Section 331
Original German
331 Das Volk als Staat ist der Geist in seiner substantiellen Vernünftigkeit und unmittelbaren Wirklichkeit, daher die absolute Macht auf Erden; ein Staat ist folglich gegen den andern in souverainer Selbstständigkeit. Als solcher für den andern zu seyn, d. i. von ihm anerkannt zu seyn, ist seine erste absolute Berechtigung. Aber diese Berechtigung ist zugleich nur formell, und die Foderung dieser Anerkennung des Staats, bloß weil er ein solcher sey, abstract; ob er ein so an und für sich seyendes in der That sey, kommt auf seinen Inhalt, Verfassung, Zustand an, und die Anerkennung, als eine Identität beyder enthaltend, beruht eben so auf der Ansicht und dem Willen des Andern.
So wenig der Einzelne eine wirkliche Person ist ohne Relation zu andern Personen (§. 71. u. sonst); so wenig ist der Staat ein wirkliches Individuum ohne Verhältniß zu andern Staaten (§. 322.). Die Legitimität eines Staats und näher, insofern er nach Außen gekehrt ist, seiner fürstlichen Gewalt, ist einerseits ein Verhältniß, das sich ganz nach Innen bezieht (ein Staat soll sich nicht in die innern Angelegenheiten des anderen mischen) — andererseits muß sie eben so wesentlich durch die Anerkennung der andern Staaten vervollständigt werden. Aber diese Anerkennung fodert eine Garantie, daß er die andern, die ihn anerkennen sollen, gleichfalls anerkenne, d. i. sie in ihrer Selbstständigkeit respectiren werde, und somit kann es ihnen nicht gleichgültig seyn, was in seinem Innern vorgeht. — Bey einem nomadischen Volke z. B., überhaupt bey einem solchen, das auf einer niedern Stufe der Cultur steht, tritt sogar die Frage ein, in wiefern es als ein Staat betrachtet werden könne. Der religiöse Gesichtspunkt (ehemals bey dem jüdischen Volke, den mahomedanischen Völkern) kann noch eine höhere Entgegensetzung enthalten, welche die allgemeine Identität, die zur Anerkennung gehört, nicht zuläßt.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
331 The people as state is spirit in its substantial rationality and immediate actuality, and is therefore the absolute power on earth; each state is consequently in sovereign independence over against the others. To be for another as such, that is, to be recognized by it, is its first absolute entitlement. But this entitlement is at the same time merely formal, and the demand for recognition of the state, simply because it is a state, is abstract; whether it is in fact such a being in and for itself depends on its content, its constitution, its condition, and recognition, since it contains an identity of both, rests just as much on the view and the will of the other.
Just as the individual is not an actual person without relation to other persons (§ 71 and elsewhere), so the state is not an actual individual without relation to other states (§ 322). The legitimacy of a state, and more precisely, insofar as it is turned outward, of its princely power, is on the one hand a relation that refers wholly inward (a state should not meddle in the internal affairs of another)—on the other hand it must just as essentially be completed by the recognition of the other states. But this recognition demands a guarantee that the state will likewise recognize those others who are to recognize it, that is, that it will respect them in their independence; and so it cannot be a matter of indifference to them what goes on within it. —With a nomadic people, for example, and in general with a people that stands at a low level of culture, the question even arises how far it can be regarded as a state. The religious standpoint (formerly among the Jewish people, among the Mohammedan peoples) can still contain a higher opposition, which does not permit the universal identity that belongs to recognition.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
331 The people as a state is spirit in its substantial rationality and immediate actuality. It is therefore the absolute power on earth. A state is consequently, toward every other state, in sovereign independence. To exist for the other as such, that is, to be recognized by it, is its first absolute entitlement. But this entitlement is at the same time only formal, and the demand that the state be recognized merely because it is a state is abstract. Whether it really is a state that exists in and for itself depends on its content, constitution and condition. And recognition, which contains an identity of both, rests just as much on the view and the will of the other.
An individual is not an actual person without relation to other persons (§ 71 and elsewhere). In the same way, a state is not an actual individual without a relation to other states (§ 322). The legitimacy of a state, and more closely of its power of the prince insofar as it is turned outward, is on one side a matter that concerns wholly the inside (a state should not meddle in the inner affairs of another). On the other side it must just as essentially be completed by the recognition of the other states. But this recognition demands a guarantee that the state will likewise recognize the others who are to recognize it, that is, will respect them in their independence. So what goes on inside it cannot be a matter of indifference to them. In the case of a nomadic people, for example, and in general of one that stands at a low stage of culture, the question even arises how far it can be regarded as a state. The religious standpoint (formerly among the Jewish people and the Mohammedan peoples) can contain a still higher opposition, which does not allow the general identity that belongs to recognition.
About this section
Section 331 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 333 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.