Section 308
Original German
308 In den andern Theil des ständischen Elements fällt die bewegliche Seite der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, die äußerlich wegen der Menge ihrer Glieder, wesentlich aber wegen der Natur ihrer Bestimmung und Beschäftigung, nur durch Abgeordnete eintreten kann. Insofern diese von der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft abgeordnet werden, liegt es unmittelbar nahe, daß diß diese thut als das, was sie ist, — somit nicht als in die Einzelnen atomistisch aufgelöst und nur für einen einzelnen und temporären Act sich auf einen Augenblick ohne weitere Haltung versammelnd, sondern als in ihre ohnehin constituirten Genossenschaften, Gemeinden und Corporationen gegliedert, welche auf diese Weise einen politischen Zusammenhang erhalten. In ihrer Berechtigung zu solcher von der fürstlichen Gewalt aufgerufenen Abordnung, wie in der Berechtigung des ersten Standes zur Erscheinung (§. 307.) findet die Existenz der Stände und ihrer Versammlung eine constituirte, eigenthümliche Garantie.
Daß Alle einzeln an der Berathung und Beschließung über die allgemeinen Angelegenheiten des Staats Antheil haben sollen, weil diese Alle, Mitglieder des Staats und dessen Angelegenheiten die Angelegenheiten Aller sind, bey denen sie mit ihrem Wissen und Willen zu seyn ein Recht haben, — diese Vorstellung, welche das demokratische Element ohne alle vernünftige Form in den Staatsorganismus, der nur durch solche Form es ist, setzen wollte, liegt darum so nahe, weil sie bey der abstracten Bestimmung, Mitglied des Staats zu seyn, stehen bleibt, und das oberflächliche Denken sich an Abstraktionen hält. Die vernünftige Betrachtung, das Bewußtseyn der Idee, ist concret, und trifft insofern mit dem wahrhaften praktischen Sinne, der selbst nichts anderes als der vernünftige Sinn, der Sinn der Idee ist, zusammen, — der jedoch nicht mit bloßer Geschäftsroutine und dem Horizonte einer beschränkten Sphäre zu verwechseln ist. Der concrete Staat ist das in seine besonderen Kreise gegliederte Ganze; das Mitglied des Staates ist ein Mitglied eines solchen Standes; nur in dieser seiner objectiven Bestimmung kann es im Staate in Betracht kommen. Seine allgemeine Bestimmung überhaupt enthält das gedoppelte Moment, Privatperson und als denkendes eben so sehr Bewußtseyn und Wollen des Allgemeinen zu seyn; dieses Bewußtseyn und Wollen aber ist nur dann nicht leer, sondern erfüllt und wirklich lebendig, wenn es mit der Besonderheit, — und diese ist der besondere Stand und Bestimmung, — erfüllt ist; oder das Individuum ist Gattung, hat aber seine immanente allgemeine Wirklichkeit als nächste Gattung. — Seine wirkliche und lebendige Bestimmung für das Allgemeine erreicht es daher zunächst in seiner Sphäre der Corporation, Gemeinde u. s. f. (§. 251.), wobey ihm offen gelassen ist, durch seine Geschicklichkeit in jede, für die es sich befähigt, worunter auch der allgemeine Stand gehört, einzutreten. Eine andere Voraussetzung, die in der Vorstellung, daß Alle an den Staats-Angelegenheiten Theil haben sollen, liegt, daß nämlich Alle sich auf diese Angelegenheiten verstehen, ist eben so abgeschmackt, als man sie dessen ungeachtet häufig hören kann. In der öffentlichen Meynung (s. §. 316.) aber ist jedem der Weg offen, auch sein subjectives Meynen über das Allgemeine zu äußern und geltend zu machen. —
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
308 Into the other part of the estates element falls the mobile side of civil society, which, externally because of the multitude of its members, but essentially because of the nature of its vocation and occupation, can enter only through deputies. In so far as these are deputed by civil society, it lies immediately at hand that civil society does this as what it is—thus not as dissolved atomistically into individuals and gathering for a moment, without further hold, only for a single and temporary act, but as articulated into its already constituted associations, communities and corporations, which in this way acquire a political connection. In their entitlement to such a deputation, summoned by the princely power, as in the entitlement of the first estate to appear (§ 307), the existence of the estates and of their assembly finds a constituted, distinctive guarantee.
