Section 258
Original German
258 Der Staat ist als die Wirklichkeit des substantiellen Willens, die er in dem zu seiner Allgemeinheit erhobenen besondern Selbstbewußtseyn hat, das an und für sich Vernünftige. Diese substantielle Einheit ist absoluter unbewegter Selbstzweck, in welchem die Freyheit zu ihrem höchsten Recht kommt, so wie dieser Endzweck das höchste Recht gegen die Einzelnen hat, deren höchste Pflicht es ist, Mitglieder des Staats zu seyn.
Wenn der Staat mit der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft verwechselt und seine Bestimmung in die Sicherheit und den Schutz des Eigenthums und der persönlichen Freyheit gesetzt wird, so ist das Interesse der Einzelnen als solcher der letzte Zweck, zu welchem sie vereinigt sind, und es folgt hieraus eben so, daß es etwas beliebiges ist, Mitglied des Staates zu seyn. — Er hat aber ein ganz anderes Verhältniß zum Individuum; indem er objectiver Geist ist, so hat das Individuum selbst nur Objectivität, Wahrheit und Sittlichkeit, als es ein Glied desselben ist. Die Vereinigung als solche ist selbst der wahrhafte Inhalt und Zweck, und die Bestimmung der Individuen ist ein allgemeines Leben zu führen; ihre weitere besondere Befriedigung, Thätigkeit, Weise des Verhaltens hat dieß Substantielle und Allgemeingültige zu seinem Ausgangspunkte und Resultate. — Die Vernünftigkeit bestehet, abstract betrachtet, überhaupt in der sich durchdringenden Einheit der Allgemeinheit und der Einzelnheit, und hier concret dem Inhalte nach in der Einheit der objectiven Freyheit d. i. des allgemeinen substantiellen Willens und der subjectiven Freyheit als des individuellen Wissens und seines besondere Zwecke suchenden Willens — und deswegen der Form nach in einem nach gedachten, d. h. allgemeinen Gesetzen und Grundsätzen sich bestimmenden Handeln. — Diese Idee ist das an und für sich ewige und nothwendige Seyn des Geistes. — Welches nun aber der historische Ursprung des Staates überhaupt, oder vielmehr jedes besonderen Staates, seiner Rechte und Bestimmungen sey oder gewesen sey, ob er zuerst aus patriarchalischen Verhältnissen, aus Furcht oder Zutrauen, aus der Corporation u. s. f. hervorgegangen, und wie sich das, worauf sich solche Rechte gründen, im Bewußtseyn als göttliches, positives Recht, oder Vertrag, Gewohnheit und sofort gefaßt und befestigt habe, geht die Idee des Staates selbst nicht an, sondern ist in Rücksicht auf das wissenschaftliche Erkennen, von dem hier allein die Rede ist, als die Erscheinung eine historische Sache; in Rücksicht auf die Autorität eines wirklichen Staates, insofern sie sich auf Gründe einläßt, sind diese aus den Formen des in ihm gültigen Rechts genommen. — Die philosophische Betrachtung hat es nur mit dem Inwendigen von Allem diesem, dem gedachten Begriffe zu thun. In Ansehung des Aufsuchens dieses Begriffes hat Rousseau das Verdienst gehabt, ein Prinzip, das nicht nur seiner Form nach, (wie etwa der Socialitätstrieb, die göttliche Autorität) sondern dem Inhalte nach Gedanke ist, und zwar das Denken selbst ist, nämlich den Willen als Prinzip des Staats aufgestellt zu haben. Allein indem er den Willen nur in bestimmter Form des einzelnen Willens (wie nachher auch Fichte) und den allgemeinen Willen, nicht als das an und für sich Vernünftige des Willens, sondern nur als das Gemeinschaftliche, das aus diesem einzelnen Willen als bewußtem hervorgehe, faßte; so wird die Vereinigung der Einzelnen im Staat zu einem Vertrag, der somit ihre Willkühr, Meynung und beliebige, ausdrückliche Einwilligung zur Grundlage hat, und es folgen die weitern bloß verständigen, das an und für sich seyende Göttliche und dessen absolute Autorität und Majestät zerstörenden Consequenzen. Zur Gewalt gediehen, haben diese Abstractionen deswegen wohl einerseits das, seit wir vom Menschengeschlechte wissen, erste ungeheure Schauspiel hervorgebracht, die Verfassung eines großen wirklichen Staates mit Umsturz alles Bestehenden und Gegebenen, nun ganz von Vorne und vom Gedanken anzufangen, und ihr bloß das vermeynte Vernünftige zur Basis geben zu wollen, andererseits, weil es nur ideenlose Abstractionen sind, haben sie den Versuch zur fürchterlichsten und grellsten Begebenheit gemacht. — Gegen das Prinzip des einzelnen Willens ist an den Grundbegriff zu erinnern, daß der objective Wille das an sich in seinem Begriffe Vernünftige ist, ob es von Einzelnen erkannt und von ihrem Belieben gewollt werde oder nicht; — daß das Entgegengesetzte, die Subjectivität der Freyheit, das Wissen und Wollen, die in jenem Prinzip allein festgehalten ist, nur das eine, darum einseitige Moment der Idee des vernünftigen Willens enthält, der diß nur dadurch ist, daß er eben so an sich, als daß er für sich ist. — Das andere Gegentheil von dem Gedanken, den Staat in der Erkenntniß als ein für sich vernünftiges zu fassen, ist, die Aeusserlichkeit der Erscheinung, der Zufälligkeit der Noth, der Schutzbedürftigkeit, der Stärke, des Reichthums u. s. f. nicht als Momente der historischen Entwickelung, sondern für die Substanz des Staates zu nehmen. Es ist hier gleichfalls die Einzelnheit der Individuen, welche das Prinzip des Erkennens ausmacht, jedoch nicht einmal der Gedanke dieser Einzelnheit, sondern im Gegentheil