Section 268
Original German
268 Die politische Gesinnung, der Patriotismus überhaupt, als die in Wahrheit stehende Gewißheit (bloß subjective Gewißheit gehet nicht aus der Wahrheit hervor, und ist nur Meynung) und das zur Gewohnheit gewordene Wollen ist nur Resultat der im Staate bestehenden Institutionen, als in welchem die Vernünftigkeit wirklich vorhanden ist, so wie sie durch das ihnen gemäße Handeln ihre Bethätigung erhält. — Diese Gesinnung ist überhaupt das Zutrauen (das zu mehr oder weniger gebildeter Einsicht übergehen kann,) — das Bewußtseyn, daß mein substantielles und besonderes Interesse, im Interesse und Zwecke eines Andern (hier des Staates) als im Verhältniß zu mir als Einzelnen bewahrt und enthalten ist, — womit eben dieser unmittelbar kein Anderer für mich ist und Ich in diesem Bewußtseyn frey bin.
Unter Patriotismus wird häufig nur die Aufgelegtheit zu außerordentlichen Aufopferungen und Handlungen verstanden. Wesentlich aber ist er die Gesinnung, welche in dem gewöhnlichen Zustande und Lebensverhältnisse das Gemeinwesen für die substantielle Grundlage und Zweck zu wissen gewohnt ist. Dieses bey dem gewöhnlichen Lebensgange sich in allen Verhältnissen bewährende Bewußtseyn ist es dann, aus dem sich auch die Aufgelegtheit zu außergewöhnlicher Anstrengung begründet. Wie aber die Menschen häufig lieber großmüthig als rechtlich sind, so überreden sie sich leicht, jenen außerordentlichen Patriotismus zu besitzen, um sich diese wahrhafte Gesinnung zu ersparen, oder ihren Mangel zu entschuldigen. — Wenn ferner die Gesinnung als das angesehen wird, das für sich den Anfang machen, und aus subjectiven Vorstellungen und Gedanken hervorgehen könne, so wird sie mit der Meynung verwechselt, da sie bey dieser Ansicht ihres wahrhaften Grundes, der objectiven Realität, entbehrt.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
268 Political disposition, patriotism in general, as certainty standing in truth (merely subjective certainty does not proceed from truth, and is only opinion) and as willing that has become habit, is solely a result of the institutions existing in the state, in which rationality is actually present, just as it receives its activation through action in conformity with them. — This disposition is in general trust (which can pass over into more or less educated insight)—the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and end of another (here, of the state), in its relation to me as an individual—whereby precisely this other is immediately no other for me, and in this consciousness I am free.
By patriotism is often understood only a readiness for extraordinary sacrifices and actions. Essentially, however, it is the disposition that, in the ordinary condition and circumstances of life, is accustomed to know the commonwealth as the substantial ground and end. It is this consciousness, proving itself in all relations in the ordinary course of life, from which readiness for extraordinary exertion is then also grounded. But as people are often more ready to be magnanimous than upright, they easily persuade themselves that they possess that extraordinary patriotism, in order to spare themselves this true disposition, or to excuse its lack. — If, further, disposition is regarded as something that can begin on its own and proceed from subjective notions and thoughts, then it is confused with opinion, since on this view it lacks its true ground, objective reality.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
268 Political disposition, patriotism in general, is certainty that stands in truth. (Merely subjective certainty does not come out of truth, and is only opinion.) It is also willing that has become habit. It is only a result of the institutions that exist in the state, in which rationality is actually present, just as it receives its confirmation through action in keeping with those institutions. — This disposition is, in general, trust (which can pass over into more or less developed insight). It is the awareness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and aim of an other (here, the state), in its relation to me as an individual. As a result, this other is for me immediately not an other, and in this awareness I am free.
By patriotism people often understand only a readiness for extraordinary sacrifices and actions. But essentially it is the disposition that is used to knowing the community, in ordinary conditions and ordinary circumstances of life, as the substantial ground and aim. This awareness, which proves itself in all relations in the ordinary course of life, is then also the basis for readiness for extraordinary effort. But people are often more eager to be generous than to be law-abiding. So they easily persuade themselves that they have that extraordinary patriotism, in order to spare themselves this true disposition, or to excuse its absence. — Further, suppose disposition is regarded as something that can make a beginning on its own and arise out of subjective ideas and thoughts. Then it is confused with opinion, since on this view it lacks its true ground, objective reality.
About this section
Section 268 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 270 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
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