Section 57
Original German
57 Der Mensch ist nach der unmittelbaren Existenz an ihm selbst ein natürliches, seinem Begriffe Aeußeres; erst durch die Ausbildung seines eigenen Körpers und Geistes, wesentlich dadurch, daß sein Selbstbewußtseyn sich als freyes erfaßt, nimmt er sich in Besitz und wird das Eigenthum seiner selbst und gegen andere. Dieses Besitznehmen ist umgekehrt ist eben so dieß, das, was er seinem Begriffe nach (als eine Möglichkeit, Vermögen, Anlage) ist, in die Wirklichkeit zu setzen, wodurch es eben sowohl erst als das Seinige gesetzt, als auch als Gegenstand und vom einfachen Selbstbewußtseyn unterschieden und dadurch fähig wird, die Form der Sache zu erhalten (vergl. Anm. zu §. 43.).
Die behauptete Berechtigung der Sclaverey (in allen ihren nähern Begründungen durch die physische Gewalt, Kriegsgefangenschaft, Rettung und Erhaltung des Lebens, Ernährung, Erziehung, Wohlthaten, eigene Einwilligung u. s. f.) so wie die Berechtigung einer Herrschaft, als bloßer Herrenschaft überhaupt und alle historische Ansicht über das Recht der Sclaverey und der Herrenschaft beruht auf dem Standpunkt, den Menschen als Naturwesen überhaupt nach einer Existenz, (wozu auch die Willkühr gehört,) zu nehmen, die seinem Begriffe nicht angemessen ist. Die Behauptung des absoluten Unrechts der Sclaverey hingegen hält am Begriffe des Menschen als Geistes, als des an sich freyen, fest und ist einseitig darin, daß sie den Menschen als von Natur frey, oder, was dasselbe ist, den Begriff als solchen in seiner Unmittelbarkeit, nicht die Idee, als das Wahre nimmt. Diese Antinomie beruht, wie alle Antinomie, auf dem formellen Denken, das die beyden Momente einer Idee, getrennt, jedes für sich, damit der Idee nicht angemessen und in seiner Unwahrheit, festhält und behauptet. Der freye Geist ist eben dieses (§. 21.) nicht als der bloße Begriff oder an sich zu seyn, sondern diesen Formalismus seiner selbst und damit die unmittelbare natürliche Existenz aufzuheben und sich die Existenz nur als die seinige, als freye Existenz, zu geben. Die Seite der Antinomie, die den Begriff der Freyheit behauptet, hat daher den Vorzug, den absoluten Ausgangspunkt, aber auch nur den Ausgangspunkt für die Wahrheit zu enthalten, während die andere Seite, welche bey der begrifflosen Existenz stehen bleibt, den Gesichtspunkt von Vernünftigkeit und Recht gar nicht enthält. Der Standpunkt des freyen Willens, womit das Recht und die Rechtswissenschaft anfängt, ist über den unwahren Standpunkt, auf welchem der Mensch als Naturwesen und nur als an sich seyender Begriff, der Sclaverey daher fähig ist, schon hinaus. Diese frühere unwahre Erscheinung betrifft den Geist, welcher nur erst auf dem Standpunkte seines Bewußtseyns ist, die Dialektik des Begriffs und des nur erst unmittelbaren Bewußtseyns der Freyheit, bewirkt daselbst den Kampf des Anerkennens und das Verhältniß der Herrenschaft und der Knechtschaft (s. Phänomenologie des Geistes S. 115. f. f. und Encyklop. der philosoph. Wissensch. §. 382. f. f.). Daß aber der objective Geist, der Inhalt des Rechts, nicht selbst wieder nur in seinem subjectiven Begriffe, und damit, daß dieß, daß der Mensch an und für sich nicht zur Sclaverey bestimmt sey, nicht wieder als ein bloßes Sollen aufgefaßt werde, dieß findet allein in der Erkenntniß Statt, daß die Idee der Freyheit wahrhaft nur als der Staat ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
57 In his immediate existence, the human being is in himself something natural, external to his concept. Only through the cultivation of his own body and spirit, and essentially through his self-consciousness grasping itself as free, does he take possession of himself and become his own property, both for himself and in relation to others. Conversely, this taking possession is equally the act of bringing into actuality what he is according to his concept—as a possibility, capacity, or disposition. Through this, it is both first posited as his own and also posited as an object, distinguished from simple self-consciousness and thus made capable of assuming the form of a thing (compare the Remark to § 43.).