die empirischen Einzelnheiten nach ihren zufälligen Eigenschaften, Kraft und Schwäche, Reichthum und Armuth u. s. f. Solcher Einfall, das an und für sich Unendliche und Vernünftige im Staat zu übersehen und den Gedanken aus dem Auffassen seiner innern Natur zu verbannen, ist wohl nie so unvermischt aufgetreten, als in Herrn v. Hallers Restauration der Staatswissenschaft, — unvermischt, denn in allen Versuchen, das Wesen des Staats zu fassen, wenn auch die Prinzipien noch so einseitig oder oberflächlich sind, führt diese Absicht selbst, den Staat zu begreifen, Gedanken, allgemeine Bestimmungen mit sich; hier aber ist mit Bewußtseyn auf den vernünftigen Inhalt, der der Staat ist, und auf die Form des Gedankens nicht nur Verzicht gethan, sondern es wird gegen das eine und gegen das Andere mit leidenschaftlicher Hitze gestürmt. Einen Theil der, wie Hr. v. Haller versichert, ausgebreiteten Wirkung seiner Grundsätze, verdankt diese Restauration wohl dem Umstande, daß er in der Darstellung aller Gedanken sich abzuthun gewußt, und das Ganze so aus Einem Stücke gedankenlos zu halten gewußt hat, denn auf diese Weise fällt die Verwirrung und Störung hinweg, welche den Eindruck einer Darstellung schwächt, in der unter das Zufällige Anmahnung an das Substantielle, unter das bloß Empirische und Aeusserliche eine Erinnerung an das Allgemeine und Vernünftige gemischt, und so in der Sphäre des Dürftigen und Gehaltlosen an das Höhere Unendliche erinnert wird. — Consequent ist darum diese Darstellung gleichfalls, denn indem statt des Substantiellen die Sphäre des Zufälligen als das Wesen des Staats genommen wird, so besteht die Consequenz bey solchem Inhalt, eben in der völligen Inconsequenz einer Gedankenlosigkeit, die sich ohne Rückblick fortlaufen läßt und sich in dem Gegentheil dessen, was sie so eben gebilligt, eben so gut zu Hause findet. \*)
\*) Das genannte Buch ist um des angegebenen Charakters willen von origineller Art. Der Unmuth des Verf. könnte für sich etwas edles haben, indem derselbe sich an den vorhin erwähnten, von Rousseau vornemlich ausgegangenen falschen Theorien und hauptsächlich an deren versuchter Realisirung entzündet hat: Aber der Hr. v. Haller hat sich, um sich zu retten, in ein Gegentheil geworfen, das ein völliger Mangel an Gedanken ist, und bey dem deswegen von Gehalt nicht die Rede seyn kann; — nämlich in den bittersten Haß gegen alle Gesetze, Gesetzgebung, alles förmlich und gesetzlich bestimmte Rechte. Der Haß des Gesetzes, gesetzlich bestimmten Rechts ist das Schiboleth, an dem sich der Fanatismus, der Schwachsinn, und die Heucheley der guten Absichten offenbaren und unfehlbar zu erkennen geben, was sie sind, sie mögen sonst Kleider umnehmen welche sie wollen. — Eine Originalität, wie die von Hallersche, ist immer eine merkwürdige Erscheinung und für diejenigen meiner Leser, welche das Buch noch nicht kennen, will ich einiges zur Probe anführen. Nachdem Hr. v. H. (Seite 342 ff. 1. Bd.) seinen Hauptgrundsatz aufgestellt, „daß nämlich wie im Unbelebten, das Größere das Kleinere, das Mächtige das Schwache verdrängt, u. s. f. so auch unter den Thieren, und dann unter den Menschen dasselbe Gesetz, unter edleren Gestalten (oft wohl auch unter unedlen?) wiederkomme," und „daß diß also die ewige unabänderliche Ordnung Gottes sey, daß der Mächtigere herrsche, herrschen müsse und immer herrschen werde;" — man sieht schon hieraus und eben so aus dem Folgenden, in welchem Sinne hier die Macht gemeynt ist, nicht die Macht des Gerechten und Sittlichen, sondern die zufällige Naturgewalt; — so belegt er diß nun weiterhin, und unter anderen Gründen auch damit (S. 365 f.) daß die Natur es mit bewundernswürdiger Weisheit also geordnet, daß gerade das Gefühl eigener Ueberlegenheit unwiderstehlich den Charakter veredelt und die Entwickelung eben derjenigen Tugenden begünstigt, welche für die Untergebenen am nothwendigsten sind. Er fragt mit vieler schulrhetorischen Ausführung, ob es im Reiche der Wissenschaften die Starken oder Schwachen sind, welche Autorität und Zutrauen mehr zu niedrigen eigennützigen Zwecken und zumVerderben der gläubigen Menschen mißbrauchen, ob unter den Rechtsgelehrten die Meister in der Wissenschaft die Legulejen und Rabulisten sind, welche die Hoffnung gläubiger Clienten betriegen, die das Weiße schwarz, das Schwarze weiß machen, die die Gesetze zum Vehikel des Unrechts mißbrauchen, ihre Schutzbedürftigen dem Bettelstab entgegenführen und wie hungrige Geyer das unschuldige Lamm zerfleischen," u. s. f. Hier vergißt He. v. H. daß er solche Rhetorik gerade zur Unterstützung des Satzes anführt, daß die Herrschaft des Mächtigern ewige Ordnung Gottes sey, die Ordnung, nach welcher der Geyer das unschuldige Lamm zerfleischt, daß also die durch Gesetzes-Kenntniß Mächtigeren ganz Recht daran thun, die gläubigen Schutzbedürftigen als die Schwachen zu plündern. Es wäre aber zuviel gefodert, daß da zwey Gedanken zusammengebracht wären, wo sich nicht einer findet. — Daß Hr. v. Haller ein Feind von Gesetzbüchern ist, versteht sich von selbst; die bürgerlichen Gesetze sind nach ihm überhaupt einestheils „unnöthig, indem sie aus dem natürlichen Gesetze sich von selbst verstehen," es wäre, seit es Staaten giebt, viele Mühe erspart worden, die auf das Gesetzgeben und die Gesetzbücher verwandt worden, und die noch darauf und auf das Studium des gesetzlichen Rechts verwendet wird, wenn man sich von je bey dem gründlichen Gedanken, daß sich alles das von selbst verstehe, beruhigt hätte, — „anderntheils werden die Gesetze eigentlich nicht den Privatpersonen gegeben, sondern als Instructionen für die Unterrichter, um ihnen den Willen des Gerichtsherrn bekannt zu machen. Die Gerichtsbarkeit ist ohnehin (1. B. S. 297. 