Section 324
Original German
324 Diese Bestimmung, mit welcher das Interesse und das Recht der Einzelnen als ein verschwindendes Moment gesetzt ist, ist zugleich das Positive nämlich ihrer nicht zufälligen und veränderlichen, sondern an und für sich seyenden Individualität. Diß Verhältniß und die Anerkennung desselben ist daher ihre substantielle Pflicht, — die Pflicht, durch Gefahr und Aufopferung ihres Eigenthums und Lebens, ohnehin ihres Meynens und alles dessen, was von selbst in dem Umfange des Lebens begriffen ist, diese substantielle Individualität, die Unabhängigkeit und Souverainetät des Staats zu erhalten.
Es gibt eine sehr schiefe Berechnung, wenn bey der Foderung dieser Aufopferung der Staat nur als bürgerliche Gesellschaft, und als sein Endzweck nur die Sicherung des Lebens und Eigenthums der Individuen betrachtet wird; denn diese Sicherheit wird nicht durch die Aufopferung dessen erreicht, was gesichert werden soll; — im Gegentheil. — In dem Angegebenen liegt das sittliche Moment des Krieges, der nicht als absolutes Uebel und als eine bloß äußere Zufälligkeit zu betrachten ist, welche, sey es in was es wolle, in den Leidenschaften der Machthabenden oder der Völker, in Ungerechtigkeiten u. s. f. überhaupt in solchem, das nicht seyn soll, seinen somit selbst zufälligen Grund habe. Was von der Natur des Zufälligen ist, dem widerfährt das Zufällige, und dieses Schicksal eben ist somit die Nothwendigkeit, — wie überhaupt der Begriff und die Philosophie den Gesichtspunkt der bloßen Zufälligkeit verschwinden macht und in ihr, als dem Schein, ihr Wesen, die Nothwendigkeit, erkennt. Es ist nothwendig, daß das Endliche, Besitz und Leben als Zufälliges gesetzt werde, weil diß der Begriff des Endlichen ist. Diese Nothwendigkeit hat einerseits die Gestalt von Naturgewalt und alles Endliche ist sterblich und vergänglich. Im sittlichen Wesen aber, dem Staate, wird der Natur diese Gewalt abgenommen, und die Nothwendigkeit zum Werke der Freyheit, einem Sittlichen erhoben; — jene Vergänglichkeit wird ein gewolltes Vorübergehen, und die zum Grunde liegende Negativität zur substantiellen eigenen Individualität des sittlichen Wesens. — Der Krieg als der Zustand, in welchem mit der Eitelkeit der zeitlichen Güter und Dinge, die sonst eine erbauliche Redensart zu seyn pflegt, Ernst gemacht wird, ist hiermit das Moment, worin die Idealität des Besonderen ihr Recht erhält und Wirklichkeit wird; — er hat die höhere Bedeutung, daß durch ihn, wie ich es anderwärts ausgedrückt habe, „die sittliche Gesundheit der Völker in ihrer Indifferenz gegen das Festwerden der endlichen Bestimmtheiten erhalten wird, wie die Bewegung der Winde die See vor der Fäulniß bewahrt, in welche sie eine dauernde Ruhe, wie die Völker ein dauernder oder gar ein ewiger Friede versetzen würde.“ — Daß diß übrigens nur philosophische Idee, oder wie man es anders auszudrücken pflegt, eine Rechtfertigung der Vorsehung ist, und daß die wirklichen Kriege noch einer anderen Rechtfertigung bedürfen, davon hernach. — Daß die Idealität, welche im Kriege als in einem zufälligen Verhältnisse nach Außen liegend, zum Vorschein kommt, und die Idealität, nach welcher die inneren Staatsgewalten organische Momente des Ganzen sind, — dieselbe ist, kommt in der geschichtlichen Erscheinung unter andern in der Gestalt vor, daß glückliche Kriege innere Unruhen verhindert und die innere Staatsmacht befestigt haben. Daß Völker die Souverainetät nach Innen nicht ertragen wollend oder fürchtend, von Andern unterjocht werden, und mit um so weniger Erfolg und Ehre sich für ihre Unabhängigkeit bemüht haben, je weniger es nach Innen zu einer ersten Einrichtung der Staatsgewalt kommen konnte, (— ihre Freyheit ist gestorben an der Furcht zu sterben —); — daß Staaten, welche die Garantie ihrer Selbstständigkeit nicht in ihrer bewaffneten Macht, sondern in anderen Rücksichten haben, (wie z. B. gegen Nachbaren unverhältnißmäßig kleine Staaten) bey einer innern Verfassung bestehen können, die für sich weder Ruhe nach Innen, noch nach Außen verbürgte u. s. f. — sind Erscheinungen, die eben dahin gehören.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
324 This determination, with which the interest and the right of individuals is posited as a vanishing moment, is at the same time the positive of their individuality, which is not contingent and changeable but in and for itself. This relation, and the recognition of it, is therefore their substantial duty—the duty of preserving, through danger and the sacrifice of their property and life, to say nothing of their opinion and all that is by itself comprised in the compass of life, this substantial individuality, the independence and sovereignty of the state.
