature, and it thereby fulfills its purpose.
Ordinary thinking has in mind that use is the real side and actual reality of property when it regards unused property as dead and ownerless, and cites the owner's failure to use it as a reason for wrongfully taking control of it.—But the owner's will, by which a thing is theirs, is the first substantial foundation. The further determination, use, is only its appearance and particular mode, subordinate to that universal foundation.
About this section
Section 59 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 61 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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