1. Th. S. 254. und allerwärts) nicht eine Pflicht des Staats, sondern eine Wohlthat, nämlich eine Hülfleistung von Mächtigern, und bloß suppletorisch; unter den Mitteln zur Sicherung des Rechts ist sie nicht das vollkommenste, vielmehr unsicher und ungewiß, das Mittel, das uns unsere neuern Rechtsgelehrten allein lassen, und uns die drey anderen Mittel rauben, gerade diejenigen, die am schnellsten und sichersten zum Ziel führen, und die außer jenem dem Menschen die freundliche Natur zur Sicherung seiner rechtlichen Freyheit gegeben hat" — und diese drey sind (was meynt man wohl?) 1) eigene Befolgung und Einschärfung des natürlichen Gesetzes, 2) Widerstand gegen Unrecht, 3) Flucht wo keine Hülfe mehr zu finden." (Wie unfreundlich sind doch die Rechtsgelehrten in Vergleich der freundlichen Natur!) „Das natürliche göttliche Gesetz aber, das (1. B. S. 292.) die allgütige Natur jedem gegeben, ist: Ehre in jedem deines Gleichen (nach dem Prinzip des Verfassers müßte es heißen: Ehre der nicht deines Gleichen, sondern der der Mächtigere ist) beleidige Niemand der dich nicht beleidigt; fodere nichts, was er dir nicht schuldig ist, (was ist er aber schuldig?) ja noch mehr: Liebe deinen Nächsten und nütze ihm wo du kannst." — Die Einpflanzung dieses Gesetzes soll es seyn, was Gesetzgebung und Verfassung überflüssig mache. Es wäre merkwürdig zu sehen, wie Hr. v. H. es sich begreiflich macht, daß dieser Einpflanzung ungeachtet, doch Gesetzgebungen und Verfassungen in die Welt gekommen sind! — In Bd. III. S. 362 f. kommt der Herr Verf. auf die „sogenannten Nationalfreyheiten" — d. i. die Rechts- und Verfassungs-Gesetze der Nationen; jedes gesetzlich bestimmte Recht hieß in diesem großen Sinne eine Freyheit; — er sagt von diesen Gesetzen unter andern „daß ihr Inhalt gewöhnlich sehr unbedeutend sey, ob man gleich in Büchern auf dergleichen urkundliche Freyheiten einen großen Werth setzen möge." Wenn man dann sieht, daß es die Nationalfreyheiten der deutschen Reichsstände, der englischen Nation — die Charta magna, „die aber wenig gelesen und wegen der veralteten Ausdrücke noch weniger verstanden wird," die bill of rigths u. s. f. — der hungarischen Nation u. s. f. sind, von welchen der Verfasser spricht, so wundert man sich zu erfahren, daß diese sonst für so wichtig gehaltene Besitzthümer etwas unbedeutendes sind, und daß bey diesen Nationen auf ihre Gesetze, die zu jedem Stück Kleidung, das die Individuen tragen, zu jedem Stück Brod, das sie essen, concurrirt haben und täglich und stündlich in Allem concurriren, bloß in Büchern ein Werth gelegt werde. — Auf das preußische allgemeine Gesetzbuch, um noch diß anzuführen, ist Hr. v. H. besonders übel zu sprechen (1. Bd. S. 185 ff.) weil die unphilosophischen Irrthümer (wenigstens noch nicht die Kantische Philosophie, auf welche Hr. v. Haller am erbittertsten ist) dabey ihren unglaublichen Einfluß bewiesen haben, unter anderen vornämlich, weil darin vom Staate, Staatsvermögen, dem Zwecke des Staats, vom Oberhaupte des Staats, von Pflichten des Oberhaupts, Staatsdienern u. s. f. die Rede sey. Am ärgsten ist dem Hrn. v. H. „das Recht, zur Bestreitung der Staatsbedürfnisse das Privatvermögen der Personen, ihr Gewerbe, Producte oder Consumtion mit Abgaben zu belegen; — weil somit der König selbst, da das Staatsvermögen nicht als Privateigenthum des Fürsten, sondern als Staatsvermögen qualificirt wird, so auch die preußischen Bürger nichts eigenes mehr haben, weder ihren Leib noch ihr Gut, und alle Unterthanen gesetzlich Leibeigene seyen, denn — sie dürfen sich dem Dienst des Staats nicht entziehen."Zu aller dieser unglaublichen Crudität könnte man die Rührung am possierlichsten finden, mit der Hr. v. Haller, das unaussprechliche Vergnügen über seine Entdeckungen beschreibt (1. B. Vorrede) — „eine Freude wie nur der Wahrheitsfreund sie fühlen kann, wenn er nach redlichem Forschen die Gewißheit erhält, daß er gleichsam (jawohl, gleichsam!) den Ausspruch der Natur, das Wort Gottes selbst, getroffen habe" (das Wort Gottes unterscheidet vielmehr seine Offenbahrungen von den Aussprüchen der Natur und des natürlichen Menschen sehr ausdrücklich) — „wie er vor lauter Bewunderung hätte niedersinken mögen, ein Strom von freudigen Thränen seinen Augen entquoll, und die lebendige Religiosität von da in ihm entstanden ist." — Hr. v. H. hätte es aus Religiosität vielmehr als das härteste Strafgericht Gottes beweinen müssen, denn es ist das härteste, was dem Menschen widerfahren kann, — vom Denken und der Vernünftigkeit, von der Verehrung der Gesetze und von der Erkenntniß, wie unendlich wichtig, göttlich es ist, daß die Pflichten des Staats und die Rechte der Bürger, wie die Rechte des Staats und die Pflichten der Bürger gesetzlich bestimmt sind, — soweit abgekommen zu seyn, daß sich ihm das Absurde für das Wort Gottes unterschiebt.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