The asserted rightfulness of slavery—in all its more specific justifications through physical force, captivity in war, the saving and preservation of life, nourishment, education, benefits, one's own consent, and so forth—as well as the rightfulness of dominion, as mere lordship in general, and every historical view of the right of slavery and lordship, rests on the standpoint that takes the human being as a natural being in general, in terms of an existence—which also includes arbitrary choice—that is not adequate to his concept. The assertion that slavery is absolutely wrong, by contrast, holds fast to the concept of the human being as spirit, as free in himself; it is one-sided in taking the human being to be free by nature, or, what amounts to the same thing, in taking the concept as such in its immediacy, rather than the Idea, as the truth. Like every antinomy, this antinomy rests on formal thinking, which holds fast to and asserts the two moments of an Idea separately, each on its own, and thus in their inadequacy to the Idea and their untruth. Free spirit is precisely this (§ 21.): not to exist as the mere concept, or in itself, but to sublate this formalism of its own, and with it immediate natural existence, and to give itself existence only as its own, as free existence. The side of the antinomy that asserts the concept of freedom therefore has the advantage of containing the absolute starting point for the truth, though only the starting point; the other side, which stops at an existence devoid of the concept, contains no standpoint of rationality and right at all. The standpoint of free will, with which right and the science of right begin, is already beyond the untrue standpoint on which the human being, as a natural being and a concept existing only in itself, is therefore capable of being enslaved. This earlier, untrue appearance concerns spirit when it is still only at the standpoint of its consciousness. There, the dialectic of the concept and of the as yet merely immediate consciousness of freedom brings about the struggle for recognition and the relation of lordship and bondage (see Phänomenologie des Geistes S. 115. f. f. and Encyklop. der philosoph. Wissensch. § 382. f. f.). But that objective spirit, the content of right, should not itself again be conceived merely in its subjective concept, and that the human being's not being destined in and for himself for slavery should therefore not again be conceived as a mere ought—this is possible only in the knowledge that the Idea of freedom truly exists only as the state.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
57 In their immediate existence, human beings are natural beings, external to their own concept. Only by developing their own body and spirit, and essentially by their self-consciousness grasping itself as free, do they take possession of themselves and become their own property, both for themselves and in relation to others. Conversely, this taking possession means putting into actual reality what they are in their concept—as a possibility, capacity, or predisposition. Only through this is it both established as their own and made into an object, distinguished from simple self-consciousness, and so made capable of receiving the form of a thing (compare the Remark to § 43).
The supposed justification of slavery—in all its more specific arguments based on physical force, capture in war, saving and preserving life, nourishment, education, benefits received, personal consent, and so forth—rests on treating human beings as natural beings in general, in an existence that does not fit their concept. Arbitrary choice, too, belongs to this existence. The same applies to the supposed justification of mastery as mere domination in general, and to every historical view of the right of slavery and mastery. The assertion that slavery is absolutely wrong, on the other hand, holds firmly to the concept of the human being as spirit, as free in itself. But it is one-sided in taking human beings to be free by nature: in other words, it takes the concept as such in its immediacy, rather than the Idea, to be the truth. Like every antinomy, this antinomy rests on formal thinking. Such thinking holds the two moments of one Idea apart, asserting each on its own, and thus in a form that does not fit the Idea and is untrue. Free spirit is precisely this (§ 21): not to exist as the mere concept, or merely in itself, but to overcome this formalism of its own, and with it immediate natural existence, and to give itself existence only as its own, as free existence. The side of the antinomy that asserts the concept of freedom therefore has the advantage of containing the absolute starting point for truth—but only the starting point. The other side, which stops at existence without its concept, does not contain the standpoint of rationality and right at all. The standpoint of the free will, with which right and the science of right begin, has already gone beyond the untrue standpoint on which human beings are natural beings and a concept existing only in itself, and so are capable of being enslaved. This earlier, untrue appearance concerns spirit that is still only at the standpoint of its consciousness. There, the dialectic of the concept and of the still merely immediate consciousness of freedom produces the struggle for recognition and the relationship of mastery and servitude (s. Phänomenologie des Geistes S. 115. f. f. und Encyklop. der philosoph. Wissensch. § 382. f. f.). But objective spirit, the content of right, must not itself be understood once again only in its subjective concept. Accordingly, the fact that human beings are not in and for themselves destined for slavery must not be understood once again as merely something that ought to be. This is achieved only by recognizing that the Idea of freedom truly exists only as the state.
About this section
Section 57 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 59 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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