Section 214
Original German
214 Außer der Anwendung auf das Besondere schließt aber das Gesetztseyn des Rechts die Anwendbarkeit auf den einzelnen Fall in sich. Damit tritt es in die Sphäre des durch den Begriff unbestimmten, Quantitativen, (des Quantitativen für sich oder als Bestimmung des Werths bei Tausch eines Qualitativen gegen eines andern Qualitativen.) Die Begriffsbestimmtheit giebt nur eine allgemeine Grenze, innerhalb deren noch ein Hin- und Hergehen stattfindet. Dieses muß aber zum Behuf der Verwirklichung abgebrochen werden, womit eine innerhalb jener Grenze zufällige und willkührliche Entscheidung eintritt.
In dieser Zuspitzung des Allgemeinen nicht nur zum Besondern, sondern zur Vereinzelung, d. i. zur unmittelbaren Anwendung, ist es vornemlich, wo das Reinpositive der Gesetze liegt. Es läßt sich nicht vernünftig bestimmen, noch durch die Anwendung einer aus dem Begriffe herkommenden Bestimmtheit entscheiden, ob für ein Vergehen eine Leibesstrafe von vierzig Streichen oder von vierzig weniger eins, noch ob eine Geldstrafe von fünf Thalern oder aber von vier Thaler und drey und zwanzig u. s. f. Groschen, noch ob eine Gefängnißstrafe von einem Jahre oder von dreyhundert und vier und sechszig u. s. f. oder von einem Jahre und einem, zwei oder drey Tagen, das Gerechte sey. Und doch ist schon Ein Streich zuviel, Ein Thaler oder Ein Groschen, Eine Woche, Ein Tag Gefängniß zuviel oder zu wenig, eine Ungerechtigkeit. — Die Vernunft ist es selbst, welche anerkennt, daß die Zufälligkeit, der Widerspruch und Schein ihre, aber beschränkte, Sphäre und Recht hat, und sich nicht bemüht, dergleichen Widersprüche ins Gleiche und Gerechte zu bringen; hier ist allein noch das Interesse der Verwirklichung, das Interesse, daß überhaupt bestimmt und entschieden sey, es sey auf welche Weise es (innerhalb einer Grenze) wolle, vorhanden. Dieses Entscheiden gehört der formellen Gewißheit seiner selbst, der abstracten Subjectivität an, welche sich ganz nur daran halten mag, daß sie, — innerhalb jener Grenze, nur abbreche und festsetze, damit festgesetzt sey, — oder auch an solche Bestimmungsgründe, wie eine runde Zahl ist, oder als die Zahl Vierzig weniger Eins enthalten mag. — Daß das Gesetz etwa nicht diese letzte Bestimmtheit, welche die Wirklichkeit erfordert, festsetzt, sondern sie dem Richter zu entscheiden überläßt, und ihn nur durch ein Minimum und Maximum beschränkt, thut nichts zur Sache, denn diß Minimum und Maximum ist jedes selbst eine solche runde Zahl, und hebt es nicht auf, daß von dem Richter alsdann eine solche endliche, rein positive Bestimmung gefaßt werde, sondern gesteht es demselben, wie nothwendig, zu.
Musean translation
Machine-assisted Musean translation made directly from Hegel's German in the Berlin Nicolai first edition, dated 1821. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360, including the author's remarks and notes; no later Gans additions.
214 Beyond the application to the particular, however, the being posited of right includes within itself applicability to the single case. Therewith it enters the sphere of the quantitative, which is undetermined by the concept (of the quantitative for itself, or as determination of value in the exchange of one qualitative thing for another qualitative thing). The determinateness of the concept gives only a universal limit, within which a going back and forth still takes place. But this must be broken off for the sake of realization, whereby a decision that is contingent and arbitrary within that limit enters in.
It is in this sharpening of the universal—not merely to the particular, but to singularization, that is, to immediate application—that the purely positive element of laws chiefly lies. It cannot be determined rationally, nor decided by the application of a determinateness derived from the concept, whether for an offense a corporal punishment of forty strokes or of forty less one is the just one; nor whether a fine of five thalers or of four thalers and three and twenty groschen, and so forth, is the just one; nor whether a prison sentence of one year, or of three hundred and sixty-four days, and so forth, or of one year and one, two, or three days, is the just one. And yet one stroke too many, one thaler or one groschen, one week, one day of imprisonment too much or too little, is already an injustice.—It is reason itself which recognizes that contingency, contradiction, and semblance have their sphere and right, but a limited one, and does not exert itself to bring such contradictions into equality and justice; here there remains present only the interest of realization, the interest that a determination and decision be made at all, in whatever manner (within a limit) it be made. This deciding belongs to the formal certainty of itself, to abstract subjectivity, which may attach itself entirely to this, that—within that limit—it merely breaks off and fixes, so that something be fixed—or also to such grounds of determination as a round number is, or as the number forty less one may contain.—That the law perhaps does not itself fix this final determinateness, which actuality requires, but leaves it to the judge to decide, and limits him only by a minimum and a maximum, makes no difference to the matter; for this minimum and maximum is itself each such a round number, and does not remove the fact that the judge must then grasp such a finite, purely positive determination, but concedes it to him, as is necessary.
Plain English translation
Independent machine-assisted Plain English translation made directly from the German first-edition source, not from the Musean edition or an existing English translation. Complete preface, introduction and sections 1–360 with the author's remarks and notes.
214 Besides application to the particular, right's being posited includes its applicability to the individual case. In this way it enters the sphere of quantity, which the concept leaves undetermined. This can be quantity on its own, or quantity as the determination of value when one qualitative thing is exchanged for another. Determination by the concept supplies only a general limit, within which there is still room to move back and forth. But to make it real, this movement must be cut off. A decision is therefore made within that limit that is contingent and arbitrary.
The purely positive element of laws lies chiefly in this bringing to a point of the universal, not just to the particular, but to the individual instance—that is, to immediate application. Reason cannot determine, nor can a determination derived from the concept decide, whether the just corporal punishment for an offense is forty strokes or forty minus one. It cannot decide whether a fine should be five thalers or four thalers and twenty-three groschen and so on, or whether a prison sentence should be a year, or three hundred and sixty-four days and so on, or a year and one, two, or three days. Yet one stroke too many, one thaler or one groschen, one week or one day in prison too many or too few, is already an injustice. Reason itself recognizes that contingency, contradiction, and appearance have their own, but limited, sphere and right. It does not try to bring contradictions of this kind into exact equality and justice. Here only the interest in realization remains: the interest that something should be determined and decided at all, in whatever way, within a limit. This decision belongs to formal certainty of oneself, to abstract subjectivity. It may simply hold to the fact that it cuts off and fixes a point within that limit, so that a determination is made. Or it may hold to grounds such as a round number, or grounds that the number forty minus one may contain. Nothing changes if the law does not fix this final determinacy that actual reality requires, but leaves the decision to the judge and restricts him only by a minimum and maximum. Each minimum and maximum is itself just such a round number. They do not remove the need for the judge to make a finite, purely positive determination of this kind. Instead, they necessarily allow him to do so.
About this section
Section 214 is part of Elements of the Philosophy of Right by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This page sets the German original beside 2 direct-source translations, so any line can be checked against the source. It is section 216 of 362 in the work, which is kept in the European tradition.
Open the work page for the full contents, every edition, and the download links, or go back to Explore to browse other complete works in the European tradition. The reader keeps your place when you are signed in and lets you compare the original with each translation, one edition at a time.