258 The state, as the actuality of the substantial will, which it has in the particular self-consciousness raised to its universality, is what is rational in and for itself. This substantial unity is an absolute, unmoved end in itself, in which freedom comes into its highest right, just as this final end has the highest right against the individuals, whose highest duty it is to be members of the state.
If the state is confused with civil society and its determination is placed in the security and protection of property and personal freedom, then the interest of individuals as such is the ultimate end for which they are united, and it follows equally from this that to be a member of the state is something optional. — But the state has a wholly different relation to the individual. Since it is objective spirit, the individual himself has objectivity, truth and ethical life only in so far as he is a member of it. Union as such is itself the true content and end, and the destiny of individuals is to lead a universal life; their further particular satisfaction, activity and mode of conduct have this substantial and universally valid element as their point of departure and result. — Rationality, considered abstractly, consists in general in the interpenetrating unity of universality and individuality, and here, concretely, in respect of content, in the unity of objective freedom, that is, of the universal substantial will, and subjective freedom, as individual knowledge and its will seeking particular ends — and therefore, in respect of form, in an action determining itself according to laws and principles that are thought, that is, universal. — This Idea is the eternal and necessary being, in and for itself, of spirit. — But what the historical origin of the state in general, or rather of each particular state, of its rights and determinations, is or has been, whether it first proceeded from patriarchal relations, from fear or trust, from the corporation, and so on, and how that on which such rights rest has been grasped and established in consciousness, as divine positive right, or contract, custom, and so forth, does not concern the Idea of the state itself; with regard to scientific cognition, of which alone there is question here, it is, as appearance, a historical matter; with regard to the authority of an actual state, in so far as it enters into grounds, these are taken from the forms of the right valid in it. — Philosophical consideration has to do only with the inward side of all this, the thought concept. In the search for this concept, Rousseau had the merit of setting up a principle which is thought not only in its form (as, say, the social instinct or divine authority are) but in its content, and is indeed thinking itself: namely, the will as the principle of the state. But since he grasped the will only in the determinate form of the individual will (as Fichte did later), and the general will not as what is rational in and for itself in the will, but only as the common element proceeding from this individual will as conscious, the union of individuals in the state becomes a contract, which thus has their arbitrary choice, opinion and optional, express consent as its foundation; and there follow the further consequences, merely of the understanding, which destroy the divine that is in and for itself, and its absolute authority and majesty. Having attained to power, these abstractions have therefore, on the one hand, produced the first prodigious spectacle since we have known of the human race: that of wanting to begin the constitution of a great actual state entirely afresh, with the overthrow of everything existing and given, from the beginning and from thought, and of wanting to give it as its basis merely what was supposed to be rational; on the other hand, because they are only abstractions without Idea, they have made the attempt the most terrible and glaring event. — Against the principle of the individual will, one must recall the fundamental concept that the objective will is what is rational in itself in its concept, whether or not it is recognized by individuals and willed by their liking; — that the opposite, the subjectivity of freedom, knowing and willing, which is held fast in that principle alone, contains only the one moment, and therefore the one-sided moment, of the Idea of the rational will, which is rational only through being as much in itself as for itself. — The other opposite of the thought of grasping the state in cognition as something rational for itself is to take the externality of appearance, the contingency of need, of the want of protection, of strength, of wealth, and so on, not as moments of historical development but for the substance of the state. Here too it is the individuality of individuals that makes up the principle of cognition, yet not even the thought of this individuality, but on the contrary empirical individualities according to their contingent qualities, strength and weakness, wealth and poverty, and so on. Such