It is a very skewed calculation when, in demanding this sacrifice, the state is regarded only as civil society and its final end only as the safeguarding of the life and property of individuals; for this security is not attained by the sacrifice of what is to be secured—on the contrary. — In what has been said lies the ethical moment of war, which is not to be regarded as an absolute evil and as a merely external contingency, having its likewise contingent ground in whatever it may be, in the passions of the powerful or of peoples, in injustices and so on, in short in what ought not to be. What is of the nature of the contingent is visited by the contingent, and this fate is therefore itself necessity—as in general the concept and philosophy make the standpoint of mere contingency vanish and recognize in it, as semblance, its essence, necessity. It is necessary that the finite, property and life, be posited as contingent, because this is the concept of the finite. This necessity has on one side the shape of natural force, and everything finite is mortal and transient. But in the ethical essence, the state, this force is taken away from nature, and necessity is raised to a work of freedom, to something ethical; — that transience becomes a passing away that is willed, and the underlying negativity becomes the substantial own individuality of the ethical essence. — War, as the condition in which the vanity of temporal goods and things, otherwise a pious phrase, is taken seriously, is thus the moment in which the ideality of the particular receives its right and becomes actuality; — it has the higher meaning that through it, as I have expressed it elsewhere, "the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the hardening of finite determinacies, just as the movement of the winds preserves the sea from the putrefaction into which lasting calm would bring it, as lasting or indeed eternal peace would bring peoples." — That this is, incidentally, only a philosophical idea, or, as it is otherwise put, a justification of providence, and that actual wars require a further justification, will be treated afterwards. — That the ideality which comes to appearance in war, as lying in a contingent relation toward the outside, and the ideality according to which the inner powers of the state are organic moments of the whole, are the same, appears in historical manifestation among other forms in this, that successful wars have prevented internal unrest and strengthened the inner power of the state. That peoples who would not or feared to endure sovereignty inwardly have been subjugated by others, and have striven for their independence with the less success and honor the less it was possible inwardly to arrive at a first establishment of the power of the state (—their freedom died of the fear of dying—); — that states which have the guarantee of their independence not in their armed power but in other considerations (as, for example, states disproportionately small in comparison with their neighbors) can subsist with an internal constitution that by itself would guarantee neither tranquility within nor without, and so on — are phenomena that belong precisely here.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
324 This determination, in which the interest and right of individuals is set as a vanishing moment, is at the same time the positive side of their individuality. This is their individuality as not accidental and changeable, but being in and for itself. This relation, and recognition of it, is therefore their substantial duty. It is the duty to preserve this substantial individuality, the independence and sovereignty of the state, at the risk and sacrifice of their property and life, and all the more of their opinion and of everything that is by itself included in the range of life.
It is a very skewed calculation when, in demanding this sacrifice, the state is seen only as civil society, and its final purpose only as securing the life and property of individuals. For this security is not reached by sacrificing what is supposed to be secured. On the contrary. In what has been said lies the ethical moment of war. War is not to be seen as an absolute evil or as a merely external accident, one that would have its cause, itself accidental, in whatever it may be: in the passions of those in power or of peoples, in injustices and so on, in short in something that ought not to be. What is of the nature of the accidental is struck by the accidental, and this very fate is therefore necessity. In the same way, the concept and philosophy in general make the standpoint of mere accident vanish, and recognize in it, as mere show, its essence, necessity. It is necessary that the finite, possession and life, be posited as accidental, because this is the concept of the finite. On one side this necessity has the shape of a natural force, and everything finite is mortal and passing. But in the ethical essence, the state, this force is taken away from nature, and necessity is raised to a work of freedom, to something ethical. That passing away becomes a willed passing, and the negativity underlying it becomes the substantial, own individuality of the ethical essence. War is the condition in which the vanity of temporal goods and things is taken seriously. Otherwise this vanity tends to be an edifying phrase. So war is the moment in which the ideality of the particular gets its right and becomes actual. It has the higher meaning that through it, as I have put it elsewhere, "the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the hardening of finite determinations, just as the movement of the winds keeps the sea from the rot into which lasting calm would put it, as lasting or even eternal peace would put peoples." That this is only a philosophical idea, or, as people otherwise tend to put it, a justification of providence, and that actual wars need a different justification, will be taken up later. The ideality that comes to light in war, lying outside in an accidental relation, and the ideality by which the inner powers of the state are organic moments of the whole, are the same. This shows itself in history, among other ways, in that successful wars have prevented inner unrest and strengthened the inner power of the state. Other cases belong right here too. Some peoples would not tolerate sovereignty toward the inside, or feared it, and were subjugated by others. They struggled for their independence with less success and honor, the less it had been possible to arrive at a first organization of state power inside (their freedom died of the fear of dying). Some states have the guarantee of their independence not in their armed force but in other considerations (for example states disproportionately small beside their neighbors). They can last with an inner constitution that by itself would guarantee neither peace inside nor peace outside, and so on. These are all phenomena that belong to this point.
About this section
Section 324 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 326 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.