Section 333
Original German
333 Der Grundsatz des Völkerrechts, als des allgemeinen, an und für sich zwischen den Staaten gelten sollenden Rechts, zum Unterschiede von dem besondern Inhalt der positiven Traktate, ist, daß die Traktate, als auf welchen die Verbindlichkeiten der Staaten gegen einander beruhen, gehalten werden sollen. Weil aber deren Verhältniß ihre Souverainetät zum Princip hat, so sind sie insofern im Naturzustande gegen einander, und ihre Rechte haben nicht in einem allgemeinen zur Macht über sie constituirten, sondern in ihrem besonderen Willen ihre Wirklichkeit. Jene allgemeine Bestimmung bleibt daher beym Sollen und der Zustand wird eine Abwechselung von dem den Traktaten gemäßen Verhältniße, und von der Aufhebung desselben.
Es giebt keinen Prätor, höchstens Schiedsrichter und Vermittler zwischen Staaten, und auch diese nur zufälligerweise, d. i. nach besondern Willen. Die Kantische Vorstellung eines ewigen Friedens durch einen Staatenbund, welcher jeden Streit schlichtete, und als eine von jedem einzelnen Staate anerkannte Macht jede Mishelligkeit beilegte, und damit die Entscheidung durch Krieg unmöglich machte, setzt die Einstimmung der Staaten voraus, welche auf moralischen, religiösen oder welchen Gründen und Rücksichten, überhaupt immer auf besonderen souverainen Willen beruhte, und dadurch mit Zufälligkeit behaftet bliebe.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
333 The principle of international law, as the universal right that is to hold in and for itself between states, in contrast to the particular content of positive treaties, is that treaties, on which the obligations of states toward one another rest, ought to be kept. But because their relation has their sovereignty as its principle, they are to that extent in a state of nature toward one another, and their rights have their actuality not in a universal will constituted as a power over them, but in their particular will. That universal determination therefore remains at the level of the ought, and the situation becomes an alternation between the relation in accordance with treaties and the suspension of it.
There is no praetor, at most arbitrators and mediators between states, and even these only by chance, that is, in accordance with particular wills. Kant's idea of an eternal peace through a league of states that would settle every dispute, and as a power recognized by each individual state would resolve every discord, thereby making decision by war impossible, presupposes the agreement of the states, which would rest on moral, religious, or whatever grounds and considerations, in general always on particular sovereign will, and would thereby remain afflicted with contingency.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
333 The basic principle of international law is that treaties should be kept. International law is the general law that is supposed to hold in and for itself between states, as distinct from the particular content of positive treaties. The obligations of states toward one another rest on treaties. But their relation has their sovereignty as its principle. So in this respect they are in a state of nature toward one another. Their rights have their actuality not in a general will set up as a power over them, but in their own particular will. That general determination therefore stays at an ought. The condition becomes a swing back and forth between a relation that follows the treaties and the cancellation of that relation.
There is no praetor between states. At most there are arbitrators and mediators, and even these only by chance, that is, according to particular wills. Kant's idea of an eternal peace through a league of states, one that would settle every dispute, resolve every disagreement as a power recognized by each single state, and so make a decision by war impossible, presupposes the agreement of the states. That agreement would rest on moral or religious grounds or whatever other grounds and considerations, and so always on particular sovereign wills. It would thereby remain affected by chance.
About this section
Section 333 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 335 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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