a notion, of overlooking what is infinite and rational in and for itself in the state and of banishing thought from the grasping of its inner nature, has surely never appeared so unmixed as in Herr von Haller's Restoration of Political Science — unmixed, for in all attempts to grasp the essence of the state, however one-sided or superficial the principles may still be, this very intention to comprehend the state brings with it thoughts and universal determinations; here, however, not only has renunciation been made with full awareness of the rational content which the state is, and of the form of thought, but there is a storming against both with passionate heat. This Restoration owes a part of the widespread effect of its principles, as Herr von Haller assures us, to the circumstance that he has known how to rid himself of all thoughts in the presentation, and how to keep the whole thus thoughtless, of a single piece; for in this way there falls away the confusion and disturbance which weakens the impression of a presentation in which, amid the contingent, an admonition of the substantial, and amid the merely empirical and external, a reminder of the universal and rational, is mixed in, and so in the sphere of the needy and the empty, the higher infinite is recalled. — This presentation is therefore consistent as well; for since, in place of the substantial, the sphere of the contingent is taken as the essence of the state, the consistency, with such a content, consists precisely in the complete inconsistency of a thoughtlessness that lets itself run on without looking back, and feels just as much at home in the opposite of what it has just approved.
The book named is of an original kind because of the character indicated. The author's indignation could have something noble in itself, in that it has been kindled by the false theories mentioned above, which proceeded chiefly from Rousseau, and mainly by the attempt to realize them. But Herr von Haller, in order to save himself, has thrown himself into an opposite which is a complete lack of thoughts, and of which, therefore, there can be no question of substance; — namely, into the bitterest hatred of all laws, of legislation, of all right formally and lawfully determined. The hatred of law, of lawfully determined right, is the shibboleth by which fanaticism, feeble-mindedness and the hypocrisy of good intentions reveal themselves and infallibly make known what they are, whatever clothes they may otherwise put on. — An originality like Haller's is always a remarkable phenomenon, and for those of my readers who do not yet know the book, I will cite a few things as a sample. After Herr von H. (page 342 ff., vol. 1) has set up his main principle, "that, namely, just as in the inanimate world the greater displaces the smaller, the mighty the weak, and so on, so among the animals, and then among human beings, the same law recurs in nobler shapes (often, no doubt, in ignoble ones too?)," and "that this is therefore the eternal, unalterable order of God, that the mightier rules, must rule, and will always rule;" — one sees already from this, and equally from what follows, in what sense might is meant here: not the might of the just and ethical, but contingent natural force; — he now supports this further, and among other grounds with this too (p. 365 f.): that nature has ordered it with admirable wisdom in such a way that precisely the feeling of one's own superiority irresistibly ennobles the character and favors the development of just those virtues that are most necessary for subordinates. He asks, with much scholastic rhetorical elaboration, whether in the realm of the sciences it is the strong or the weak who misuse authority and trust more for low, selfish ends and to the ruin of credulous people; whether among jurists it is the masters of the science who are the pettifoggers and quibblers who deceive the hope of trusting clients, who make white black and black white, who misuse the laws as a vehicle of injustice, lead those who need their protection toward the beggar's staff, and like hungry vultures tear the innocent lamb to pieces," and so on. Here Herr von H. forgets that he is bringing in such rhetoric precisely in support of the proposition that the rule of the mightier is the eternal order of God, the order according to which the vulture tears the innocent lamb to pieces, so that those who are mightier through knowledge of the law do quite right to plunder the trusting people who need their protection, as the weak. But it would be asking too much that two thoughts should be brought together where not even one is to be found. — That Herr von Haller is an enemy of law codes goes without saying; civil laws are, according to him, in general partly "unnecessary, since they are self-evident from the natural law," and much trouble would have been spared, since states have existed, that has been spent on legislation and law codes, and that is still spent on them and on the study of lawful right, if people had always rested content with the profound thought that all this is self-evident, — "and partly the laws are really not given to private persons, but as instructions for the lower judges, to make known to them the will of the lord of the court. Jurisdiction is anyway (vol. 1, p. 297; part 1, p. 254; and everywhere) not a duty of the state but a benefit, namely a helping hand from the mightier, and merely supplementary; among the means for securing right it is not the most perfect, but rather unsafe and uncertain, the means which our modern jurists alone leave us, robbing us of the three other means, precisely those that lead most quickly and surely to the goal, and which, besides that one, kindly nature has given to man for the security of his rightful freedom" — and these three are (what does one suppose?) 