That all individually should have a share in deliberating and deciding on the universal affairs of the state, because all are members of the state and its affairs are the affairs of all, in which they have a right to take part with their knowledge and will—this notion, which would set the democratic element without any rational form into the organism of the state, which is an organism only through such form, lies so near at hand because it stops at the abstract determination of being a member of the state, and superficial thinking holds to abstractions. Rational consideration, the consciousness of the Idea, is concrete, and to that extent coincides with the truly practical sense, which is itself nothing other than rational sense, the sense of the Idea—a sense, however, which is not to be confused with mere routine of business and the horizon of a limited sphere. The concrete state is the whole articulated into its particular circles; the member of the state is a member of such an estate; only in this his objective determination can he come into consideration in the state. His universal determination in general contains the twofold moment of being a private person and, as thinking, no less consciousness and will of the universal; but this consciousness and will is not empty, and is instead fulfilled and actually alive, only when it is filled with particularity—and this is the particular estate and vocation; or the individual is a species, but has his immanent universal actuality as the proximate species. Hence he attains his actual and living determination for the universal first of all in his sphere of the corporation, the community and so on (§ 251), where it is left open to him, through his skill, to enter any for which he qualifies himself, including the universal estate. Another presupposition, lying in the notion that all should take part in the affairs of the state, namely that all understand these affairs, is as preposterous as it is nevertheless often heard. In public opinion (see § 316), however, the way is open to everyone to express and assert his subjective opinion on the universal as well.—
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
308 In the other part of the estates element falls the mobile side of civil society. Outwardly because of the number of its members, but essentially because of the nature of its character and occupation, it can enter only through deputies. Since these are sent out by civil society, it follows directly that civil society does this as what it is. It does not do it as dissolved atomistically into individuals and gathering for a moment, with no further hold, for a single, temporary act. It does it as divided into its already established associations, communities and corporations, which in this way gain a political connection. In their right to send out such deputies, called on by the power of the prince, as in the right of the first class to appear (§ 307), the existence of the estates and of their assembly finds an established and proper guarantee.
The idea is that all individually should take part in the deliberation and decision on the general affairs of the state. The reasoning is that these all are members of the state, and its affairs are the affairs of all, in which they have a right to be present with their knowledge and will. This idea would put the democratic element, without any rational form, into the state organism, which is an organism only through such form. It lies close at hand because it stops at the abstract determination of being a member of the state, and shallow thinking holds to abstractions. Rational thinking, the consciousness of the Idea, is concrete. In this it agrees with true practical sense, which is itself nothing other than rational sense, the sense of the Idea. This is not to be confused with mere office routine and the horizon of a narrow sphere. The concrete state is the whole divided into its particular circles. The member of the state is a member of such a class, and only in this objective character can he count in the state. His universal character in general contains a double element: he is a private person, and, as a thinking being, equally a consciousness and will of the universal. But this consciousness and will is not empty, and is filled and truly alive, only when it is filled with particularity, and this is the particular class and calling. Or: the individual is a genus, but has his immanent universal actuality as the nearest genus. — He therefore reaches his real and living determination for the universal first within his own sphere, the corporation, community and so on (§ 251). It remains open to him to enter, through his skill, any sphere for which he is qualified, and the universal class is among them. Another assumption lies in the idea that all should take part in the affairs of the state: that all understand these affairs. This is as absurd as it is nevertheless often heard. In public opinion (see § 316), however, the way is open to everyone to express and assert his subjective opinion about the universal. —
About this section
Section 308 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 310 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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