Section 40
Original German
40 Das Recht ist zuerst das unmittelbare Daseyn, welches sich die Freyheit auf unmittelbare Weise gibt,
a) Besitz, welcher Eigenthum ist; — die Freyheit ist hier die des abstracten Willens überhaupt, oder ebendamit einer einzelnen sich nur zu sich verhaltenden Person.
b) Die Person sich von sich unterscheidend verhält sich zu einer andern Person und zwar haben beyde nur als Eigenthümer für einander Daseyn. Ihre an sich seyende Identität erhält Existenz durch das Uebergehen des Eigenthums des einen in das des andern mit gemeinsamen Willen und Erhaltung ihres Rechts, — im Vertrag.
c) Der Wille als (a) in seiner Beziehung auf sich, nicht von einer andern Person (b), sondern in sich selbst unterschieden, ist er, als besonderer Wille von sich als an und für sich seyendem verschieden und entgegengesetzt, — Unrecht und Verbrechen.
Die Eintheilung des Rechts in Personen-Sachen-Recht und das Recht zu Actionen hat, so wie die vielen andern dergleichen Eintheilungen, zunächst den Zweck, die Menge des vorliegenden unorganischen Stoffs in eine äußerliche Ordnung zu bringen. Es liegt in diesem Eintheilen vornemlich die Verwirrung, Rechte, welche substantielle Verhältnisse, wie Familie und Staat, zu ihrer Voraussetzung haben, und solche, die sich auf die bloße abstracte Persönlichkeit beziehen, kunterbunt zu vermischen. In diese Verwirrung gehört die Kantische und sonst beliebt gewordene Eintheilung in sächliche, persönliche und dinglich-persönliche Rechte. Das Schiefe und Begrifflose der Eintheilung in Personen- und Sachenrecht, das in dem römischen Rechte zu Grunde liegt, zu entwickeln, (das Recht zu Actionen betrifft die Rechtspflege und gehört nicht in diese Ordnung) würde zu weit führen. Hier erhellt schon so viel, daß nur die Persönlichkeit ein Recht an Sachen gibt und daher das persönliche Recht wesentlich Sachenrecht ist, — Sache im allgemeinen Sinne als das der Freyheit überhaupt Aeußerliche, wozu auch mein Körper, mein Leben gehört. Dieß Sachenrecht ist das Recht der Persönlichkeit als solcher. Was aber das im römischen Rechte sogenannte Personen-Recht betrifft, so soll der Mensch erst, mit einem gewissen status betrachtet, eine Person seyn; (Heineccii Elem. Jur. Civ. §. LXXV.) im römischen Rechte ist hiemit sogar die Persönlichkeit selbst, als gegenüber der Sclaverey, nur ein Stand, Zustand. Der Inhalt des römischen sogenannten Personenrechtes betrifft dann außer dem Recht an Sclaven, wozu ungefähr auch die Kinder gehören, und dem Zustande der Rechtlosigkeit (capitis diminutio) die Familienverhältnisse. Bey Kant sind vollends die Familienverhältnisse, die auf dingliche Weise persönlichen Rechte. — Das römische Personen-Recht ist daher nicht das Recht der Person als solcher, sondern wenigstens der besondern Person; — späterhin wird sich zeigen, daß das Familienverhältniß vielmehr das Aufgeben der Persönlichkeit zu seiner substantiellen Grundlage hat. Es kann nun nicht anders als verkehrt erscheinen, das Recht der besonders bestimmten Person vor dem allgemeinen Rechte der Persönlichkeit abzuhandeln. — Die persönlichen Rechte bey Kant sind die Rechte, die aus einem Vertrage entstehen, daß Ich etwas gebe, leiste — das jus ad rem im römischen Recht, das aus einer Obligatio entspringt. Es ist allerdings nur eine Person, die aus einem Vertrage zu leisten hat, so wie auch nur eine Person, die das Recht an eine solche Leistung erwirbt, aber ein solches Recht kann man darum nicht ein persönliches nennen; jede Art von Rechten kommt nur einer Person zu und objectiv ist ein Recht aus dem Vertrage nicht Recht an eine Person, sondern nur an ein ihr Aeußerliches, oder etwas von ihr zu veräußerndes, immer an eine Sache.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
40 Right is, first, the immediate existence that freedom gives itself in an immediate way:
a) Possession, which is property.—Freedom here is that of the abstract will in general, or, what amounts to the same, of an individual person relating only to themselves.
b) The person, distinguishing themselves from themselves, relates to another person; the two have existence for one another only as owners. Their identity, which is in itself, acquires existence through the passage of one person’s property into the other’s, with a common will and the preservation of their right—in contract.
c) The will, as in (a), in its relation to itself, is distinguished not from another person (b) but within itself. As a particular will, it differs from and is opposed to itself as a will that is in and for itself:—wrong and crime.