1) one's own observance and inculcation of the natural law, 2) resistance to injustice, 3) flight where no more help is to be found." (How unkind jurists are, compared with kindly nature!) "But the natural divine law that (vol. 1, p. 292) all-bountiful nature has given to each is: honor in each your equal (according to the author's principle it ought to read: honor not your equal, but him who is the mightier), offend no one who does not offend you; demand nothing that he does not owe you, (but what does he owe?) indeed still more: love your neighbor and be of use to him where you can." — The implanting of this law is supposed to be what makes legislation and constitutions superfluous. It would be remarkable to see how Herr von H. makes it comprehensible to himself that, despite this implanting, legislations and constitutions have nevertheless come into the world! — In vol. III, p. 362 f., the author comes to the "so-called national freedoms" — that is, the laws of right and constitution of nations; every lawfully determined right was called in this great sense a freedom; — he says of these laws, among other things, "that their content is usually very insignificant, even though in books great value may be set on such documentary freedoms." When one then sees that the national freedoms of the German imperial estates, of the English nation — Magna Carta, "which, however, is little read and, because of its antiquated expressions, still less understood," the Bill of Rights, and so on — of the Hungarian nation, and so on, are what the author speaks of, one is amazed to learn that these possessions, otherwise held to be so important, are something insignificant, and that among these nations value is placed on their laws, which have concurred in every piece of clothing the individuals wear, in every piece of bread they eat, and every day and hour concur in everything, merely in books. — Against the Prussian General Code (to cite this as well), Herr von H. is especially ill-disposed (vol. 1, p. 185 ff.), because the unphilosophical errors (at least not yet the Kantian philosophy, against which Herr von Haller is most embittered) have proved their incredible influence in it, among other things chiefly because in it there is talk of the state, of state property, of the end of the state, of the head of the state, of the duties of the head, of state officials, and so on. Worst of all to Herr von H. is "the right to impose taxes on the private property of persons, their trade, products or consumption, to meet the needs of the state; — because thereby, since the property of the state is qualified not as the private property of the prince but as state property, even the king himself, and thus the Prussian citizens too have nothing of their own any more, neither their bodies nor their goods, and all subjects are legally serfs, for — they may not withdraw from the service of the state." Amid all this incredible crudity one might find most comical the emotion with which Herr von Haller describes the unspeakable pleasure over his discoveries (vol. 1, Preface) — "a joy such as only the friend of truth can feel when, after honest inquiry, he obtains the certainty that he has as it were (yes indeed, as it were!) hit upon the pronouncement of nature, the word of God itself" (the word of God distinguishes its revelations very expressly from the pronouncements of nature and of the natural man) — "how from sheer admiration he could have sunk down, a stream of joyful tears welled from his eyes, and living religiosity arose in him from that moment." — Herr von H., out of religiosity, ought rather to have wept over it as God's severest judgment, for it is the severest thing that can befall a human being — to have strayed so far from thinking and rationality, from reverence for the laws and from the knowledge of how infinitely important and divine it is that the duties of the state and the rights of citizens, like the rights of the state and the duties of citizens, are determined by law — that the absurd is substituted for him as the word of God.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
258 The state is the actual reality of the substantial will, which it has in the particular self-consciousness once that has been raised to its universality. So the state is what is rational in and for itself. This substantial unity is an absolute, unmoved end in itself. In it freedom comes into its highest right, just as this final end has the highest right against individuals, whose highest duty is to be members of the state.
