Section 349
Original German
349 Ein Volk ist zunächst noch kein Staat, und der Uebergang einer Familie, Horde, Stammes, Menge u. s. f. in den Zustand eines Staats macht die formelle Realisirung der Idee überhaupt in ihm aus. Ohne diese Form ermangelt es als sittliche Substanz, die es an sich ist, der Objectivität, in Gesetzen, als gedachten Bestimmungen, ein allgemeines und allgemeingültiges Daseyn für sich und für die Andern zu haben, und wird daher nicht anerkannt; seine Selbstständigkeit, als ohne objective Gesetzlichkeit und für sich feste Vernünftigkeit nur formell, ist nicht Souverainetät.
Auch in der gewöhnlichen Vorstellung nennt man einen patriarchalischen Zustand nicht eine Verfassung, noch ein Volk in diesem Zustande einen Staat, noch seine Unabhängigkeit Souverainetät. Vor den Anfang der wirklichen Geschichte fällt daher einerseits die interesselose, dumpfe Unschuld, andererseits die Tapferkeit des formellen Kampfs des Anerkennens und der Rache. (vergl. §. 331. u. S. 61.)
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
349 A people is at first not yet a state, and the transition of a family, horde, tribe, multitude, and so on into the condition of a state constitutes the formal realization of the Idea in it in general. Without this form it lacks, as the ethical substance that it is in itself, the objectivity of having, in laws as thought determinations, a universal and universally valid existence for itself and for others, and is therefore not recognized; its independence, being merely formal without objective lawfulness and a rationality firm for itself, is not sovereignty.
In ordinary thinking too, a patriarchal condition is not called a constitution, nor a people in this condition a state, nor its independence sovereignty. Before the beginning of actual history there therefore falls, on the one hand, disinterested, dull innocence, on the other, the bravery of the formal struggle of recognition and of revenge. (Compare § 331 and p. 61.)
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
349 A people is at first not yet a state. A family, horde, tribe, crowd and so on becomes a state, and this change is the formal realization of the idea in it generally. Without this form, a people, as the ethical substance that it is in itself, lacks objectivity. It has no universal and universally valid existence in laws, which are determinations in thought, for itself and for others. So it is not recognized. Its independence, being without objective lawfulness and without a rationality firm in itself, is only formal. It is not sovereignty.
In ordinary thinking as well, a patriarchal condition is not called a constitution. A people in that condition is not called a state, and its independence is not called sovereignty. So two things come before the beginning of actual history. On one side there is uninterested, dull innocence. On the other there is the bravery of the formal struggle for recognition and for revenge. (Compare § 331 and p. 61.)
About this section
Section 349 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 351 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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