The division of right into the law of persons and of things and the right to bring actions, like the many other divisions of this kind, initially serves to bring the mass of material lying before us, without organic structure, into an external order. The chief confusion in this division is that it indiscriminately mixes rights presupposing substantial relations, such as family and state, with rights relating to mere abstract personality. Kant’s division, which has also become popular elsewhere, into rights to things, personal rights, and rights to persons in the manner of things belongs to this confusion. To develop the skewed and conceptless character of the division into the law of persons and of things that underlies Roman law would take us too far. (The right to bring actions concerns the administration of justice and does not belong in this order.) This much is already evident: only personality gives a right to things, and personal right is therefore essentially the law of things—taking “thing” in the general sense of what is external to freedom as such, which also includes my body and my life. This law of things is the right of personality as such. As for the so-called law of persons in Roman law, a human being is supposed to be a person only when considered as having a certain status (Heineccii Elem. Jur. Civ. § LXXV); thus, in Roman law, even personality itself, as opposed to slavery, is only a standing, a condition. The content of the so-called Roman law of persons then concerns, apart from the right to slaves, among whom children also more or less belong, and the condition of rightlessness (diminution of civil status), family relations. In Kant, family relations are, indeed, the personal rights held in the manner of rights to things.—The Roman law of persons is therefore not the right of the person as such, but at least that of the particular person.—It will emerge later that the family relation has, rather, the surrender of personality as its substantial foundation. It cannot but seem inverted to treat the right of the particularly determined person before the universal right of personality.—For Kant, personal rights are the rights arising from a contract that I give or perform something—the right to a thing in Roman law, which arises from an obligation. Certainly, it is only a person who must perform under a contract, just as it is only a person who acquires the right to such performance; but this does not make such a right personal. Every kind of right belongs only to a person, and, objectively, a right arising from a contract is not a right to a person, but only to something external to that person, or something they are to alienate—always to a thing.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
40 Right is initially the immediate existence that freedom gives itself in an immediate way:
a) Possession that is property. Here freedom is the freedom of the abstract will in general, or, what amounts to the same thing, of one individual person relating only to themselves.
b) The person distinguishes themselves from themselves and relates to another person. The two exist for one another only as owners. Their identity, which exists in itself, gains existence through the transfer of one person’s property to the other by their common will and with their rights preserved: in contract.
c) The will, as in (a), relates to itself, but is distinguished not from another person, as in (b), but within itself. As a particular will it differs from and is opposed to itself as it is in and for itself: wrong and crime.
The division of right into the law of persons, the law of things, and the right to bring legal actions, like many similar divisions, initially aims to put a mass of unorganized material into an external order. Its chief confusion lies in mixing together indiscriminately rights that presuppose substantial relations, such as the family and the state, and rights that relate to merely abstract personality. Kant’s division into rights to things, personal rights, and rights to persons in the manner of things, which has also become popular elsewhere, belongs to this confusion. It would take us too far to develop the distorted and conceptless character of the division into the law of persons and the law of things that underlies Roman law. (The right to bring legal actions concerns the administration of justice and does not belong in this classification.) This much is already clear here: only personality gives a right to things, and personal right is therefore essentially the right to things. A thing is taken in the general sense of whatever is external to freedom, including my body and my life. This right to things is the right of personality as such. In the so-called law of persons in Roman law, however, a human being is supposed to be a person only when considered as having a certain status (Heineccius, Elements of Civil Law, § LXXV). In Roman law, then, even personality itself, in contrast to slavery, is merely a standing or condition. The content of this so-called Roman law of persons concerns the right to slaves—among whom children are more or less included—the condition of having no rights (loss of civil status), and family relations. In Kant, family relations are outright the personal rights held in the manner of rights to things. Roman law of persons is therefore not the right of the person as such, but at least that of the particular person. Later it will become clear that the family relation actually has the surrender of personality as its substantial foundation. It can only seem backward to discuss the right of the specially determined person before the universal right of personality. Kant’s personal rights are rights arising from a contract under which I give or perform something: the right to a thing in Roman law that arises from an obligation. Certainly, only a person can owe performance under a contract, just as only a person can acquire a right to such performance. But that does not make this a personal right. Every kind of right belongs only to a person. Objectively, a contractual right is not a right to a person, but only to something external to them, or something they are to transfer—always to a thing.
About this section
Section 40 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 42 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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