Suppose the state is confused with civil society, and its vocation is set in the security and protection of property and personal freedom. Then the interest of individuals as such is the final purpose for which they are united. It follows just as much that being a member of the state is something optional. — But the state has a quite different relation to the individual. Since it is objective spirit, the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life only as a member of it. The union as such is itself the true content and purpose. The vocation of individuals is to lead a universal life. Their further particular satisfaction, activity, and way of acting have this substantial and universally valid thing as their starting point and their result. — Seen in the abstract, rationality consists in the unity, in which the two penetrate each other, of universality and individuality. Here, concretely, in terms of content, it consists in the unity of objective freedom, that is, the universal substantial will, and subjective freedom, as the individual's knowing and his will that seeks particular purposes. And so, in terms of form, it consists in acting that is determined by thought, that is, by universal laws and principles. — This Idea is the eternal and necessary being of spirit, in and for itself. — Now what is or was the historical origin of the state in general, or rather of any particular state, with its rights and provisions? Did it first arise from patriarchal relations, from fear or trust, from the corporation, and so on? And how did that on which such rights rest come to be grasped and fixed in consciousness, as divine or positive right, or contract, custom, and so forth? None of this concerns the Idea of the state itself. In regard to scientific knowledge, which is the only matter discussed here, it is a historical matter, as an appearance. In regard to the authority of an actual state, to the extent that it enters into giving reasons, these are taken from the forms of the law that is valid in it. — Philosophical consideration deals only with the inner side of all this, the thought concept. In the search for this concept, Rousseau had the merit of setting up a principle for the state that is thought not only in its form (as the social drive or divine authority are) but also in its content. It is indeed thinking itself. That principle is the will. But Rousseau grasped the will only in the determinate form of the individual will (as Fichte did later). And he grasped the general will not as what is rational in and for itself in the will, but only as what is held in common, which comes out of this individual will as conscious. So the union of individuals in the state becomes a contract. A contract has their arbitrary choice, their opinion, and their freely given, express consent as its basis. The further consequences follow, merely of the understanding, which destroy the divine that is in and for itself, and its absolute authority and majesty. When these abstractions came to power, they therefore produced, on the one hand, the first tremendous spectacle since we have known of the human race. They set about overthrowing everything existing and given in the constitution of a great actual state, starting again entirely from the beginning and from thought, and wanting to give it only the supposedly rational as its basis. On the other hand, because they are only abstractions without Idea, they turned the attempt into the most terrible and glaring event. — Against the principle of the individual will, we should recall the basic concept that the objective will is what is rational in itself, in its concept, whether or not individuals recognize it and want it by their liking. — The opposite of this, the subjectivity of freedom, knowing and willing, is held alone in that principle. It contains only the one moment, and therefore a one-sided moment, of the Idea of the rational will. The will is rational only because it is in itself just as much as it is for itself. — The other opposite of the thought that the state is to be grasped in knowledge as something rational in itself is this: taking the outwardness of appearance, the chance of need, of the need for protection, of strength, of wealth, and so on, not as moments of historical development but for the substance of the state. Here too it is the individuality of individuals that makes up the principle of knowing. But it is not even the thought of this individuality. On the contrary, it is the empirical individualities with their chance qualities, strength and weakness, wealth and poverty, and so on. Such a notion, of overlooking what is infinite and rational in and for itself in the state, and of banishing thought from the grasp of its inner nature, has surely never appeared so unmixed as in Herr von Haller's Restoration of Political Science. I say unmixed. For in all attempts to grasp the essence of the state, however one-sided or superficial the principles may be, this very intention to comprehend the state brings thoughts and general determinations with it. Here, however, there is a conscious renunciation of the rational content that the state is, and of the form of thought. And a passionate rage is stormed against both. This Restoration perhaps owes part of the wide effect of its principles, which Herr von Haller asserts, to the fact that he knew how to rid himself of all thoughts in his presentation, and so how to keep the whole thoughtless and of a piece. For in this way there is no confusion or disturbance, which weakens the impression of a presentation in which a prompting toward the substantial is mixed in among the chance, and a reminder of the universal and rational among the merely empirical and external, so that in the sphere of the poor and empty one is reminded of the higher infinite. — This presentation is therefore also consistent. For when the sphere of chance is taken, instead of the substantial, as the essence of the state, then with such a content consistency lies precisely in the complete inconsistency of a thoughtlessness. It lets itself run on without looking back, and feels just as much at home in the opposite of what it has just approved.
