Section 35
Original German
35 Die Allgemeinheit dieses für sich freyen Willens ist die formelle, die selbstbewußte sonst inhaltslose einfache Beziehung auf sich in seiner Einzelnheit, — das Subject ist in so fern Person. In der Persönlichkeit liegt, daß ich als Dieser vollkommen nach allen Seiten (in innerlicher Willkühr, Trieb und Begierde, so wie nach unmittelbarem äußerlichen Daseyn) bestimmte und endliche, doch schlechthin reine Beziehung auf mich bin und in der Endlichkeit mich so als das Unendliche, Allgemeine und Freye weiß.
Die Persönlichkeit fängt erst da an, in so fern das Subject nicht bloß ein Selbstbewußtseyn überhaupt von sich hat als concretem auf irgend eine Weise bestimmtem, sondern vielmehr ein Selbstbewußtseyn von sich als vollkommen abstractem Ich, in welchem alle concrete Beschränktheit und Gültigkeit negirt und ungültig ist. In der Persönlichkeit ist daher das Wissen seiner als Gegenstands, aber als durch das Denken in die einfache Unendlichkeit erhobenen und dadurch mit sich rein identischen Gegenstandes. Individuen und Völker haben noch keine Persönlichkeit, in so fern sie noch nicht zu diesem reinen Denken und Wissen von sich gekommen sind. Der an und für sich seyende Geist unterscheidet sich dadurch von dem erscheinenden Geiste, daß in derselben Bestimmung, worin dieser nur Selbstbewußtseyn, — Bewußtseyn von sich, aber nur nach dem natürlichen Willen und dessen nach äußerlichen Gegensätzen ist, (Phänomologie des Geistes. Bamberg und Würzburg 1807. S. 101. f. f. und Encyklopädie der philos. Wissensch. §. 344.) der Geist sich als abstractes und zwar freyes Ich zum Gegenstande und Zwecke hat und so Person ist.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
35 The universality of this will that is free for itself is formal: the self-conscious, otherwise contentless, simple relation to itself in its individuality. To this extent, the subject is a person. Personality entails that I, as this particular self, though determined and finite in every respect—in inward arbitrary choice, drive, and desire, as well as in immediate external existence—am nevertheless an unconditionally pure relation to myself, and thus know myself within finitude as infinite, universal, and free.
Personality begins only when the subject has not merely a self-consciousness in general of itself as concrete and determined in some way, but rather a self-consciousness of itself as a completely abstract I, in which all concrete limitation and validity are negated and invalid. Personality therefore contains the knowledge of oneself as object, but as an object raised by thinking into simple infinity and thereby purely identical with itself. Individuals and peoples do not yet have personality insofar as they have not yet attained this pure thinking and knowing of themselves. Spirit that is in and for itself differs from spirit in its appearance in this: in the same determination in which the latter is only self-consciousness—consciousness of itself, but only in accordance with the natural will and that will’s external oppositions (Phenomenology of Spirit, Bamberg and Würzburg, 1807, p. 101 ff., and Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, § 344)—spirit has itself as an abstract, and indeed free I, for its object and end, and is thus a person.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
35 The universality of this will that is free for itself is its formal, self-conscious, and otherwise contentless simple relation to itself in its individuality. To this extent, the subject is a person. Personality means that, as this particular individual, I am completely determined and finite in every respect—in my inner choice, drive, and desire, as well as in my immediate external existence. Yet I am also an utterly pure relation to myself, and within my finitude I therefore know myself as infinite, universal, and free.
Personality begins only when the subject has more than a general self-consciousness of itself as concrete and determined in some way. It must have self-consciousness of itself as a completely abstract I, in which all concrete limitation and validity are negated and invalid. Personality therefore includes knowing oneself as an object, but as an object raised by thinking into simple infinity and thus purely identical with itself. Individuals and peoples do not yet have personality insofar as they have not reached this pure thinking and knowing of themselves. Spirit that is in and for itself differs from spirit as it appears in this respect: in the very determination in which the latter is only self-consciousness—consciousness of itself, but only in terms of the natural will and its external oppositions (Phenomenology of Spirit, Bamberg and Würzburg, 1807, p. 101 ff., and Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, § 344)—spirit has itself as an abstract and specifically free I for its object and purpose, and is therefore a person.
About this section
Section 35 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 37 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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