Section 294
Original German
294 Das Individuum, das durch den souverainen Act (§. 292.) einem amtlichen Berufe verknüpft ist, ist auf seine Pflichterfüllung, das Substantielle seines Verhältnisses, als Bedingung dieser Verknüpfung angewiesen, in welcher es als Folge dieses substantiellen Verhältnisses das Vermögen und die gesicherte Befriedigung seiner Besonderheit (§. 264.) und Befreyung seiner äußern Lage und Amtsthätigkeit von sonstiger subjectiver Abhängigkeit und Einfluß findet.
Der Staat zählt nicht auf willkührliche, beliebige Leistungen (eine Rechtspflege z. B., die von fahrenden Rittern ausgeübt wurde) eben weil sie beliebig und willkührlich sind, und sich die Vollführung der Leistungen nach subjectiven Ansichten, eben so wie die beliebige Nichtleistung und die Ausführung subjectiver Zwecke vorbehalten. Das andere Extrem zum fahrenden Ritter wäre in Beziehung auf den Staatsdienst das des Staatsbedienten, der bloß nach der Noth, ohne wahrhafte Pflicht und eben so ohne Recht seinem Dienste verknüpft wäre. — Der Staatsdienst fodert vielmehr die Aufopferung selbstständiger und beliebiger Befriedigung subjectiver Zwecke, und gibt eben damit das Recht, sie in der pflichtmäßigen Leistung aber nur in ihr zu finden. Hierin liegt nach dieser Seite die Verknüpfung des allgemeinen und besonderen Interesses, welche den Begriff und die innere Festigkeit des Staats ausmacht (§. 260.) — Das Amtsverhältniß ist gleichfalls kein Vertragsverhältniß (§. 75.), obgleich ein gedoppeltes Einwilligen und ein Leisten von beyden Seiten vorhanden ist. Der Bedienstete ist nicht für eine einzelne zufällige Dienstleistung berufen, wie der Mandatarius, sondern legt das Hauptinteresse seiner geistigen und besonderen Existenz in diß Verhältniß. Eben so ist es nicht eine ihrer Qualität nach äußerliche, nur besondere Sache, die er zu leisten hätte und die ihm anvertraut wäre; der Werth einer solchen ist als inneres von ihrer Aeußerlichkeit verschieden und wird bey der Nichtleistung des Stipulirten noch nicht verletzt (§. 77.). Was aber der Staatsdiener zu leisten hat, ist wie es unmittelbar ist, ein Werth an und für sich. Das Unrecht durch Nichtleistung oder positive Verletzung (dienstwidrige Handlung, und beydes ist eine solche) ist daher Verletzung des allgemeinen Inhalts selbst, (verglichen §. 95. ein negativ unendliches Urtheil,) deswegen Vergehen oder auch Verbrechen. — Durch die gesicherte Befriedigung des besonderen Bedürfnisses ist die äußere Noth gehoben, welche, die Mittel dazu auf Kosten der Amtsthätigkeit und Pflicht zu suchen, veranlassen kann. In der allgemeinen Staatsgewalt finden die mit seinen Geschäften Beauftragten Schutz gegen die andere subjective Seite, gegen die Privatleidenschaften der Regierten, deren Privatinteresse u. s. f. durch das Geltendmachen des Allgemeinen dagegen, beleidigt wird.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
294 The individual connected with an official vocation through the sovereign act (§ 292) is directed to the fulfillment of his duty, the substantial element in his relation, as the condition of this connection. As a consequence of this substantial relation, he finds in it the means and secure satisfaction of his particularity (§ 264), and the liberation of his outward circumstances and official activity from other subjective dependence and influence.
The state does not count upon arbitrary services performed at pleasure—for example, justice administered by knights-errant—precisely because they are matters of pleasure and arbitrary choice, and reserve for themselves the performance of services according to subjective views, as well as their omission at pleasure and the pursuit of subjective purposes. The other extreme from the knight-errant, in relation to service of the state, would be that of a state servant attached to his service merely by need, without genuine duty and equally without right. Service of the state demands rather the sacrifice of the independent satisfaction of subjective purposes at pleasure, and precisely thereby gives the right to find their satisfaction in the dutiful performance of service, but only in it. From this side, here lies the connection of the universal and particular interest that constitutes the concept and inward stability of the state (§ 260). The official relation is likewise not a contractual relation (§ 75), although it involves consent on both sides and performance by both. The official is not engaged for an individual contingent service, like an agent entrusted with a commission, but places the chief interest of his spiritual and particular existence in this relation. Likewise, what he must perform and what is entrusted to him is not something external in its quality, a merely particular thing. The value of such a thing, as inward, is distinct from its externality and is not yet violated by failure to perform what was stipulated (§ 77). But what the servant of the state must perform is, as it immediately stands, a value in and for itself. Wrong through failure to perform or through a positive violation—action contrary to duty, and both are of this kind—is therefore a violation of the universal content itself, compare § 95, a negatively infinite judgment, and hence a misdemeanor or even a crime. Through the secure satisfaction of particular need, the outward necessity that may prompt one to seek the means of satisfying it at the expense of official activity and duty is removed. Those entrusted with its business find in the universal power of the state protection against the other subjective side, against the private passions of the governed, whose private interest and so forth is offended by the assertion of the universal against it.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
294 The individual who is tied to an official calling by the sovereign act (§ 292) is bound to fulfill his duty, which is the substantial part of his relationship, as the condition of this tie. In this tie he finds, as a consequence of that substantial relationship, a livelihood and secure satisfaction of his particularity (§ 264). He also finds that his outward situation and his official work are freed from other kinds of personal dependence and influence.
The state does not count on arbitrary, optional services (for example, justice administered by knights errant), precisely because they are optional and arbitrary. Such people keep it in their own hands to carry out their services according to their own views, just as they keep the option of not performing them and of pursuing their own private aims. The opposite extreme to the knight errant, in regard to public service, would be the state servant who is tied to his service only by need, with no true duty and, equally, with no right. — Public service demands rather that a person give up independent and optional satisfaction of his private aims. By doing so it gives him the right to find that satisfaction in the performance of his duty, but only there. In this, from this side, lies the link between universal and particular interest, and this link makes up the concept of the state and its inner strength (§ 260). — The official relationship is also not a relationship of contract (§ 75), although there is consent on both sides and each side performs something. The official is not called to a single, accidental service, as an agent is. He puts the main interest of his spiritual and particular existence into this relationship. Likewise, what he has to perform and what is entrusted to him is not a thing that is merely particular and outside him in its nature. The value of such a thing is something inner, different from its outward form, and it is not yet violated when the stipulated performance is not delivered (§ 77). But what the state servant has to perform is, just as it stands, a value in and for itself. So the wrong done by not performing, or by actively violating (acting against his duty, and both count as that), is a violation of the universal content itself (compare § 95, an infinite negative judgment). That is why it is an offense, or even a crime. — Secure satisfaction of his particular needs removes the outward necessity that might drive someone to look for the means at the expense of his office and duty. In the universal power of the state, those entrusted with its business find protection against the other, subjective side, namely the private passions of the governed, whose private interest and so on is offended when the universal is asserted against it.
About this section
Section 294 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 296 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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