The book named is of an original kind because of the character described. The author's indignation could be something noble in itself, since it was kindled by the false theories mentioned above, which came mainly from Rousseau, and chiefly by the attempt to put them into practice. But Herr von Haller, to save himself, threw himself into an opposite, which is a complete lack of thought, and about which, therefore, there can be no question of content. That opposite is the bitterest hatred of all laws, legislation, and all right that is formally and lawfully determined. Hatred of the law, of lawfully determined right, is the shibboleth by which fanaticism, feeble-mindedness, and the hypocrisy of good intentions reveal themselves and unfailingly make known what they are, whatever clothes they may put on. — An originality like Haller's is always a remarkable appearance. For those of my readers who do not yet know the book, I will quote some passages as a sample. First Herr von H. (vol. 1, p. 342 ff.) sets out his main principle: "that just as in the inanimate world the greater drives out the smaller, the mighty the weak, and so on, so too among the animals, and then among human beings, the same law returns, in nobler forms (often surely in ignoble ones too?)." And "that it is therefore the eternal, unchangeable order of God that the mightier rules, must rule, and always will rule." — One already sees from this, and equally from what follows, in what sense might is meant here. It is not the might of what is just and ethical, but the chance violence of nature. — He then supports this further, and among other grounds with this (p. 365 f.): that nature has arranged things with admirable wisdom so that precisely the feeling of one's own superiority irresistibly ennobles the character and favors the development of exactly those virtues that are most necessary to subordinates. He asks, with much school rhetoric, "whether in the realm of the sciences it is the strong or the weak who misuse authority and trust more for low, selfish purposes and for the ruin of believing people. And whether among jurists the masters of the science are the petty lawyers and pettifoggers who cheat the hopes of trusting clients, who make white black and black white, who misuse the laws as a vehicle of injustice, who lead those who need protection toward beggary and tear apart the innocent lamb like hungry vultures," and so on. Here Herr von H. forgets that he cites such rhetoric precisely in support of the proposition that the rule of the mightier is the eternal order of God, the order by which the vulture tears apart the innocent lamb. So those who are mightier through their knowledge of the laws are entirely right to plunder the trusting people who need protection, as the weak. But it would be asking too much that two thoughts be brought together where not even one is found. — That Herr von H. is an enemy of law codes goes without saying. According to him, civil laws are in general, on the one hand, "unnecessary, since they are understood of themselves from the natural law." Since states have existed, much effort would have been saved, effort spent on legislating and on law codes, and still spent on them and on the study of lawful right, if people had always rested content with the thorough thought that all of this is understood of itself. — "On the other hand, laws are not really given to private persons, but as instructions for the lower judges, to make known to them the will of the lord of the court. In any case jurisdiction (vol. 1, p. 297; part 1, p. 254; and everywhere) is not a duty of the state but a favor, namely help given by the mightier, and merely supplementary. Among the means of securing right it is not the most perfect. It is rather unsure and uncertain. It is the only means that our modern jurists leave us, and they rob us of the three other means, precisely those that lead to the goal most quickly and surely, and that the kindly nature has given man, besides that one, for securing his lawful freedom." And these three are (what do you suppose?): "1) one's own observance and inculcation of the natural law, 2) resistance to injustice, 3) flight where no help is to be found any more." (How unkind jurists are, compared with kindly nature!) "But the natural divine law, which (vol. 1, p. 292) all-good nature has given to everyone, is: Honor everyone who is your equal (on the author's principle it would have to read: honor not your equal, but the one who is mightier), offend no one who does not offend you; demand nothing that he does not owe you (but what does he owe?), indeed more: love your neighbor and benefit him where you can." — The implanting of this law is supposed to be what makes legislation and constitutions superfluous. It would be remarkable to see how Herr von H. makes it comprehensible to himself that, despite this implanting, legislations and constitutions have come into the world! — In vol. 3, p. 362 ff., the author comes to the "so-called national freedoms," that is, the laws of right and of constitution of the nations. In this broad sense every lawfully determined right was called a freedom. Of these laws he says, among other things, "that their content is usually very insignificant, even though in books great value may be placed on such documented freedoms." Then one sees that the national freedoms the author speaks of are those of the German imperial estates, of the English nation (the Magna Carta, "which is little read and, because of its antiquated expressions, even less understood," the bill of rights, and so on), of the Hungarian nation, and so on. One is surprised to learn that these possessions, otherwise held to be so important, are insignificant. And one is surprised to learn that these nations place value on their laws only in books, though those laws have contributed to every piece of clothing the individuals wear and every piece of bread they eat, and contribute daily and hourly in everything. — Herr von H. also speaks especially ill of the general Prussian law code, to mention this too (vol. 1, p. 185 ff.). The reason is that unphilosophical errors (not yet, at least, Kantian philosophy, against which Herr von Haller is most bitter) have shown their incredible influence in it. The main reason, among others, is that it speaks of the state, the property of the state, the purpose of the state, the head of the state, the head's duties, state officials, and so on. Worst of all to Herr von H. is "the right to tax people's private property, their trade, products, or consumption, to meet the needs of the state. For the king himself, since the property of the state is classed not as the prince's private property but as property of the state, thus also the Prussian citizens have nothing of their own any more, neither their body nor their goods, and all subjects are serfs by law, for — they may not withdraw from the service of the state."
Amid all this incredible crudity, one might find the most comical thing to be the emotion with which Herr von Haller describes the inexpressible pleasure he takes in his discoveries (vol. 1, preface). It is "a joy such as only the friend of truth can feel, when after honest research he gains the certainty that he has, as it were (yes, indeed, as it were!), hit upon the pronouncement of nature, the word of God himself" (the word of God, rather, distinguishes its revelations very expressly from the pronouncements of nature and of natural man). "He felt he could have sunk down in sheer admiration, a stream of joyful tears welled from his eyes, and from that, living religiousness arose in him." — Out of religiousness, Herr von H. should rather have wept over it as God's hardest punishment. For it is the hardest thing that can happen to a human being, to have strayed so far from thinking and rationality, from reverence for the laws, and from the knowledge of how infinitely important and divine it is that the duties of the state and the rights of citizens, like the rights of the state and the duties of citizens, are determined by law, that the absurd slips itself in for him as the word of God.
About this section
Section 258 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 260 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.